Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Blaine Simmons, a landowner, and Tom Loertscher and Josh Williams, cattle owners. Simmons owns land in Bonneville County, Idaho, which is part of a herd district established in 1919. The herd district prohibits livestock from running at large within its boundaries. Loertscher owns Hi Willow Ranch Corporation, which has a permit to graze cattle on a portion of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land adjacent to Simmons' property. The BLM land is designated as open range, where livestock may graze and roam freely. Over time, cattle allegedly owned by Williams, grazing on the Loertscher Allotment, have strayed onto Simmons' property. Simmons repeatedly complained to Loertscher and Williams about this and set conditions for them to retrieve their cattle from his land.Simmons filed a small claims action against Loertscher and Williams alleging herd district violations and nuisance. The magistrate judge ruled in favor of Loertscher and Williams, stating that herd district laws do not apply to the Loertscher Allotment, which is on BLM land and designated as open range. The judge also stated that Loertscher and Williams have a common law right to enter Simmons’s Parcel at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to retrieve their cattle. Simmons appealed this decision to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court's interpretation of Idaho Code section 25-2402, which excludes open range from any herd district and reinstates Idaho’s “fence-out” rule with respect to cattle straying from open range, was consistent with the history of herd district law and the effect of the 1963 amendment. The court also affirmed the district court's decision regarding the conditions governing the retrieval of cattle from Simmons’s Parcel. The court found that Simmons did not preserve this issue for appeal before the district court, and the issue was waived before this Court. View "Simmons v. Loertscher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Association (Casa Blanca) and its dispute with the County of Santa Barbara (County) and the California Coastal Commission (Commission). Over 30 years ago, the County approved the development of a 12-lot oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria, managed by Casa Blanca. One of the conditions for approval was the construction of a public beach access walkway. The County accepted the offer to dedicate the walkway in 2011. In 2017, the County and Commission alleged that Casa Blanca had missed the deadline to construct the walkway. Casa Blanca submitted construction plans but was told it needed a coastal development permit from the Commission. The Commission deemed the application incomplete, leading to a series of unsuccessful attempts to complete the application.The trial court found that Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca's. The court found that the offer to dedicate had been timely accepted by the County. As for the second cause of action seeking a determination regarding the deadline for Casa Blanca to construct the walkway, the court found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the County and Commission.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Casa Blanca's action was not ripe because it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court also disagreed with Casa Blanca's argument that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. The court concluded that a party may not evade the exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. View "Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Assn v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves Lusardi Construction Company (Lusardi), a prime contractor, and its subcontractor, Pro Works Contracting Inc. (Pro Works). Pro Works violated certain Labor Code provisions by failing to hire apprentices for a construction project. The Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) cited Pro Works for these violations and ordered Lusardi to pay penalties. Lusardi's administrative appeal was unsuccessful, and it subsequently filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the superior court denied. Lusardi argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that it knew of Pro Works's violations and that the joint and several liability provision applied.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed the DLSE's decision, concluding that Lusardi had knowledge of Pro Works's violations and was liable for the penalties. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the findings relating to the amount of the penalty assessment. The court rejected Lusardi's claim of due process violations, stating that Lusardi was put on notice of the potential for being held jointly and severally liable for Pro Works’s apprentice hiring violations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the superior court did not err in interpreting the statute, which provides two inclusive and alternative ways for imposing liability on a prime contractor for penalties resulting from the subcontractor’s violations. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the penalty imposed. The court concluded that Lusardi was not denied due process when it refused to enforce its subpoena or ask for a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance. View "Lusardi Construction Co. v. Dept. of Industrial Rel." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Honoipu Hideaway, LLC's (Honoipu) appeal of the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) order denying its petition for a declaratory order to change the boundary location between the conservation and agricultural districts on a district boundary map. The appeal was initially filed with the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. However, following a decision in another case, In re Kanahele, it was determined that appeals of LUC declaratory orders should have been filed with the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in the first instance. This led to a question of whether the circuit court had the authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had initially accepted the appeal. However, following the decision in In re Kanahele, it was determined that the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i was the correct court for such appeals. This led to a dispute between Honoipu and the LUC, with Honoipu arguing for the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court, and the LUC arguing for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had both inherent and statutory authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The court reasoned that the power to "do such other acts and take such other steps as may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given to them by law or for the promotion of justice" gave the circuit court the power to correct a jurisdictional mistake that was no party’s or court’s fault. The court also noted that transferring the case would further the judiciary’s policy of permitting litigants to appeal and hear the case on its merits. View "Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over attorney fees awarded under Minnesota Statutes section 117.031(a) in an eminent domain proceeding. The State of Minnesota, through the Department of Transportation (MnDOT), seized a portion of Joseph Hamlin's property under the "quick take" provision of Minnesota eminent domain law. Hamlin was awarded attorney fees after the compensation he received was more than 40% greater than MnDOT's final offer. The attorney fees awarded exceeded the amount Hamlin owed his attorney under a contingent fee agreement.MnDOT appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the term "reasonable" in section 117.031(a) should limit the attorney fee award to the amount owed in the contingent fee agreement. The district court had applied the lodestar method (a method for calculating attorney fees based on the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) and awarded Hamlin $63,228 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that "reasonable attorney fees" in section 117.031(a) are calculated under the lodestar method and are not limited by any existing agreement between the landowner and his attorney.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court reiterated its previous holding in County of Dakota v. Cameron that "reasonable attorney fees" in section 117.031(a) refers to attorney fees calculated by the lodestar method. Therefore, an award of reasonable attorney fees is not capped by a contingent fee agreement. The court concluded that a landowner's fee agreement with their attorney does not limit an award of attorney fees because "reasonable attorney fees" under section 117.031(a) means attorney fees calculated using the lodestar method. View "State v. Schaffer" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the allocation of water from the Rio Grande River among the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado. The Rio Grande Compact, an interstate agreement, governs the equitable distribution of the river's waters among these states. In 2013, Texas sued New Mexico and Colorado, alleging that excessive groundwater pumping in New Mexico was depleting the river's water supply intended for Texas, in violation of the Compact. The United States sought to intervene, asserting its own interests in the Compact's enforcement due to its operation of the Rio Grande Project, an irrigation system in southern New Mexico.In previous proceedings, the Supreme Court allowed the United States to intervene, recognizing its distinct federal interests in the Compact. The Court noted that the Compact was intertwined with the United States' operation of the Rio Grande Project and that the federal government had an interest in ensuring New Mexico complied with its obligations under the Compact.Texas and New Mexico proposed a consent decree to resolve the case, which would establish a methodology for determining each state's allocation of the river's waters. However, the United States opposed the proposed consent decree, arguing that it would dispose of its claims that New Mexico's groundwater pumping was violating the Compact.The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the United States, holding that parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party without that party's agreement. The Court found that the United States still had the same claims it did in 2018, backed by the same unique federal interests. The Court concluded that the proposed consent decree would settle all parties' Compact claims and, in the process, cut off the United States' requested relief as to New Mexican groundwater pumping. As such, the Court denied the motion to enter the consent decree. View "Texas v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership, a company that constructs, manages, designs, and repairs billboards, clashed with Beaufort County over the county's billboard policy. The county sought to phase out billboards within its borders by prohibiting the construction of new billboards and restricting structural repairs of old ones. Adams was issued a criminal citation for performing structural repairs on two old billboards without seeking authorization. Additionally, Adams filed eleven applications requesting permits to construct new commercial billboards with digital displays, each of which was denied. Adams sought to challenge Beaufort County’s local ordinance regulating billboards, along with several other local sign regulations.The district court dismissed all of Adams’s claims with prejudice. The claims related to the criminal citation were dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, and those related to the permit denials were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Adams appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with each of the district court’s dismissal determinations. However, it noted that the claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court remanded those claims with the instruction that their dismissal be amended to dismissal without prejudice. The court also found that Adams did not have standing to challenge certain provisions of the county's sign ordinance, as it had not demonstrated that it had been adversely affected by those provisions. The court concluded that the case belongs in state court due to the state's interest in land-use planning and development, the ongoing state court proceedings, and the jurisdictional hurdles faced by Adams. View "Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. Beaufort County" on Justia Law

The case involves Hahnenkamm, LLC and the United States Forest Service. Hahnenkamm sold a parcel of land to the Forest Service. The purchase price was based on an appraisal that was supposed to comply with the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, also known as the Yellow Book. Hahnenkamm later sued the Forest Service, claiming that the appraisal did not comply with the Yellow Book and was not independent, thus breaching the purchase agreement.The United States Court of Federal Claims found in favor of Hahnenkamm, ruling that the Forest Service had breached the agreement by not supporting the purchase price with an independent, Yellow Book-compliant appraisal. The court rejected the government's defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel and awarded damages to Hahnenkamm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit partially reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that Hahnenkamm could not have reasonably relied on the contractual representation that the appraisal was independent. However, the court remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether Hahnenkamm reasonably relied on the representation that the appraisal was Yellow Book-compliant. The court also remanded the lower court's rejection of the equitable estoppel defense.On cross-appeal, Hahnenkamm argued that the lower court erred in its damages determination. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's damages determination, finding no abuse of discretion in its analysis. View "HAHNENKAMM, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

A real estate developer, 3534 East Cap Venture, LLC, and a construction company, McCullough Construction, LLC, were involved in a dispute with their insurers, Westchester Fire Insurance Company and Endurance American Insurance Company. The dispute centered around the coverage of two identical builders’ risk insurance policies for a residential and retail complex under construction in the District of Columbia. During construction, the absence of a vapor barrier in the architect's plans led to the condensation of vapor into water during cold weather, causing nearly $1.5 million in damages. The insurers denied the claims, arguing that the policies excluded losses caused by atmospheric dampness or temperature changes.The case was initially brought to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but was moved to federal district court due to diversity of citizenship. The district court ruled in favor of the insurers, holding that the exclusions for losses caused by "dampness of atmosphere" or "changes in temperature" applied. The court also held that the ensuing-loss exception to the exclusions did not apply because losses from "water damage" to the building were "inextricably intertwined" with—and indeed were "one and the same" as—losses covered by the dampness and temperature exclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ensuing-loss clause in the insurance policies applied to losses from water damage caused by the excluded perils of dampness and temperature changes. Therefore, the policies covered the losses at issue. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the insureds on the question of liability. View "3534 East Cap Venture, LLC v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land between two neighboring property owners in Park County, Wyoming. The appellants, Michael and Michelle Sellers, purchased a 12-acre property that was adjacent to a 4-acre parcel owned by the appellees, Phyllis Claudson, William Pond, Pamela Pond, and Peggy Lou Pond Paul. During the purchase, the Sellers discovered that a portion of their property was located on the Ponds' side of a boundary fence. The Ponds filed a lawsuit to claim ownership of this portion of land based on adverse possession.The District Court of Park County initially heard the case. The Ponds and the Sellers filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of the Ponds, finding that they had adversely possessed the disputed property. The Sellers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Ponds had established a prima facie case for adverse possession. They had shown actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed property, which was hostile and under claim of right or color of title. The Sellers failed to rebut this claim by showing permissive use of the property through neighborly accommodation. The court also rejected the Sellers' argument that the Ponds could only have adversely possessed the areas of the property containing buildings, as the Sellers had not raised this issue in the lower court. View "Sellers v. Claudson" on Justia Law