Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose after a rare vehicle, originally owned by a Wisconsin man, was stolen and shipped to Europe. Richard Mueller inherited the vehicle and sold part of his interest to Joseph Ford. Years later, TL90108 LLC (“TL”) purchased the vehicle overseas and, upon attempting to register it in the United States, was notified that Ford and Mueller were the owners of record. Ford and Mueller sued TL in Wisconsin state court for a declaratory judgment and replevin. The trial court dismissed the case on statute-of-repose grounds, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review. While the appeal was pending, Ford filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy but did not list TL as a creditor or provide it with formal notice of the bankruptcy proceedings or relevant deadlines.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida set a deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) for creditors to file complaints objecting to the discharge of debts. TL did not file a complaint before this deadline, as it was unaware of the relevant facts supporting a fraud claim until later discovery in the Wisconsin litigation. After learning of Ford’s alleged fraud, TL moved to extend the deadline and file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), arguing for equitable tolling and asserting a due process violation due to inadequate notice. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in In re Alton, which held that equitable tolling does not apply to Rule 4007(c) deadlines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in In re Alton remains binding and precludes equitable tolling of Rule 4007(c)’s deadline, even in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The court also held that TL’s actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding satisfied due process, and thus, the deadline could not be extended on that basis. View "TL90108 LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner, after selling his San Diego County home and purchasing property in Trinity County, sought to transfer the base year value of his former property to his new one. In 2009, he sued the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to compel such a transfer under California law. The parties settled in 2012, agreeing that if the County later adopted an ordinance or if a change in law required it, the owner would be entitled to retroactively transfer the base year value. In 2020, after the passage of Proposition 19, which expanded the ability to transfer base year values between counties, the owner requested the transfer from the county assessor, who denied the request.The Superior Court of Trinity County held a bench trial and found in favor of the property owner on his breach of contract claims, ordering the County to specifically perform the settlement agreement and awarding damages. The court rejected the County’s arguments that the agreement was limited to intra-county transfers and that the Board lacked authority to bind the assessor. The court also found that the new law triggered the County’s obligations under the agreement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, concluded that the Board of Supervisors did not have the authority to direct the county assessor in setting or transferring base year values, as this is a duty assigned by law to the assessor, an elected official independent of the Board’s control. The court held that the 2012 settlement agreement was void and unenforceable because it exceeded the Board’s legal authority. As a result, the judgment on the breach of contract claims was reversed, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The County was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Sceper v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over mining rights to a parcel of land near Nome, Alaska. After the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) deemed certain mining claims abandoned, two individuals, Foster and Baker, relocated and recorded new claims in 2017. However, another miner, Klutchnikov, also recorded claims on the same land, asserting an earlier staking date, which would give his claims priority. DNR notified the parties of the overlap and advised them to resolve the conflict through legal means. Klutchnikov later transferred his claims to Amerigold Holdings, LLC, which invested in developing the site. Baker and Silverbow Mining, LLC, whose claims were closed by DNR due to the unresolved conflict, filed suit seeking a declaration that Klutchnikov’s claims were invalid because he had not physically staked the land, but had instead “paper staked” the claims.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, held a bench trial. The court admitted testimony from other miners about Klutchnikov’s alleged pattern of paper staking, over Amerigold’s objection. The court found that Klutchnikov had not physically staked the disputed claims and that Baker and Silverbow’s claims were valid. The court rejected Amerigold’s laches defense, concluding that Amerigold had not shown it was prejudiced by the delay in filing suit, and that any harm suffered by Amerigold’s manager, Hice, was not relevant because he was not a party.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that laches can apply to both quiet title and declaratory judgment actions when they are equitable in nature. The court further held that prejudice to a nonparty closely connected to the defendant, such as an investor with a contractual relationship, may be considered in the laches analysis. The court vacated the Superior Court’s rejection of the laches defense and remanded for further proceedings on that issue, but affirmed the admission of testimony regarding Klutchnikov’s prior acts as relevant to the absence of accident. View "Amerigold Holdings LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged the tax assessment of its facility in Salisbury, Vermont, for the 2023-2024 tax year. After a grievance hearing attended by both the property owner and its attorney, the town listers denied the grievance and mailed the decision by certified mail to the property owner’s address of record. The property owner received the notice twelve days before the deadline to appeal but did not forward it to its attorney until after the appeal period had expired. The attorney then filed an appeal to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA), which was rejected as untimely.The property owner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, arguing that the town violated its procedural due process rights by failing to send notice of the listers’ decision to both the property owner and its attorney. The Superior Court allowed the property owner to amend its complaint and ultimately granted summary judgment in its favor, relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, which required notice to both a claimant and their attorney in the context of unemployment benefits. The court ordered the BCA to hear the untimely appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, in the context of property tax grievances, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s counsel. The Court distinguished Perry as limited to unemployment-benefit proceedings and found that the statutory scheme for property tax appeals only requires notice to the taxpayer. Because the property owner received actual notice and had sufficient time to appeal, the Court concluded that due process was satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and instructed that summary judgment be entered for the Town of Salisbury. View "Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law

Costco sought to operate a gas station adjacent to its retail store in Colchester, Vermont, near a busy highway interchange. The company obtained both municipal and Act 250 permits, which included conditions requiring traffic mitigation measures—specifically, improvements at a nearby intersection (the MVD Improvements) or, alternatively, implementation of modified traffic signal timings if a larger state highway project (the DDI Project) was not yet under construction. Two neighboring businesses, who also operated gas stations nearby, actively participated in the permitting process and subsequent litigation, arguing that Costco’s gas station would exacerbate traffic congestion and that Costco should not be allowed to operate the station at full-time hours until the DDI Project was complete.After initial permits were issued, the neighbors appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld the permits with the mitigation conditions. The neighbors then appealed the Act 250 permit to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the sufficiency of the mitigation measures. As the DDI Project faced delays, Costco sought and received permit amendments allowing limited-hours operation of the gas station, subject to the same traffic mitigation conditions. The neighbors continued to challenge these amendments and argued that the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) should have been joined as a co-applicant, and that Costco needed further permit amendments to operate at full-time hours.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to consider whether Costco could operate the gas station at full-time hours. The Court concluded that Costco was not required to seek further amendments to its Act 250 or municipal permits before commencing full-time operation, as the permit conditions were satisfied either by the commencement of the DDI Project or by implementation of the signal timing modifications. The Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision and found the neighbors’ remaining arguments moot. View "In re Costco Wholesale Administrative Decision" on Justia Law

In 2006, Brenda Merle White executed a $250,000 promissory note secured by a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans, which was later assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM). White stopped making payments in 2008, and BNYM initiated, then rescinded, a non-judicial foreclosure. In 2012, the Association of Apartment Owners of Kumelewai Court foreclosed on the property for unpaid fees, and Gabi Collins acquired an interest in the property in 2015 via quitclaim deed. Collins was not a party to the original mortgage. In 2017, BNYM sent White a notice of default and filed a foreclosure action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. White did not respond, but Collins contested the action, arguing, among other things, that the statute of limitations had expired.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment to BNYM, finding the foreclosure action timely. Collins appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action is twenty years under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-31.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed whether the ICA erred in applying a twenty-year statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions. The court held that such actions are more analogous to real property actions than to debt recovery actions, and thus the twenty-year limitations period under HRS § 657-31 applies. The court rejected Collins’ arguments that recent precedent required a different result and found that neither DW Aina Lea Development, LLC v. State Land Use Commission nor Adair v. Kona Corporation conflicted with this approach. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment, holding that the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure actions is twenty years. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. White" on Justia Law

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

Kenneth Minshall sought to quiet title to a two-acre property in Washakie County, Wyoming, which had previously belonged to Gail Lee Quinn. Minshall lived with Quinn for decades and claimed that Quinn had agreed to transfer the property to his business, identified variously as M/G Enterprises, M/Q Enterprises, or M-Q Enterprises, all sharing the same EIN but none of which were ever legally incorporated. In 2018, Quinn executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property to M/G Enterprises. After Quinn’s death in 2019, Minshall executed a quitclaim deed on behalf of M/G Enterprises to himself. Quinn’s daughters, Robin Griffin and Joy Osbon, as her heirs and personal representatives, contested Minshall’s claim to the property.The District Court of Washakie County held a bench trial and found that the deeds purporting to transfer the property to M/G Enterprises (or its variants) were void because the grantee entities had no legal existence and thus could not take title. The court concluded that the last valid deed left the property in Quinn’s name, making it subject to probate by her estate. The court ordered that the void deeds be stricken from the county records. Minshall appealed, arguing that the doctrine of estoppel by deed should prevent Quinn’s heirs and estate from challenging the validity of the deeds.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that estoppel by deed cannot apply where the underlying deed is void, as a deed to a nonexistent entity is a nullity and does not pass title. Because the grantee entities never legally existed, no interest in the property was conveyed, and the property remained with Quinn’s estate. The court affirmed that the doctrine of estoppel by deed had no application in this case. View "Minshall v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Two companies each owned a one-half undivided interest in the subsurface estate (sand, gravel, and clay) of a small parcel of land, while one of them, Toll, also owned the surface estate. Toll developed the parcel as part of a larger project, excavating soil from parts of the parcel and using it as fill on the same parcel to achieve the desired grade and density. The other company, Genesis, alleged that Toll had removed and transferred soil from the parcel to third parties without compensation, and also claimed that Toll’s use of the soil on-site interfered with Genesis’s rights.After discovery, Toll moved for summary judgment in the Fourth District Court, Provo, arguing there was no evidence it had exported soil from the parcel and that Genesis was not entitled to compensation for soil used on-site. Genesis conceded it lacked evidence of off-site removal but argued that a jury could infer such removal due to Toll’s exclusive control of relevant information. Genesis also argued it was entitled to compensation for Toll’s on-site use of the soil, claiming this interfered with its rights or unjustly enriched Toll. The district court granted summary judgment to Toll, finding no evidence of off-site removal and holding that, under Utah law and persuasive Washington precedent, a surface owner may use soil on-site without compensating the subsurface co-owner unless the soil is exported.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that Genesis failed to provide evidence supporting its claim that Toll removed soil from the parcel, and that mere speculation or attacks on Toll’s credibility were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The Court further held that Genesis was not entitled to compensation for Toll’s on-site use of the soil, as such use did not constitute actionable interference with Genesis’s subsurface rights under the deed or common law. The summary judgment in favor of Toll was affirmed. View "Genesis Aggregates B v. Toll Southwest" on Justia Law

A group of residents sought to challenge a Tooele County zoning ordinance that changed the designation of a parcel of land in Erda from agricultural to planned-community zoning, enabling its development. The residents, acting as referendum sponsors, attempted to gather enough signatures to place the ordinance on the ballot for possible repeal, aiming to preserve the land’s agricultural status. Their efforts were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related executive orders, which they argued hindered their ability to collect signatures. Despite requesting permission to use electronic signatures, their request was denied, and they ultimately failed to meet the required signature threshold as determined by the County Clerk.The sponsors then filed suit in the Third District Court, Tooele County, against both the County and the Governor, challenging the signature threshold and the denial of electronic signatures. During the litigation, the area containing the property was incorporated as the City of Erda, transferring land-use authority from the County to the new city. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, finding the Clerk had correctly applied the signature threshold, and granted judgment on the pleadings to the Governor, rejecting the constitutional claims. The sponsors appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and determined that it was moot. The court held that, because the property is now within the City of Erda and subject to its zoning authority, a referendum repealing the Tooele County ordinance would have no legal effect on the property’s current zoning. The court found that it could not provide meaningful relief to the sponsors, as Erda has enacted its own zoning ordinances for the property. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Haney v. Tooele County" on Justia Law