Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for the lower level of a residential property in Los Angeles in 2015. In 2016, the property was purchased by a new landlord, who made some improvements at the tenant’s request. In 2018, the landlord sought to reclaim the unit for personal use and offered the tenant compensation to vacate, but the tenant refused, alleging harassment and claiming entitlement to substantial back rent. Subsequently, city agencies issued and later rescinded orders regarding the legality of the unit, with the landlord providing documentation to resolve the issues. Despite this, the tenant stopped paying rent, citing the unit’s alleged illegality, and remained in possession for over a year without payment. The landlord attempted to evict the tenant, provided relocation payments, and ultimately the tenant vacated after cashing a relocation check.The tenant filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting multiple claims including violation of statutory and municipal code provisions, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. The landlord filed a cross-complaint for unpaid rent and related claims. After pretrial motions were resolved, the case proceeded to a jury trial, where the tenant’s claim focused on the alleged illegality of the unit and the landlord’s claim centered on breach of contract for unpaid rent. The jury found in favor of the landlord on both the tenant’s claim and the landlord’s cross-claim, awarding the landlord $14,700 in unpaid rent. The trial court denied the tenant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that it was proper for the jury to determine the legality of the unit as a factual issue, and that the landlord was not precluded from contesting the unit’s legality or from introducing evidence from city agencies. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the landlord. View "Emmons v. Jesso" on Justia Law

A Wyoming limited liability company leased commercial property in northern Idaho to a Delaware corporation, which was formerly known as a North Carolina corporation. The lease required the tenant to pay $1,000,000 annually in rent, increasing by 3% each year, on a triple net basis. During the lease, the tenant made some payments directly to the lender on the property’s mortgage, but these were less than the required rent. Additionally, a related entity paid over $8 million to a contractor for construction of a new residence on the property. The tenant argued that these construction payments should be credited as rent, and that it was not required to pay rent after the first month because the landlord failed to deliver a corporate retreat as allegedly contemplated.The District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonner County, granted summary judgment to the landlord for breach of lease, awarding damages and attorney fees. The court found that the tenant failed to pay the full rent required under the lease and rejected the tenant’s argument that construction payments should be credited as rent, finding no evidence of an agreement to that effect. The court also dismissed the tenant’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment, concluding that the lease governed the parties’ obligations and that any improvements became the landlord’s property. The court denied the tenant’s motion for reconsideration, finding no evidence that the tenant funded the construction payments or that such payments were intended as rent.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the district court properly granted summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the tenant’s failure to pay rent, and no evidence supported the tenant’s claims or affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the landlord and awarded attorney fees on appeal under the lease. View "Erie Properties, LLC v. Global Growth Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a cul-de-sac constructed by the plaintiff in Laconia in the late 1980s. The plaintiff indicated on a 1987 subdivision plan that the cul-de-sac would be built and deeded to the City, and lots were sold based on that plan. However, the cul-de-sac was never formally deeded to the City, though the City maintained it until 2019, and it has been used by the public and public services since its construction. In 2019, the plaintiff sought to remove the cul-de-sac and replace it with a hammerhead turnaround, but the planning board denied this request.After the planning board’s denial, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the cul-de-sac had never been accepted by the City and remained private property. Subsequently, intervenors petitioned the City Council to lay out the cul-de-sac as a public highway under New Hampshire law. The City Council approved the layout, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether there was “occasion” to lay out the road as a public highway. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the intervenors, finding that the plaintiff had dedicated the cul-de-sac for public use and that the public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s private interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that the plaintiff’s dedication of the cul-de-sac created a public easement and vested the public with a right to accept the road, limiting the plaintiff’s rights to use the property in ways that would interfere with public use. The Court also found that the public interest in the cul-de-sac outweighed both the plaintiff’s private interest and the burden on the City, thus satisfying the statutory “occasion” requirement for laying out a public highway. The judgment in favor of the intervenors was affirmed. View "Taylor Community v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

A condominium association challenged the validity of a property transaction involving a shorefront parcel that was originally added to the condominium by the declarant, who had expressly reserved development rights, including the right to withdraw land. After the original declarant’s unsuccessful development efforts, the property and associated development rights were transferred to a lender and then to a successor declarant. The successor declarant withdrew the shorefront parcel from the condominium and conveyed it to another entity without obtaining the written consent of 80% of the unit owners. The association argued that this withdrawal and conveyance violated the Maine Condominium Act and sought to have the transaction set aside, as well as to recover attorney fees.The Business and Consumer Docket (a Maine trial court) granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the withdrawal and conveyance were valid exercises of the declarant’s reserved development rights under the condominium declaration and the Maine Condominium Act. The court denied the association’s motion for summary judgment and set remaining claims for trial. On the day of trial, the parties reached a settlement, which was incorporated into a final judgment. The settlement preserved the association’s right to appeal the summary judgment ruling on the withdrawal of the shorefront parcel.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that a declarant’s properly reserved development rights, including the right to withdraw land, are not subject to the statutory requirement that 80% of unit owners approve the withdrawal of common elements. The court also rejected the association’s claim for attorney fees, finding that the parties’ settlement agreement foreclosed such a claim. View "The Village at Ocean's End Condominium Association v. Southwest Harbor Properties LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns the method by which county tax assessors in Georgia determine the fair market value of properties that qualify for federal low-income housing tax credits under Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code. The property owner, who operates a Section 42 affordable housing complex, challenged the county’s assessment of the property’s value for tax purposes. The dispute centers on whether tax assessors may use the “income approach”—a method that estimates value based on projected income streams—when valuing such properties, given statutory limitations on how Section 42 tax credits may be considered as income.After the county tax assessors issued a notice valuing the property, the owner appealed to the Superior Court of Lowndes County. The assessors moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that, under existing precedent, the income approach could not be used because Section 42 tax credits do not generate “actual income” for the property owner. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment on this issue. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Freedom Heights, LP v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, which interpreted both the relevant statute and Supreme Court of Georgia precedent as prohibiting use of the income approach under these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to clarify the proper interpretation of the statute and its own precedent. The court held that tax assessors are permitted to use the income approach to determine the fair market value of Section 42 properties, even though Section 42 tax credits, as currently structured, may not be treated as “income” under that approach. The court overruled the contrary holding in Freedom Heights, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GATEWAY PINES HAHIRA, LP v. LOWNDES COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS" on Justia Law

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a home in a subdivision governed by restrictive covenants that generally prohibit keeping animals other than up to three horses, unless the animals are “household pets” not kept for commercial purposes. After moving in, the plaintiffs acquired a flock of chickens, which at times numbered around sixty. The homeowners association notified the plaintiffs that keeping chickens violated the covenants and threatened fines. The plaintiffs argued that their chickens were household pets and not used commercially, while the association disagreed, citing the number of chickens and evidence suggesting some eggs were sold.In the Superior Court of Union County, both parties moved for summary judgment, but the court found factual disputes and sent the case to a jury. At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of their affectionate relationship with the chickens, while the association highlighted the flock’s size and evidence of egg sales. The jury found that the chickens were not household pets, and the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no evidence the chickens were not household pets and that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the motions for directed verdict and JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the chickens were not household pets. The Court also found no error in the trial court’s jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or limitations on closing arguments. The main holding is that whether the chickens qualified as household pets was a factual question for the jury, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict for the homeowners association. View "Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law