Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over oil and gas interests between Spottie, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and several other Nevada corporations and a limited liability company. Spottie alleged that the defendants had wrongfully claimed title to these interests, which were once owned by Edward Davis, who had formed Spottie as a holding company. The defendants countered that they had entered into an agreement with Davis to acquire these interests, and that Davis and Spottie had transferred the disputed interests to one of the defendants via an assignment in 2016.The district court dismissed several of Spottie's claims, leaving only a quiet title claim and a claim for unjust enrichment. After a three-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the assignment from Davis and Spottie to one of the defendants was valid. The court also found that Spottie had erroneously received revenue from the disputed interests and awarded damages to the defendants.Spottie appealed the decision, arguing that the district court had erred in its ownership determination, its rejection of Spottie's laches defense, its binding of a non-party to the judgment, and its award of attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part, concluding that the district court did not err in its ownership determination and its award of attorney fees. However, it reversed in part, finding that the court had erred in awarding costs for non-legal expenses. The case was remanded for the court to recalculate its cost award and to consider the defendants' request for additional attorney fees and legal costs. View "SPOTTIE v. BAIUL-FARINA" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a construction dispute where several homeowners in the San Marcial neighborhood sued Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc., for negligence and gross negligence. The homeowners alleged that the company's misuse of heavy equipment and faulty construction techniques caused damage to their homes during the construction of a drainage pipeline. They sought actual damages to restore their properties and exemplary damages based on gross negligence.The trial court found Renda Contracting negligent and grossly negligent. However, the jury was not unanimous in deciding the amount of exemplary damages, with ten out of twelve jurors agreeing. Consequently, the trial court omitted exemplary damages from the judgment. The homeowners appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that unanimity as to exemplary damages could be implied despite a divided verdict.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The court held that under Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a court may not imply a unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and "may not be shifted." The court concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden to obtain the findings necessary to impose exemplary damages, including that the jury is unanimous as to any amount of exemplary damages awarded. It is the plaintiff who must challenge a divided verdict as infirm or in need of clarification. View "OSCAR RENDA CONTRACTING, INC. v. BRUCE" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lori Randolph, who was injured after falling down stairs in a rental property owned by Aidan, LLC. Randolph sued Aidan, alleging negligence in failing to provide safe stairs. Aidan, in turn, filed a third-party claim against Sioux City, asserting that a city employee had inspected the property and declared it compliant with the municipal code. Aidan claimed that the city was negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising the unqualified inspector, and thus, should indemnify Aidan for any damages owed to Randolph. Sioux City moved to dismiss Aidan’s claim, arguing it was immune under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j).The district court denied Sioux City's motion to dismiss Aidan's claim. Sioux City and Randolph requested interlocutory review, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Iowa was tasked with reviewing the denial of Sioux City's motion for the correction of errors at law.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Sioux City was immune from Aidan's claim under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j). The court reasoned that Aidan's claim for negligent hiring was "based upon" the negligence of Sioux City's employee in inspecting the stairs. Therefore, the claim fell within the scope of the immunity provided by section 670.4(1)(j). The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the dismissal of Aidan's claim against Sioux City. View "Randolph v. Aidan, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Pawtucket petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to review a judgment in favor of the Rhode Island Department of Revenue (DOR) and other defendants. The case revolved around two properties owned by The Memorial Hospital, which were deemed ineligible for state aid under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) Act for fiscal years 2021 and 2022. The City argued that the hearing justice erred in upholding the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act, which stated that the properties were not eligible for PILOT funds.Previously, the Superior Court had ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the DOR's interpretation of the PILOT Act was not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported in the record, or an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the properties were not owned by a licensed hospital and were therefore ineligible for consideration under the PILOT statute. The City appealed this decision, arguing that the properties should be eligible for PILOT funds because they were still being used for medical care and treatment, even though they were not owned and licensed by the same entity.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the PILOT Act's definition of a "nonprofit hospital facility" required that the hospital-owner of the property also be the holder of a state-issued license. Since Memorial Hospital's license was deactivated in 2018, the properties were deemed ineligible for PILOT funds. The court concluded that the City's argument conflating tax-exempt status with PILOT fund eligibility was unpersuasive, and that the DOR's decision to deny the disbursement of PILOT funds for the properties was not erroneous. View "City of Pawtucket v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a contract zone agreement that would have allowed development on a property in Saco, Maine. The property owners, Amarjit Singh Dhillon and Ajinder Kaur, appealed from a lower court's grant of partial summary judgment to Michael Dahlem, who owns neighboring property and challenged the contract zone agreement. Dahlem cross-appealed from the court's dismissal of his Rule 80B appeal and denial of his motion to reconsider that dismissal, and from the court's denial of summary judgment on two counts in his complaint.The lower court had granted summary judgment to Dahlem on several counts, declaring that the 2017 agreement became null and void in 2019 and thereafter could not be amended, was invalid and unlawful for noncompliance with the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and was inconsistent with Maine’s Mandatory Shoreland Zoning statute and therefore preempted and invalid. The court denied summary judgment to all parties on the count of whether the 2021 agreement was compatible with the City’s comprehensive plan.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects and dismissed Dahlem’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that Dahlem properly challenged the 2021 agreement by asserting claims for declaratory relief, that the 2017 agreement became null and void on November 20, 2019, and could not thereafter be amended, that the 2021 agreement was invalid and unlawful under the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and that the 2021 agreement was preempted by the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning provisions. View "Dahlem v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The case involves Juan Angel Rubalcaba, a homeowner, who filed a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against the Association of Apartment Owners of Makakilo Cliffs. The central issue was whether the mortgage debt of the homeowner to a third-party lender, which was discharged by the third-party lender's subsequent foreclosure, should be considered in determining the plaintiff's damages.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit sought guidance on this issue and forwarded a reserved question to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i. The Supreme Court accepted the question, indicating that it would provide an answer through a related case, Wong v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Harbor Square, which was then pending before the court.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, after deciding the Wong case, provided guidance on how a plaintiff may calculate damages in a lawsuit against a condominium association for wrongful foreclosure. The court then remanded the case back to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Wong decision. The court did not provide a specific ruling on the reserved question but indicated that the lower court should follow the precedent set in the Wong case. View "Rubalcaba v. Association of Apartment Owners of Makakilo Cliffs " on Justia Law

In September 2016, Sanford Sachtleben and Luciann Hruza (the Buyers) purchased a property in Missouri from Perry and Joanie Sullivan (the Sellers). Prior to the sale, the city of New Melle had sued the Sellers over a barn they had built on the property, alleging it violated city zoning ordinances. The Buyers were added as defendants to this lawsuit after they purchased the property. The Buyers demanded coverage from their title insurance company, Alliant National Title Insurance Co. (Alliant), but Alliant refused. The Buyers then sued Alliant, claiming it had breached the title insurance policy by refusing to defend them in the New Melle lawsuit.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, where Alliant moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Alliant's motion, concluding that the unambiguous language of the title insurance policy provided no coverage for the Buyers. The Buyers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the title insurance policy was unambiguous and did not provide coverage for the Buyers. The court noted that the policy provided coverage only if a notice, describing any part of the land, was recorded in the public records setting forth the violation or intention to enforce. Since no such notice was recorded, the court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage. The court also rejected the Buyers' arguments that other provisions of the policy provided coverage, finding that these arguments were precluded by an exclusion in the policy. View "Sachtleben vs. Alliant National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a real estate commission. Andrew Waldo, a broker in charge of a realty company, represented buyers in the purchase of thirteen golf courses from National Golf Management, LLC (NGM). Michael Cousins, another broker, who had previously represented NGM in an earlier transaction, claimed a commission for the golf course deal despite not having a written representation agreement. Cousins, Waldo, and Waldo's agent agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Cousins, awarding him half of the commission earned on the golf course sale.The circuit court initially dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that oral agreements for a commission were unenforceable under South Carolina law. However, the arbitration panel later ruled in favor of Cousins. Waldo petitioned the circuit court to vacate the award, which was referred to the Master-in-Equity. The Master-in-Equity vacated the award, stating that the arbitration panel ignored statutory law regarding real-estate agency. The court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that there was a "barely colorable" ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the award. The court held that the arbitration panel had manifestly disregarded several statutes governing real-estate agency law in awarding Cousins half of the commission. The court noted that the Act, which governs real-estate licensing, requires written agreements for real estate agency and forbids oral or implied ones. The court also rejected Cousins' argument that he was entitled to a commission based on a series of cases that recognized a realtor's right to a commission through an oral or implied contract, as these cases were decided before the Act became law. View "Waldo v. Cousins" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Debra and Sidney Schutter (the Schutters) and the State of Montana Board of Land Commissioners (the Board) over the ownership of a water right, identified as Claim 13169. The Schutters use a groundwater well on their private property to irrigate four parcels of land, one of which is school trust land owned by the State of Montana. The Board objected to the Schutters' claim of exclusive ownership of the water right, asserting that the State holds an ownership interest in the portion of the water right used to irrigate the school trust land.The Montana Water Court granted summary judgment to the Board, adding the State as a co-owner of Claim 13169, but only for the portion of the claim appropriated to irrigate the school trust land. The Schutters appealed this decision, arguing that the Water Court erred in applying the precedent set in a previous case, Pettibone, and that no portion of Claim 13169 is appurtenant to the school trust land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the Water Court's decision. The court held that the portion of Claim 13169 used to irrigate the school trust land is appurtenant to that land and, therefore, the State is a co-owner of that portion of the right. The court also rejected the Schutters' argument that the Water Court erred in applying the Pettibone precedent, stating that the Schutters' reliance on the point of diversion as singularly controlling was misplaced. The court concluded that the Schutters used the school trust land they leased to qualify for and establish the parameters of Claim 13169, and without the ability to claim a beneficial use on the school trust land, the Schutters' claim to a water right would have been different, perhaps smaller. View "Schutter v. Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC, an oil and gas mineral rights investment firm, acquired mineral interests on two sections of real property in Richland County, Montana. The previous owner, Katherine Solis, had been approached multiple times by Kraken Oil and Gas LLC, an energy production company, to secure a lease of the mineral interests or to participate in drilling wells. Solis consistently refused to engage with Kraken. After Phoenix acquired the mineral interests, it expressed a desire to participate in the oil and gas production from the wells being drilled by Kraken. However, Kraken responded that the mineral interests had been deemed “non-consent” due to Solis’s lack of participation, and it was authorized to recover risk penalties.The Board of Oil and Gas Conservation of the State of Montana held a hearing and determined that Kraken had made unsuccessful, good faith attempts to acquire voluntary pooling in the spacing unit, and that Phoenix, as a successor in interest, was bound to Solis’s decision not to participate. The Board therefore determined that the mineral interests owned by Phoenix would be subject to forced pooling and that Kraken could recover risk penalties from Phoenix. Phoenix requested a rehearing from the Board, but that request was denied. Phoenix then filed a Complaint seeking injunctive relief from the Board decision in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court issued an Order granting Kraken and the Board’s motions for summary judgment, and dismissing Phoenix’s Complaint.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Phoenix appealed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Board correctly interpreted the statutory force-pooling requirements, and that its decision to force pool Phoenix’s mineral interests was reasonable. The court also held that Kraken’s letters to Solis constituted written demands that gave Solis the option to either participate or face assessment of risk penalties. The court concluded that risk penalties were imposed, not pursuant to the presumption in § 82-11-202(3), MCA (2021), but under § 82-11-202(2), MCA, which requires an owner pay risk penalties when “after written demand, [the owner] has failed or refused to pay the owner’s share of the costs of development or other operations . . . .” View "Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas" on Justia Law