Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

The United States initiated an eminent domain action to acquire land in Montecito, California, to build the Ortega Reservoir. Plaintiff’s property is located directly north of the Ortega Reservoir, and the maintenance road at issue (the Access Road) runs along the southern edge of Kimball-Griffith’s property, just within the boundaries of the federal reservoir land. The federal Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) granted an easement over the Access Road to the County of Santa Barbara, and the County installed locked gates across the road, blocking public entry. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting the right to use the Access Road based on its purported ownership. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claim against the BOR and its officials must be construed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act (QTA). The district court dismissed the remaining claims as time-barred and because Plaintiff failed to allege a property interest in the Access Road.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that in light of Wilkins, it need not decide whether the statute of limitations applied. The panel held that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record. The panel held that Plaintiff did not allege that, at the time of condemnation, the Access Road existed as a “public street.” As a result, Plaintiff cannot rely on the theory that the adjacent landowners acquired a private easement. Second, the panel held that Plaintiff had not alleged facts suggesting that the adjacent landowners acquired an easement over the Access Road as a third party by any other means or operation of law. View "KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P V. BRENDA BURMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff on its claims of trespass and encroachment and against Defendants on their counterclaim for adverse possession, holding that the trial justice erred in deciding that Defendants failed to satisfy the open and notorious elements of their adverse possession claim.Plaintiff, The Union Cemetery Burial Society of North Smithfield, brought this complaint alleging that Defendants, John and Donna Foisy, had encroached and trespassed on its property at two locations. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to quiet title pursuant to the doctrine of adverse possession. The trial justice ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining Defendants from further trespass. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial justice overlooked or misconstrued material evidence and failed to take into account relevant and instructive caselaw. View "Union Cemetery Burial Society of North Smithfield v. Foisy" on Justia Law

Defendant-landowner Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP (SBIG) appealed an environmental-division enforcement order: enjoining it from using real property in the City of Burlington; ordering it to address site-improvement deficiencies as required by an agreement executed by a prior owner and the City; and imposing $66,759.22 in fines. SBIG purchased the subject property in 2004, which was then in use as a gas and service station, a preexisting, nonconforming use permitted under the City’s zoning ordinance. The property had eighteen parking spaces that were required to be used in connection with the service-station business. Following an unappealed 2002 notice of violation (NOV), the prior owner and the City signed an agreement on June 16, 2004—one day before SBIG purchased the property—which set out specific requirements to cure those violations. The agreement required the prior owner to take certain steps if it wished to sell the property and provided that the agreement was “specifically enforceable and . . .binding upon the successors and assigns of” the previous owner. The City did not enforce compliance with the agreement before this action. At some point after 2004, SBIG began renting out a small number of parking spaces to private individuals. This was not a permitted use under the zoning ordinance. In July 2017, the gas and service station closed, and SBIG thereafter increased the number of parking spaces it rented out to private individuals. Following complaints about the private-parking use and graffiti, the City contacted SBIG in 2018 about bringing the property into compliance with the zoning ordinance. SBIG took no remedial action, and the City issued an NOV. In June 2019, the Development Review Board (DRB) affirmed the NOV with respect to the change-of-use violation, finding the nonconforming use as a gas and service station had been discontinued for more than one year, which constituted abandonment of that use. In March 2020, the City filed a complaint in the environmental division to enforce the decision and sought fines. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erroneously found that SBIG knew or should have known about the 2004 agreement, therefore, it reversed the judgment order, directed the trial court to strike the condition requiring SBIG to address the site-improvement deficiencies in the agreement, and remanded for the court to recalculate fines without considering whether SBIG violated the agreement’s terms. View "City of Burlington v. Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP" on Justia Law

Moses attended a gathering at a condominium Roger-McKeever rented. Two years later, Moses filed suit for injuries. Moses alleged that, upon her arrival, she mentioned to Roger-McKeever that the entryway was dark. Roger-McKeever “was apologetic indicating that there was an electrical problem” and explained that her landlord had not been responsive in repairing the light. A photograph depicted three steps leading up from a street sidewalk, to a short walkway that ended at a door to Roger-McKeever’s condominium. Moses stated that when she was leaving, she could not see the second step and fell. She provided a declaration from a mechanical engineer that the steps were non-compliant with the building code and that the absence of a handrail and the riser heights were probable causes of the accident. Roger-McKeever submitted a declaration and the depositions of two individuals who attended the meeting, indicating that the walkway was not noticeably dark that night.The court granted Roger-McKeever summary judgment, finding that Roger-McKeever was a tenant who did not have control over the steps or the outside lighting and had no duty to maintain or repair that area. Roger-McKeever did not have a duty to warn Moses because she did not have prior notice that the steps were a “non-obvious” dangerous condition. The court of appeal affirmed. Moses did not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Roger-McKeever owed her a duty of care to protect her against the allegedly dangerous condition of the walkway. View "Moses v. Roger-McKeever" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that "repowering" a wind plant, or replacing a substantial proportion of its parts, does not change the analysis for valuing wind plants for property tax purposes under Iowa Code 427B.26, holding that the district court did not err.Story County Wind, LLC (SCW) owned a wind energy conversion property. In 2019, a repowering project began for the wind plants. Because the Story County Assessor continued to value and assess the wind plants as before, in 2021, SCW filed a protest seeking to modify the assessment. The Board declined to modify the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under section 427B.26, repowering a wind plant by replacing component parts does not charge the plants' valuation for property tax purposes. View "Story County Wind, LLC v. Story County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

In 1973, the brothers’ father, Marvin, purchased property in Sequatchie County. In 1997, he obtained a $200,000 home equity line of credit. A Deed of Trust was recorded. The terms of the loan required monthly interest payments until the maturity date—May 2007—when a final balloon payment of the entire outstanding balance would become due. The loan’s maturity date passed but Regions did not demand payment of the entire balance, refinance the loan, or foreclose on the property, but continued to accept monthly interest payments. After Marvin’s death, the brothers used the property for their trucking business and made payments on the loan through the business account. Regions learned of Marvin’s death in 2011 but continued to accept payments. In 2017, the brothers realized that Regions was sending statements demanding payment of the entire debt. A Regions representative informed them that the property would be foreclosed on with “no further discussion.” In 2018, Regions filed a foreclosure action, requesting a declaration that the loan’s maturity date had been extended. Based on an apparent tax lien, the IRS removed the case to federal court.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the brothers. Tennessee law provides a 10-year statute of limitations for the enforcement of liens. The maturity date of the loan was never extended; Tennessee law requires a written instrument, “duly executed and acknowledged,” and “filed for record with the register of the county.” View "Regions Bank v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of a homeowners' association in this dispute against Owner over unpaid assessments concluding that the HOA was entitled to collect the assessments because the HOA members in general had ratified the HOA's authority, holding that protective covenants that were not signed by the property owner are capable of ratification.The HOA in this case sued the Owner of a lot within its boundaries for unpaid assessments. The Owner argued, in response, that the HOA's governing documents were unauthorized encumbrances on the lot and therefore violated the Wrongful Lien Act. The district court granted summary for the HOA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) protective covenants that were not signed by the property owner are voidable but not void as against public policy and are thus capable of ratification; (2) the district court correctly ruled that the HOA at the authority to assess the lot at issue and correctly calculated the unpaid assessments owing to the HOA; and (3) the HOA was entitled to its attorney fees on appeal. View "Hi-Country Estates v. MountainTop Properties" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission agreeing with the determination of Washington County that rental property owned by Durbano Properties, LC in the County did not qualify for a property tax exemption, holding that Durbano was not entitled to relief on its claims of error.For the 2010 through 2017 tax years Durbano received a residential tax exemption as provided by the Property Tax Act, Utah Code 59-2-103(3), under which property owners are allowed an exemption equal to forty-five percent of the fair market value of "property used for residential purposes as a primary residence," Utah Code 59-2-102(34)(a). Durbano brought a petition arguing that limiting the residential exemption to property used as a primary residence violated the permissive authority granted to the legislature. The Supreme Court disagreed and declined to disturb the Commission's decision, holding that Durbano provided no legal basis to invalidate the legislature's definition of "residential property" as authorized by Utah Const. art. XIII, 3. View "Durbano Properties, LC v. Utah Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a homeowners association (HOA) in this lawsuit it brought to collect unpaid assessments against against the trustee (Trustee) of two trusts that each owned a lot (Lots) within the HOA's boundaries, holding that there was no error.Since at least 1979, prior owners of the Lots paid the HOA's annual assessments, but when Trustee purchased the Lots on behalf of the trust in 2009 he refused to pay the assessments. When the HOA brought this action Trustee argued that the HOA lacked authority to assess the Lots, which rendered the HOA's founding documents void and the HOA powerless. The district court concluded that the HOA was entitled to collect the past due assessments but that a bench trial was necessary to determine the amount owing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the members of the HOA collectively ratified the HOA's authority; and (2) therefore, the HOA had authority to assess the Lots. View "Hi-Country Estates v. Frank" on Justia Law