Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. This case began in December 2021 when plaintiff Katherine Brady filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. At the time of the petition, plaintiff resided with her husband and children in a single-family residence. The property was titled only in plaintiff’s name. On Schedule C of the petition, plaintiff claimed a homestead exemption under RSA 480:1 for $120,000. Subsequently, plaintiff amended her petition to claim an additional $120,000 homestead exemption on behalf of her non-debtor, non-owner spouse. The Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee filed an objection to the second claimed homestead exemption. In March 2022, plaintiff converted her case to one under Chapter 13. Subsequently, plaintiff amended Schedule D of her petition to add a second secured claim for her spouse for $120,000 based upon her spouse’s claimed homestead exemption. Defendant Lawrence Sumski, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee, asserted the same homestead exemption objection as the predecessor Chapter 7 Trustee. Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that to maintain a homestead right pursuant to RSA 480:1, a person had to demonstrate both occupancy and ownership interests in the homestead property. Because plaintiff’s husband was not an owner of the property, the court concluded that he was not entitled to a homestead exemption under RSA 480:1, and plaintiff could neither assert a homestead exemption on behalf of her husband, nor claim that he possesses a lien that secures his interest in the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded RSA 480:1 included an ownership requirement that applied to all real property occupied as a homestead and a non-owning occupying spouse of another who held a homestead right, pursuant to the statute, did not hold a present, non-contingent homestead right of his or her own. With respect to the district court’s second question, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion and declined to answer because a response to that question was not “determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court.” View "Brady v. Sumski" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting United States Liability Insurance Group's (USLI) motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. to secure insurance coverage in connection with defense costs and indemnification arising from a state court action brought by Northeastern University, holding that there was no error.Northeastern sued Nahant in state court seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights concerning certain land. Nahant, which carried liability insurance through USLI, did not notify USLI of the suit until it wrote to USLI seeking coverage for defense costs. USLI refused to provide coverage on the grounds that Nahant had provided untimely notice of the claim. Thereafter Nahant sued USLI seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment regarding USLI's duty to defend and indemnify. The First circuit granted USLI's motion to dismiss, concluding that the "exclusion agreement" signed by the parties excluded coverage. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly accepted USLI's plausible reading of the exclusion amendment. View "Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law

In a suit filed in 2014 under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–19, Cook County claimed that the banks made credit too readily available to some borrowers, who defaulted, and then foreclosed on the loans in a way that injured the County. The County alleged the banks targeted potential minority borrowers for unchecked or improper credit approval decisions, which allowed them to receive loans they could not afford; discretionary application of surcharge of additional points, fees, and other credit and servicing costs above otherwise objective risk-based financing rates; higher cost loan products; and undisclosed inflation of appraisal values to support inflated loan amounts. When many of the borrowers could not repay, the County asserts, it had to deal with vacant properties and lost tax revenue and transfer fees.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Entertaining suits to recover damages for any foreseeable result of an FHA violation would risk “massive and complex damages litigation.” Proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Cook County seeks a remedy for effects far beyond “the first step.” The directly injured parties are the borrowers, who lost both housing and money. The banks are secondary losers. The County is at best a tertiary loser; its injury derives from the injuries to the borrowers and banks. View "County of Cook v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court finding that Nancy Miles, Cheryl Bettin, and Robert Moninger would by unjustly enriched if they were not required to make reimbursement of taxes paid on the property at issue in this case during the time that Boone River, LLC and 11T NE, LLC held the tax certificate and tax deed, holding that the present lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion.Boone River purchased a tax certificate for the property owned by Miles, Bettin, and Moninger and obtained a tax deed. Boone River later transferred the property to 11T. When 11T sued to quiet title to the property the district court voided 11T's tax deed and quieted title to the property in Miles, Bettin, and Moninger. Thereafter, Boone River and 11T brought this lawsuit for unjust enrichment, seeking to be reimbursed for taxes paid on the property while they held they held the tax certificate and tax deed. The district court ruled in favor of Boone River and 11T. Miles and Bettin appealed, but Moninger did not. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Miles and Bettin showed that this action was barred by claim preclusion. View "Boone River, LLC v. Miles" on Justia Law

International sought permission to erect two two-sided billboards in the City of Troy. These billboards were to be 14 by 48 feet in area and 70 feet in height when mounted; they did not conform to height, size, and setback requirements in the Ordinance. After the City denied its permit application and request for a variance, International sued, citing the First Amendment and arguing that the Ordinance’s variance procedure imposed an invalid prior restraint and that its permit exceptions were content-based restrictions on free speech. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the City on International’s prior-restraint claim but remanded for the court to consider whether the Ordinance, with the permit exceptions, survived strict scrutiny.The district court held that the permitting requirements, with the content-based exceptions. did not survive strict scrutiny but that the permit exceptions are severable, leaving intact the Ordinance’s height, size, and setback requirements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International’s proposed billboards do not satisfy those valid, content-neutral standards, View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's requests for writs of mandamus and certiorari to reverse the Clay County Board of Adjustment's decision affirming the order of the Clay County Planning Commission denying Appellant's proposed conditional use permit, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the writ of certiorari as untimely.In denying Appellant's requests, the circuit court determined that the petition for writ of certiorari was untimely and that a writ of mandamus was not an available remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the writ of mandamus; but (2) erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the writ of certiorari. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Appellant's petition seeking a writ of certiorari was timely filed. View "Hauck v. Clay County Commission" on Justia Law

In the underlying matter involving a longstanding dispute between two condominium owners (Owners) and the Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC (collectively, Compass Harbor) the Supreme Court dismissed this instant appeal from orders of the business and consumer docket, holding that the appeal was interlocutory.The district court entered a judgment awarding Owners damages and attorney fees against Compass Harbor, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part. The instant action involved a complaint brought against Compass Harbor and Owners seeking to enforce the judgment. Here, Owners appealed from orders granting motions to dismiss filed by some of the defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, holding that the orders did not dispose of all claims against all defendants, and therefore, the interlocutory appeal must be dismissed. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law