Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Benjamin Jones and Melanie Jones were married in 2003 and have two minor children. They resided in Glenburn, North Dakota, and purchased a modular home and surrounding acreage from Melanie's parents under a contract for deed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, payments on the contract were suspended, and no payments have been made since, leaving an outstanding debt. In March 2023, Benjamin filed for divorce. In February 2024, Melanie's father notified the parties of his intention to declare default and cancel the contract for deed. The trial was held later that month.The District Court of Renville County granted the divorce, awarded primary residential responsibility of the children to Benjamin, and divided the property and debts. The court found zero equity in the marital home due to nonpayment and the intention to foreclose. It reserved ruling on the final value of the marital home and debt consolidation loan for six months. The court awarded Melanie spousal support of $900 per month for 10 years and ordered her to pay $590 per month in child support.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the award of primary residential responsibility to Benjamin, finding no clear error in the lower court's decision. However, it reversed the lower court's reservation of ruling on the marital home and debt consolidation loan valuations, as well as the valuation of the marital home and corresponding debt without specific findings on the valuation date. The Supreme Court also found error in the child support calculation for omitting spousal support and in-kind income.The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court to clarify the valuation date for the marital property and debt, make specific findings if another valuation date is fair and equitable, redistribute the marital estate if valuations change, reconsider spousal support in light of any redistribution, and recalculate child support to include spousal support. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Kensington Title-Nevada, LLC, a Nevada-based real estate company, acquired property in Denton, Texas, which contained radioactive materials owned by US Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (USR). The Texas Department of State Health Services had denied USR’s application for a radioactive material license and ordered decommissioning of the materials. Kensington proposed a decommissioning plan, which the Department approved, and a licensed contractor began the cleanup. However, Kensington faced conflicting demands from the Department and local taxing entities, leading to a halt in decommissioning.The Department issued a notice of violation to Kensington for possessing radioactive material without a license and sought an $8,000 penalty. Kensington amended its pleading in an ongoing tax dispute to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the licensing rule did not apply to it as it did not own or possess the radioactive material. The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kensington failed to allege a proper rule-applicability challenge.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Kensington had standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a). The Court found that Kensington’s allegations of interference with its legal rights due to the Department’s notice of violation were sufficient to establish standing. The Court also concluded that Kensington’s challenge to the applicability of the licensing rule was within the scope of the statute’s waiver of immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES" on Justia Law

Several residents of the City of Muscle Shoals filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking damages for negligence and trespass due to flooding caused by the City's management of a stormwater-drainage pond in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs claimed that heavy rainfall in February 2019 overwhelmed the pond, leading to the flooding of their homes. They argued that the City failed to plan adequately for such events and did not maintain the pond properly.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court in March 2020, seeking damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. They later amended their complaint to drop the wantonness claim and added a request for injunctive relief, which the trial court denied. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the trespass claim. The trial court denied the City's motion, leading the City to file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The Court found that the City's decision to plan for 25-year rainfall events was within common municipal practice and did not constitute neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness. Additionally, the Court concluded that the City's design and maintenance of the pond were not defective within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the City, effectively barring the plaintiffs' claims for damages. View "In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law

Emmett Hotard acquired two lots in Hancock County in 2006 and used one as security for a loan from The Peoples Bank. After defaulting on the loan and failing to pay property taxes, Lot 17 was sold at a tax sale to Ken Foreman in 2012. The bank later assigned its interest to Emmett's brother, Eric Hotard, who initiated foreclosure proceedings. Eric's company, DHP1, LLC, purchased the lots at a foreclosure sale in 2014. The chancery clerk sent a notice of the tax sale to Emmett, which was returned undelivered. Notices were also sent to lienholders, including Eric.The Hancock County Chancery Court found that the chancery clerk failed to satisfy statutory notice requirements for the tax sale and declared the sale void. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, and voided the tax deed to Ken Foreman and the subsequent quitclaim deed to Baron Foreman, who had acquired Lot 17 from Ken.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that Emmett, as the record owner 180 days before the redemption period expired, was entitled to notice. The chancery clerk failed to provide proper notice by certified mail or personal service and did not conduct a diligent search for Emmett's address, which was easily discoverable in the land records. The court emphasized that any deviation from the statutory notice requirements renders a tax sale void. Consequently, the tax sale was declared void, and summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, was affirmed. View "Foreman v. DHP1, LLC" on Justia Law

The Randy W. Stevens Living Trust owns land in Saratoga, Wyoming, bordered by an alleyway owned by the Town of Saratoga. Randy Stevens, the trustee, and Quality Landscape & Nursery, Inc., which uses the land, have had various disputes with the Town over the years. In 2019, a judgment was issued in favor of the Town, which the Stevens parties did not appeal. In 2023, the Stevens Trust and Quality Landscape filed a motion for an order to show cause and for a writ of mandamus, which the district court dismissed, citing res judicata and the parties' contractual limitations period. The court also found mandamus was not available under the circumstances.The district court of Carbon County had previously ruled on several issues between the parties, including the reconstruction of the alleyway, installation of utilities, and access to the property. The court found that the Town had acted in good faith and that the Stevens parties had failed to prove damages. The Stevens parties did not appeal these rulings. In 2023, they sought to revisit these issues, but the district court dismissed their motion, finding that the claims were barred by res judicata and the contractual limitations period.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the claims raised by the Stevens parties were barred by res judicata, as they had been or could have been litigated in prior proceedings. The court also agreed that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, as the duties in question were not ministerial. Finally, the court found that judicial estoppel did not apply, as the Town had not taken inconsistent positions. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Stevens parties' motion. View "Stevens v. The Governing Body of the Town of Saratoga, Wyoming" on Justia Law

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

Harold Sheppard, Jr., who operates a plane salvage and trucking business, began leasing part of the South Big Horn County Airport in 2011 for a metal scrapping and recycling venture. In 2019, Big Horn County sued him for unpaid rent, resulting in a money judgment and an order to remove his property, which he did not comply with. In 2021, the County filed a $543,600 storage lien against his property. Sheppard then sued the Board of County Commissioners to stop the sale of his property, challenge the lien, and seek damages. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations in September 2022, leading to the vacating of a scheduled trial.The County Commissioners moved to dismiss Sheppard’s claims for failure to prosecute in January 2024, citing a lack of action since the September 2022 status conference. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the case with prejudice. Sheppard did not appeal this dismissal but filed a motion to reconsider under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) in March 2024, arguing that the dismissal was premature and that the court should enforce the settlement agreement before dismissing the case.The district court denied Sheppard’s motion, finding he failed to meet the burden for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Sheppard appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not recognizing the unusual circumstances and the existence of a settlement agreement. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that Sheppard failed to protect his legal interests by ensuring the settlement agreement and lease were executed and that his delay in filing the motion to reconsider was unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Sheppard v. Board of County Commissioners, In and for Big Horn County, Wyoming" on Justia Law

In 2020, Article 13 LLC filed a quiet title action against LaSalle National Bank Association (now U.S. Bank) to discharge a mortgage as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired since a foreclosure action was commenced in 2007. U.S. Bank contended that the statute of limitations had not expired because the 2007 foreclosure action was invalid to accelerate the mortgage debt. The district court found a disputed issue of material fact regarding the validity of the 2007 foreclosure action and denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.Following the district court's ruling, New York enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which bars the defense of the invalidity of prior accelerations of mortgages in quiet title actions. Article 13 LLC moved for reconsideration, and the district court applied FAPA retroactively, granting summary judgment in favor of Article 13 LLC. U.S. Bank appealed, arguing that FAPA should not be applied retroactively and that such retroactivity would be unconstitutional under both the New York and U.S. Constitutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the questions of FAPA's retroactivity and its constitutionality under the New York Constitution were novel and essential to the resolution of the appeal. Consequently, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: whether Section 7 of FAPA applies to foreclosure actions commenced before the statute's enactment, and whether FAPA's retroactive application violates substantive and procedural due process under the New York Constitution. The Second Circuit deferred its resolution of the appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Article 13 LLC v. Lasalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n" on Justia Law

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. sought to build a natural gas pipeline through McKenzie County, North Dakota. After obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, WBI attempted to acquire the necessary easements through voluntary sales. When one family refused to sell, WBI filed a federal condemnation action under the Natural Gas Act. After three years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the amount of just compensation for the easement, but the issue of attorney fees remained unresolved.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that WBI was responsible for the family's attorney fees based on North Dakota law, which allows for such fees in condemnation proceedings. The district court relied on the precedent set by Petersburg School District of Nelson County v. Peterson.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the availability of attorney fees depends on whether state or federal law governs the compensation due. The court concluded that federal law applies because WBI was exercising the federal eminent-domain power delegated under the Natural Gas Act. The court noted that the Fifth Amendment's requirement for just compensation does not include attorney fees unless explicitly provided by statute. The Natural Gas Act does not mention attorney fees, and thus, the default rule under the Fifth Amendment applies. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees, holding that WBI is not obligated to pay the family's attorney fees. View "WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods in Twsp. 149" on Justia Law

Cedar Hills Investment Co., L.L.C. leased part of the ground under the Battlefield Mall in Springfield, Missouri, to Battlefield Mall LLC. Cedar Hills suspected that Battlefield was improperly deducting certain costs from revenue-sharing payments owed under the lease. Cedar Hills sued Battlefield, and the district court found that Battlefield had improperly deducted capital expenditures and some administrative costs from shared revenue. The court approved the deduction of security costs and other administrative costs but held that Battlefield failed to state charges to subtenants for deducted costs separately as required by the lease. Cedar Hills was awarded approximately $3.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Cedar Hills on several points, including the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the court also found that Battlefield's deduction of security costs was permissible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings regarding the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the appellate court found that the district court misidentified which administrative costs were deductible and miscalculated Cedar Hills's damages. The Eighth Circuit held that Battlefield's deduction of capital expenditures breached the lease, and the failure to separately state charges also breached the lease. The court affirmed the district court's finding that security costs were common area maintenance costs. The case was remanded for further proceedings to correctly identify deductible administrative costs and recalculate damages. The appellate court granted the parties' joint motion to supplement the record. View "Cedar Hills Investment Co. v. Battlefield Mall, LLC" on Justia Law