Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

In 2021, Sharon Ceynar initiated a divorce action against William Ceynar. Following a bench trial, the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, granted the divorce and divided the marital estate. Sharon received $1,218,903.90 in net assets, while William received $681,827.35. The court ordered the sale of the couple's real estate and mineral interests at public auction, with 55% of the proceeds going to William and 45% to Sharon.William appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its division of the marital estate, particularly given his large inheritance. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that property distribution decisions are not reversed unless clearly erroneous. The court emphasized that the district court's findings are presumed correct and that it does not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility on appeal.The Supreme Court found that the district court had properly considered the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, which include factors such as the duration of the marriage, the parties' ages, health, and financial circumstances. The district court had noted the long-term nature of the marriage and the need for both parties to have income-generating assets for retirement. Although William argued that his inheritance should result in a larger share of the marital estate, the court found that the district court had appropriately considered this factor and had not erred in its division.The Supreme Court also addressed William's contention that the district court erred in ordering the sale of the real property, noting that the court had the authority to do so to achieve an equitable distribution. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the property division was equitable and not clearly erroneous. View "Ceynar v. Ceynar" on Justia Law

DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC and DCA Capitol Hill SNF, LLC (collectively, “DCA”) leased a property from Capitol Hill Group (“CHG”) in Northeast Washington, DC, to operate a long-term acute care hospital and skilled nursing facility. In 2015, DCA began withholding rent payments, claiming dissatisfaction with CHG’s installation of a new HVAC system and generator. CHG sued for breach of contract, and DCA counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and fraud, alleging misrepresentations by CHG.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to CHG on DCA’s fraud counterclaims related to pre-lease representations, citing the lease’s integration clauses. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of CHG on its breach-of-contract claim and DCA’s counterclaims, finding that CHG had fulfilled its obligations regarding the HVAC system and generator work. The court also awarded CHG attorneys’ fees based on a provision in the lease.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court held that DCA’s fraud claims related to pre-lease representations failed as a matter of law because DCA’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable. The court also concluded that CHG had not breached the lease, as the term “new HVAC system” did not include distribution components, and CHG had fulfilled its generator-related obligations by replacing one generator. The court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to CHG, finding no abuse of discretion.The case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award CHG attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal. View "DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Group" on Justia Law

David L. Murphy Properties, LLC and John Schaffer own property adjacent to Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC on Flathead Lake. Painted Rocks constructed a dock after obtaining a permit from Lake County. Murphy Properties claimed the dock violated the Lakeshore Protection Act, interfered with their prescriptive easement, and constituted a nuisance.The Twentieth Judicial District Court dismissed Murphy Properties' Lakeshore Protection Act claim against Lake County and granted summary judgment in favor of Painted Rocks on all claims. The court found that the dock did not interfere with navigation or lawful recreation under the Act, as Murphy Properties could still access the cove with smaller watercraft. The court also ruled that Murphy Properties could not establish a prescriptive easement because their use of the cove was not exclusive, given the public's right to use the waters. Additionally, the court dismissed the nuisance claim, as it was contingent on the alleged violation of the Lakeshore Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's rulings. The court held that the Lakeshore Protection Act does not mandate denial of a permit if a project impacts navigation or recreation, but rather favors issuance if it does not. The court agreed that Murphy Properties' use of the cove was not exclusive and thus could not support a prescriptive easement. The court also upheld the dismissal of the nuisance claim, as it was based on the failed Lakeshore Protection Act claim. The judgment in favor of Lake County and Painted Rocks was affirmed. View "David L. Murphy Properties, LLC v. Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of Montana filed a lawsuit to determine the ownership of riverbeds underlying certain segments of rivers within its borders. The dispute centered on whether the riverbeds were navigable at the time of Montana's statehood in 1889, which would determine whether Montana or the United States held title to the riverbeds. The segments in question included parts of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers.The United States District Court for the District of Montana held a 10-day bench trial and found that only one segment, the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment of the Missouri River, was navigable in fact at the time of statehood. The court quieted title to the United States for the riverbeds underlying four other segments, including the Big Belt Mountains Segment and the Big Falls to Belt Creek Segment of the Missouri River, the Eddy Segment of the Clark Fork River, and the Headwaters/West Yellowstone Basin Segment of the Madison River. The court's decision was based on the "navigability in fact" test, which requires that navigability be determined on a segment-by-segment basis, considering the physical characteristics of the river at the time of statehood.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the navigability in fact test as clarified in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012). The court rejected Montana's argument that evidence of actual use alone establishes navigability and upheld the district court's findings that the four segments were not navigable. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the cross-appeal by Talen Montana, LLC and Northwestern Corporation, which argued that the district court should not have considered the navigability of the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. The court found that the district court's review was consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in PPL.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine damages for the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. View "State v. Talen Montana, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002 and 2009, the town of Pembroke recorded tax liens against property owned jointly by Brian E. Priest and his wife, Lisa C. Priest. The Priests paid the delinquent taxes, and the town discharged the liens through "municipal quitclaim deeds." After Brian died intestate, a dispute arose among his heirs regarding whether the tax liens had severed the joint tenancy, thus terminating Lisa's right of survivorship.The Penobscot County Probate Court denied Lisa's petition to reform the municipal quitclaim deeds to reflect that the property remained in joint tenancy. The court found no evidence of the transferor's intention at the time the deeds were drafted and dismissed the petition. The court did not address Lisa's alternative request for a declaration that the property was not an asset of the estate.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the joint tenancy was not severed because the town never foreclosed on either tax lien mortgage. The court held that the municipal quitclaim deeds served only to discharge the liens and did not affect the joint tenancy. Consequently, Lisa's right of survivorship remained intact. The judgment of the Probate Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Estate of Priest" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between homeowners in the Dairy Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming. The appellants, Robert, Linda, and Anthony Schroth, along with Jackson Hole Winery, LLC, were enjoined by the district court from conducting certain commercial activities on their property, which the appellees, Robert and Viesia Kirk, claimed violated the subdivision's covenants. The covenants restrict the use of properties to single-family residential purposes and prohibit commercial activities, although they allow for certain home occupations and agricultural activities.The district court found that the activities of Jackson Hole Winery, which included wine production, sales, and hosting public tastings, were commercial and violated the covenants. The court also found that the appellants' claims of laches, arguing that the Kirks delayed unreasonably in enforcing their rights, were unfounded. The court issued a permanent injunction limiting the winery's activities to those initially approved by the subdivision's design committee in 2010.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the winery's expanded activities were commercial and violated the covenants. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the Kirks did not delay unreasonably in enforcing their rights, noting that the Kirks only became aware of the full extent of the winery's activities in 2020 and filed suit in 2022. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to grant the injunction, as the equities weighed in favor of enforcing the covenants to preserve the residential character of the subdivision. View "Schroth v. Kirk" on Justia Law

In January 2017, Bruce Higgins, Rebekka Higgins, the Estate of Judy Devney, and John L. Devney sought a judgment to quiet title to mineral interests in Williams County and recover oil and gas proceeds. The defendants, Maynard Lund, Kjersti Eide, Don Eide, and Jennifer Eide, denied the allegations and counterclaimed for quiet title. XTO Energy, Inc., Continental Resources, Inc., and Whiting Petroleum, Corp. requested dismissal of the complaint.The District Court of Williams County held a bench trial in April 2018 to interpret a 1964 warranty deed. The court found that the deed reserved Milton Higgins' entire interest in the top parcel and quieted title accordingly, resulting in a 50/50 split of the partnership mineral acres between the successors of Milton Higgins and Howard Lund. The court awarded the plaintiffs $237,000 in royalty damages plus fees and costs. In 2021, the court granted summary judgment motions by the plaintiffs, determining that the 1952 royalty deed conveyed a floating royalty rather than a fixed royalty. Final judgment was entered in January 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the 1964 warranty deed was ambiguous, allowing for extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent, and concluded that the reservation applied to both the top and bottom parcels. The court also found no valid stipulation regarding the interpretation of the 1952 royalty deed and determined that the deed conveyed a floating royalty. The court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the deeds and the division of the suspended oil and gas proceeds. View "Higgins v. Lund" on Justia Law

Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District and the Coronado Yacht Club, alleging that the lease of coastal public trust land to the private club violated the public trust doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, the Public Resources Code, and the Port’s Master Plan. Herron claimed that the lease was executed without public notice or competitive bidding and requested the court to compel the Port District to comply with proper procedures and award the lease to a qualified applicant who would operate the property for public benefit.The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District’s discretionary decisions under a writ for traditional mandamus and that the time for filing a writ for administrative mandamus had expired. The court dismissed Herron’s petition with prejudice, leading to Herron’s appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Herron failed to establish a claim for traditional mandamus because the Port District’s decision to lease the land involved discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty. The court also found that Herron’s petition for administrative mandamus was untimely, as it was filed more than four years after the lease became final, exceeding the 90-day statutory limit. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Herron was not entitled to relief under either theory and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. View "Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law