Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

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In October 2020, Cal SD, LLC purchased a property with a restrictive covenant that regulated property maintenance and improvements, including a prohibition on new construction within designated "no build" areas. The covenant allowed for a specific exception for a garden fence on Lot B, with strict size and location limitations. Tina Roberts, who gained control of Cal SD in April 2021, constructed a garden with a fence that included overhead trusses and hail netting, exceeding the permitted dimensions and height.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, reviewed the case after Spring Canyon Properties, LLC filed a complaint alleging that Roberts' garden structure violated the restrictive covenant. The court denied Roberts' motion for summary judgment and granted Spring Canyon's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the garden structure was a building rather than a fence and violated the covenant. The court ordered Roberts to remove the overhead components and comply with the covenant.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision that the garden structure violated the restrictive covenant, as the structure did not fit the plain and ordinary meaning of a "fence" and conflicted with the covenant's purposes. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in imposing an eight-foot height restriction, as neither the covenant nor the county ordinance specified such a limit. The Supreme Court affirmed the order to bring the fence into compliance with the covenant but remanded to remove the height restriction. View "Spring Canyon Properties, LLC v. Roberts" on Justia Law

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Mary Johnson entered into an oral agreement with her parents, Carl and Pearl Johnson, to obtain financing for constructing a small home on a parcel of land (Gertie Lode) they conveyed to her. In exchange, Mary and her family could live in their parents' larger home on a separate parcel (Spaniard Lode). Once the mortgage was satisfied, Mary was to transfer the Gertie Lode property equally to herself and her siblings. Despite satisfying the mortgage, Mary informed her siblings in 2008 that she would not convey the land to them.Greg Johnson, Mary's brother, sought to enforce the oral agreement and reform the deed from their parents to Mary. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, granted Mary’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Greg’s breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that he was not entitled to reformation because he could not establish that the deed failed to reflect the parties’ intent. Greg appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Greg’s breach of contract claim accrued when he received Mary’s 2008 letter, which clearly indicated her intent to breach the oral agreement. Since Greg did not bring his claim until October 2018, it was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Additionally, the court found no basis for reformation of the deed, as the oral agreement was never reduced to writing, and the warranty deed accurately reflected the intent of the parties. Therefore, summary judgment on both the breach of contract and reformation claims was appropriate. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Habdab, LLC filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Lake County against the County of Lake and the Village of Mundelein, seeking to invalidate certain fees imposed under an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). Habdab claimed the fees violated the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law (Impact Fee Law) and sought to avoid paying unconstitutional road improvement impact fees. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Habdab's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision.The appellate court held that the fees imposed under the IGA did not constitute "road improvement impact fees" under the Impact Fee Law because they were not conditioned on the issuance of a building permit or a certificate of occupancy. The court also found that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions did not apply, as there was an essential nexus and rough proportionality between the fees and the legitimate state interest of preventing traffic congestion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the IGA fees did not fall under the definition of "road improvement impact fees" as per the Impact Fee Law, which specifically applies to fees imposed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy. The court also agreed that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply, as there was a legitimate state interest in minimizing traffic congestion and a rough proportionality between the fees and the impact of the proposed development. View "Habdab, LLC v. County of Lake" on Justia Law

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Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of real property in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, leaving them "up for grabs," and that they claimed the minerals by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County District Court, the petitioners attempted service of process by publication on "unknown persons." Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The court granted the Lindvigs' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees, concluding the petitioners' action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County District Court, the petitioners filed a similar lawsuit. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including non-compliance with procedural rules and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases and remanded for further findings on whether the Lindvigs owned mineral interests subject to the petitioners' claims. View "Nelson v. Lindvig" on Justia Law

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Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

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Aksal Group, LLC filed an application with the Minot City Planning Department in July 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve a preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition, a new three-lot subdivision. The Kyle’s Addition plat, recorded in 1995, included a single block with a 24-foot public access easement. RMM Properties, which owns adjacent property, objected, arguing that Aksal Group needed their consent to vacate the public alley and that half of the alley would revert to them as the adjacent property owner.The Minot Planning Commission approved Aksal Group’s application under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16, and the Minot City Council subsequently passed a resolution in September 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. RMM Properties appealed this decision to the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, which affirmed Minot’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 was the appropriate statute governing Aksal Group’s application. The court found that Minot’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. The court also determined that the Kyle’s Addition plat dedicated a public access easement, not a fee title, and that the procedures under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 were correctly applied. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, upholding Minot’s decision to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. View "RMM Properties v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

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Northstar Center, LLC filed a lawsuit against Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP, and Tundra Properties, LLC, alleging breach of contract and intentional interference with contract. Lukenbill had initially agreed to sell a 120-acre parcel to Templeton Enterprises, LLC, which later assigned its rights to Northstar. However, Lukenbill sold the property to Tundra instead. Northstar claimed Lukenbill breached their agreement, and Tundra intentionally interfered with the contract. Lukenbill sought indemnification from Tundra, and Tundra counterclaimed for breach of warranty deed against Lukenbill.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, and in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. The court denied Tundra’s summary judgment motion on its breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, concluding Tundra did not adequately brief the issue.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, as Tundra did not challenge the dismissal on the grounds that it could not maintain the claim without a certificate of authority to transact business in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the title of a condominium unit that was foreclosed upon twice by different lien holders. Wonder Twins Holdings, LLC purchased the property at the first foreclosure sale conducted by the condominium association to recover unpaid assessments. Later, 450101 DC Housing Trust purchased the property at a second foreclosure sale conducted by the mortgage lender. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to DC Housing Trust, ruling that the mortgage had been recorded earlier than the Trustee’s Deed received by Wonder Twins.The Superior Court's decision was based on the premise that the mortgage had priority over the condominium association's lien. The court did not consider the super-priority lien created by D.C. Code § 42-1903.13(a)(2), which gives the condominium association a priority lien for the most recent six months of unpaid assessments. The court also noted that the foreclosure sale was advertised as subject to any prior liens, which it interpreted as preserving the mortgage lender's priority.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reaffirmed its previous holdings that the most recent six months of unpaid condominium assessments constitute a super-priority lien. This lien, when foreclosed upon, extinguishes any deed of trust, regardless of the terms of the sale. However, the court also recognized that a 2017 amendment to the Condominium Act requires that if a condominium association forecloses on more than the six-month super-priority lien, the first deed of trust must be preserved.The Court of Appeals found that the record did not clarify whether the condominium association foreclosed only on its super-priority lien or on a split lien. Therefore, it reversed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the exact nature of the foreclosure and the resulting priority of the liens. View "Wonder Twins Holdings, LLC v. 450101 DC Housing Trust" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Ohio Edison Company and the Corder family over the use of herbicides on property subject to easements held by Ohio Edison. The easements, granted in 1948, allow Ohio Edison to maintain electrical transmission lines and to trim, cut, and remove trees, limbs, underbrush, or other obstructions that may interfere with or endanger their infrastructure.Initially, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, believing it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction and remanded the case to resolve the ambiguity in the easements. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's jurisdictional ruling but vacated its analysis of the easements, remanding the case to the trial court.On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Corders, holding that the easements did not permit the use of herbicides. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding the easements ambiguous and concluding that they did not authorize the use of herbicides.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the easements unambiguously grant Ohio Edison the right to remove vegetation and other obstructions. The court held that the term "remove" includes the use of herbicides, as the easements do not restrict the methods of removal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to issue an entry awarding summary judgment to Ohio Edison. View "Corder v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law