Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cheryl Lynch, the owner of a residential property in San Clemente, California, engaged a general contractor for home improvement and repairs. The contractor hired Peter & Associates, Engineers, Geologists, Surveyors, Inc. (the Peter firm) to perform a geotechnical inspection of a footing trench. The Peter firm conducted a visual inspection and used a steel probe but did not perform subsurface exploration or laboratory testing. The footing later collapsed, causing significant damage to Lynch's home.Lynch filed a lawsuit in February 2021 against multiple parties, including the Peter firm, for breach of contract, nuisance, and negligence. The Peter firm moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty of care to Lynch due to the lack of a direct contract. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the motion, heavily relying on the precedent set by Weseloh Family Ltd. Partnership v. K.L. Wessel Construction Co., Inc., which found no duty of care in the absence of privity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the Peter firm failed to meet its burden in the summary judgment motion. The court held that the firm owed a duty of care to Lynch, applying the Biakanja factors, which consider the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm, and other factors. The court also found that the trial court erred in dismissing Lynch's nuisance claim and in sustaining the Peter firm's evidentiary objections without proper basis.The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to deny the Peter firm's motion in its entirety. View "Lynch v. Peter & Associates" on Justia Law

A real estate development company, Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, owned by Chinese billionaire Wei Huang, was involved in a scheme to bribe Los Angeles City Councilmember Jose Huizar. Over nearly four years, Huang provided Huizar with extravagant Las Vegas trips, gambling chips, and prostitutes, seeking Huizar's support for redeveloping the L.A. Grand Hotel into Los Angeles's tallest skyscraper. Huang's strategy was to "give, give, give" to later make a "big ask" for Huizar's support on the project.A federal jury in the Central District of California convicted Shen Zhen on three counts of honest-services mail and wire fraud, one count of federal-program bribery, and four counts of interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, rejecting Shen Zhen's argument that the Government failed to establish an agreement or official action by Huizar. The court also denied Shen Zhen's proposed jury instruction on quid pro quo, finding it legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings, noting that bribery under federal law does not require an explicit agreement with the public official. The court also upheld the district court's jury instructions, which correctly required the jury to find that Shen Zhen provided benefits intending to receive official acts in return. Additionally, the court found that California's bribery statutes, although broader than the Travel Act's generic definition, were proper predicates for the Travel Act convictions because the jury convicted Shen Zhen based on elements conforming to the generic definition of bribery. The court also concluded that any evidentiary errors were harmless and did not affect the verdict. View "USA V. SHEN ZHEN NEW WORLD I, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a property dispute in Lincoln County, Montana. Tiffany House sought to sell a property initially conveyed to her former husband, Conrad Coggeshall, by an LLC owned by David E. Orr. After their divorce, House was granted permission by the Superior Court of Arizona to transfer the property into her name. However, Coggeshall, while incarcerated, executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the property to Orr, who recorded it in Lincoln County. House then filed a quiet title action, alleging the transfer was fraudulent.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the case. House served Orr with discovery requests, including admissions that Orr failed to respond to. Consequently, House filed a motion for summary judgment, which Orr did not contest. The District Court granted House’s motion, quieting title in her name and ordering Orr to execute a quitclaim deed. Orr filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay execution, which the District Court denied. Orr’s first appeal was dismissed, and he filed a second notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. Orr argued that the requests for admission were improperly served, that he did deny them, and that the summary judgment violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court noted that these arguments were not raised in the lower court and thus were not preserved for appeal. The court emphasized the importance of procedural rules and fair notice of legal issues. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of House. View "House v Orr" on Justia Law

The case involves Isabelo and Michele Domingo, who defaulted on a mortgage refinance loan for their property in Kailua-Kona. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, filed a foreclosure complaint, and the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit for the State of Hawai'i issued a foreclosure judgment, ordering the property to be sold at public auction. The Domingos appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) granted a stay conditioned on a $300,000 supersedeas bond, which the Domingos did not post. Wilmington purchased the property at auction and later sold it to BBNY REO LLC. The Domingos filed a separate wrongful foreclosure lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit and recorded a lis pendens.The ICA dismissed the Domingos' appeals as moot because BBNY was deemed a good faith purchaser. The Domingos then filed for certiorari. The Supreme Court of Hawai'i reviewed the case, focusing on whether the failure to post the supersedeas bond rendered the appeals moot and whether the lis pendens affected the title conveyed to BBNY.The Supreme Court of Hawai'i held that even if the mortgagee is the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale, an appellant must satisfy conditions for a stay, including posting a supersedeas bond, to prevent transfer of title to a good faith purchaser. The court affirmed that BBNY was a good faith purchaser despite knowledge of the Domingos' pending lawsuit and lis pendens. The court also ruled that a lis pendens does not eliminate the need to post a supersedeas bond and does not affect the title conveyed to a good faith purchaser.The court further held that the Domingos' separate wrongful foreclosure lawsuit was an improper collateral attack on the foreclosure judgment and that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the ICA's dismissal of the appeals as moot. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Domingo" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Susan Keller, co-trustees of the MIKA Trust, challenged the reassignment of a parking space by defendants Clement and Martha Dwyer from one condominium unit they owned to another unit they also owned. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief, alleging violations of the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B. The dispute arose after the Dwyers transferred Parking Space 2 from Unit 11 to Unit 20, which they owned, and subsequently sold Unit 11 without an assigned parking space to the plaintiffs.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Harbour Hill Condominium Association and the Dwyers. The court found that the assignment and reassignment of the parking spaces were authorized and properly effected. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that although Harbour Hill’s declaration of condominium was deficient under RSA 356-B:16, I(e) for not designating the unit to which Parking Space 2 was assigned, this deficiency was cured by the condominium instruments, including the floor plan and form warranty deed. These documents, when read together, satisfied the requirements of the Condominium Act.The court also determined that the reassignment of Parking Space 2 complied with RSA 356-B:19, which governs the reassignment of limited common areas. The reassignment was authorized by the condominium declaration and had the consent of all affected unit owners, as required by the Act. The amendment to the declaration, reflecting the reassignment, was approved by a two-thirds majority of unit owners and recorded accordingly. Therefore, the court concluded that the reassignment was valid and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Keller v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions. View "Bock v. People" on Justia Law

Debbie O'Gorman, facing foreclosure by creditor Grant Reynolds, transferred her property to the Lovering Tubbs Trust for no consideration. This transfer was intended to hinder Reynolds' foreclosure efforts. The Lovering Tubbs Trust and other entities involved in the transfer argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee lacked Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548 because O'Gorman's creditors were not harmed by the transfer.The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the Trustee, finding that O'Gorman's transfer was fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed this decision, noting that the Trustee had established a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer and that the appellants failed to present any admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. The court held that the Trustee had Article III standing because the transfer depleted the estate's assets, causing an injury-in-fact that was redressable by the avoidance sought. The court also clarified that actual harm to creditors is not an element of a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548. The court found that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment, as the Trustee provided direct and circumstantial evidence of O'Gorman's fraudulent intent, and the appellants failed to present any evidence to dispute this.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the bankruptcy court's denial of the appellants' request for a continuance to conduct discovery, noting that the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d) by failing to submit an affidavit or declaration specifying the facts they hoped to elicit through further discovery. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. View "IN RE: THE LOVERING TUBBS TRUST V. HOFFMAN" on Justia Law

Shawn Valentine sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment approved by the Spencer Township Board of Trustees, which rezoned a portion of property owned by Jeff Davis Properties, L.L.C. Valentine and others circulated a petition for the referendum but included a map that outlined the area originally requested for rezoning, not the smaller area actually rezoned by the trustees.The Lucas County Board of Elections reviewed the petition and found it contained the required number of valid signatures. However, Jeff Davis Properties filed a protest, arguing that the map included with the petition was not appropriate. The Board of Elections held a hearing and sustained the protest, deciding that the map did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 519.12(H), which mandates that a referendum petition be accompanied by an appropriate map of the area affected by the zoning proposal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the map submitted with the petition was misleading because it did not accurately reflect the area affected by the zoning resolution. The court found no evidence that the map was approved by the board of township trustees as reflecting the zoning amendment. Consequently, the court held that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it sustained the protest and refused to place the referendum on the ballot. The writ of mandamus was denied, along with Valentine’s requests for costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Valentine v. Schoen" on Justia Law

A man sued his neighbors, claiming that an access road on their property caused flooding on his property. After settling with the neighbors and dismissing his claims with prejudice, he sued them again over continued flooding, alleging nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the tort claims, citing res judicata, but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. After a bench trial, the court found the neighbors had breached the settlement agreement and awarded specific performance, consequential damages, and attorney’s fees, but denied punitive damages. The neighbors appealed the breach of contract ruling, and the man cross-appealed the dismissal of his tort claims and the denial of punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim, finding it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the man was on inquiry notice of the breach when the driveway reconstruction was completed, as he observed defects at that time. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that the tort claims were barred by res judicata, as they stemmed from the same transaction as the prior lawsuit. The court also upheld the denial of punitive damages, finding no evidence of egregious conduct by the neighbors.In summary, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the breach of contract ruling and associated awards, affirmed the dismissal of the tort claims under res judicata, and upheld the denial of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Strong" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two lakefront property owners, the McCavits and the Lachers, over a dock extension built by the McCavits. The Lachers claimed that the extension interfered with their riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The superior court agreed and ordered the removal of the dock extension. The McCavits appealed, leading to the articulation of a new rule of reasonableness to determine whether the dock unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' rights. The case was remanded for the superior court to apply this new rule, and the court again ruled in favor of the Lachers.Initially, the superior court found that the dock extension unreasonably interfered with the Lachers' riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The court ordered the removal of the dock extension and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lachers. The McCavits appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to apply a newly articulated rule of reasonableness. On remand, the superior court reaffirmed its earlier findings and again ruled in favor of the Lachers, ordering the removal of the dock extension and awarding attorney’s fees.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the new rule of reasonableness or in finding that the dock constituted a private nuisance. However, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further consideration, noting that fees related to the litigation against the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) should not be charged to the McCavits. The main holding is that the superior court's application of the reasonableness rule and its finding of a private nuisance were upheld, but the attorney’s fees award was vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "McCavit v. Lacher" on Justia Law