Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Tax Court, though its adjustments, increasing the market value of the real estate of the Minneapolis Hyatt Regency Hotel for the tax years 2016 through 2018, holding that when a county opposes discovery and the taxpayer moves to compel discovery, the balancing test found in Minn. Stat. 13.03, subdivision 6 is applicable.Relator, which owned the Hotel, challenged the market values assessed by the County of Hennepin for the tax years at issue, arguing that the tax court clearly erred when it accepted the appraisal report of Relator's expert but then made unsupported and unexplained adjustments to the expert's valuations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in its discovery and evidentiary rulings; and (2) did not clearly err in adjusting Relator's valuation of the hotel real estate. View "1300 Nicollet, LLC v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Appellant's unjust enrichment award, holding that the district court did not clearly err in its award to Appellant.Over the course of the parties' romantic relationship Appellant made $282,736.02 in net cash payments to Respondent to renovate Respondent's home. Respondent sold her home for $1.2 million after the couple ended their relationship, and Appellant sued to recover his contribution. The district court awarded Appellant $282,736.02 for his contributions, concluding that Respondent had been unjustly enriched by Appellant's financial contributions. The court of appeals reversed because Appellant did not prove before the district court the increase in value to Respondent's home attributable to his financial contributions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the net amount of money that Appellant contributed directly to and on behalf of Respondent was an appropriate measure of relief for unjust enrichment; and (2) the district court did not clearly err in its award to Appellant. View "Herlache v. Rucks" on Justia Law

Tyler's Hennepin County, Minnesota condominium accumulated about $15,000 in unpaid real estate taxes plus interest and penalties. The County seized the condo and sold it for $40,000, keeping the $25,000 excess over Tyler’s tax debt for itself, Minn. Stat. 281.18, 282.07, 282.08. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Tyler’s suit.The Supreme Court reversed. Tyler plausibly alleges that Hennepin County’s retention of the excess value of her home above her debt violated the Takings Clause. Whether the remaining value from a tax sale is property protected under the Takings Clause depends on state law, “traditional property law principles,” historical practice, and Supreme Court precedents. Though state law is an important source of property rights, it cannot “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests” in assets it wishes to appropriate. The County's use of its power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes to confiscate more property than was due effected a “classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.” Supreme Court precedent recognizes that a taxpayer is entitled to any surplus in excess of the debt owed. Minnesota law itself recognizes in other contexts that a property owner is entitled to any surplus in excess of her debt. The Court rejected an argument that Tyler had no property interest in the surplus because she constructively abandoned her home by failing to pay her taxes. View "Tyler v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed. View "Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc., RAR2-Villa Marina Center CA, LLC, and Villa Marina Company, LLC (collectively, Villa entities) appealed from a judgment entered in this property tax refund action after the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by the County of Los Angeles (County) and denied the Villa entities’ summary judgment motion, upholding the decision of the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (Board) concerning the 2011 valuation of a shopping center owned by the Villa entities. In 2011 the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined the value of the shopping center had decreased, setting the assessment roll value (roll value) at approximately $94 million. The Villa entities filed an assessment appeal with the Board seeking a further reduction of the assessed value to $48 million. On appeal, the Villa entities contend the Assessor had no authority to issue a raise letter recommending an increase in the property’s valuation more than one year after the initial assessment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that a raise letter issued under section 1609.4 providing notice, in the context of an assessment appeal, that the assessor recommends a higher valuation than the roll value is not properly characterized as a proposal by the assessor to correct the roll value to reflect a decline in the property’s value, even if the initial assessment reflected a decline in value, and therefore, the one-year limitations period under section 4731, subdivision (c), does not apply. The court agreed that the County and the Board carried out their statutory duty in adopting the higher valuation for the property. View "RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying the County of St. Lawrence's action seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 2-2021 of the City of Ogdensburg was inconsistent with N.Y. Real. Prop. Tax Law (RPTL) 1150 or otherwise unconstitutional under the home rule article of the New York State Constitution, holding that there was no error.The law at issue in this case repealed a prior local law validly opting out of the application of RPTL article 11. The County commenced this proceeding arguing that the law was not in accord with state law and impaired the rights of the County and the County Treasurer. Supreme Court denied the petition and declared the law to be valid and enforceable. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the law did not violate the statutory and constitutional protections at issue in this case but effectuated a power granted by the legislature to cities wishing to revoke their opt-out from article 11. View "St. Lawrence County v. City of Ogdensburg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Town of Ogunquit Board of Appeals concluding that good cause existed for this appeal brought by Appellant pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B challenging the issuance of building permits by the Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) to 477 Shore Road LLC, holding that the Board erred.At issue was the issuance of building permits to the LLC of construction relating to six single-family dwelling units. Appellant, who owned property abutting the LLC's parcel, filed a complaint requesting an injunction, a writ of mandamus, and a declaratory judgment. The complaint was denied. While Appellant's appeal was pending (Tominsky I), the CEO issued a certificate of occupancy for one of the dwelling units. Appellant appealed the issuance of the certificate, but the Board voted not to hear the appeal. Appellant then filed a second complaint containing multiple counts against the Town and the LLC (Tominsky II). The superior court denied Appellant's appeal in Tominsky I and dismissed the appeal in Tominsky II. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in Tominsky I and affirmed the judgment in Tominksy II, holding (1) the appeal in Tominsky I before the Board was untimely; and (2) the appeal in Tominsky II failed to allege a viable claim for relief. View "Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Andrew William Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint asking a circuit court to enter a judgment declaring that he had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons's property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons's property and denied Ammons's counterclaims. Ammons appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ammons Properties, LLC v. Spraggins" on Justia Law