Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a university in Nebraska instituted a policy requiring all students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by a specified deadline, with the only exemptions allowed for medical reasons or until a vaccine received full FDA approval. Religious exemptions were not permitted. Students who failed to comply were unenrolled and barred from campus, and some had holds placed on their accounts, preventing access to transcripts. One student complied with the mandate but suffered adverse effects and was medically exempted from further doses. Another student withdrew voluntarily before the deadline.After the university enforced the mandate, several students sought injunctive relief in the District Court for Douglas County to prevent their unenrollment, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court denied relief, finding that any contract included the Emergency Use Authorization waiver agreements and that the students breached the contract by not being vaccinated after FDA approval. An initial appeal was dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court for lack of a final, appealable order. The students then consolidated their actions and filed an operative complaint alleging breach of implied contract, denial of due process, conversion, negligence, and violations of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (NCPA). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied leave to amend.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and found that the students plausibly alleged claims for breach of an implied contract and conversion, based on the university’s unilateral modification of conditions mid-semester and the withholding of transcripts. The court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence and NCPA claims, finding them preempted by the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, and held that the due process claim was abandoned on appeal. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the breach of contract and conversion claims. View "Ramaekers v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two competing billboard companies after one company constructed an electronic billboard in Gulfport, Mississippi. The company that operated existing billboards nearby filed suit, claiming that the new billboard violated a city ordinance enacted as part of a settlement resolving earlier litigation involving the city and the plaintiff. The defendant, along with related entities, countered with claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged the plaintiff’s standing to bring the suit. The property owner on whose land the disputed billboard was constructed also became a party to the litigation.The litigation began in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, which denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, specifically rejecting their standing argument. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it and awarded costs to the plaintiff. After the defendants’ interlocutory appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was transferred to circuit court. There, the court again denied summary judgment, and further unsuccessful dispositive motions were filed by the defendants. Over several years, the case involved multiple motions, removal, transfer, and appeals, with no claims proceeding to trial. Eventually, after the defendants transferred their interest in the billboard to a third party who settled with the plaintiff, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted the motion and denied the defendants’ subsequent request for attorney’s fees and costs, finding that much of the litigation expense was due to the defendants’ own aggressive litigation strategies, and declined to impose sanctions, concluding the suit was not frivolous.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal, focusing on whether the trial court erred in denying attorney’s fees and sanctions to the defendants. The court held that the decision to award attorney’s fees or impose sanctions was within the trial court’s discretion, and found no abuse of discretion in denying fees or sanctions, affirming the dismissal with prejudice. View "Busby v. The Lamar Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A Texas law, Senate Bill 17, prohibits individuals who are domiciled in certain “designated countries,” including China, from acquiring interests in Texas real estate. The law defines “domicile” as a person’s true, fixed, and permanent home to which the individual intends to return whenever absent. Peng Wang, a Chinese citizen who has lived in Texas for sixteen years on an F-1 student visa, challenged the law’s constitutionality. Wang attends school in Texas, intends to remain in the state after graduation, and does not plan to return to China.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Wang’s suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that he lacked standing. The district court found that Wang was not domiciled in China based on his long-term residence and stated intentions to remain in Texas. The court also concluded that Wang faced no substantial risk of future enforcement of the statute against him, citing repeated in-court statements by the Texas Attorney General disavowing any intent to enforce the law against Wang.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Wang lacked standing for two independent reasons. First, Wang failed to allege he was domiciled in China, so the statute did not arguably proscribe his conduct. Second, he did not demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement of the law, given the Attorney General’s in-court assurances and lack of any enforcement action or procedures targeting Wang. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wang v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Russ and Debi Ropken hired a construction company to build a custom home based on an oral agreement. The contractor began work and sent invoices for services and materials, which the Ropkens paid until May 2022, after which they stopped making payments. In July 2022, the Ropkens removed the contractor from the site. The contractor then sent a demand letter for three unpaid invoices totaling $276,169, but the Ropkens refused to pay. The contractor sued to recover the unpaid amount.In the District Court of Park County, the Ropkens admitted owing at least $176,870.21. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found there was a valid contract, the Ropkens had breached it, and awarded the contractor $258,587.70 in damages. The district court entered judgment for that amount and permitted the contractor to request prejudgment interest. The contractor timely filed for prejudgment interest, and the Ropkens objected. The district court found for the contractor, awarding $33,473.25 in prejudgment interest at a statutory rate, and calculated interest from the date of the demand letter. The Ropkens paid the judgment but appealed the prejudgment interest award.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest and whether due process was violated by granting interest without an evidentiary hearing. The court held that a district court may award prejudgment interest even when it is not the trier of fact, as prejudgment interest is a matter of law and not fact. The court found the claim was liquidated and the Ropkens had notice. The court also held that the Ropkens received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, satisfying due process. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Ropken v. Yj Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman against whom a default judgment had been entered later married and, after her marriage, her husband opened a bank account solely in his name. Some months later, both spouses executed new signature cards for the account, designating ownership as “tenancy by the entireties” and checking the relevant box. The husband’s wages were the only funds deposited into the account. When the creditor holding the judgment against the wife sought to garnish the account, she asserted that the account was exempt from garnishment as an entireties account, since the debt was her individual obligation.The Circuit Court rejected her claim of exemption, holding that because the account was originally opened by only one spouse, the common law “unities” of time and title were not present, and the account could not be a tenancy by the entireties. The petitioner did not dispute the absence of these unities but argued that the express designation on the signature card and section 655.79(1), Florida Statutes, made the account an entireties account regardless. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that neither the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates nor section 655.79(1) eliminated the common law requirements for an entireties account. The Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District’s decision in Versace v. Uruven, LLC, which had found a similar account exempt.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case to resolve the conflict. It held that while Beal Bank did not address or eliminate the common law unities for entireties accounts, the 2008 amendment to section 655.79(1) did. The Court concluded that under the statute, a joint spousal account may be held as a tenancy by the entireties even if originally opened by only one spouse. The Court quashed the Second District’s decision and approved Versace to the extent it was consistent. View "Loumpos v. Bank One" on Justia Law

A property owner participated in Georgia’s Conservation Use Value Assessment (CUVA) program, which allows for reduced property tax assessments in exchange for maintaining the land for conservation purposes under a ten-year covenant. The property was subsequently sold in part to a new owner, who failed to apply to continue the CUVA covenant by the statutory deadline. As a result, the Hall County Board of Tax Assessors determined that this failure constituted a breach of the covenant, imposed penalties for the breach, and sent tax statements reflecting the penalty to both the original and new property owners.The original owner appealed the Board’s determination to the Hall County Board of Equalization, which denied the appeal. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Superior Court of Hall County, arguing that the Board had not completed required statutory steps before imposing the penalty, that the relevant statutory provision was unconstitutionally vague, and that the wrong penalty provision had been applied. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all issues.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the owner’s constitutional claim challenging the statute’s validity. The Supreme Court concluded that, due to a 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9-4-7(c), any constitutional challenge to a statute—even as part of a non-declaratory judgment action—requires service of the proceeding on the Attorney General so the State may defend the statute. Because the owner had not served the Attorney General prior to the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. The Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order addressing the constitutional question and remanded the case to allow proper service on the Attorney General. The Court did not address the owner’s non-constitutional arguments. View "CHESTNUT RIDGE, LLC v. HALL COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS" on Justia Law

Two neighbors in a residential community disagreed about a tree branch that obstructed one neighbor’s view. Jinshu Zhang, the owner seeking the view, used his homeowners association’s dispute resolution process, which included mediation and arbitration services provided by Charles Peterson, an independent mediator. When the association dismissed Zhang’s application, Zhang sued Peterson for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Peterson was a director or officer of the association and thus owed him such a duty. However, Peterson was neither a director nor an officer, but an independent contractor. Zhang lost his lawsuit against Peterson following a nonsuit at trial, and did not appeal.After that case concluded, Peterson filed a malicious prosecution action against Zhang, alleging Zhang’s earlier suit was baseless and continued without probable cause once Zhang had evidence Peterson was not an officer or director. In response, Zhang filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), seeking to dismiss Peterson’s malicious prosecution claim. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding Peterson’s case had at least minimal merit based on evidence showing Zhang lacked probable cause and may have acted with malice in pursuing the prior suit.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed Zhang’s appeal. The court affirmed the denial of Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the denial of a discretionary sanctions motion in the underlying suit did not establish probable cause under the “interim adverse judgment rule,” and did not bar the malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that Peterson’s evidence on lack of probable cause and malice was sufficient to allow his case to proceed, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Zhang" on Justia Law

In 2016, the City of Los Angeles established new tiered water rates for residential customers of its Department of Water and Power (LADWP). These rates included a charge that funded a low-income subsidy, which was paid by customers who did not qualify for the subsidy, and utilized progressively increasing charges based on water usage tiers. Stephen and Melinda Dreher, LADWP customers, challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of these rates under article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution: (1) the inclusion of a low-income subsidy charge in the rates of non-subsidized customers, and (2) the structure of the tiered rates themselves, arguing they exceeded the proportional cost of water service to each parcel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the Drehers regarding the low-income subsidy charge, finding it unconstitutional and issuing a writ to prevent the City from including this charge in future rates. However, the court denied the Drehers’ request for a refund of previously paid charges, concluding that such a claim was barred because the Drehers had not paid under protest, as required by Health and Safety Code section 5472. The court also found that, aside from the invalid low-income subsidy, the City’s tiered rates complied with constitutional proportionality requirements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the payment under protest requirement of Health and Safety Code section 5472 applies to claims seeking refunds of water delivery charges fixed by city ordinance, and that the Drehers’ failure to comply with this requirement barred their retrospective refund claim. The court further held that the City met its burden to demonstrate that its tiered water rates (excluding the invalid subsidy) did not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to each parcel, as required by article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "Dreher v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The case centers on a bakery and deli operator, Bagelmania Holdings, LLC, which leased property from Somerset Property, LLC. Together, they renovated the building for Bagelmania’s restaurant, hiring RDH Interests, Inc. as architect, JEM Associates West, Inc. as contractor, and Turpin & Rattan Engineering, Inc. for HVAC mechanical engineering. Following the renovation, Bagelmania and Somerset alleged construction defects and sued these entities for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence, with both plaintiffs represented by the same attorney.Prior attempts to initiate litigation were dismissed for failing to comply with Nevada’s NRS 11.258 requirements, which mandate an attorney affidavit of merit and supporting expert reports in nonresidential construction defect cases. The plaintiffs then filed a joint complaint supported by one affidavit and a set of expert reports. The defendants argued that each plaintiff was required to file separate affidavits and expert reports, and the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, agreed, dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to comply with NRS 11.258, also awarding attorney fees, costs, and interest to the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether a single affidavit and set of expert reports sufficed under NRS 11.258 when coplaintiffs, represented by the same attorney, jointly brought identical claims arising from the same alleged defects. The Supreme Court held that, under such circumstances, separate affidavits and expert reports are not required. The Court found that the plaintiffs complied with the statute’s plain language and purpose and that the affidavit and reports met the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal, vacated the post-judgment award of fees, costs, and interest, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bagelmania Holdings, LLC v. RDH Interests, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design & Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design & Construction LLC" on Justia Law