Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A property owner purchased a 17.547-acre parcel in North Kohala, Hawai‘i Island, in 2018. According to the official 1974 State Land Use District Boundaries map, about 4.794 acres of the property are within the conservation district, and the remainder is in the agricultural district. The owner contended that the conservation district boundary was incorrectly drawn, following the location of an old road rather than a newer road built in 1961. If the boundary had followed the newer road, 1.813 acres currently classified as conservation would have been agricultural. The owner petitioned the Land Use Commission (LUC) for a declaratory order to interpret the boundary under Hawai‘i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 15-15-22, arguing that the map contained a mistake and that the boundary should be corrected.The LUC held a public hearing, where the property owner presented evidence and testimony. The Office of Planning and Sustainable Development opposed the petition, stating there was insufficient reason to believe the official boundary was incorrect. The County of Hawai‘i took no position. The LUC unanimously denied the petition, finding that the evidence was not “conclusive” or “compelling” enough to show a mapping error or that the boundary was intended to follow the newer road. The LUC concluded that the map was properly drawn and that the boundary interpretation provided by staff was correct.The property owner appealed to the Circuit Court for the Third Circuit, and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i. The Supreme Court held that, absent rulemaking to the contrary, the proper burden of proof for factual findings in such proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Because the LUC applied a heightened burden of proof, the Supreme Court vacated the LUC’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The case concerns an agreement between the City of Fairfield and the Solano Irrigation District, initiated at the request of Solano County, to treat raw water for a new mixed-use development in Middle Green Valley, an unincorporated area outside Fairfield’s city limits. Under the agreement, the City would treat water supplied by the District and return it as potable water, while the District would handle distribution, operations, maintenance, and billing. The development, approved by the County, includes residential units and preserves a significant portion of land for agriculture and open space. The City asserted that providing such water treatment services outside its boundaries was consistent with its practices and rights.After the City Council approved the agreement, the Solano County Orderly Growth Committee filed a petition in the Solano County Superior Court, arguing that the agreement violated the City’s 2002 General Plan and California’s Planning and Zoning Law by providing municipal services for development outside the city’s urban limit line. The Superior Court granted the petition, finding the agreement inconsistent with the General Plan and invalidating it.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether state law required the agreement to be consistent with the City’s General Plan and, if so, whether the City’s determination of consistency was reasonable. The appellate court held that California law does not require such agreements to be consistent with a city’s general plan unless specifically mandated by statute, which was not the case here. Even assuming a consistency requirement, the court found the City’s determination that the agreement was consistent with its General Plan to be reasonable. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, thereby upholding the agreement. View "Solano County Orderly Growth Committee v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

After failing to pay property taxes on her home in Maricopa County, Arizona, the plaintiff’s tax liens were sold to a private entity, which later foreclosed on the property. The plaintiff did not respond to the foreclosure action, resulting in a default judgment that extinguished her rights to the property. The property was then deeded to the private purchaser, who transferred it to another private party. The plaintiff subsequently challenged the foreclosure, the retention of surplus equity from the sale, and the constitutionality of the Arizona statute that allowed private parties to enforce tax liens without providing just compensation.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s injuries stemmed from the state court’s foreclosure judgment, which had already extinguished her property rights, and thus her federal claims amounted to an impermissible appeal of a state court decision. The court also dismissed her state law claims, except for one over which it declined supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims that directly attacked the state court foreclosure judgment, such as those alleging the foreclosure was an unconstitutional taking or excessive fine. However, the court held that claims challenging the defendants’ post-judgment retention of surplus equity were not barred, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a property owner’s right to excess equity after a tax foreclosure. The court also found that the plaintiff’s facial challenge to the statute was not barred by Rooker-Feldman but was moot due to legislative amendments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the surviving claims. View "SEARLE V. ALLEN" on Justia Law

A hotel property owner challenged the Los Angeles County Assessor’s valuation of its property for tax purposes, arguing that two specific revenue streams should have been excluded from the income-based assessment. The first was a 14 percent nightly occupancy tax assigned by the City of Los Angeles to the original developer as an incentive to construct the hotel, and the second was a one-time “key money” payment made by Marriott International to the owner for the right to manage and brand the hotel for 50 years. The owner claimed these revenues derived from nontaxable intangible assets—contractual rights—and thus should not be included in the property’s taxable value.The Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board ruled in favor of the County, finding both the occupancy tax and key money payments were properly included as income from the property itself. The Board also found insufficient evidence to isolate the value of certain enterprise assets (customer goodwill, food and beverage operations, and workforce) from the real estate value. The Los Angeles County Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision on the occupancy tax and key money, but remanded for further proceedings on the valuation of the enterprise assets. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court on the first two issues, holding that the occupancy tax and key money should be excluded, but affirmed the remand for valuation of the enterprise assets.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that the Assessor was permitted to include both the occupancy tax and key money payments in the hotel’s assessed value, as these revenues represent income from the use of the property itself rather than from enterprise activity. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to remand for further proceedings regarding the valuation and deduction of the three identified enterprise assets. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Olympic and Ga. Partners, LLC v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

A family leased a home within military housing at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California. Shortly after moving in, they experienced persistent water intrusion and mold contamination, which they alleged damaged their property and affected their health. The family reported these issues to the property manager and the public-private entity responsible for the housing, but claimed that remediation efforts were inadequate and that their concerns were dismissed. After further testing confirmed hazardous mold, the family vacated the property and brought state law claims, including negligence and breach of contract, against the property manager, the public-private housing entity, and a mold remediation company.The defendants removed the case from California state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal officer, and federal agency jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and, after further proceedings, found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on all asserted grounds. Specifically, the court determined there was no evidence that the United States had accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the property, that the defendants failed to show a causal nexus between their actions and federal direction, and that the public-private entity was not a federal agency. The district court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the remand order under an exception allowing appellate review when federal officer removal is asserted. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly found no federal enclave jurisdiction because there was no evidence of federal acceptance of exclusive jurisdiction over the property. The court also held that the defendants did not meet the requirements for federal officer or agency jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand to state court. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

Aaron Powers owned a lot within a subdivision governed by covenants, codes, and restrictions (CC&Rs), as well as an adjacent parcel he intended to develop. The adjacent parcel lacked access to a public or private road, so Powers sought to construct a road across a sixty-foot strip of his lot to provide access. After the homeowners association (HOA) denied permission, Powers obtained a boundary line adjustment and amended plat from Teton County, effectively moving the strip into the adjacent parcel. Carl Jordan, a subdivision homeowner and HOA board member, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the road’s construction, arguing that the CC&Rs still applied to the strip and prohibited the road.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Teton County, granted summary judgment for Jordan, declaring that the CC&Rs continued to apply to the strip, that Powers violated the CC&Rs by splitting the lot, and that the CC&Rs categorically prohibited construction of the road. The court issued a permanent injunction against Powers and awarded attorney fees and costs to Jordan. Powers moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the CC&Rs continued to apply to the sixty-foot strip despite the boundary adjustment and that Powers was required to obtain approval from the HOA’s Design Committee before constructing the road, which he had not done. However, the Court reversed the lower court’s declaration that the CC&Rs categorically prohibited road construction and that the boundary adjustment constituted a prohibited lot split, finding those issues either unsupported or moot. The permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs were vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Jordan v. Powers" on Justia Law

A group of seven property owners and part-time residents in Northeast Harbor challenged the approval of a six-unit subdivision proposed by Mount Desert 365 (MD 365) on a 0.9-acre parcel. The subdivision, called Heel Way, was designed to provide workforce housing and consisted of two double-dwelling-unit buildings and two single-dwelling-unit buildings on a commonly owned lot. The Town of Mount Desert Planning Board held nine meetings, considered input from the developer, residents, and the public, and ultimately approved the application in October 2023, issuing a written decision in December 2023.The residents sought judicial review in the Maine Superior Court, which transferred the case to the Business and Consumer Docket. In June 2024, the Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, and the residents appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly, applying de novo review to the ordinance interpretation. The Court held that the Planning Board correctly determined that the subdivision did not create separate lots and thus did not need to meet access-road requirements. The Planning Board also did not abuse its discretion in waiving the performance bond in favor of a conditional agreement. The Court affirmed the Planning Board’s calculation of density requirements, finding no error in its methodology.However, the Court found that the Planning Board erred by declining to calculate the open-space requirements under the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the Business and Consumer Docket with instructions to remand to the Planning Board for further consideration of the open-space calculation. View "Cannon v. Town of Mount Desert" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations, including landowners and agricultural groups, challenged North Dakota statutes governing the underground storage of carbon dioxide and oil or gas, as well as laws permitting pre-condemnation surveys on private property. The plaintiffs own or represent owners of “pore space” in underground geological formations, which is used for carbon dioxide sequestration projects overseen by the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC). The plaintiffs argued that the statutes authorizing amalgamation of pore space and pre-condemnation surveys violate constitutional protections against uncompensated takings and due process, and that certain statutory provisions constitute an improper delegation of legislative power.The District Court of Bottineau County granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that most of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a six-year statute of limitations, as the claims were facial challenges to statutes enacted more than six years prior. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the oil and gas storage law was not viable as a facial challenge because it depended on future actions and factual circumstances. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the provision allowing the NDIC to grant exceptions (N.D.C.C. § 38-22-03(7)) and the oil and gas storage amalgamation law (N.D.C.C. ch. 38-25), as they had not shown actual or threatened injury. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the carbon dioxide storage amalgamation provisions (N.D.C.C. ch. 38-22). The court ruled that the district court erred in dismissing these claims as time-barred, as the claims accrued when the NDIC acted under the statutes, not when the statutes were enacted. The court affirmed dismissal of the pre-condemnation survey law claims, but on the basis of binding precedent, not the statute of limitations. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northwest Landowners Association v. State" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute over the calculation of nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRI) in oil and gas produced from a tract of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The plaintiffs, as trustees of three family trusts, each hold an undivided one-third interest in a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the NW¼NE¼ of Section 31-154-97, based on a 1951 royalty deed. The land in question abuts the Missouri River, and a portion of it lies below the ordinary high-water mark, which is owned by the State of North Dakota. Continental Resources, Inc. operates an oil well on a spacing unit that includes this tract, while third-party defendants own the minerals above the high-water mark, subject to the trusts’ royalty interests.The District Court of McKenzie County previously found that the trusts’ NPRI did not include State-owned acreage below the high-water mark, and adopted Continental’s calculation of the royalty payment factor, which excluded the State’s acreage and included an upward adjustment for equitable distribution. The court also held that Continental’s suspension of royalty payments was permissible under the “safe harbor” provision of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1, denied the trusts’ request for an accounting, and awarded costs to Continental, concluding the trusts were not the prevailing party. The trusts appealed, arguing errors in the NPRI calculation, the application of the safe harbor provision, and the determination of the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s amended judgment. It held that the 1951 royalty deed unambiguously grants the trusts a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the entire described tract, including State-owned acreage. The court remanded for recalculation of the NPRI, reconsideration of the safe harbor provision, determination of outstanding royalties and accounting, and proper allocation of costs and disbursements, finding the trusts to be the prevailing party. View "Garaas v. Continental Resources" on Justia Law