Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

A mother and her son owned real property together in Pennsylvania as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, meaning that if one died, the other would automatically inherit the entire property. After their relationship deteriorated, the mother sought to sever this joint tenancy so that her share would not pass automatically to her son upon her death. She executed a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in the property from herself as grantor to herself as grantee, explicitly stating her intent to sever the joint tenancy and create a tenancy in common. The mother died while litigation over the property was ongoing, and her estate, represented by her executrix, continued the dispute.The Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County determined that the mother’s quitclaim deed did not sever the joint tenancy because it did not destroy any of the four unities (title, time, interest, or possession) that define a joint tenancy. The court held that, since the joint tenancy was not severed, the property passed entirely to the son upon the mother’s death by right of survivorship. The court quieted title in favor of the son. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision, reasoning that a joint tenant’s act must be of such manifestation that the actor cannot retreat from severance, and that a self-conveyance does not meet this standard.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether a quitclaim deed transferring a joint tenant’s interest to herself is sufficient to sever a joint tenancy. The court held that such a self-conveyance is insufficient to sever a joint tenancy because it does not destroy any of the four unities. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that the joint tenancy remained intact and the property passed to the son by survivorship. View "Grant v. Grant" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over public access to a portion of Estabrook Road in Concord, Massachusetts, which runs through land owned by various private parties, land trusts, and Harvard College. The road consists of a northern section, which was formally laid out by county authorities in 1763, and a southern section, for which no direct layout records exist but which connects to the northern section and an undisputed public way. The abutting landowners sought to bar public access, arguing that the southern section was never a public way and that a 1932 discontinuance order by county commissioners converted the road into a private way, extinguishing public rights. The town of Concord contended that both sections were public ways and that the 1932 order only ended the town’s maintenance obligation, not public access.The Land Court, after a bench trial, found that both the northern and southern disputed sections had been established as public ways, the latter based on circumstantial evidence such as historical use, maintenance, and references in town records. The court also concluded that the 1932 discontinuance under G. L. c. 82, § 32A, terminated only the town’s duty to maintain the road, not the public’s right to use it. The Appeals Court affirmed, modifying the judgment to clarify that both sections were public ways prior to 1932 and that public access was not terminated by the 1932 order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that the Land Court did not err in finding, based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, that the disputed sections were public ways by 1763. The Court further held that the 1932 discontinuance under § 32A relieved the town of maintenance obligations but did not extinguish the public’s right of access to the road. The judgment as modified by the Appeals Court was affirmed. View "Town of Concord v. Rasmussen" on Justia Law

Two children of a decedent alleged that their late stepmother wrongfully transferred assets belonging to their father to herself, depriving them of property they would have received under his will. The assets in question included a house and shares in a corporation. The stepmother, who had married their father after both had children from previous marriages, allegedly used a power of attorney to transfer the property to herself during the father’s cognitive decline. After both the father and stepmother died, the children claimed they were not notified of the stepmother’s estate proceedings and that the disputed property was distributed to the stepmother’s descendants.The District Court for Lincoln County dismissed the children’s complaint, citing the doctrine of jurisdictional priority because a similar proceeding was pending in county court. After the county court dismissed the children’s petition for lack of standing, the district court denied the children’s motion to alter or amend its dismissal, without further explanation. The children appealed, arguing that the district court’s reliance on jurisdictional priority was no longer justified after the county court’s dismissal.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the children had standing to pursue relief under the Nebraska Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which specifically allows a principal’s issue to petition a court to review an agent’s conduct under a power of attorney. The court found that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority no longer applied once the county court proceeding was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court also determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the children would not have inherited the disputed property under the will or by operation of law, even if the transfers were invalid. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the children should be given leave to amend their complaint and reversed and remanded the case with directions to allow amendment. View "Kimball v. Rosedale Ranch" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Colorado owned property subject to a railroad easement held by Great Western Railway of Colorado, LLC. The railroad line, originally used for transporting sugar beets, had fallen into disuse except for railcar storage. In 2008, Great Western sought permission from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the line. The STB granted this request and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) to allow negotiations for possible interim recreational trail use. Negotiations failed, and the NITU expired. Instead of abandoning the line, Great Western repeatedly extended its abandonment authority and ultimately decided not to abandon the line, continuing to use it for storage and making some improvements.The landowners sued the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the issuance of the NITU constituted a temporary taking under the Fifth Amendment. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the NITU caused a taking. Specifically, the court determined that Great Western would not have abandoned the line at the time of the NITU, so the NITU did not delay the vesting of the landowners’ reversionary interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that to establish a compensable taking in a rails-to-trails case, plaintiffs must show that the issuance of the NITU caused a delay in abandonment that would have otherwise occurred, thereby postponing the vesting of their property interests. The court found that the evidence showed Great Western would not have abandoned the line regardless of the NITU, so causation was not established. The court also rejected arguments that state law abandonment or mere issuance of a NITU alone could establish a taking. The judgment for the government was affirmed. View "SAUER WEST LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Several residential property owners in the Pauoa Beach Subdivision, part of the Mauna Lani Resort in Hawaiʻi, challenged the use of a residential lot (Lot B) owned by Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC (PBL1). PBL1’s parent company operates a luxury destination club, allowing its members to stay at properties like Lot B in exchange for annual dues. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement constituted a prohibited “commercial use” under the subdivision’s governing documents, which restrict commercial activity but allow short-term rentals.The dispute began in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of PBL1, finding no violation of the residential use restrictions. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated that decision, holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether PBL1’s use amounted to a “gainful occupation, profession or trade,” and remanded for further factual findings. On remand, the circuit court reinterpreted the project documents and initially found PBL1 to be a commercial owner, but ultimately determined, based on evidence of actual use, that PBL1’s activities did not rise to the level of commercial use. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, and both sides appealed again.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case. It affirmed the ICA’s conclusion that PBL1’s use of Lot B did not violate the project documents, agreeing that the law of the case doctrine precluded reinterpreting the documents’ meaning. The court also held that the ICA did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to PBL1. However, it reversed the ICA’s award of attorney fees to PBL1, holding that the relevant contract only allowed prevailing plaintiffs, not defendants, to recover such fees. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of Civil Code section 798.30.5, which limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities in California. The statute, effective from January 1, 2022, to January 1, 2030, restricts rent increases to the lower of 3 percent plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 5 percent, and limits the number of rent increases within a 12-month period. The owner alleged that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism for property owners to seek rent adjustments to ensure a fair return, arguing this omission violates due process and results in an uncompensated taking.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the absence of a process to seek exceptions to the rent ceiling violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the statute’s plain language was undisputed and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer, determining that any amendment would be futile.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to demonstrate that the statute is facially unconstitutional, clarifying that a fair return adjustment mechanism is not required for all rent control laws to be constitutional, but may be necessary only if the law is confiscatory in its application. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing to sue at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the owner. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

Baker Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporation, holds decreed water rights in Baker and Lehman Creeks, which flow through Great Basin National Park. In 2015, the National Park Service (NPS) received a permit for a nonconsumptive instream flow in Baker Creek, requiring that the water not be removed and the full natural flow exit the park undiverted. Baker Ranches alleged that, since 2016, the NPS denied it permission to remove obstructions and allowed rock dams to be constructed, diverting water into caves and interfering with its water rights. While related federal litigation was ongoing, Baker Ranches requested the State Engineer to investigate these alleged violations.The State Engineer, after site visits and correspondence, decided in 2021 to hold the investigation in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal litigation. Baker Ranches then petitioned the Seventh Judicial District Court in White Pine County for judicial review or a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the writ but granted judicial review, finding the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the State Engineer to complete the investigation and render a final decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State Engineer had the authority to hold the investigation in abeyance and whether such a decision was subject to judicial review. The court held that the State Engineer possesses discretionary powers, including the implied authority to pause investigations pending related litigation. The court further determined that the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation was interlocutory, not a final order, and therefore not subject to judicial review. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order granting Baker Ranches’ petition for judicial review. View "SULLIVAN, P.E. VS. BAKER RANCHES, INC." on Justia Law

A company leased 24 properties from a landlord under separate agreements that included options to renew the leases for additional terms, provided the tenant gave written notice 120 days before expiration. The tenant successfully renewed twice, but in 2021, failed to send the required renewal notice to the landlord by the deadline. The landlord notified the tenant that the leases would terminate, and after unsuccessful negotiations for new leases, the tenant sought a court declaration that its late renewal was still effective, citing the significant value of improvements made to the properties.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the tenant, finding that equity could forgive the tenant’s “honest mistake” in missing the deadline and prevent forfeiture of the improvements. The court also found that the landlord’s acceptance of rent after the expiration of a tolling agreement estopped the landlord from terminating the leases. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on prior Ohio appellate decisions that allowed equitable relief for honest mistakes or even negligence if forfeiture would result and the landlord was not prejudiced.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that while equity may excuse a failure to comply with a lease renewal option in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, it does not extend to negligence. The court clarified that “mistake” refers to a misapprehension of a basic assumption at contract formation, not a negligent failure to act. Because the tenant’s failure to timely exercise the renewal option was due to negligence, equitable relief was not warranted. The case was remanded to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to consider the landlord’s remaining arguments regarding equitable estoppel. View "Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. SuperAsh Remainderman, Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities. The owner argued that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism allowing property owners to seek rent increases above the statutory cap to ensure a fair return, which the owner claimed is required by the California and U.S. Constitutions. The owner asserted that the absence of such a mechanism results in a violation of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against uncompensated takings.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the statute’s failure to provide a process for seeking exceptions to the rent cap violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the legal issue was dispositive and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer. Judgment was entered in favor of the owner, and the State appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to establish that the statute is facially unconstitutional, as the relevant legal precedents do not require a fair return adjustment mechanism in every rent control law. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the absence of a fair return adjustment mechanism does not, by itself, render the statute facially unconstitutional, and that the State’s answer raised material issues that should have prevented judgment on the pleadings. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law