Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

By 2011, due to weathering and aging, the condition of the concrete stairs leading to the entrance of the Oil City Library (the “library”) had significantly declined. Oil City contracted with Appellants Harold Best and Struxures, LLC, to develop plans for the reconstruction of the stairs and to oversee the implementation of those design plans. The actual reconstruction work was performed by Appellant Fred Burns, Inc., pursuant to a contract with Oil City (appellants collectively referred to as “Contractors”). Contractors finished performing installation work on the stairs by the end of 2011. In early 2012, Oil City began to receive reports about imperfections in the concrete surface, which also began to degrade. In September 2013, Oil City informed Burns of what it considered to be its defective workmanship in creating the dangerous condition of the stairs. Between February 28, 2012 and November 23, 2015, the condition of the stairs continued to worsen; however, neither Oil City nor Contractors made any efforts to repair the stairs, or to warn the public about their dangerous condition. In 2015, Appellee David Brown (“Brown”) and his wife Kathryn exited the library and began to walk down the concrete stairs. While doing so, Kathryn tripped on one of the deteriorated sections, which caused her to fall and strike her head, suffering a traumatic head injury. Tragically, this injury claimed her life six days later. Brown, in his individual capacity and as the executor of his wife’s estate, commenced a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence claims against Oil City, as owner of the library, as well as Contractors who performed the work on the stairs pursuant to their contract with Oil City. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether Section 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposed liability on a contractor to a third party whenever the contractor, during the course of his work for a possessor of land, creates a dangerous condition on the land that injures the third party, even though, at the time of the injury, the contractor was no longer in possession of the land, and the possessor was aware of the dangerous condition. To this, the Court concluded, as did the Commonwealth Court below, that a contractor may be subjected to liability under Section 385 in such circumstances. View "Brown v. Oil City, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured by fellow fans at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (Coliseum) near the end of a Los Angeles Rams football game. Plaintiff, his wife, and two daughters brought an action against Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), the Los Angeles Rams (Rams) and the University of Southern California (USC), alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability and related torts. All three Defendants obtained summary judgment in their favor. This appeal involves two of the defendants: CSC and the Rams. CSC is an entity hired to provide crowd management services at the Coliseum during certain events, including Rams football games. In granting CSC’s and the Rams’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court assumed that both Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff and his family and had failed to take the ameliorative steps proposed by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that these failures were not the cause of the assault. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not provide any record citation showing how response time was measured. Plaintiffs seem to assume that response time is measured from when a CSC employee first decides to seek assistance from APEX or LAPD to the time APEX or LAPD personnel arrives. However, the court explained that It is equally, if not more, likely that response time is measured from when APEX or LAPD receive the request for assistance from CSC command. Plaintiffs have not created a triable issue of fact concerning whether improving CSC communications would have prevented the assault View "Romero v. Los Angeles Rams" on Justia Law

Samsara rented San Francisco office space from Rreef for a ten-year term, to be in “delivery condition” by November 1, 2019. Samsara provided an $11,384,368.00 letter of credit as “collateral for the full performance.” In 2021, Samsara sued, asserting that in July 2019, after Rreef had certified “delivery condition,” Samsara discovered that the premises were contaminated with lead and asbestos and that after Samsara conducted testing, Rreef cut off its access to the premises. The next day, Rreef served Samsara a 5-day notice to pay rent or quit based on Samsara’s alleged failure to pay rent for August-September 2021 ($1,826,697.95). Rreef subsequently filed an unlawful detainer complaint, alleging that Samsara stopped paying rent and had created a pretext to avoid its lease obligations. In October 2021, Rreef sought a writ of attachment in the unlawful detainer action, seeking $3,796,175.51: the amount demanded in the 5-day notice and $1,784,477.53 for October-November.The court granted Rreef’s application. The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court rejected Samsara’s arguments that the amount that Rreef sought to attach must be reduced under Code of Civil Procedure 483.015(b)(4) by the amount remaining on the letter of credit and that the trial court erroneously refused to consider Samsara’s affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. However, the trial court declined to consider Samsara’s retaliatory eviction defense and whether Rreef sought attachment for an improper purpose. View "Rreef America Reit II Corp, YYYY v. Samsara, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals on remand that PNC Mortgage's foreclosure claim was time-barred, holding that there was no error.PNC, whose predecessor refinanced John and Amy Howards' original mortgage loans, did not initiate foreclosure proceedings until its claim to enforce its own lien was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the common-law doctrine of equitable subrogation did not provide PNC with an alternative means of disclosure. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to address the Howards' claim that PNC's equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PNC's claim was time-barred. View "PNC Mortgage v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding arising out of a dispute between Property Owners and a Homeowners Association (HOA) regarding enforcement of amended restrictive covenants, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling joinder of the other owners.Property Owners sued the HOA in this case requesting a declaratory judgment that the amended restrictions could not be enforced against them because the required percentage of owners did not approve the amended restrictions. The trial court granted the HOA's motion to abate the claims until Property Owners joined all 700 other owners in the subdivision as parties or face dismissal of their suit. The court of appeals denied Property Owners' ensuing petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting the motion to abate and ordering Property Owners to join the other property owners and that Property Owners lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. View "In re Kappmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment of the district court concluding that a condominium owner-landlord owed no duty of care with respect to a downspout that discharged water directly onto a shared driveway, holding that the owner-landlord had no common law, contractual, or statutory duty to keep the driveway clear.The condominiums at issue in this case were subject to a horizontal property regime pursuant to Iowa Code ch. 449B, which, in turn, was governed by a document referred to as the declaration. Shelly and Cameron Barnes leased a condominium unit from CDM Rentals, LLC. After Shelly fell on ice on the shared driveway the Barneses brought this negligence lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment for CDM on the ground that CDM lacked control over the common areas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) regarding premises liability, CDM lacked control of the driveway and downspout under the declaration; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Iowa Code ch. 562A, requires landlords to maintain common areas but only to the extent the landlord has control over those areas. View "Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs' insurer and its agent in this negligence action brought by Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages after their home was destroyed in a fire, holding that the district court did not err.Insureds purchased a homeowners insurance policy from Insurer through a licensed insurance producer (Agent). Insureds later filed a complaint alleging that Agent negligently advised them on the estimated replacement value of their home and negligently misrepresented the adequacy of their policy limits in the event of a total loss. Insureds also alleged that Insurer was liable under a theory of respondent superior. The district court granted summary judgment for Insurer and Agent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Insureds' claims failed as a matter of law and that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Callahan v. Brant" on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of divorce entered by the district court as to the disposition of certain property and the dissolution of Cole G. Bridges Wild Blueberry LLC, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order the dissolution of the LLC and erred in setting aside certain property to Cole Bridges.In 2020, Candy Littell filed for divorce from Bridges. The district court granted the divorce. On appeal, Bridges argued that the district court erred in evaluating and classifying a Cessna airplane and lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case, holding (1) the court did not have jurisdiction over the LLC and thus could not order its dissolution; and (2) the court erred in its classification and valuation of the Cessna airplane. View "Littell v. Bridges" on Justia Law