Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Three community stakeholders moved to intervene in several lawsuits challenging the authority of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to ban all off-highway vehicle (OHV) use at Oceano Dunes State Vehicular Recreation Area (Oceano Dunes). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the stakeholders’ interests are adequately represented in the litigation. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it: (1) denied them leave to intervene as of right, (2) denied their request for permissive intervention, and (3) sustained Respondents’ evidentiary objections.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that where a nonparty has interests in the outcome of a civil action that are identical to those of a party to the action, the nonparty must make a compelling showing of inadequate representation to be permitted to intervene as of right. The court explained that the trial court’s decision to deny Appellants’ request for permissive intervention did not exceed the bounds of reason because “ ‘the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit on their own terms’ ” outweighed the reasons for intervention. The court wrote that additionally, permitting Appellants to intervene would add to an already-expansive action, one with four consolidated writ petitions; multiple plaintiffs, defendants, and real parties in interest; and significant burdens on the trial court. View "Friends of Oceano Dunes v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Petitioners' petition for a writ of review seeking interlocutory review of the orders of the district court denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss and motion to set aside default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.At issue was subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on service by publication. Petitioners argued that the failure to serve Defendants with a summons stripped the district court of both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit held (1) absent a statute or rule to the contrary, no summons is required when service is accomplished by publication; (2) the district court correctly determined that a summons is not required as to those defendants who are properly subject to service by publication; but (3) the court erred in finding the service by publication conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendants with a known address. View "Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC" on Justia Law

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. The Corps settled on a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet. The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps and various federal officials. Their complaint alleged that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and certain easements. The district court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its height on the date of the Act’s enactment. Corps argued that this reading ignores the clause “for water supply and recreational activities” and that a lowered pool that still fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim and the resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. The court left it to the district court to decide whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and recreational purposes. The court explained that it agreed with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to “absurd results.” Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” But neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.” View "State of South Carolina v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Jorge Othon, who purchased property from Victalina Carreon but never recorded the deed with the county recorder, may not collaterally challenge a default judgment entered in a separate tax lien foreclosure action.The property Othon purchased was encumbered by delinquent property taxes. Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. (APTL) purchased a tax lien on the property and then filed a tax lien foreclosure action against Carreon. The trial court entered default judgment against Carreon. APTL then filed this quiet title action seeking to establish its title to the property. Othon filed an answer and counterclaim requesting that the trial court determine that the default judgment in the foreclosure action was void due to invalid service on Carreon, and declare that title to the property vested in Othon. The trial court granted summary judgment for Othon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Othon could not, in this quiet title action, collaterally attack the default judgment entered in the foreclosure action. View "Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Othon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the court's summary judgment and grant of motions to strike in favor of Defendant, holding that the hearing justice erred when he granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five of Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five counts against Defendant stemming from the purchase and lease of a commercial property. A hearing justice granted Defendants' motions to strike an expert disclosure and an affidavit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the hearing justice (1) properly granted Defendant's motion to strike the affidavit; but (2) erroneously granted summary judgment as to count five of the complaint. View "Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment and final judgment in favor of third-party defendants, Western Surety Company and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (collectively, the Sureties) in this case concerning the scope of the sureties' liability under a performance and payment bond issued in conjunction with a public works project, holding that there was no error.The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) was sued by Apex Development Company in this action alleging that RIDOT and its contractors trespassed and damaged Apex's private property. RIDOT filed a third-party complaint against the Sureties and others, seeking full indemnity and contribution. A hearing justice granted summary judgment for the Sureties, and a final judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RIDOT was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error on appeal. View "Apex Development Co., LLC v. State of R.I. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. View "Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer. View "DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law