Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A steel subcontractor was hired to perform work for a university construction project and entered into a subcontract with the general contractor. The general contractor began defaulting on payments, prompting the subcontractor to notify the surety insurance company, which had issued a payment bond guaranteeing payment for labor, materials, and equipment. The surety made partial payment but disputed the remaining amount. The subcontractor then demanded arbitration against the contractor, with the surety notified and invited to participate. The contractor filed for bankruptcy and did not defend in arbitration, nor did the surety participate. The arbitrator awarded the subcontractor damages, including attorneys’ fees and interest, and the award was confirmed in court. The subcontractor sought to enforce the arbitration award against the surety, including attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest, and also brought a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania’s insurance statute.The Centre County Court of Common Pleas initially excluded evidence of the arbitration award against the surety at trial and ruled the surety was not liable for attorneys’ fees or bad faith damages. A jury found for the subcontractor on the underlying debt, and the court awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate. Both parties appealed. The Superior Court held the arbitration award was binding and conclusive against the surety, who had notice and opportunity to participate, and affirmed liability for attorneys’ fees related to pursuing the contractor in arbitration. The court rejected the bad faith claim, holding the statute did not apply to surety bonds, and confirmed the statutory interest rate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in all respects. It held that Pennsylvania’s insurance bad faith statute does not apply to surety bonds, based on statutory language. The court also held that the surety is bound by the arbitration award against its principal, and is liable for attorneys’ fees incurred in arbitration and prejudgment interest at the statutory rate. View "Eastern Steel v. Int Fidelity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property comprising eight parcels totaling roughly 140 acres in Tinicum Township, Delaware County, owned by several parties collectively referred to as the Hendersons. The City of Philadelphia sought to condemn the property for airport expansion and eventually filed formal declarations of taking. The Hendersons alleged that the City’s actions rendered their property worthless, prompting appointment of a board of viewers who conducted hearings and ultimately issued a report awarding damages exceeding $139 million. The City contested the viewers’ findings, particularly challenging the standard and analysis used to determine the property’s highest and best use, and sought a jury trial de novo.Upon appeal, the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas addressed the City’s objections. The court declined to remand the matter to the viewers, finding such a step unnecessary given the impending de novo jury trial. It determined that questions regarding the highest and best use were mixed questions of fact and law, appropriate for resolution at trial, and overruled the City’s objections on this issue. The court made preliminary determinations to guide pre-trial discovery and did not expressly confirm, modify, or change the viewers’ report.The City appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which quashed the appeal, concluding the trial court’s order was not a final, appealable order under the Eminent Domain Code. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed the matter and held that the trial court’s order constituted only preliminary determinations and did not confirm, modify, or change the viewers' report. Thus, it was not a final order subject to immediate appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision to quash the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "In Re: Condemn by City of Phila. Airport Bus. Ctr." on Justia Law

Soscia Holdings, LLC operated the Flat River Reservoir Dam in Rhode Island. In July 2022, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), acting under state law, ordered Soscia to reduce the Dam’s water flow to maintain specific water levels in Johnson’s Pond. Soscia was later assessed monetary penalties by DEM for alleged violations of the permitting statute. During these proceedings, the Town of Coventry condemned the Dam and Johnson’s Pond, paying Soscia just compensation for the property.The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. This court dismissed all claims against the State of Rhode Island and DEM based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also dismissed the § 1983 individual capacity claims against two DEM officials on the grounds of qualified immunity, and rejected Soscia’s claim under the Rhode Island Constitution. However, the court allowed § 1983 official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against the DEM officials to proceed. After Soscia amended its complaint, the district court ultimately dismissed the remaining federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Soscia argued that it continued to face ongoing enforcement actions and monetary penalties, and thus maintained a property interest and the right to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. The First Circuit found that the district court’s opinions thoroughly and correctly explained why Soscia’s federal claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and that new arguments raised on appeal were either waived or did not meet the standard for plain error review. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

An individual entered into a lease to reside in an apartment within an assisted living community. The lease required the tenant to keep the apartment tidy and free of clutter, incorporating provisions from a resident handbook. After the landlord became concerned about the tenant’s compliance—specifically, the presence of unpacked boxes and general clutter—the parties executed a Negotiated Risk Agreement to address these issues. When conditions did not improve, the landlord issued written notices culminating in a 14-day discharge notice and ultimately filed a complaint for restitution of the premises when the tenant did not vacate.Initially, the County Court for Douglas County dismissed the landlord’s first complaint for restitution. Afterward, the landlord issued a new notice based on ongoing violations and filed a second complaint. Following a trial, the county court found the tenant had materially breached the lease and Nebraska law by failing to keep the apartment clean and safe, and entered judgment in favor of the landlord. The tenant appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, which affirmed the county court’s decision. The district court held that the landlord’s pleadings and notice were sufficient, waiver and res judicata did not bar relief, and although the supersedeas bond had been set too high, the issue was moot because the tenant had already been evicted following the failure to post the bond.Before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the tenant argued that various errors warranted reversal, including pleading defects, waiver, res judicata, and improper bond setting. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the appeal was moot because the tenant had been removed from the apartment and no effective relief could be granted. The court also found that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply to any of the issues raised. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. Royce" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to secure water rights in the Dixie Creek-Tenmile Creek basin to support a mining operation. The Nevada State Engineer issued a decision concerning the relinquishment of groundwater rights by the Nevada Division of State Lands (NDSL), which effectively reduced the amount of water available for future appropriation in the basin. The mining company did not hold any established water rights in the basin but had filed several applications for future rights and had objected to NDSL’s filings. The State Engineer did not notify the company of his decision, and the company only learned of it months later through a third party.After learning of the decision, the company petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court for judicial review, claiming the relinquishment adversely affected its interests and the prospects of its water rights applications. The State Engineer moved to dismiss, arguing that the company lacked standing and that the petition was untimely. The district court agreed, finding that the company was not an aggrieved party under NRS 533.450(1) and had no standing, and also found the petition was untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court determined that under NRS 533.450(1), unless a decision is made pursuant to certain enumerated statutes, the party seeking review must have a personal or property right affected by the challenged decision. The mining company had no such existing right; its interest was speculative and based only on pending applications. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition for lack of standing and did not reach the issues of timeliness or equitable relief. The holding clarifies that only parties with a personal or property right affected by a State Engineer’s decision may seek judicial review under the relevant statutory provision. View "Gold Standard Ventures (US) Inc. v. Thorson" on Justia Law

The dispute stems from a series of lawsuits initiated by a borrower after a nonjudicial foreclosure was attempted on a Maui property he purchased in 2003. Following his default on the mortgage in 2008, the property was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure in 2010 and title transferred to a bank. The bank, through its attorneys, sought to evict the borrower and later filed a judicial foreclosure counterclaim after the borrower challenged the foreclosure's validity. The borrower remained in possession of the property throughout, and subsequent litigation centered on the conduct of both the lender and its attorneys.After an initial summary judgment against the borrower in his wrongful foreclosure suit, the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the parties settled most claims except those against certain attorneys. Separately, the borrower filed new claims against the bank’s law firm and its attorneys, alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, wrongful foreclosure, and other torts related to their legal filings and conduct during the foreclosure process. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the attorneys and declared the borrower a vexatious litigant due to a pattern of abusive litigation.On appeal, the ICA affirmed most of the circuit court’s rulings but reinstated the borrower’s claim alleging fraud on the court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the ICA erred by reinstating this claim, reasoning that even if the borrower’s allegations were true, they did not meet the high threshold required for an independent action for fraud on the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of all claims against the attorneys and the vexatious litigant order, and vacated the ICA’s ruling to the extent it had revived the fraud on the court claim. View "Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law

A ceiling collapse at a construction site in New York injured three employees of a subcontractor, Vanquish Contracting Corporation. The general contractor, Reidy Contracting Group, LLC, had required Vanquish to procure insurance coverage that would protect Reidy as an additional insured. Vanquish obtained an excess liability policy from Mt. Hawley Insurance Company, which incorporated the terms of an underlying policy issued by Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company. After the accident, the injured Vanquish employees sued Reidy. Reidy sought defense and indemnification from Mt. Hawley, but Mt. Hawley denied coverage, arguing that Reidy was not an additional insured and that the Employers Liability Exclusion in the policy barred coverage. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that Reidy was an additional insured under the policy and that the Employers Liability Exclusion did not bar coverage. The court reasoned that, based on the policy’s language and the Separation of Insureds clause, “the insured” in the exclusion referred to the party seeking coverage—here, Reidy, which did not employ the injured workers. Alternatively, the court found the exclusion ambiguous and construed it against Mt. Hawley as the drafter. The court also held that Mt. Hawley was precluded from contesting Reidy’s status as an additional insured because it failed to timely raise this argument as required by New York law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Reidy qualifies as an additional insured and that the Employers Liability Exclusion is ambiguous; thus, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of coverage for Reidy. The judgment granting summary judgment to Reidy and Merchants Mutual Insurance Company was affirmed. View "Reidy Contracting Group, LLC v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A property owner sought judicial review of a city’s decision under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) after the city canceled her land use application for inactivity. The owner, having taken over the application from the prior owner, received multiple requests from the city for additional information and corrections over two years but failed to satisfy them. After being granted several extensions, the city sent a written decision canceling the application via e-mail to the owner and her attorney.The owner filed a LUPA petition in King County Superior Court and attempted service on the city within the statutory 21-day period, but the first attempt was made on a city office assistant who was not statutorily authorized to receive service. A subsequent attempt, this time on the city manager (an authorized person), occurred after the 21-day deadline. The superior court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction due to improper and untimely service, and the owner appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the first service attempt sufficed and that the three-day tolling provision for mailed decisions applied to decisions sent by e-mail, making the second attempt timely.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that personal service under RCW 4.28.080(2) must be made on individuals specifically designated by statute, such as the mayor, city manager, or city clerk, or their designated agents. Service on a non-designated city employee is insufficient. The court further held that LUPA’s three-day tolling provision applies only to decisions sent by postal mail, not by e-mail. Thus, the 21-day period began when the city’s e-mail provided notice of the decision’s public availability. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chandrruangphen v. City Of Sammamish" on Justia Law

A group of residents and an association challenged actions taken by the Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1 (CID) in Boise, Idaho. The dispute arose after the CID’s board adopted resolutions in 2021 authorizing payments to a developer for infrastructure projects—such as roadways, sidewalks, and stormwater facilities—and issued a general obligation bond to finance those payments. The residents objected to the projects, arguing they primarily benefited the developer, imposed higher property taxes on homeowners, and allegedly violated the Idaho Community Infrastructure District Act (CID Act) as well as state and federal constitutional provisions. Previously, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District reviewed the matter after the residents filed a petition challenging the board’s decisions. The district court ruled in favor of the CID and the developer, concluding most of the residents’ claims were either time-barred under the CID Act’s statute of limitations or had been waived because they were not preserved before the CID board. The court also found that the remaining claims failed on their merits, holding that the challenged projects qualified as “community infrastructure,” the stormwater facilities satisfied ownership requirements, and the CID was not the alter ego of the City of Boise. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court clarified that, given the lack of formal administrative proceedings under the CID Act, the preservation doctrine did not apply to bar the residents’ arguments. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any challenge to the CID’s original formation and the 2010 bond election was time-barred. The court further held that the roadways and stormwater facilities qualified as community infrastructure, the CID’s actions did not violate constitutional requirements regarding taxation or lending of credit, and the CID was not the alter ego of the city. The Supreme Court awarded costs on appeal to the CID and the developer but denied attorney fees to all parties. View "Doyle v. The Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1" on Justia Law

The case concerns a parcel of property located in a network of alleyways in downtown Washington, D.C. The property, formerly owned by a partnership concerned about crime and disruption related to nightclub use, was sold in 2008 subject to a recorded restrictive covenant prohibiting operation of a nightclub or late-night alcohol establishment. The property changed hands again, and in 2023, the current owner and its lessee sought to open a large nightclub there, despite being aware of the covenant. They secured a provisional alcoholic beverage license, which was granted after a regulatory hearing that did not consider the covenant’s enforceability. When neighboring property owners and the original seller filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to enforce the covenant, the current property owner and lessee counterclaimed to invalidate it. After discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, upholding the covenant, and dismissed the counterclaim. The court found the covenant’s language unambiguous, that the defendants had notice, and that no substantial changes in the property’s character justified disregarding the restriction. A separate motion to intervene by a neighboring property owner, JPMorgan Chase Bank, was denied as moot. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions. It held that unambiguous, perpetual restrictive covenants are enforceable unless unreasonable or contrary to public policy, and the circumstances here did not warrant equitable nonenforcement. The court also found that the proposed fact disputes were not material and that the denial of JPMorgan’s intervention was proper due to the outcome. The judgment was affirmed. View "DTLD, LLC v. Power Station Limited Partnership" on Justia Law