Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Pamela Gleichman, a real estate developer, established four affordable housing developments in Pennsylvania as limited partnerships in the 1990s. Gleichman and her company, Gleichman & Co., Inc., served as the general partners, while Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional held limited partnership interests. In 2014, Gleichman’s daughter, Rosa Scarcelli, acquired Gleichman & Co. (renamed General Holdings, Inc.) through a foreclosure auction. In 2018, Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional transferred their limited partnership interests to Eight Penn Partners, L.P., without the consent of General Holdings.General Holdings and Preservation Holdings filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Eight Penn, Metropolitan, and U.S.A. Institutional, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. The court denied Eight Penn’s motion for summary judgment, finding ambiguity in the partnership agreements regarding General Holdings’ status as a general partner. After a trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights and that the transfer of interests to Eight Penn was invalid without General Holdings’ consent.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court found that the partnership agreements required the consent of both general partners for a valid transfer of limited partner interests. The court concluded that the transfer of General Holdings’ controlling interest at a foreclosure auction did not require the limited partners’ consent. Therefore, General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights, and the transfer to Eight Penn was invalid. The court upheld the declaratory judgment and denied injunctive relief as unnecessary. View "General Holdings, Inc. v. Eight Penn Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, owners of two condominium units, obtained a judgment against Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC for damages due to mismanagement. The judgment awarded Maples $134,900 and Brown $106,801, along with specific performance, declaratory relief, and attorney fees. The judgment prohibited the defendants from imposing special assessments to pay for the judgment. The judgment was affirmed in part by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but specific performance and the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim were vacated.Maples and Brown recorded writs of execution, obtaining liens against the LLC's and Association's properties. However, the LLC's units were foreclosed by The First, N.A., extinguishing the liens. Maples and Brown then filed a new action in the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the judgment against the remaining seven units not owned by them or foreclosed upon. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, where the court dismissed their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the lower court erred in dismissing the claim to enforce the judgment lien against the seven units under the Maine Condominium Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117. The court held that the proper procedure for enforcing such a lien requires a disclosure proceeding in the District Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket did not cure the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Maples and Brown’s claims, as the Superior Court and the Business and Consumer Docket lacked jurisdiction to issue the necessary turnover or sale orders under the disclosure statutes. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Kimberly Deramos lived in an apartment complex owned by Anderson Communities. While returning from a walk with her Shih Tzu, Princess, they were attacked by a pit bull allegedly owned by a neighboring tenant. Princess died, and Deramos sustained injuries requiring surgery and counseling. Deramos sued Anderson Communities, claiming they negligently failed to maintain a safe environment for tenants.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Anderson Communities' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on the strict liability dog-bite rule in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.235(4). The court concluded that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and thus could not be held strictly liable. Deramos did not cite this statute in her complaint but instead alleged general negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under the statute and did not address Deramos's negligence claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the strict liability dog-bite statute was inapplicable to Deramos's negligence claim. The court emphasized that negligence and strict liability are distinct legal concepts, and Deramos's complaint sufficiently alleged negligence. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence claim based on strict liability principles. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Deramos v. Anderson Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use.As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law

Linda Lee owned a motel in Pascagoula, Mississippi, which had deteriorated significantly and was being used improperly, attracting vagrants and drug users. The city council ordered the demolition of the motel after a hearing, citing it as a menace to public health and safety. Lee did not attend the hearing, but her son did. The city council decided the motel was beyond repair and ordered its demolition.Lee appealed the city council's decision to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing that the city failed to provide substantial evidence and did not comply with statutory notice provisions. The Circuit Court affirmed the city's decision. Lee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the city’s notice was insufficient and reversed and remanded the case for further determination.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the appeal was moot because the motel had already been demolished by a new owner, as admitted by Lee in her appellate filings. Additionally, Lee lacked standing to pursue the appeal because she had transferred the property to her son on the day of the city council meeting and no longer had any interest in it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed Lee's appeal. View "Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

Angela Knight and her two children lived in a rental unit managed by the King County Housing Authority. In January 2023, the Housing Authority served a three-day notice to vacate due to alleged nuisance and criminal conduct, including unauthorized guests, excessive garbage, and activities leading to police reports involving shootings and stolen property. Despite previous warnings and a transfer to another unit, the issues persisted. When the Knights did not vacate, the Housing Authority filed for an unlawful detainer.A commissioner of the King County Superior Court ruled that the property fell under the CARES Act's 30-day notice requirement for evictions, as the Knights were given only three days' notice. Consequently, the unlawful detainer petition was denied, and the eviction action was dismissed without prejudice. The Housing Authority appealed this decision.The Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, held that the 30-day notice requirement under the CARES Act applies only to evictions for nonpayment of rent, disagreeing with Division Two's broader interpretation in a similar case. Andre Knight sought discretionary review from the Washington Supreme Court to resolve this conflict.The Washington Supreme Court held that § 9058(c) of the CARES Act requires a 30-day notice only for evictions due to nonpayment of rent. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that the CARES Act's notice provision does not extend to all types of evictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hous. Auth. v. Knight" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the partition of a family-owned oceanside property in West Maui. The property, originally owned by Elizabeth Cockett Robinson, was conveyed to her children and grandchildren. After Elizabeth's passing, the property was held in undivided interests by her five children and their descendants. The property includes four residential structures, three of which are occupied by some family members, while others do not reside there. The families have attempted to subdivide or sell the property for decades without success.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit initially ordered a partition in kind by subdividing the property into three lots, later amending it to two lots due to regulatory challenges. Eventually, the court ordered the property to be partitioned as a four-unit Condominium Property Regime (CPR), despite objections from some family members who argued that such a partition was not lawful under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 668.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case, focusing on whether a circuit court can order a partition by CPR under HRS Chapter 668. The court held that partition by CPR is not a lawful form of partition in kind pursuant to HRS Chapter 668. The court emphasized that the purpose of partition is to sever co-ownership ties, which a CPR does not accomplish as it creates new contractual obligations and entanglements among the owners.The Supreme Court vacated the Circuit Court's April 18, 2023 Final Judgment and related orders, remanding the case to the Circuit Court to undo the CPR, partition the property by sale, and hold further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Robinson v. Zarko" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Hari and Saranya Nagireddy, live next to a property owned by Willow Haven on 106th Street, LLC, which is being developed to house up to ten residents with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. After Willow Haven obtained a building permit from Carmel, the Nagireddys sued, seeking a declaration that the proposed use would be a public nuisance as it would violate Carmel’s unified development ordinance (UDO). They also obtained a preliminary injunction against further construction.The Hamilton Superior Court denied Willow Haven’s motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the Nagireddys did not need to exhaust administrative remedies before the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and were likely to succeed on their claim. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, with a majority holding that the Nagireddys were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and were likely to succeed on their nuisance claim. A dissenting judge argued that the UDO was ambiguous and should be interpreted to permit Willow Haven’s land use.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the preliminary injunction was improper. The court found that the Nagireddys did not prove they were likely to win their public-nuisance claim, as they did not show that Willow Haven’s proposed land use violated the UDO at this preliminary stage. The court noted that the UDO incorporates state and federal law, which may protect Willow Haven’s land use. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willow Haven on 106th St, LLC v. Nagireddy" on Justia Law

Eight Black homeowners in New York City sued a lending institution and affiliated entities, alleging that the lender violated federal, state, and city antidiscrimination laws. They claimed the lender made mortgage refinancing loans with high default interest rates to Black and Latino individuals in poor neighborhoods who had no income, no assets, and low credit scores but high equity in their homes, and then foreclosed on the loans when the individuals defaulted. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a final judgment awarding four homeowners $722,044 in compensatory damages and four others nominal damages.The lender appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: by finding the homeowners' claims timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling and the discovery rule of accrual, in its instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination, and in holding that a release-of-claims provision in a loan modification agreement signed by two homeowners was unenforceable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the homeowners' claims were timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court also found no error in the district court's instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination. Finally, the court agreed that the release-of-claims provision in the loan modification agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law