Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Attorney General v. Town of Milton
The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law
Reese v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
Plaintiff Jeanie Reese, acting as conservator for Leoma Musil, filed a lawsuit against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and other defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The dispute arose when SPS recorded a notice of trustee’s sale while Reese’s loan modification application was pending. Reese claimed that SPS violated former section 2923.6 by proceeding with foreclosure actions during the loan modification process.The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but this decision was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court finding a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Reese had submitted a complete loan modification application. Upon remand, Reese amended her complaint, but the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that SPS had not violated former section 2923.6 because it recorded a new notice of trustee’s sale and sold the property more than a year after denying the loan modification application and Reese’s subsequent appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that SPS’s actions did not constitute a violation of former section 2923.6, as the new notice of trustee’s sale recorded in May 2018 cured any previous violation. The court also found that the 18-month delay between the denial of the loan modification application and the new notice of trustee’s sale rendered the initial violation immaterial. Consequently, the court concluded that Reese’s complaint did not state a cause of action under former section 2923.6, and the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend was appropriate. View "Reese v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law
Becker v. City of Hillsboro
The City of Hillsboro, Missouri, enacted ordinances prohibiting new private wells within city limits and requiring residences to connect to the city water system. The Antoinette Ogilvy Trust, owning a 156-acre property within Hillsboro, claimed these ordinances constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trustees, William Becker and Darcy Lynch, argued that the regulations made developing the property financially unfeasible due to the high costs of connecting to the city water system.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the City, rejecting the trustees' claims. The court found that the regulations did not constitute a per se taking, as they did not involve a physical invasion of the property or deprive it of all economic value. The court also determined that the regulations did not fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulatory takings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the regulations did not mandate a permanent physical invasion of the property, as the trustees were not compelled to build structures or dedicate land to the City. The court also found that the property retained substantial value, thus not constituting a taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Additionally, the court declined to consider the trustees' exaction claim, as it was not sufficiently raised in the lower court.Under the Penn Central test, the court concluded that the economic impact on the trustees was not significant enough to constitute a taking, and the regulations did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The character of the governmental action was deemed a legitimate exercise of the City's police powers to prevent water contamination and protect the aquifer. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Becker v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law
Franklin v. Regions Bank
Two lessors, Elizabeth Franklin and Cynthia Peironnet, owned mineral interests in a tract of land in Louisiana. In 2007, Regions Bank, managing their interests, mistakenly extended a lease for the entire tract instead of a portion. Advances in drilling technology increased the tract's value, and the lessors sued Matador Resources, the lessee, to invalidate the extension. Meanwhile, they entered into a new lease with Petrohawk Energy Corporation, contingent on the invalidation of the Matador lease. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the Matador lease, preventing the lessors from benefiting from the more favorable Petrohawk lease.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial in 2021, finding Regions liable for breach of contract. On remand, the court considered extrinsic evidence to determine the lease's royalty provision, concluding it should be based on gross proceeds. The court awarded damages accordingly, including prejudgment interest on past losses and discounted future losses to present value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the lease conveyed a gross proceeds royalty and the admission of extrinsic evidence. However, it reversed the district court's award of royalty damages plus prejudgment interest. The appellate court instructed the district court to consider actual loss data for past years when recalculating damages and to award prejudgment interest from the date each item of past damages was incurred. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these instructions. View "Franklin v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law
JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara
Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law
Schneider v. Lane
The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners, Eberhard and Ursula Schneider (plaintiffs) and Karla S. Lane (defendant), over an easement used by Lane to access her property. The easement was initially destroyed by flooding in 2002, leading to a 2011 judgment that established the easement burdened the entire servient tenement owned by the Schneiders. The court relocated the easement further inland on the Schneiders' property. After another flooding incident in 2018 damaged the relocated easement, the Schneiders filed an action for quiet title and declaratory relief, while Lane filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief.The Superior Court of Alpine County granted Lane summary judgment against the Schneiders' complaint, ruling it was barred by res judicata. At trial on Lane's cross-complaint, the court again relocated the easement further inland but ruled that Lane was responsible for stabilizing the riverbank to prevent further erosion under Civil Code section 845.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to relocate the easement but reversed the ruling that Lane was responsible for stabilizing the riverbank. The appellate court held that section 845 requires the dominant tenement owner to maintain the easement in good repair but does not obligate them to construct new improvements, such as a riverbank stabilization project, separate from the easement to protect it from potential future harm. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the new easement route that imposed the least burden on the servient tenement. View "Schneider v. Lane" on Justia Law
Remington v. Iverson
Duane and Melody Remington purchased a campground and later discovered various defects on the property. They sued the seller, Keith Grimm, and the real estate agent, Bryan Iverson, alleging multiple claims including failure to disclose defects, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The Remingtons claimed that Iverson and Grimm did not provide a required property disclosure statement and misrepresented the financial condition of the campground.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of Iverson, determining that a property disclosure statement was not required because the sale was a commercial transaction. The court did not specifically address the common law claims of nondisclosure against Iverson. The Remingtons appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that a property disclosure statement was required for the living quarters of the campground, which constituted residential real property. The court affirmed the lower court's decision that a disclosure statement was not required for the non-residential aspects of the campground. The case was remanded to determine whether Iverson breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the Remingtons that Grimm was required to provide a property disclosure statement for the living quarters.The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of Iverson’s direct liability, concluding that the Remingtons failed to establish that Iverson had actual knowledge of the alleged defects. The court dismissed Iverson’s notice of review regarding attorney fees and costs due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Remington v. Iverson" on Justia Law
A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation
A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI) leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and sought to purchase it under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which mandates that Caltrans offer to sell commercial real property deemed excess to the current occupant at fair market value. ADI used the property commercially and applied to purchase it after Caltrans designated it as excess. However, Caltrans denied the application, arguing that the property was not commercial when initially acquired. The trial court agreed with Caltrans and denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that ADI met the conditions of section 118.1, including leasing, occupying, and improving the property. However, it ruled that the statute applied only to property that was commercial when acquired by Caltrans, interpreting "acquired" as a past-tense verb.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the plain and contextual reading of section 118.1 requires the property to be commercial at the time it is deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court found that the statute's language, legislative history, and Caltrans' own manuals support this interpretation. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer to sell the property to ADI at fair market value. The court held that ADI is entitled to its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles
The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara
Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law