Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A woman was injured while running along a city road when she stepped off the roadway to avoid traffic and her foot became lodged in a metal culvert that was partially exposed in a roadside ditch. The culvert had been installed by the city as part of improvement projects in the mid-1990s, and there were no sidewalks in the area. The woman suffered a sprained ankle and a significant laceration that required medical treatment. She alleged that the city failed to maintain the public right-of-way, leaving the culvert uncapped and exposed, and did not provide adequate inspection, maintenance, or warnings.After the incident, the city admitted responsibility for maintaining public rights-of-way and acknowledged that its maintenance practices were primarily complaint-driven, with no routine inspections or written policies for culvert maintenance. The city stated that it had not received complaints about the culvert before the accident and that, after being notified of the incident, it inspected and repaired the culvert by removing the damaged end section.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all claims, holding that the city owed no common law duty of care, that the plaintiff failed to show the culvert was damaged as required under the relevant statute (SDCL 31-32-10), and that the nuisance and gross negligence claims were barred or unsupported.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the culvert was damaged and whether the city should have discovered the damage, making summary judgment on the negligence claim improper. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the city on the nuisance and gross negligence claims, finding them barred by statutory exemptions and insufficient evidence, respectively. The court thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Mahmoudi v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

A state-operated university in South Dakota, facing increased demand for student housing, entered into a series of lease agreements with a local housing commission beginning in 2000. The commission constructed and financed two apartment buildings, leasing them to the university with an option for the university to purchase the property. The original 2000 lease included a provision for a reserve account, funded by any excess between actual debt service and lease payments, which would be disbursed to the university if it exercised its purchase option. Over the years, the parties executed new leases in 2011, 2014, and 2017, each with different terms and none referencing the reserve account provision from the 2000 lease. In 2020, the university notified the commission of its intent to purchase the property, leading to disputes over the purchase price and whether the university was entitled to a credit from a reserve account that no longer existed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Lake County, South Dakota, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the university, holding that all the leases should be read as a single, continuous contract, thereby extending the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease into subsequent agreements. The court also interpreted the purchase price provision to refer to the original construction mortgage, not any refinanced debt, and determined the university was entitled to a refund after calculating the buy-out amount. The commission’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and final judgment was entered for the university.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. It held that the leases were separate agreements, not a single continuous contract, and that the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease did not carry forward. The court further held that the buy-out price should be based on the balance of the mortgage existing at the time the purchase option was exercised, including any refinanced debt, not just the original mortgage. The circuit court’s judgment was vacated. View "S.D. Board Of Regents v. Madison Housing" on Justia Law

A religious corporation in Boise owned property that it used for its church activities. The church entered into a Shared Use Agreement with the local YMCA, allowing the YMCA to operate a daycare program on a portion of the property during weekdays. The YMCA paid the church a monthly amount that was below market rent, intended to help cover maintenance expenses. The daycare provided services to working parents in downtown Boise, including those who could not afford to pay full price, and the church considered this partnership part of its mission outreach to the community.The Ada County Board of Commissioners granted the church only an 82% property tax exemption, determining that the portion used by the YMCA was not exempt because it was leased for business or commercial purposes. The Ada County Board of Equalization affirmed this decision after a hearing, and the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District also affirmed, reasoning that the daycare use was not a religious purpose of the church and that the Shared Use Agreement constituted a lease for business or commercial purposes. The district court declined to consider the church’s alternative argument for a charitable exemption because it was not raised in the original application.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the statutory requirements for property tax exemptions for religious entities under Idaho Code section 63-602B. The court held that the church’s partnership with the YMCA to provide daycare services was in connection with its religious purposes, as supported by the church’s mission statement and evidence of its outreach activities. The court further held that, although the Shared Use Agreement was a lease, the use of the property for daycare constituted use of recreational facilities and meeting rooms in connection with the church’s purposes, and thus was not a business or commercial purpose under the statute. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision and held that the church was entitled to a 100% property tax exemption. View "First Presbyterian Church of Boise, Idaho, Inc. v. Ada County" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law

A primary contractor entered into a subcontract with a heating and cooling company to install HVAC systems in an apartment complex. The subcontract included an arbitration clause allowing the contractor, at its sole option, to require arbitration of disputes. Over several years, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, leading the heating and cooling company to file suit for breach of contract and related claims. The contractor failed to respond timely to an amended complaint due to a breakdown in communication with its registered agent, resulting in a default being entered against it. After being properly served, the contractor and the heating and cooling company stipulated to set aside the default, and the contractor then filed an answer and counterclaims. Only after several months did the contractor move to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the subcontract.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the contractor’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the contractor had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by failing to assert the arbitration right when reentering the litigation and by not including the arbitration defense in its initial answer. The court also determined that the delay prejudiced the heating and cooling company, which had incurred additional costs and surrendered its default judgment without knowing the contractor would later seek arbitration.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the contractor had waived its right to compel arbitration by acting inconsistently with that right and by causing prejudice to the opposing party. The court found no error in the District Court’s application of the waiver standard and declined to address arguments regarding federal arbitration law, as the waiver was established under Montana law. View "Monarch v. Petra" on Justia Law

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on approximately 930 acres of agricultural land owned by two trusts near Pocatello, Idaho. The trusts entered into a purchase and sales agreement with a developer, Millennial Development Partners, to sell a strip of land for a new road, Northgate Parkway, which was to provide access to their property. The trusts allege that Millennial and its partners, along with the City of Pocatello, failed to construct promised access points and infrastructure, and that the developers and city officials conspired to devalue the trusts’ property, interfere with potential sales, and ultimately force a sale below market value. The trusts claim these actions diminished their property’s value and constituted breach of contract, fraud, interference with economic advantage, regulatory taking, and civil conspiracy.After the trusts filed suit in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trusts sought to delay the proceedings to complete additional discovery, arguing that the defendants had not adequately responded to discovery requests. The district court denied both of the trusts’ motions to continue, struck their late response to the summary judgment motions as untimely, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice and awarding attorney fees to the defendants. The trusts appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s denial of the trusts’ motions to continue, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court erred by failing to analyze whether the defendants had met their burden under the summary judgment standard and appeared to have granted summary judgment as a sanction for the trusts’ untimely response. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, and declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Rupp v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

After suffering spinal fractures in a car accident, the plaintiff received surgical treatment and post-operative care from a neurosurgeon and a surgical nurse. The plaintiff was insured at the time, and the medical provider received his insurance information but did not bill the insurer. Instead, the provider filed a medical lien for over $180,000 against any potential recovery the plaintiff might obtain from a third-party tortfeasor, pursuant to Idaho Code section 45-704B. The plaintiff’s attorney objected, arguing that the Idaho Patient Act (IPA) required the provider to bill the patient’s insurance before filing such a lien. The provider maintained the lien was proper under the medical lien statute and did not comply with the IPA.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The court determined that the medical lien was not subject to the IPA because it did not constitute an “extraordinary collection action” as defined by the Act. The court also found a factual dispute regarding whether the charges were reasonable, ultimately concluding after a bench trial that the physician’s charges were reasonable but the nurse’s charges should be excluded. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the medical lien did constitute an “extraordinary collection action” under the IPA because it was a lien placed on the patient’s property in connection with a debt. The Supreme Court further held that, because the provider failed to bill the patient’s insurance before filing the lien, as required by the IPA, the lien was invalid. The judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff and declare the lien invalid. The Supreme Court also awarded attorney fees on appeal to the plaintiff. View "DeKlotz v. NS Support, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned three contiguous, landlocked parcels in Ammon, Idaho, with no access to a public road. The property directly south, which bordered an arterial road, was owned by another party. In 2017, the plaintiffs sought to sell their parcels and attempted to purchase an easement from the southern neighbor, but negotiations failed. They then filed suit to establish an easement by necessity over the southern property. The defendants, successors to the original southern owner, raised several affirmative defenses but did not initially cite a statute of limitations.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding they were entitled to an easement by necessity. On the first appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the four-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-224 applied to such claims and remanded for fact-finding on when the statute accrued. On remand, the district court found the claim accrued in 2004 and was time-barred, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the statute of limitations defense was waived, the summary judgment was erroneous, and the prior Supreme Court decision should be reconsidered.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case again. It held that the statute of limitations in section 5-224 does not apply to easement by necessity claims, departing from its earlier decision. The court reasoned that such easements arise at severance and exist as long as necessity continues, and applying a statute of limitations would undermine Idaho’s public policy favoring the full use of land. The court vacated the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants, reinstated the original grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and remanded solely to determine the proper location of the easement. The plaintiffs were awarded costs on appeal but not attorney fees. View "Easterling v. Clark" on Justia Law