Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals upholding the final determination by the tax commissioner assessing a use tax against Appellant, holding that the Board did not err in upholding that tax commissioner's final determination.The challenged assessment in this action related to items used in the construction of a data center that Appellant contracted to have built. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision upholding the use tax assessed against Appellant, holding (1) Appellant failed to cite to any authority to support its argument that it was not liable for the use tax because a contractor had already paid it on the items in question; (2) Appellant forfeited the arguments under its third and fourth positions of law; and (3) Appellant's first and second propositions of law were moot. View "PCM, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellants LNSU #1 and LNSU #2, two homeowners in a common interest development managed by the Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (the Association), appealed a judgment entered against them in their action against the Association for violations of the Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act (OMA). The court rejected appellants’ claims that: (1) the Association violated the OMA when its board of directors took action in an executive session that it should have taken in a meeting open to all members; (2) the board failed to prepare minutes concerning a second executive session; and (3) certain directors discussed items of Association business via e-mails without giving all Association members notice and opportunity to participate in the discussions and without preparing related minutes. Appellants also appealed postjudgment orders denying their motion to strike or tax costs and granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to appellants' OMA violation claims. The Court determined the trial court incorrectly awarded costs under a provision of the OMA authorizing such an award to a prevailing homeowners association in an action the court finds “to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” but that the Association was not entitled to attorney fees or costs: "appellants’ action does not meet that description, the Association is not entitled to costs." The judgment is affirmed. The order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs is reversed. The order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions: (1) to vacate the order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs, and to enter a new order granting the motion and denying all costs; (2) to vacate the order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees, and to enter a new order denying the motion; and (3) to strike the amended judgment. View "LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn." on Justia Law

The General Council of the Assemblies of God (General Council) governed the Assemblies of God denomination. Its affiliate, the Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God (District), governed the denomination’s local churches in Mississippi, including Gulf Coast Worship Center (GCWC) in Long Beach. In January 2017, Kevin Beachy, the pastor of GCWC, did not renew his credentials as an ordained pastor with the General Council, ultimately informing the District that he and GCWC intended to disaffiliate from the General Council. The District then informed Beachy that GCWC was being placed under District supervision. On March 19, 2017, the GCWC congregation voted to disaffiliate from the General Council. The congregation voted also to remove a reverter clause from its constitution and bylaws; this clause would have caused the GCWC’s property to revert to the District in the event that GCWC ceased operating as a “church body.” In November 2017, the District filed a chancery court petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Beachy and the GCWC board of trustees, Eddie Kinsey, Andre Mulet, and Kris Williams (collectively, Defendants). Both the District and Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and denied Defendants’ motion. Defendants appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that issues concerning disaffiliation, i.e., actions taken at the congregational meeting on March 19, 2017, and whether GCWC was under the District’s supervision, were church-governing matters. Thus, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the chancellor of jurisdiction to address those claims. But the Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact remained regarding ownership of property. Therefore, the Court reversed the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment to the District and remanded all issues concerning ownership of property for further proceedings. View "Beachy, et al. v. Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan. View "LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer.In April 2019, Seller entered into an agreement to sell a casino and hotel to Buyer. The agreement contained an ordinary course covenant requiring Seller to operate its business in the usual manner between the time the agreement was signed and closing. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Seller complied with the Governor's emergency directive mandating closure of all nonessential businesses. The pandemic also affected Buyer's duties under the agreement. Buyer subsequently terminated the agreement and sued Seller for return of the deposit, alleging various contract claims. Seller counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Buyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Seller did not violate the agreement's ordinary course covenant by closing the casino and hotel as mandated by the Governor's emergency directive and was entitled to retain the earnest money deposit. View "Lucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant owned real property located at 3546 Multiview Drive in Los Angeles, California (the property). That year, he executed two deeds of trust against the property. Defendant obtained a HELOC from National City Bank, memorialized in an Equity Reserve Agreement and secured by a deed of trust against the property (collectively, the HELOC agreement). Piedmont Capital, L.L.C. (Piedmont)—a debt buyer—purchased the HELOC debt. Piedmont sued Defendant. Following a demurrer to the original complaint sustained with leave to amend, Piedmont filed the operative first amended complaint for (1) breach of contract, (2) money lent, (3) money had and received, and (4) declaratory relief. Although Piedmont alleged that the full amount of the HELOC debt Defendant owed totaled $186,587.26, Piedmont conceded that it was “not seeking to collect on any [amounts] that were already barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time [the] action was filed.”   The Second Appellate District reversed. At issue is whether the borrower’s duty to make a monthly payment under such a HELOC agreement indivisible from the borrower’s duty to pay the full amount such that the statute of limitations to recover the full amount begins to run upon the first missed monthly payment. The court held that the duties are divisible. The court explained that the HELOC agreement in this case—by setting a fixed maturity date for the full amount and leaving it to the discretion of the lender whether to accelerate that date—necessarily contemplates that a breach as to a monthly payment does not constitute a breach as to the full amount. View "Piedmont Capital Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of John and Beth Bruner and against Don and Cathy Cooper in this property dispute, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief.The Coopers brought this action seeking to have a road that had been maintained by the fiscal court and used by the public and the Bruners, the Coopers' adjoining landowners, The circuit court ultimately concluded that the road was neither a public road nor an easement. Thereafter, the Bruners successfully sought relief from the court's orders regarding the road's classification under Rule 60.02. The circuit court subsequently granted summary judgment for the Bruners, finding that the road was a public road by prescription. The court of appeals vacated the summary judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting the Bruners' motion for Rule 60.02 relief or by granting summary judgment in favor of the Bruners. View "Bruner v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the conclusions of the district court and court of appeals that Minn. Stat. 515B.2-118(b), a statute of limitations contained within the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act, applied to bar Appellant's claims in this case, holding that the lower courts erred.Appellant owned and operated a common interest community in Richfield that was registered under the Act in 2004. Following a repair project, Appellant sought commercial contributions from Respondent, who refused under the belief that its property interest had been severed from the community. Both parties brought actions seeking declarations as to whether Respondent was required to contribute to the repair project. Respondent cited an amended declaration, recorded in 2007, in arguing that it was not a member of the community and thus not responsible for contributions. The district court and court of appeals concluded that section 515B.2-118(b) applied to bar Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations contained in section 515B.2-118 for challenging the validity of an amendment or supplemental declaration does not bar an action that broadly challenges not the underlying validity of an amended declaration but whether severance occurred under the statute. View "City Bella Commercial, LLC v. City Bella on Lyndale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the tax court that the taxable 2018 market value of a DoubleTree in Bloomington was $25,500,000, an amount that exceeded the valuations offered by the DoubleTree's owner and the County of Hennepin, holding that remand was required on a single issue.The County initially assessed the value of the DoubleTree property at $31,586,400, but Relator, the DoubleTree's owner, appealed the valuation to the tax court. After a trial, the tax court determined that the taxable 2018 market value of the DoubleTree was $25,500,000. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part and otherwise affirmed, holding that remand was required for the tax court to revisit and explain its adoption of the percentage reduction to the sales price of one of the hotels it used in its sales comparison analysis to account for non-taxable assets included in the sales price of comparator hotels. View "Bloomington Hotel Investors, LLC v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Todd and Margaret Maddock appealed a superior court order in favor of defendant Michael Higgins on plaintiffs’ petition to quiet title and their request for declaratory judgment, equitable relief, and a temporary injunction. The dispute arose over clearing of part of the property, a driveway and parking area between the parties abutting properties. Plaintiffs argued the court erred by: (1) failing to find that monuments in the field controlled over bearings or distances in a deed or plan; (2) finding that plaintiffs did not establish title by adverse possession; (3) finding that plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish a boundary by acquiescence; (4) dismissing plaintiffs’ trespass claim; and (5) finding that the testimony of one of defendant’s witnesses was credible. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly found that the field monuments did not control the boundaries established by the parties’ deeds, properly found that plaintiffs did not establish a boundary by acquiescence, properly granted plaintiffs a prescriptive easement over the limited adjacent area for the purposes of snow removal, and properly assessed the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs’ trespass claim but reversed, in part the trial court’s adverse possession decision as it pertained to plaintiffs’ claims concerning their driveway and parking area. View "Maddock, et al. v. Higgins" on Justia Law