Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A woman and her long-term partner jointly purchased a duplex in Florida, signing both a promissory note and a mortgage as joint obligors and joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The note required monthly payments and a $100,000 balloon payment. After making all monthly payments, they failed to pay the balloon payment when due. The partner died shortly thereafter, and the woman became the sole owner of the property. The lender sent a default notice, and the woman entered into a forbearance agreement but did not pay the balloon payment. The lender filed a creditor’s claim against the deceased partner’s estate, which was rejected, leading the lender to sue the estate for the unpaid amount.The District Court of Fremont County, Wyoming, found the estate liable for the full balloon payment and associated costs, and also found the woman jointly liable as a co-obligor. The estate then sought contribution from the woman, arguing she should pay her share of the debt. After a bench trial, the district court determined that both the woman and the estate were each responsible for 50% of the balloon payment and related fees, applying Florida’s doctrine of equitable contribution. The court rejected the woman’s arguments that she should not be liable due to alleged inequitable conduct by the estate or because the deceased partner had intended to pay the balloon payment himself.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s application of Florida law and its equitable determinations. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the woman was jointly liable for 50% of the balloon payment and associated costs. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the doctrine of equitable contribution, its rejection of the unclean hands defense, or its allocation of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Hutton v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Wildlife Preserves, Inc., a non-profit conservation organization, conveyed land comprising most of the Sunken Forest Preserve—a rare maritime holly forest on Fire Island, New York—to the United States government in the 1950s and 1960s. The deeds included restrictions requiring the land to be maintained in its natural state and operated as a preserve for wildlife, prohibiting activities such as hunting, trapping, and any actions that might adversely affect the environment or animal population. Over time, the National Park Service managed the property as part of the Fire Island National Seashore. In response to a significant increase in white-tailed deer, which threatened local flora and fauna, the government adopted a 2016 management plan involving exclusion fencing and deer population reduction within the Sunken Forest.Wildlife Preserves filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the 2016 plan violated the deed restrictions and triggered a reversionary interest in the property under New York law. The district court denied Wildlife Preserves’ motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s cross-motion, holding that the suit was time-barred under the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations due to a prior fence constructed in 1967.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but on alternative grounds. The court held that, under New York law, the 2016 management plan did not violate the deed restrictions. The court reasoned that the plan’s fencing and deer reduction measures were consistent with the requirement to maintain the land in its natural state and operate it as a wildlife preserve, and that the restrictions must be strictly construed against the grantor. Thus, summary judgment for the government was affirmed. View "Wildlife Preserves v. Romero" on Justia Law

Two landowners initiated mandamus actions challenging an order issued by a local natural resources district (NRD) that permanently reduced certified irrigated acres on their properties under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. One party, a corporation, owned the affected real estate at the time the administrative proceeding began, while the other acquired ownership only after the proceeding and subsequent appeals had concluded. The NRD’s order stemmed from findings that flow meters on wells had been tampered with, violating district rules. Notice of the proceeding was served on the original landowners and published in local newspapers, but not directly on the corporation.The District Court for Harlan County reviewed the case. It dismissed related declaratory judgment actions but granted mandamus relief to both plaintiffs, finding that the NRD’s order was void as to them because they were not served or made parties to the original administrative proceeding. The court ordered the NRD not to enforce the penalties against the plaintiffs and to take steps to restore their rights to irrigate the affected acres. Attorney fees were also awarded to both plaintiffs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the corporation was entitled to relief because it was not properly served with notice, rendering the order void as to it. However, the individual who acquired property after the administrative proceeding was not entitled to relief, as the reduction of irrigated acres was completed before he obtained an interest, and the statute does not provide for restoration in such circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and attorney fee award for the individual, but affirmed as modified the judgment and attorney fee award for the corporation. The main holdings are: due process requires notice to a corporation owning certified irrigated acres, and a reduction completed before a person acquires an interest is not affected by later acquisition. View "State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A woman was injured while running along a city road when she stepped off the roadway to avoid traffic and her foot became lodged in a metal culvert that was partially exposed in a roadside ditch. The culvert had been installed by the city as part of improvement projects in the mid-1990s, and there were no sidewalks in the area. The woman suffered a sprained ankle and a significant laceration that required medical treatment. She alleged that the city failed to maintain the public right-of-way, leaving the culvert uncapped and exposed, and did not provide adequate inspection, maintenance, or warnings.After the incident, the city admitted responsibility for maintaining public rights-of-way and acknowledged that its maintenance practices were primarily complaint-driven, with no routine inspections or written policies for culvert maintenance. The city stated that it had not received complaints about the culvert before the accident and that, after being notified of the incident, it inspected and repaired the culvert by removing the damaged end section.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all claims, holding that the city owed no common law duty of care, that the plaintiff failed to show the culvert was damaged as required under the relevant statute (SDCL 31-32-10), and that the nuisance and gross negligence claims were barred or unsupported.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the culvert was damaged and whether the city should have discovered the damage, making summary judgment on the negligence claim improper. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the city on the nuisance and gross negligence claims, finding them barred by statutory exemptions and insufficient evidence, respectively. The court thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Mahmoudi v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

A state-operated university in South Dakota, facing increased demand for student housing, entered into a series of lease agreements with a local housing commission beginning in 2000. The commission constructed and financed two apartment buildings, leasing them to the university with an option for the university to purchase the property. The original 2000 lease included a provision for a reserve account, funded by any excess between actual debt service and lease payments, which would be disbursed to the university if it exercised its purchase option. Over the years, the parties executed new leases in 2011, 2014, and 2017, each with different terms and none referencing the reserve account provision from the 2000 lease. In 2020, the university notified the commission of its intent to purchase the property, leading to disputes over the purchase price and whether the university was entitled to a credit from a reserve account that no longer existed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Lake County, South Dakota, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the university, holding that all the leases should be read as a single, continuous contract, thereby extending the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease into subsequent agreements. The court also interpreted the purchase price provision to refer to the original construction mortgage, not any refinanced debt, and determined the university was entitled to a refund after calculating the buy-out amount. The commission’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and final judgment was entered for the university.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. It held that the leases were separate agreements, not a single continuous contract, and that the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease did not carry forward. The court further held that the buy-out price should be based on the balance of the mortgage existing at the time the purchase option was exercised, including any refinanced debt, not just the original mortgage. The circuit court’s judgment was vacated. View "S.D. Board Of Regents v. Madison Housing" on Justia Law

A religious corporation in Boise owned property that it used for its church activities. The church entered into a Shared Use Agreement with the local YMCA, allowing the YMCA to operate a daycare program on a portion of the property during weekdays. The YMCA paid the church a monthly amount that was below market rent, intended to help cover maintenance expenses. The daycare provided services to working parents in downtown Boise, including those who could not afford to pay full price, and the church considered this partnership part of its mission outreach to the community.The Ada County Board of Commissioners granted the church only an 82% property tax exemption, determining that the portion used by the YMCA was not exempt because it was leased for business or commercial purposes. The Ada County Board of Equalization affirmed this decision after a hearing, and the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District also affirmed, reasoning that the daycare use was not a religious purpose of the church and that the Shared Use Agreement constituted a lease for business or commercial purposes. The district court declined to consider the church’s alternative argument for a charitable exemption because it was not raised in the original application.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the statutory requirements for property tax exemptions for religious entities under Idaho Code section 63-602B. The court held that the church’s partnership with the YMCA to provide daycare services was in connection with its religious purposes, as supported by the church’s mission statement and evidence of its outreach activities. The court further held that, although the Shared Use Agreement was a lease, the use of the property for daycare constituted use of recreational facilities and meeting rooms in connection with the church’s purposes, and thus was not a business or commercial purpose under the statute. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision and held that the church was entitled to a 100% property tax exemption. View "First Presbyterian Church of Boise, Idaho, Inc. v. Ada County" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law

A primary contractor entered into a subcontract with a heating and cooling company to install HVAC systems in an apartment complex. The subcontract included an arbitration clause allowing the contractor, at its sole option, to require arbitration of disputes. Over several years, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, leading the heating and cooling company to file suit for breach of contract and related claims. The contractor failed to respond timely to an amended complaint due to a breakdown in communication with its registered agent, resulting in a default being entered against it. After being properly served, the contractor and the heating and cooling company stipulated to set aside the default, and the contractor then filed an answer and counterclaims. Only after several months did the contractor move to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the subcontract.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the contractor’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the contractor had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by failing to assert the arbitration right when reentering the litigation and by not including the arbitration defense in its initial answer. The court also determined that the delay prejudiced the heating and cooling company, which had incurred additional costs and surrendered its default judgment without knowing the contractor would later seek arbitration.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the contractor had waived its right to compel arbitration by acting inconsistently with that right and by causing prejudice to the opposing party. The court found no error in the District Court’s application of the waiver standard and declined to address arguments regarding federal arbitration law, as the waiver was established under Montana law. View "Monarch v. Petra" on Justia Law