Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Land Court regarding a property in Duxbury, claiming ownership following a foreclosure sale. The defendants, who had executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff's predecessor, refused to vacate the property. The Land Court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, declaring them the lawful owner. The defendants appealed this decision.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint in the Housing Court to gain possession of the property and requested use and occupancy payments from the defendants during the litigation. The Housing Court judge granted this request but stayed the proceedings pending the appeal of the Land Court judgment. The defendants sought interlocutory relief from a single justice of the Appeals Court, who vacated the Housing Court's order, stating that the Housing Court judge had not determined ownership.The plaintiff renewed their motion in the Housing Court, which was again granted, with the judge explicitly relying on the Land Court's judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The defendants again sought relief from the single justice, who vacated the order, arguing that the Housing Court judge's reliance on the appealed Land Court judgment was improper. The plaintiff was granted leave to appeal to a full panel of the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge hearing a summary process action for possession may rely on a final judgment of the Land Court regarding ownership, even if an appeal is pending. The court confirmed that the Land Court's judgment had preclusive effect, allowing the Housing Court judge to order interim use and occupancy payments. The order of the single justice was reversed, and the defendants' petition for relief was denied. View "TJR Services LLC v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Craig Baugh acquired a 20-acre tract of land in 1983 and another adjoining 20-acre tract in 1993, both located in a remote, forested area in Flathead County, Montana. In 2006, Baugh consolidated and subdivided the 40-acre aggregate into two new 20-acre tracts (Tract 1 and Tract 2) by certificate of survey (COS), which included a 20-foot wide access and utility easement on an existing road. Baugh sold Tract 2 to Florian Skyland in 2019, who later sold it to H2S2, LLC. H2S2 planned to develop a 32-unit short-term "glamping" business on Tract 2, which Baugh opposed, leading to a lawsuit.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, initially denied Baugh's request for a preliminary injunction but later granted summary judgment in his favor. The court concluded that H2S2's planned commercial use of the easement would exceed the intended scope of the easement, which was meant for single-family residential use. The court permanently enjoined H2S2's planned use and awarded Baugh prevailing party attorney fees, deeming H2S2's counterclaims for damages as frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's summary judgment that H2S2's proposed commercial use exceeded the authorized scope of the express easement. The court held that the easement's intended use was limited to single-family residential purposes, and H2S2's planned commercial use would significantly exceed this scope. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney fees to Baugh, concluding that the central issue was a bona fide dispute on the merits of the permissible use and scope of the easement, and thus, H2S2's counterclaims were not frivolous. The case was remanded for entry of a corresponding final judgment. View "Baugh v. H2S2, LLC" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

Curtis Park Group, LLC (Curtis Park) encountered a significant issue during the construction of a new development called S*Park, which included five buildings supported by a single concrete slab. The slab began to sag due to construction defects, and Curtis Park hired a consultant to determine the cause and necessary repairs. The repairs cost $2,857,157.78, which were fronted by the general contractor, Milender White, as per their agreement. Curtis Park had a builder’s risk insurance policy with Allied World Specialty Insurance Company (Allied World) but did not include Milender White or subcontractors as named insureds.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case, where Curtis Park sued Allied World for breach of contract and bad faith after Allied World denied coverage for the repair costs. The district court ruled that Curtis Park could seek coverage for the repair costs even though Milender White had absorbed these costs. The jury found in favor of Curtis Park on the breach-of-contract and statutory bad-faith claims but not on the common-law bad-faith claim. Allied World’s motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in interpreting the insurance policy to allow Curtis Park to recover repair costs it had not paid and had no obligation to pay. The policy explicitly limited recovery to the amount the named insured (Curtis Park) actually spent on repairs. The Tenth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial, instructing that Curtis Park cannot recover the costs of repair that it did not pay. The court also vacated the remainder of the judgment and remanded for a new trial on all other issues. View "Curtis Park Group v. Allied World Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An entity that owns and holds a loan agreement, including its note and the beneficiary interest in the security instrument, sought to foreclose on a property after borrowers failed to make required payments on the note. The entity entered a judgment for non-judicial foreclosure.The district court denied the borrowers’ motion for an extension of time, adopted the magistrate judge’s report recommending summary judgment against the borrowers, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied the borrowers’ motion for an altered judgment, which was styled as a motion for a new trial. The borrowers challenged the district court’s orders, alleging abuse of discretion and plain error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an extension of time or the motion for a new trial. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in determining that the entity did not manifest an unequivocal intent to abandon acceleration. The appellate court held that the notice sent by the entity unequivocally manifested an intent to abandon acceleration, as it expressly withdrew, canceled, and abandoned any prior demands or notices of acceleration.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court directed the district court to address whether the lender must seek a new order authorizing foreclosure following the abandonment of acceleration. View "US Bank Trust National v. Walden" on Justia Law

Lucy Mancini Newell was designated as the trustee and sole beneficiary of her parents' trust. After her father, Arthur Mancini, passed away, Newell discovered that he had amended the trust to name his caregiver, Neneth Rollins, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. Newell challenged the validity of these amendments and, upon learning that Rollins used trust assets to purchase real property, recorded a lis pendens against the property and sought to impose a constructive trust on it.The probate court granted Rollins' motion to expunge the lis pendens, ruling that Newell's petition did not contain a "real property claim" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court concluded that Newell's petition sought to invalidate the trust amendments and change the trustee, but did not directly affect the title or possession of the real property.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Newell's petition did indeed contain a real property claim because it would affect the title to the property if successful. The court noted that the trustee holds legal title to the trust's property, and a change in trustee would change the name on the title. Therefore, the petition would affect the title to the Van Nuys property.The Court of Appeal granted Newell's petition for writ of mandate, directing the probate court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens and to enter a new order denying Rollins' motion to expunge. The court also awarded Newell her costs in the proceeding. View "Newell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Eiden Construction, LLC (Eiden) entered into a subcontract with Hogan & Associates Builders, LLC (Hogan) for earthwork and utilities on a school construction project. Hogan sued Eiden and its bonding company, AMCO Insurance Company (AMCO), for breach of contract, claiming Eiden failed to complete its work, including draining sewage lagoons and constructing a fire pond. Eiden counterclaimed for unpaid work, arguing it was not responsible for draining the lagoons and that Hogan did not comply with the subcontract’s notice and opportunity to cure provisions. AMCO argued it was not liable under the performance bond because Eiden did not breach the subcontract and Hogan did not provide proper notice.The District Court of Uinta County found for Hogan on the claim regarding the sewage lagoons but not on other claims, ruling AMCO was not liable under the bond due to lack of notice. Eiden and Hogan both appealed. Eiden argued the court erred in finding it responsible for draining the lagoons and in awarding Hogan damages billed to an associated company. Hogan contended the court erred in not awarding damages for other work and in its calculation of prejudgment interest.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held Eiden breached the subcontract by not draining the lagoons and that Hogan was entitled to recover costs for supplementing Eiden’s work. The court found Eiden’s late completion of the septic system justified Hogan’s directive to expedite lagoon drainage. It also ruled Hogan properly paid the supplemental contractors, despite invoices being sent to an associated company. The court rejected Hogan’s claims for additional damages, concluding Eiden complied with the notice to cure provisions for the fire pond and other work. The court also upheld the lower court’s calculation of prejudgment interest, applying the offset before calculating interest. View "Hogan & Associates Builders, LLC v. Eiden Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

KNB Properties LLC and Delta Dawn, LLP, appealed a judgment and an order denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment. They argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cass County. The case revolves around whether KNB needed the County’s approval under its subdivision ordinance for its development of an unplatted parcel of land in Stanley Township, which KNB bought in October 2017. KNB constructed a commercial building on the parcel and later subdivided it into two parcels, conveying one to Delta Dawn by warranty deed in 2021.The District Court of Cass County initially denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, finding disputed issues of material fact. Later, it granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that KNB’s creation of two auditor’s lots and the conveyance of one lot to Delta Dawn in 2021 triggered the subdivision ordinance. The court issued a permanent injunction requiring compliance with the subdivision ordinance before any further development, sale, or transfer of the parcel. KNB and Delta Dawn’s counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the subdivision ordinance was not violated until the act of subdivision in 2021. The court held that the County’s authority was not implicated until KNB platted the parcel into two parcels and conveyed one to Delta Dawn. The court found that the district court erred in granting a permanent injunction and that the proper remedy was to void the conveyance of the 12.451-acre parcel to Delta Dawn, thus restoring the KNB parcel to its original size. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment vacating the auditor’s lots and restoring the parties to their original positions. View "Cass Co. v. KNB Properties" on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law