Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between SR Construction (SRC), a construction company, and RE Palm Springs II, L.L.C. (RPS), a company formed to take title to a hotel property. SRC was hired to build a hotel in California but was terminated before completion, leaving it with a demand for $14 million in unpaid work. After several failed attempts to recover its dues, SRC held onto certain personal property left over from the hotel project. The bankruptcy court ordered SRC to turn over the personal property, which SRC appealed.The lower courts had a series of interactions with this case. The bankruptcy court initially ordered SRC to turn over the personal property. SRC appealed this decision, challenging the bankruptcy court's power to order the turnover and the validity of the most recent hotel owner's claim to the personal property. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the Sale Order. It also affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Hall had obtained title to the Personal Property and had not waived its right to the Personal Property by taking it "as is."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court's order was part of its undisputed power to order the sale of a bankruptcy debtor's assets. It also rejected SRC's arguments about ownership of the assets in this case. The court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Turnover Order because that order interpreted and enforced the Sale Order. It also concluded that because the Turnover Order is integral to and inseparable from RPS's bankruptcy, it is a core matter. Therefore, issuing the Turnover Order was entirely within the bankruptcy court's authority. The court also affirmed the conclusion that title to the Personal Property passed from SRC to Palm Springs, then to RPS, and finally to Hall. View "SR Construction v. RE Palm Springs II" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by homeowners in the Falcon Ridge subdivision in Billings, Montana, against Buscher Construction and Development, Inc., and other related entities and individuals (collectively referred to as the "Buschers"). The homeowners alleged that the Buschers negligently designed and developed the subdivisions, failed to construct homes to mitigate against the possibility of differential settlement on hydro-collapsible soils, and failed to disclose material adverse facts known to them as the original owners of all the lots within the subdivision.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, certified the class action. The Buschers appealed this decision, arguing that the proposed class did not satisfy the prerequisites for class certification under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and that the court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The court also found that the class action was superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the homeowners' claims were not dependent upon individual conduct but on the Buschers' alleged uniform negligence. The court also noted that the lower court has the discretion to revisit certification if class claims no longer predominate as the case proceeds. View "Busher v. Cook" on Justia Law

The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of local property owners, sued to halt the construction, arguing it would violate local building height and bulk restrictions. The Regents countered that as a state entity, they were immune from local building and zoning regulations when engaging in governmental activities, such as constructing university buildings. The trial court disagreed, ruling that the question of whether the construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity could not be resolved at this stage.The trial court concluded that the Regents' immunity depended on whether the proposed construction was a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The court further concluded that the exemption only applies when a project is solely for educational purposes. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court held that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. Therefore, the project falls within the Regents’ broad public purpose, and the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue. The court concluded that the demurrer should have been sustained and issued the writ of mandate. The court also ordered modifications to the published opinion filed on June 13, 2024, but there was no change in the judgment. View "Regents of the University of Calif. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the conditional rezoning of a property in Mayfield Township, Michigan. The property, owned by A2B Properties, LLC, had been the site of the Lapeer International Dragway since 1968. In 2018, A2B purchased the dragway, expanded the facilities, and increased its hours of operation. In 2021, A2B filed a conditional-rezoning agreement with the township, seeking to have the property rezoned from Residential Agricultural District (R-1) to General Commercial District (C-2), with limitations on when the dragway could operate. The township board approved the conditional-rezoning agreement and rezoned the property as requested. However, Ronald and Susan Jostock, who live near the dragway, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief that the conditional rezoning was erroneous and injunctive relief to enjoin the conditional rezoning.In the lower courts, the Lapeer Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs, noting that the rezoning was conditioned on A2B operating the dragway in a specified manner. However, because operation of a dragway is not a permitted use in the C-2 district, A2B had erroneously bound itself to perform conditions it could not lawfully perform in that district. On that basis, the trial court held that the conditional rezoning was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, reasoning that the conditional-rezoning agreement was void because use as a dragway was not an approved use for that area under the township’s zoning ordinance.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a conditional rezoning is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if the proposed use is not a permitted use—either by right or after special approval—within the proposed zoning district. The court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning district. View "Jostock v. Mayfield Township" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Agustin Vinas, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 for attempting to hire a hitman to murder a contractor and his business partner. Vinas, a subcontractor, claimed that the contractor owed him $8,500 for construction work and had threatened to harm him and his family when he tried to collect the debt. Vinas was arrested after a series of meetings with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a hitman. He pleaded guilty to using facilities of interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire, and the government agreed to dismiss the second count related to interstate travel in the commission of murder-for-hire.The District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced Vinas to time served, which amounted to nearly two years in pretrial detention. The government had recommended a sentence of ten years' imprisonment, arguing that a substantial sentence was necessary for specific and general deterrence. However, the defense argued for a sentence of time served, citing Vinas's attempts to peacefully collect the debt, the threats he received from the contractor, his mental health issues, and his efforts towards rehabilitation while in pretrial custody.The government appealed the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable given the seriousness of the crime. The government also contended that the District Court had categorically refused to consider general deterrence and had created a disparity with defendants in other cases who were given longer sentences for the same statutory violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that the sentence was within the expansive universe of reasonable sentences and that the District Court had adequately considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court of Appeals also found that the government had not preserved its arguments regarding general deterrence and sentencing disparity, and that these arguments did not meet the plain error standard. View "United States v. Vinas" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two neighboring landowners, David W. Axelrod, as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust, and Reid Limited Partnership (RLP) and Michael Reid, an individual. The dispute arose from a settlement agreement concerning the real property and easement rights of the two parties. Axelrod purchased a property in Teton County in 2003, which was not accessible by road. Reid, who owned and operated an organic dairy farm nearby, preferred Axelrod to build onto an existing dirt road on Reid's property rather than using two easements provided in Axelrod's deed. In 2004, Axelrod built onto the existing dirt road, referred to as the "RLP Easement." However, the relationship between Axelrod and Reid began to sour in 2011, leading to a series of disputes and legal actions.The district court initially concluded that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. The parties then executed a settlement agreement and stipulated to dismiss the suit. However, disagreements over the implementation of the settlement agreement led to further litigation. The district court granted Axelrod's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Reid had failed to properly support any assertion of fact or address the assertions of fact in Axelrod's motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Reid individually and affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing RLP's counterclaims for conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court also affirmed the judgment of the district court on Axelrod's breach of contract claim and the judgment of the district court refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to add RFLP as a party. However, the court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing RLP's trespass claim. The court also vacated the attorney fee award as against RLP and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration award in a real estate transaction. The plaintiffs, Miguel and Lizette Valencia, purchased a home from the defendants, Armando Mendoza, Coastal Holdings, LLC, and Class A Realty, Inc. After discovering undisclosed defects in the home, the Valencias initiated an arbitration proceeding against the defendants. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Valencias, awarding them damages for repairs, loss of use, statutory penalties, and inspection fees, as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees.The defendants appealed the arbitration award to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the court erred in denying their petition to vacate the arbitration award and in confirming the Valencias' petition to confirm the award. The defendants also contended that the arbitrator committed legal error by excluding key evidence from the arbitration hearing. The trial court affirmed the arbitration award, finding that the defendants' petition to vacate the award was untimely and that they failed to show that the arbitrator erred in its rulings excluding evidence.On appeal to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in not considering the evidence they submitted with their late-filed petition to vacate the arbitration award. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of error in the arbitration award. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the award without considering the defendants' untimely evidence. View "Valencia v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Martin Tait, Jane Tait, and Bry-Mart, LLC (collectively, the Taits) who sued Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth) for breach of a title insurance policy. The Taits alleged that Commonwealth failed to pay the full amount by which their property’s value was diminished due to an undisclosed easement. The Taits had purchased a residential property in Danville for $1.25 million and had plans to subdivide the property into two lots. However, they discovered a separate 1988 maintenance easement that they believed would impact the marketability and value of the property and interfere with its potential development.The trial court granted Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required Commonwealth to compensate the Taits only for the value of their actual use of the property as a vacant residential lot suitable for only one home rather than its highest and best use as a subdividable lot. The court reasoned that the legal standard for title insurance losses did not permit consideration of a property’s highest and best use, only its actual use as vacant residential land.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four disagreed with the trial court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the Taits’ policy entitles them to reimbursement for the diminution in value of their property based on its highest and best use. The court found that the Taits’ evidence of the likelihood of subdivision and the value of a subdividable lot created a triable issue of fact regarding the amount of the Taits’ loss under the policy, thereby precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Tait v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied to the City of Oakland's Planning Department for a zoning clearance to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The proposed facility was described as a compartmentalized commercial kitchen for take-out services only, measuring roughly 14,000 square feet. The facility is located in a Housing and Business Mix-1 Commercial Zone (HBX-1 zone), which permits certain industrial activities classified as "Light Manufacturing." The Planning Department issued CloudKitchens a zoning clearance and later a building permit allowing renovations.In April 2021, the San Pablo Avenue Golden Gate Improvement Association, Inc., and Oakland Neighborhoods For Equity (Neighbors) learned of CloudKitchens's plans. They sent a letter to the City Administrator requesting that the City reconsider its approval of CloudKitchens as qualifying for HBX-1 classification. The City's Zoning Manager responded, maintaining that the decision was proper. In July, Neighbors filed a formal complaint requesting the Planning Department initiate a revocation review process. They alleged that CloudKitchens will become a nuisance due to increased traffic, air pollution, and noise, and that the commercialized kitchen is essentially a Fast-Food Restaurant not permitted in an HBX-1 zone. The Planning Department denied the request.Neighbors then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed, holding that chapter 17.152 “does not create a legal basis to challenge a prior zoning determination made by the City.” Neighbors appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 does not provide a legal basis to challenge the Planning Department’s interpretations and determinations of the zoning regulations, including use classifications and zoning clearances. The court also noted that the Enforcement Regulations still permit Neighbors to seek a revocation hearing for any nonconforming uses (or nuisances) if they arise. However, the Enforcement Regulations do not allow members of the public to challenge use classifications or zoning determinations outside the procedures prescribed in chapter 17.132. View "San Pablo Ave. Golden Gate Improvement Assn. v. City Council of Oakland" on Justia Law