Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Jerome and Shaun Cohen operated a Ponzi scheme through their companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC, from 2010 to 2018. They solicited funds from individual investors and institutional lenders, promising high returns secured by real estate, primarily in Chicago. In reality, the Cohens used new investors’ funds to pay earlier investors and overvalued properties to retain excess capital. By 2018, the scheme collapsed, leaving over $75 million in unpaid obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened, obtaining a temporary restraining order and having a receiver appointed to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to victims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois oversaw the receivership and determined how proceeds from the sale of two properties—7749 South Yates and 5450 South Indiana—should be distributed. Both a group of individual investors and Shatar Capital Partners claimed priority to the proceeds, with Shatar arguing its mortgages were recorded before those of the individual investors. The district court found that Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ preexisting interests and thus not entitled to priority, limiting all claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, minus any amounts previously received.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s distribution order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois law, Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ interests in both properties at the time it invested, given multiple red flags about the properties’ financing and EquityBuild’s business model. As a result, the individual investors were entitled to priority in the distribution of proceeds. The court also found Shatar’s challenge to the distribution plan moot, as there were insufficient funds to benefit Shatar after satisfying the investors’ claims. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Duff" on Justia Law

A group of homeowners, all over the age of 65, entered into contracts for energy efficiency improvements to their homes under California's Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. This program allows local governments to offer financing for such improvements, with repayment made through voluntary special assessments added to the homeowners’ property tax bills. Most local governments contracted private companies to administer these PACE loans. The homeowners alleged that these private administrators failed to comply with consumer protection and lending laws applicable to consumer lenders, such as providing required warnings and avoiding prohibited security interests. They filed suit under the Unfair Competition Law, seeking injunctive relief and restitution, including the return of assessment monies paid and prohibitions on future collection of delinquent assessments unless the assessments were removed from their properties.The San Diego County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrers, concluding that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative tax remedies before pursuing their claims in court. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that because PACE assessments are collected as part of property taxes and the relief sought would invalidate those assessments, plaintiffs first needed to pay the assessments and seek administrative relief through the established tax refund procedures.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether plaintiffs were required to follow statutory procedures for challenging taxes. The court held that when plaintiffs’ claims effectively seek to invalidate PACE assessments or prevent their future collection, they must first pay the assessments and pursue administrative tax remedies. However, the court also held that plaintiffs are not required to use tax challenge procedures for claims that do not directly or indirectly challenge a tax, such as those solely addressing the administration of the PACE program. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded to consider whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaints to state only non-tax-related claims. View "Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

Zakaria Allaf and Stephanie Crosby rented an apartment from Robb Crawford and later from Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC, with the lease requiring a $1,795 security deposit. The tenants experienced a persistent cockroach infestation and, after unsuccessful remediation attempts, agreed with Crawford to terminate the lease early in January 2022. Upon moving out, Allaf and Crosby were assured by Crawford’s agent that the security deposit would be addressed within thirty days, but no response was received. Eventually, Crawford’s attorney informed Crosby that the deposit was being withheld because Crawford did not consider the lease terminated.Allaf and Crosby filed a small claims action in the Maine District Court (Portland), alleging wrongful retention of the security deposit and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. After a trial, the District Court found in their favor, awarding $6,000 in damages (including double damages for the security deposit and damages for breach of habitability), plus attorney fees and costs. Shoreline appealed to the Cumberland County Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. Shoreline then appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting liability for wrongful retention and arguing that attorney fees should not be awarded in addition to the $6,000 statutory monetary limit for small claims actions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. It held that sufficient evidence supported the lower court’s finding that the lease had been terminated by agreement and that Shoreline failed to return the security deposit or provide a written explanation. The Court also held that attorney fees awarded under a fee-shifting statute such as 14 M.R.S. § 6034(2) are considered “costs” and are not included within the $6,000 small claims cap set by 14 M.R.S. § 7482. Thus, the award of attorney fees in addition to $6,000 in damages was proper. Judgment was affirmed. View "Allaf v. Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC" on Justia Law

James and Tahnee Young executed a promissory note and mortgage on property in Fargo, North Dakota, in 2016, originally with The Mortgage Company, Inc., and naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee. In July 2022, MidFirst Bank became the holder of the note. After the Youngs stopped making payments, with the last payment in February 2023, MidFirst initiated foreclosure proceedings. In response, the Youngs filed counterclaims alleging fraudulent misrepresentation (based on alleged “robo-signing” or forgery in the assignment of the mortgage), various federal statutory violations, unjust enrichment, coercive collection practices, and constructive fraud.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of MidFirst Bank and denied the Youngs’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that the Youngs lacked standing to challenge the mortgage assignment because they were not parties to the assignment contract and, therefore, could not claim injury from any alleged fraud in the assignment. The district court also ruled against the Youngs on their federal law claims, finding some barred by res judicata and others lacking proof of damages. Additionally, the court denied their request for audio recordings of hearings, stating the transcript was the official record.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court agreed that the Youngs lacked standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage and that MidFirst Bank, as holder of the note, was entitled to foreclose as a matter of law. The court found no evidence of judicial bias or error in the denial of audio recordings that would have affected the outcome. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that any error in denying access to audio recordings was harmless and that summary judgment for MidFirst was proper. View "MidFirst Bank v. Young" on Justia Law

Four property-specific limited liability companies owned real estate in Wisconsin, which was leased to skilled nursing facilities operated by Kevin Breslin through his company, KBWB Operations, LLC. Breslin and his co-guarantors executed personal guaranties ensuring payment and performance under the leases. The nursing facility tenants defaulted on their rent obligations starting in 2018 and subsequently lost their operating licenses after a court-appointed receiver moved residents out. The tenants also failed to complete a purchase option for the properties, triggering a liquidated damages clause. Plaintiffs later sold the properties at a loss.The plaintiffs sued Breslin, his company, and co-guarantors in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enforce the guaranties and recover damages. During the litigation, plaintiffs discovered that one co-guarantor was a California citizen, which destroyed complete diversity and thus federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss this non-diverse defendant, arguing he was not indispensable because the guaranties provided for joint and several liability. The district court agreed and dismissed him. Breslin did not oppose the dismissal. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment; Breslin, facing criminal charges, invoked the Fifth Amendment and presented no evidence on liability or damages. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and awarded nearly $22 million in damages across several categories.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper because the dismissed co-guarantor was not an indispensable party under Rule 19, given joint and several liability. The court affirmed the district court’s findings on most damages but vacated the awards for accelerated rent under one lease (pending further consideration of its enforceability as a liquidated damages clause) and for liquidated damages related to the purchase option (finding it unenforceable as a penalty). The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with these holdings. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "CCP Golden/7470 LLC v. Breslin" on Justia Law

Several tenants of a subdivided property in Los Angeles, each with separate oral lease agreements for individual units, were forced out of their homes after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of a different unit. The landlord did not inform these tenants of the proceedings or provide proper notice. Although only the tenant of unit seven was behind on rent, the landlord sought and obtained possession of the entire property. The sheriff’s deputies, acting on the writ of possession, evicted all the tenants, leaving them homeless and unable to retrieve most of their belongings.The tenants filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims such as wrongful eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of statutory and local ordinances. The landlord responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the tenants’ claims arose from protected petitioning activity—the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action. The Superior Court granted the motion for ten of the eleven causes of action, concluding that the tenants’ claims were premised on the landlord’s protected activity in pursuing the unlawful detainer case.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, held that the tenants’ claims did not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court found that the gravamen of the tenants’ complaint was the landlord’s improper termination of their tenancies without judicial process or notice—not the act of filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer action against another tenant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to deny the motion. View "Noon v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a real estate transaction in which a buyer agreed to purchase a property in Miami for $5,450,000 from two sellers, with a closing set for October 2021. The sellers subsequently discovered a mortgage restriction preventing them from closing until January 2022, which resulted in their failure to close on time. They acknowledged the breach, but subsequent negotiations to revive the deal fell through because the buyer wanted a discounted price to account for damages incurred from the delay, which the sellers refused.The matter proceeded to litigation. The buyer sued for specific performance and damages in state court; the sellers removed the action to federal court and also brought their own federal suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the buyer, not they, had breached. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the sellers’ declaratory action and granted summary judgment to the buyer on breach of contract, reserving the amount of damages for trial. After a bench trial, the district court awarded the buyer specific performance and damages, ordering the sale to proceed. The parties closed the transaction as ordered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the issue of specific performance was moot because the sale had already occurred and the property was now owned by third parties not before the court, making further relief impossible. However, the court found the damages issue remained live. It affirmed the district court’s damages award in all respects except for damages for lost tax savings, which it reversed due to insufficient evidence that the buyer itself suffered those losses. The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with the appellate decision. View "Marmol v. Kalonymus Development Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

A homeowners association in San Diego, governed by the Davis-Stirling Act and its own bylaws, held a recall election to remove a board director. The association distributed recall ballot materials, including a candidate statement from the sole candidate seeking to replace the director if the recall succeeded. The sitting director sought to include her own statement in these materials to advocate against her removal but was denied by the elections inspector, who reasoned that only candidate statements were included. The association’s election rules defined “association media” to exclude candidate forms or statements attached to ballots.Previously, the Superior Court of San Diego County, in a separate action brought by the same director, found no violation of the statutory equal-access requirement for association media, concluding that all candidates had equal opportunity to submit statements using the association’s forms for regular board elections. Following the recall, the director filed a new petition and complaint challenging the association’s refusal to distribute her statement, alleging violations of Civil Code section 5105, various Corporations Code provisions, and negligence. After a bench trial, the Superior Court again ruled for the association and the inspector, finding the candidate statement was not “association media” under the relevant statute and that the recall vote met statutory requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that “association media” as used in Civil Code section 5105 does encompass ballot materials containing candidate statements distributed by the association during an election. The court concluded the director was entitled to equal access to these materials to advocate her position. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Civil Code section 5145, whether the association’s failure to provide equal access affected the election outcome. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions. View "Arroyo v. Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

A credit union recorded a judgment lien against an individual, Troy Lewis, in January 2017. Several months later, the Alaska Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD), recorded a child support lien against Lewis’s property. Subsequently, a law firm acting as trustee initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on Lewis’s property to satisfy a deed of trust held by a bank. After paying the bank, the trustee was left with surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Both the credit union and CSSD claimed entitlement to these surplus funds, with the credit union asserting priority based on the earlier recording of its lien, and CSSD asserting priority under statutes specific to child support liens and withholding orders.The District Court of the State of Alaska, Anchorage, ruled in favor of CSSD, finding that the statutory provisions governing child support liens and withholding orders gave CSSD priority to the surplus funds, despite its lien being recorded after the credit union’s. The district court also found that CSSD’s withholding order applied to the surplus. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, affirmed this decision, relying primarily on the child support withholding order statute as more specific and therefore controlling over the general lien priority statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that CSSD’s withholding order was ineffective in this scenario because, at the relevant time, the surplus funds were not “due, owing, or belonging” to Lewis, as required by the statute. However, the court ruled that the statutory prohibitions on transferring property subject to a CSSD child support lien (AS 25.27.230(d)) do apply to judgment lienholders in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. This effectively grants CSSD’s lien priority over other judgment liens, regardless of recording order. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. The Sayer Law Group, P.C." on Justia Law

A city in Alaska amended its zoning code through an ordinance designed to streamline permitting processes, reduce costs, and encourage development. The planning department reviewed the history of conditional use permits and identified certain uses that could be changed to permitted uses across multiple zoning districts. This proposed amendment underwent a series of public meetings and hearings before the city’s planning commission and city council. Notices about these meetings and the ordinance were published, and the ordinance was ultimately adopted by the city council after public participation and minor amendments.A resident challenged the ordinance in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, claiming the city failed to comply with procedural requirements in its code, did not provide adequate public notice, and that the ordinance lacked a legitimate government purpose, violating substantive due process. He also argued the ordinance was unenforceable and objected to the award of attorney’s fees to the city. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding no genuine issues of material fact, and awarded attorney’s fees to the city, concluding that the city was the prevailing party and the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the city code required only substantial, not strict, compliance with procedural rules and that the city had substantially complied. The court found the city’s public notices adequate and determined that the ordinance served a legitimate public purpose, rejecting claims of arbitrariness or vagueness. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion, and concluded the constitutional claims were frivolous, thus not barring a fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings on all issues. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law