Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two property owners in the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of College Station, Texas, challenged city ordinances regulating off-premise signage and driveway construction. They argued that these regulations, imposed without granting them the right to vote in city elections, violated the Texas Constitution's requirement for a "republican form of government." The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ordinances were void and unenforceable.The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, agreeing with the City that the form of local government is a political question for the legislature, not the courts. The plaintiffs appealed, but while the appeal was pending, the legislature amended the law to allow ETJ residents to unilaterally opt out of a city's ETJ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's dismissal, not addressing the new statutory opt-out provision.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the legislative change provided a nonjudicial remedy that could moot the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court vacated the lower court judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to abate the proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to complete the opt-out process. The court emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance, noting that the new law offered a means of relief that should be pursued before addressing broader constitutional questions. View "ELLIOTT v. CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

Shanda Yates was bitten by a pit bull named Yurk while visiting her friend Neah Friar, who rented a property from TLM Investments, LLC. Friar's lease had a no-pet provision, which she disregarded by keeping Yurk and concealing his presence from TLM. Yates filed a personal injury claim against both Friar and TLM, alleging negligence on TLM's part for allowing Yurk on the property and claiming protections under the lease.The Prentiss County Circuit Court denied TLM's motion for summary judgment, leading to an interlocutory appeal. TLM argued that it had no knowledge of Yurk's presence or his dangerous propensities, as Friar had intentionally concealed the dog. TLM also contended that Yates failed to establish herself as an intended third-party beneficiary under the lease.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Yates did not provide evidence that TLM had actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or his dangerous propensities. The court noted that the no-pet provision in the lease was not an admission that all dogs are dangerous but was intended to prevent property damage. Additionally, the court found that Yates did not have standing to claim protections under the lease as she was not a party to it and was not an intended third-party beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, rendered summary judgment in favor of TLM, and remanded the case to the Prentiss County Circuit Court for any necessary further proceedings. The case against TLM was dismissed with prejudice. View "TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the North Dakota Department of Health inspected ND Indoor RV Park, LLC and found several health, safety, and fire code violations. The Park was informed that its 2020 operating license would be revoked unless the violations were corrected. The Park did not address the violations, leading to the initiation of the license revocation process. The Park also requested a renewal of its license for 2021, which was denied due to the existing violations. The Park was allowed to operate until the hearing proceedings were final. The Park later withdrew its request for a hearing, and the Department of Health dismissed the renewal application and closed the case. Subsequently, the Park sold its property.The Park filed a complaint against the State of North Dakota, alleging regulatory taking, deprivation of substantive and procedural due process, inverse condemnation, unlawful interference with business relationships, systemic violation of due process, and estoppel. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming qualified immunity for individual defendants and lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the takings claims. The district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the takings and due process claims but granted summary judgment on the unlawful interference claim. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court granted a writ of supervision, directing the district court to dismiss counts II and III because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also directed the dismissal of counts I and IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Park failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Park could not prevail on its substantive and procedural due process claims and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the takings claims. View "ND Indoor RV Park v. State" on Justia Law

B-R Penn Realty defaulted on a $46 million loan backed by a mortgage on its Philadelphia apartment building. U.S. Bank, the lender, sued to foreclose in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled that Penn Realty had breached the loan agreement and entered a money judgment in U.S. Bank’s favor for $51,392,086.96. U.S. Bank then sought a foreclosure sale of the building to recover the judgment amount. Penn Realty moved twice to halt the sale, but the District Court denied both motions, and the building was sold.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially ruled in favor of U.S. Bank, issuing a money judgment for the amount owed by Penn Realty. Penn Realty appealed the judgment but did not obtain a stay. Subsequently, U.S. Bank renewed its foreclosure efforts, and the District Court denied Penn Realty’s emergency motion to quash the writ of execution and cancel the sale. The sale was rescheduled, and Penn Realty filed a second motion to quash, which was also denied by the District Court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the sale of the building was an execution sale governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), not a judicial sale under 28 U.S.C. § 2001. The court determined that U.S. Bank complied with the requirements of Rule 69(a), which imports Pennsylvania law for execution sales. The court also found that service of the writ was proper under Pennsylvania law. Consequently, the Third Circuit upheld the sale and affirmed the District Court’s denial of Penn Realty’s motion to quash. View "US Bank NA v. B R Penn Realty Owner LP" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from alleged breaches of a partnership agreement between PNC Bank, N.A., Columbia Housing SLP Corporation (collectively, the "PNC Parties"), and Rene O. Campos, along with 2013 Travis Creek GP, LLC, as general partner. The partnership was formed to acquire, construct, develop, and operate an affordable housing apartment complex in Austin, Texas, with anticipated federal tax credits. A mechanic’s lien was placed on the property, leading to a default on the construction loan. The PNC Parties sought to remove the general partner and replace it with Columbia, resulting in a lawsuit.The PNC Parties filed the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement that resolved the 2017 lawsuit. In 2021, the Eureka Parties moved to re-open the case to enforce the settlement agreement, leading to competing motions to enforce. The district court severed the motions from the original lawsuit, creating a new case, and granted each motion in part, offsetting the balance owed. The Eureka Parties and the Partnership appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the parties failed to establish an independent jurisdictional basis for the severed motions. The court noted that severed claims must have an independent jurisdictional basis and that the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish diversity of citizenship. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether such jurisdiction exists. The panel retained jurisdiction over the limited remand. View "PNC Bank v. 2013 Travis Oak Creek" on Justia Law

A group of landowners in Indiana, who own land adjacent to the former Indiana Nickel Plate Line, sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims. They sought compensation for an alleged taking under the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 constituted a taking of their property.The Court of Federal Claims rejected the plaintiffs' request to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court. It held that the plaintiffs lacked a compensable property interest because the releases signed by their predecessors-in-interest conveyed fee simple estates to the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that under Indiana law, the releases conveyed fee simple titles to the railroad company. The court relied on the Indiana Supreme Court's decisions in Newcastle & Richmond Railroad Co. v. Peru & Indianapolis Railroad Co. and Indianapolis, Peru, & Chicago Railway Co. v. Rayl, which established that releases executed under the railroad's legislative charter conveyed fee simple estates. The court also declined to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court, finding that the relevant Indiana law was clear and controlling. View "ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Continental Resources, Inc., an oil and gas production company, leases minerals from both the North Dakota Board of University and School Lands (Land Board) and the United States. The dispute centers on the entitlement to royalties from minerals extracted from the bed of Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota, which depends on the location of the Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM). If North Dakota law and the state survey govern the OHWM, the Land Board is entitled to a larger percentage of the royalties; if the federal survey controls, the United States is entitled to a larger percentage.The United States removed the interpleader action to federal court and moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the motion, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(5), the United States waived sovereign immunity because North Dakota law created a lien in favor of the United States upon Continental severing the minerals. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States for lands retained since North Dakota's admission to the Union, applying federal law and the Corps Survey. It granted summary judgment in favor of the Land Board for lands reacquired by the United States, applying North Dakota law and the Wenck survey.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the United States had a lien on the disputed minerals under North Dakota law. The court also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Land Board, holding that North Dakota law governs the current location of the OHWM for lands reacquired by the United States. The court denied the United States' motion for judicial notice of additional documents. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Applicant sought permission from the Town’s Development Review Board (DRB) to build a senior-living facility in Castleton, Vermont, which included independent-living, assisted-living, and memory-care units. The DRB approved the project with conditions, including that each unit have a kitchen, but did not approve the memory-care unit, classifying it as a nursing home, which exceeded the allowed number of residents.Applicant appealed to the Environmental Division, which reviewed the case de novo. The court struck the condition requiring kitchens in each unit and concluded that the project was a multi-family dwelling, not a nursing home, based on state law definitions. Neighbors did not appeal but challenged the project’s height and the classification of the memory-care unit. The court dismissed the height challenge for lack of jurisdiction and found that the project met the multi-family dwelling definition.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision on the jurisdictional issue, agreeing that the height challenge was outside the scope of the court’s review. However, it found that the Environmental Division erred in using state law definitions instead of the town’s zoning bylaws to classify the memory-care unit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding the memory-care unit and remanded for further findings on whether it met the bylaw’s definition of a nursing home, which requires in-house nursing care for residents suffering from illness or disease. The court also upheld the Environmental Division’s decision to strike the kitchen condition for the independent and assisted-living units but required further consideration of the memory-care unit’s compliance with the cooking requirement in the zoning ordinance. View "In re Dousevicz, Inc." on Justia Law

Sentry Dynamics, Inc. (Sentry) requested a list of all property owners' names and addresses in Ada County from the Ada County Assessor’s Office. Ada County denied the request, suspecting Sentry intended to sell the data for use as a mailing or telephone list, which is prohibited under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). Sentry filed a complaint in district court seeking access to the records. The district court ordered Ada County to release the records in an electronic format of its choosing. Ada County appealed, and Sentry cross-appealed, requesting the records in the shapefile format used by the County.The district court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho ruled that the information Sentry sought was a public record and constituted a "list of persons" under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). The court held that Sentry was entitled to the records because it agreed not to use them as a mailing list. However, the court allowed Ada County to choose the electronic format for providing the records. Ada County appealed, arguing that Sentry did not assure the data would not be used for mailing list purposes by third parties. Sentry cross-appealed, seeking the records in their original shapefile format.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the records requested by Sentry constituted a "list of persons" and that Ada County could require Sentry to assure that the data would not be used for mailing purposes by its clients and customers. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of Ada County’s "Acknowledgment and Agreement" form went beyond the permissible inquiry under Idaho Code section 74-102(5)(b). However, the court reversed the district court's order requiring Ada County to provide the records in an electronic format, stating that the PRA does not mandate delivery in any specific format. The court concluded that Ada County was not required to produce the records because Sentry refused to certify that neither it nor its clients would use the records as a mailing list. View "Sentry Dynamics, Inc. v. Ada County" on Justia Law