Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The property at issue in this appeal served as a rental home located in a residential neighborhood. The property owner, J.C. King III, stopped paying property taxes in 2015 after a fire extensively damaged the property and rendered it uninhabitable. The State of Alabama purchased the property at a 2016 tax sale, and in 2019 the property was ultimately sold in its uninhabitable state to Anderson Realty Group, LLC ("ARG"). ARG spent $88,812 to extensively renovate and restore the property to a habitable condition, and in 2020 it filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property. King filed a counterclaim to redeem the property and disputed whether the extensive renovations to the property could be considered "preservation improvements" due to be included in the redemption amount pursuant to § 40-10-122, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court agreed with King, holding that "preservation improvements" included only those amounts expended by ARG to keep the property from further deterioration, the value of which it concluded was $10,000, and it entered a judgment setting the redemption amount accordingly. ARG appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment, holding that the trial court had erred in limiting the "preservation improvements" to the cost of repairs undertaken to keep the property in the same condition it was in at the time of the tax sale. The Alabama Supreme Court granted King's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider, as a matter of first impression, the meaning of the phrase "preservation improvements" as defined in § 40-10-122(d). The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in limiting ARG to the recovery of the cost of repairs to keep the property in the same condition it was in at the time of the tax sale. Accordingly, its judgment was affirmed. View "Ex parte J.C. King III" on Justia Law

MUSA Properties, LLC ("MUSA"), and R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc. ("Allen Oil"), entered into a real-estate sales contract in which MUSA agreed to purchase from Allen Oil a gasoline service station and convenience store ("the property"). The terms of the sales contract were not fulfilled, and the property was not transferred to MUSA. Allen Oil filed a lawsuit against MUSA, alleging various causes of action based on the sales contract; MUSA filed various counterclaims in response. MUSA also filed in probate court a notice of lis pendens describing the property. In an interlocutory order, the circuit court later determined that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in the property, and, upon the motion of Allen Oil, the circuit court entered an order expunging the lis pendens notice. MUSA then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief, to direct the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. Finding that Allen Oil's argument did not provide a convincing basis for the Supreme Court to suspend application of the doctrine of lis pendens and deny MUSA's mandamus petition, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. View "Ex parte MUSA Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Debbie Berry appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PHH Mortgage Corporation ("PHH") on PHH's ejectment claim and Berry's breach-of-contract counterclaim. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Berry waived most of the arguments she raised on appeal by failing to address the effects of her prior settlement with PHH's predecessor and because her other appellate arguments failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred. View "Berry v. PHH Mortgage Corporation" on Justia Law

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. In December 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence in Huntsville. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip- resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne traversed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located. According to Byrne's testimony, he was holding the handrail and being careful. However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne commenced this action against Fisk and fictitiously named parties. Byrne alleged that there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. Consequently, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Fisk. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law

Defendant is a landlord, who allegedly terminated a lease based on Tenants' family status. The United States brought a claim against Defendant under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). A jury awarded Tenants $14,400 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. Defendant landlord filed post-trial motions, which were denied.Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant landlord acted with at least reckless indifference and the district court did not err in submitting the punitive damages issue to the jury. The Eighth Circuit also held that the award was not unconstitutionally excessive View "United States v. Louis Rupp, II" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Gates appealed a trial court’s extension and modification of three stalking orders against him. he parties are longtime neighbors who lived on the same street in Mendon, Vermont. Defendant owned a home on the street; he also owns a vacant lot next to the home of plaintiffs Elizabeth Swett and Doug Earle. In January 2021, plaintiffs sought stalking orders against defendant, alleging defendant was engaging in aggressive and intimidating behavior, including yelling and swearing at them, firing his gun to intimidate them, and otherwise acting in ways that made them fear for their physical safety. Gates raised numerous arguments, many of which related to the requirements for the issuance of initial stalking orders rather than extensions of those orders. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion in extending and modifying the orders and therefore affirmed. View "Swett, et al. v. Gates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that no statute expressly authorizes a school district to retain a lawyer on a contingent-fee basis to prosecute litigation designed to increase the appraised value of property so as to generate more tax receipts for the school district and that authority for such an arrangement cannot be implied from a school district's express authority to bring litigation regarding appraisals.Iraan-Sheffield Independent School District employed attorney D. Brent Lemon on a contingent-fee basis to pursue claims designed to increase the appraised value of property so as to generate more tax receipts. After the Appraisal Review Board denied the challenge the school district appealed. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12 motion challenging Lemon's authority to represent the school district and then dismissed the case with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tex. Tax Code 6.30(c) authorized the contingent-fee arrangement. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) correctly granted Defendants' Rule 12 motion; but (2) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. View "Pecos County Appraisal District v. Iraan-Sheffield Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's holding that, as a matter of law, a statutory "safe-harbor" provision applied and relieved an operator of oil-and-gas wells from any obligation to pay interest in the amounts withheld, holding that the safe-harbor provision applied as a matter of law.At issue was the "safe harbor" provision that permits operators to withhold payments without interest under certain circumstances. In reliance with the safe harbor provision the operator in this case withheld production payments it was contractually obligated to make to one of the wells' owners. The owner brought suit seeking to recover the payments with interest. The operator made the payments but without interest. The trial court concluded that the safe-harbor provision allowed the operator to withhold the funds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operator established as a matter of law that it was entitled to withhold distribution of production payments without interest under the statutory safe-harbor provision of Tex. Nat. Res. Code 91.402(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). View "Freeport McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC v. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over a civil case within the $750,000 limit involving the foreclosure of a lien on land.The McMasters executed a deed of trust to Ditech Servicing, LLC to secure a loan to purchase property. Thereafter, Jerry Perez acquired the property at a sheriff's sale to enforce a judgment. When the McMasters defaulted on their note Ditech initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Perez subsequently sued Ditech in County Court seeking a declaration that Ditech had waived its right to foreclose. Ditech counterclaimed for judicial foreclosure. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment for Ditech. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the trial court had no jurisdiction under Tex. Gov't Code 26.043. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Ditech, holding (1) suits for the enforcement of a lien on land or for the recovery of land are "civil cases" over which a district court has jurisdiction; and (2) where the amount in controversy was less than $750,000, the Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over Ditech's counterclaim. View "Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez" on Justia Law

In this proceeding brought by one political subdivision against another the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity did not apply in this context, thus reversing the conclusion of the court of appeals that the condemnee entity was immune from suit and that the trial court's order granting the condemnee entity's plea to the jurisdiction was without error.Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 (the Improvement District) offered to purchase subsurface easement from Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 1 (the Irrigation District) in order to extend an irrigation pipeline. After the Irrigation District rejected the offer the Improvement District filed this condemnation action. The commissioners awarded the Irrigation District $1,900 in damages, and before the trial court ruled on its objection, the Irrigation District filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea, concluding that the Irrigation District had governmental immunity from the condemnation suit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply in eminent domain proceedings and that the Irrigation District was not immune from the Improvement District's condemnation suit. View "Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County irrigation District No. 1" on Justia Law