Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, the governing body of a Tennessee county adopted a resolution regulating the operation and location of quarries and similar activities in unincorporated areas. The resolution prohibited quarries from being located within 5,000 feet of residences, schools, parks, and various other establishments. After purchasing property and leasing it for quarry operations, the plaintiffs were informed by the county mayor that their quarry violated this resolution and were asked to cease operations. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the resolution was void because it functioned as a zoning ordinance and was not enacted in compliance with statutory zoning procedures. The county, in response, maintained that the resolution was not a zoning ordinance but rather a proper exercise of its police powers.The case was first heard in the Chancery Court for Grundy County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court reasoned that, because the county did not have a comprehensive zoning plan, the resolution could not be considered tantamount to zoning and thus was not subject to the County Zoning Act’s requirements. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds. It held that the absence of a comprehensive zoning plan was not determinative but concluded that the resolution did not divide the county into districts and thus was not a zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts. The Court held that the resolution was, in effect, a zoning ordinance because it divided the county into zones—prohibiting quarrying in certain areas based on proximity to designated establishments—and substantially affected land use. The Court found that the county failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the County Zoning Act, rendering the resolution unenforceable. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Tinsley Properties, LLC v. Grundy County, Tennessee" on Justia Law

The property in question had operated as a tavern under a nonconforming-use exception in an area zoned for residential use. The tavern ceased operations in April 2019 after its liquor license became inactive in January 2019. In March 2022, one of the property’s owners and a representative inquired with the township zoning inspector about the property’s status, prompted by interest from a potential buyer who wanted to reopen the tavern. The inspector responded by email, stating that the property no longer qualified as a nonconforming use due to over two years of discontinued operation and referenced the applicable zoning resolution provision.Following this, the property owners, through counsel, requested clarification and formal notice regarding the property’s zoning status. The township’s legal counsel confirmed the inspector’s position by forwarding the original email as the official communication. The owners then appealed to the Hinckley Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the email constituted a “decision” under Ohio law and that the 20-day appeal period had lapsed. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the BZA’s dismissal, concluding that the email was a “decision” and that notice was sufficient. On further appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the email was not a formal “decision” under the relevant statutes and therefore did not trigger the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The Court held that the zoning inspector’s email was not a “decision” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code sections 519.14 and 519.15, and so did not trigger the statutory appeal deadline. The BZA therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the property owners’ appeal. View "729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

Two water users on Mill Creek in Montana claimed rights to divert and use water based on historical court decrees. Their claims, filed in the 1980s as part of Montana’s general water rights adjudication, asserted periods of use that were broader than those described in a 1964 district court decree, the Petrich Decree, which had granted rights to “surplus” water in Mill Creek from May 1 to approximately July 15. The claimants’ filings instead asserted periods stretching from as early as April 1 to as late as October 1. After the Montana Water Court issued a preliminary decree for Basin 43B, Trout Unlimited, a conservation organization, objected, contending that the claimants overstated their periods of use.The Water Court consolidated the objections and granted Trout Unlimited partial summary judgment, limiting the claimants’ decreed periods of use to May 1 through July 15, as reflected in the Petrich Decree. The claimants then requested the generation of “implied claims” for water use outside this period, arguing they had historically used water beyond those dates. The Water Court generated implied claims with later priority dates for those additional periods but made them junior to other existing rights. Both sides appealed: Trout Unlimited challenged the creation of implied claims, and the claimants challenged Trout Unlimited’s standing and the summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the Water Court’s ruling that Trout Unlimited had standing to object and upheld the limitation of the decreed periods of use to May 1–July 15. However, it reversed the Water Court’s generation of implied claims, finding that the claimants had not met their burden to show sufficient evidence of pre-1973 historic use outside the decree and that other water users lacked adequate notice. The Court remanded for further proceedings, requiring notice and specific factual findings regarding any implied claims. View "Petrich Family Limited Partnership v. Trout Unlimited" on Justia Law

Four brothers who had previously formed a diamond partnership later entered into an oral agreement in 1995 with a fifth brother to create a separate real estate partnership. The agreement was never reduced to writing, consistent with family custom. Over several years, the brothers jointly acquired and managed a large portfolio of California real estate. Tensions arose after the original real estate owner repaid a loan that was a condition for his partnership interest. One brother, who controlled the partnership’s entities, began excluding the others and denied the existence of any partnership, asserting sole ownership over the assets.The litigation began in 2003 when the excluded brother sued his siblings and related entities for his partnership share and damages. Two other brothers, who initially disclaimed the partnership under alleged economic coercion, later filed cross-complaints for their shares in both the diamond and real estate partnerships. The case saw multiple prior appeals and writ proceedings. After the trial court initially granted summary adjudication against the main plaintiff on most claims, the California Court of Appeal reversed, allowing contract, fiduciary duty, and fraud claims to proceed. Further cross-complaints were filed by the brothers, which survived demurrer on statute of limitations grounds.In 2024, after a lengthy jury trial, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County entered judgment in favor of the three plaintiff brothers, awarding declaratory relief, partnership shares, compensatory and punitive damages, and prejudgment interest totaling about $6.85 billion against the controlling brother and the partnership entities. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, rejected most challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and instructions, but held the court erred in admitting an undisclosed expert opinion concerning lost investment profits. The appellate court conditionally affirmed the judgment, ordering a reduction of the economic damages awards relating to the real estate partnership by amounts attributable to this opinion, unless the plaintiffs opt for a new trial on those damages and related punitive damages. The judgments were otherwise affirmed. View "Jogani v. Jogani" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when beneficiaries of a land trust owning commercial property in Hammond, Indiana, declined an offer from a city redevelopment commission to purchase their property. When the commission subsequently initiated a condemnation action to acquire the property for a purported public street, the landowners alleged that the taking was arbitrary, capricious, and motivated by improper, private interests rather than a legitimate public purpose. After the landowners' attempt to file a counterclaim for abuse of process in the condemnation action was denied, they pursued a separate lawsuit alleging abuse of process and seeking damages.The Lake Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), finding that the landowners’ abuse-of-process claim should be addressed in the pending condemnation action to avoid conflicting rulings. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a parallel abuse-of-process claim was permissible, that the complaint stated a claim suitable for judicial review, and that the question of immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) could not be resolved on the pleadings because it was disputable whether the defendants acted outside the scope of their employment.Upon granting transfer and thereby vacating the appellate court’s opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the application of the ITCA’s immunity provisions. The Court held that the alleged conduct by the mayor, redevelopment commission members, and city fell within the scope of their employment and that the abuse-of-process claim directly resulted from the initiation of a judicial proceeding—the condemnation action. Therefore, the ITCA provided immunity from suit as a matter of law for all defendants. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the landowners’ claims. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC applied to install six antennas on top of a water tower owned by the York Water District. The Town of York Planning Board approved the application. Two nearby property owners opposed the project, claiming it violated the local Wireless Communications Facilities Ordinance, specifically regarding fencing and setbacks from residential structures. They filed an administrative appeal with the Town of York Board of Appeals, which held public hearings. During the process, the Board asked New Cingular Wireless to provide a more accurate site plan showing distances to neighboring residences. After reviewing the updated information, the Board denied the neighbors’ appeal, stating it was satisfied with the information provided.The neighbors then sought judicial review in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the project did not comply with fencing and setback requirements. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. The neighbors appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, continuing to dispute whether the project met the ordinance’s requirements.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the neighbors did not preserve their argument about fencing requirements, as this issue was not raised before the Board of Appeals and was therefore waived. However, the Court found that the setback issue had been properly preserved for review. The Court determined that the Board’s findings regarding setbacks were insufficient for appellate review, as the Board did not explain from where the setback was measured or whether the project met the ordinance’s requirements. The Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Superior Court with instructions to remand it to the Board of Appeals for further factual findings and explanation regarding compliance with setback requirements. View "Drew v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The case involved a property owner in Euless, Texas, who had an ongoing dispute with the local post office regarding mail delivery to her two rental properties. She alleged that United States Postal Service employees intentionally withheld her mail and interfered with its delivery, resulting in personal and financial harm, including lost rental income and difficulty attracting tenants. Despite her attempts to resolve the issue through administrative complaints and by requesting alternative mail-handling services, the problems persisted.After these efforts failed, the property owner filed suit against the United States in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting various state-law tort claims such as nuisance, conversion, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed her complaint, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) postal exception preserved the government’s sovereign immunity for claims relating to the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of mail, regardless of whether the conduct was negligent or intentional. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the statutory terms did not encompass intentional acts of non-delivery.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to resolve a split among federal appellate courts. The Supreme Court held that the FTCA’s postal exception bars claims against the United States for the intentional nondelivery of mail. The Court found that, at the time the statute was enacted, the terms “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail included failures to deliver mail regardless of intent, and thus sovereign immunity applies even to claims alleging intentional misconduct by postal workers. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Postal Service v. Konan" on Justia Law

A married couple leased a commercial property from a landlord for use as a salon. As their lease approached expiration in March 2020, one of the tenants decided to retire, and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a state-issued stay-at-home order. The tenants left their salon equipment on the premises at the landlord’s repeated assurances not to worry about it. One day before the lease expired, the tenants paid an amount equivalent to one month’s rent with a note indicating the payment was a gesture of support during the pandemic. Three months later, they made a smaller payment. There was no discussion or agreement to continue the tenancy month-to-month. Several months after returning the keys, the landlord demanded rent for the months following lease expiration, asserting that the initial payment created a month-to-month tenancy under California Civil Code section 1945.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a bench trial and found the tenants credible, particularly regarding the nature of the payment as a gift rather than rent. The court concluded the statutory presumption of a renewed month-to-month tenancy was rebutted by the parties’ actions and lack of communication about continuing the tenancy. The court found no contract existed after the lease expired and entered judgment for the tenants. The landlord’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in its application of section 1945, finding no contract arose after the lease expired. The court emphasized that the presumption of a month-to-month tenancy is rebuttable by objective evidence showing the parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease. The judgment in favor of the tenants was affirmed. View "Ashirwad, LLC v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

Dorothy Apostolico, after her husband’s death, deeded a house in Cranston, Rhode Island to her three children, reserving a life estate for herself. The deed did not specify who was responsible for property taxes. Dorothy lived in the house until 2023, after which her son Domenic Apostolico resided there. The property did not produce any income during Dorothy’s life tenancy. Domenic paid property taxes during this time and sought reimbursement from his sister, Deborah Pagliaro, for her share of those taxes. After failed written requests, Domenic initiated a lawsuit seeking contribution and unjust enrichment.The Providence County Superior Court first dismissed Domenic’s original claim for contribution but allowed him to amend his complaint. Domenic then filed an amended complaint seeking Deborah’s share of taxes from 2010 onward. He moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Deborah’s liability for taxes. Deborah objected and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court, applying the precedent from Koszela v. Wilcox, 538 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1988), ruled that since the property was not income-producing, the responsibility for taxes fell to the remaindermen. The court granted Domenic’s motion as to liability, denied it as to the specific amount, and final judgment was entered for Domenic in the amount of $38,466.42.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that, under Rhode Island law, where a life estate property does not produce income, remaindermen—not the life tenant—are responsible for property taxes, regardless of whether the property is developed or the life tenant resides there. The Court also rejected Deborah’s statutory arguments, finding Koszela controlling and the statutes not in conflict with this rule. View "Apostolico v. Pagliaro" on Justia Law

A married couple jointly petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in Alaska, reaching a written agreement to divide their assets, including the husband’s military benefits and the marital home. At the time of the dissolution, the husband was receiving monthly payments from the Coast Guard, which were described in the petition as “retirement benefits.” Both parties confirmed in court that the agreement was voluntary and fair, and the husband agreed to pay half of his military benefits to his spouse directly. The superior court master found the agreement satisfied statutory requirements and recommended approval, which the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, then incorporated into the dissolution decree.After the decree was issued, the husband began labeling payments as both “retirement” and “disability pay.” Upon learning from Coast Guard officials that his payments were actually Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) and not divisible as marital property under federal law, he filed motions challenging the enforceability of the decree, arguing that federal law barred division of his benefits and raising claims of mistake, fraud, and coercion. The Superior Court denied his motions, finding he had voluntarily consented to the division and that his challenges were untimely under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), as more than one year had passed since the decree. The court also addressed an ancillary dispute regarding removal of the husband’s name from the mortgage of the marital home, ultimately finding both parties responsible for delays and declining to order a forced sale.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the appeal. It held that even if the decree divided benefits contrary to federal law, this did not render the judgment void or entitle the husband to relief under Civil Rule 60(b). The husband’s claims of mistake, fraud, or coercion were time-barred, and no extraordinary circumstances justified relief. The court further determined the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in resolving the mortgage issue. The judgment was affirmed. View "Million v. Hubert" on Justia Law