Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease. View "Oreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Appellants' complaint against Maricopa County for appeal of an administrative action and the final judgment on the County's counterclaim, holding that the plain meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A) did not bar jurisdiction.Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department fined Appellants for violations of the county zoning ordinance, and the decision was affirmed. Appellants filed a complaint against the County requesting declaratory relief and alleging due process violations. The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was deficient. The trial court denied the motion and allowed Appellants to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants brought an amended complaint seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. The County asserted a counterclaim seeking to enforce the fine. The trial court ruled the complaint failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A), and therefore, Appellants failed timely to file a "notice of appeal." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding that Appellants' complaint complied with section 12-904(A)'s three jurisdictional requirements that the timely filing's substance provide notice of the appeal, identify the decision being appealed, and state the issues argued on appeal. View "Shea v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Loik appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for the partition and sale of real estate. At issue was whether the superior court or the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, under the applicable statute, the circuit court and not the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, it vacated and direct the superior court to transfer the petition to the circuit court. View "Loik v. Loik" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) and ruling that Kageco Orchards, LLC's requests for declaratory judgment relief and mandamus were correctly denied, holding that the district court did not err.Kageco filed suit against MDT alleging that the placement of certain mailboxes within MDT's right of way created a potential hazard and interfered with Kageco's lawful use of an approach from a highway to its property. Kageco sought a declaratory judgment and, alternatively, a writ of mandamus seeking to have the mailboxes removed and relocated. The district court granted judgment to MDT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Kageco did not have standing to pursue its claim for declaratory relief because there was no justiciable case or controversy; and (2) did not err in denying Kageco's request for a writ of mandamus because MDT's acts were discretionary as opposed to ministerial. View "Kageco v. Mont. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The landlord is a four-member LLC with a single asset--a building in downtown Napa. The tenant, Stone Brewing, a large beer brewing and retail corporation, operates a brewpub in the building. Stone Brewing did not pay rent for several months during the pandemic. The landlord sued for unlawful detainer. Stone argued it was excused from paying rent because COVID-19 regulations and business interruptions triggered a force majeure provision in its lease.The trial court granted the landlord summary judgment, finding that the force majeure provision only excused performance if the claiming party was unable to meet its obligations due to factors outside its control; the tenant admitted during discovery it had the financial resources to pay rent during the period of the COVID-19 regulations but simply refused to do so. The court of appeal affirmed. The force majeure provision does not apply where the tenant had the ability to meet its contractual obligations but chooses not to perform due to financial constraints. The plain meaning of the force majeure provision does not support an interpretation that ties a party’s obligation to pay rent to its profitability or revenue stream instead of a delay or interruption caused by the force majeure event itself. View "West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Manuel Hernandez appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Stockton (City) based on his failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff sued for damages arising out of an allegedly defective public sidewalk. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City, alleging that it negligently maintained public property by failing to correct a dangerous condition along a sidewalk. Plaintiff claimed that he sustained severe injuries when he tripped and fell due to a “dangerous condition” on the City-owned “sidewalk surface” that he identified only as an “uplifted sidewalk.” After his government claim was rejected, plaintiff filed this personal injury action, complaining broadly that the “sidewalk surface” harbored a “dangerous condition” that created an unspecified hazard. He later disclosed during his deposition that he tripped and fell when he stepped into a hole, specifically a tree well with no tree in it. When specifically asked whether it was “fair to say that [his] fall was not caused by an uplifted sidewalk,” he responded: “Correct.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that this action was barred because the factual basis for recovery was not “fairly reflected” in plaintiff’s government claim. View "Hernandez v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

In this case requiring a determination of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC's scope of authority under an easement it acquired to create Lake Norman, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the superior court, holding that the easement's plain language was clear and unambiguous and that Duke's actions were encompassed with the easement's broad grant of authority.In 1961, Duke purchased the easement at issue, which covered a tract of what is now known as Lake Norman. In 2017, after the lake level receded, Duke filed suit against Defendants alleging trespass and wrongful interference with the easement by building a retaining wall and backfilling the lakebed area subject to Duke's easement. The trial court ordered Defendants to remove the retaining wall and clear the backfilled area from the lakebed and then granted summary judgment for Duke on its remaining trespass claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Duke acted within its broad authority under the easement and that the trial court did not err. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Deadwood Historic District Commission to deny a certificate of appropriateness sought by Harlan Kirwan to conduct renovations on a building he owned that was located in the Historic District, holding that there was no error.Kirwan, who owned a saloon located in the Historic District, applied for a certificate of appropriateness from the Commission after renovating the saloon's facade. The Commission denied the application and ordered Kirwan to remove the facade. Kirwan subsequently applied for a new certificate of appropriateness to cover the existing facade. The Commission denied the permit, and the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the underlying decision. View "Kirwan v. City Of Deadwood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jayde Downey appealed the dismissal of her case after a trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers of defendants-respondents Ara and Vahram Sevacherian (collectively, Sevacherian) and the City of Riverside (City) to Downey’s operative complaint. Downey alleged causes of action for dangerous condition of property and negligence arising out of an automobile collision involving Downey’s daughter, Vance. In that pleading, Downey alleged the collision occurred “because [City] created or permitted to exist, a dangerous condition of public property” and because Sevacherian maintained vegetation and trees on their property so as to cause an unsafe obstruction to the view of vehicular traffic. She alleged that because she was on the phone with Vance and heard the sounds of the crash and its aftermath, she was “present, or virtually present” at the scene when the collision happened, thereby causing Downey "serious emotional injuries and damages." The trial court ruled Downey’s allegations were “insufficient to show that Downey had a contemporaneous awareness of the injury-producing event—not just the harm Vance suffered, but also the causal connection between defendants’ tortious conduct and the injuries Vance suffered.” Downey contended the court erred; that because she contemporaneously perceived the event causing injury to Vance, she adequately alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, finding that under the circumstances, Downey should be given an opportunity to allege facts establishing she had the requisite “‘contemporaneous sensory awareness of the causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury.’” View "Downey v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the interpretation of a restrictive covenant was a question of fact for a jury, holding that because the evidence did not conclusively establish one covenanting party's intent in drafting the document at issue, the interpretation of the covenant was a question of fact for a jury.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the interpretation of an ambiguous restrictive land use covenant is a question for a jury unless extrinsic evidence proffered by the parties is conclusive as to the covenanting parties' intent; (2) a jury should strictly construe an ambiguity in a restrictive covenant against the land use restriction only if the jury is unable to resolve by a preponderance of the evidence the ambiguity from the extrinsic evidence; and (3) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the extrinsic evidence in this case did not conclusively resolve the ambiguity in the restrictive covenant. View "Windcliff Ass'n v. Breyfogle" on Justia Law