Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing in part Plaintiffs' claims that a subset of Defendants participated in a conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968 and that this conspiracy injured Plaintiffs, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendants engaged in several interrelated schemes to defraud Plaintiffs of Maine real estate. The district court dismissed the RICO conspiracy claim against two defendants, David Hirshon and LOSU, LLC, and denied Plaintiffs' motion seeking limited discovery from Hirshon. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ruling that the complaint failed to state a RICO conspiracy claim against Hirshon and LOSU; (2) declining to consider certain documents outside the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss; and (3) denying Plaintiffs discovery. View "Douglas v. Hirshon" on Justia Law

A 2008 Michigan initiative decriminalized marijuana for medical purposes; a 2016 law afforded legal status to medical marijuana dispensaries. In Detroit, the Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) screened applications for such facilities. The code prohibits locating such a facility in a drug-free zone–an area “within 1,000 radial feet of the zoning lot” containing any one of several "sensitive places," including a school.Genie applied to run a medical marijuana distribution facility on Mack Avenue in Detroit. BSEED denied the application at the screening stage because the proposed site was in a drug-free zone based on a lot (in the neighboring community of Grosse Point Park) on which St. Clare School sits. Genie unsuccessfully challenged the determination through state administrative and judicial channels. Detroit deemed the St. Clare’s “zoning lot” to include land where the parish church sits (the church and school have separate lots of record), all of which is listed under a single tax parcel number.Genie sued in federal court, arguing that Detroit erred in measuring the distance between the proposed Genie site and St. Clare’s while approving other sites in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. Genie had no property interest in its proposed facility. Detroit applied the same method of measurement to each comparable applicant. Although Genie cited two applications that were approved, many applications were rejected on that basis. View "Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the decision of Supreme Court granting summary judgment against Plaintiff and dismissing its complaint alleging that Saratoga County erroneously failed to serve upon it a tax foreclosure petition, holding that Plaintiff was permitted to raise a question of fact regarding whether the taxing authority complied with the statutory notice requirements contained in N.Y. Real Prop. Law (RPTL) 1125(1)(b).The County allegedly mailed, via certified and first class mail, a notice of foreclosure and notice of commencement of the tax foreclosure proceeding to Plaintiff's address. Later, a default judgment entered in favor of the County. The County sold the property at auction. Plaintiff brought this action seeking vacatur of the default judgment and the deeds conveying the property, alleging that the County failed to serve upon it the tax foreclosure petition, in violation of RPTL 1125. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the County, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an interested party is permitted to establish that a taxing authority failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in RPTL 1125(1)(b) even when proof is submitted that notice that was allegedly sent by both certified and first class mail is not returned. View "James B. Nutter & Co. v. County of Saratoga" on Justia Law

In 1985, Palo Alto established the Commercial Downtown zoning district with parking regulations that allowed for “payment of an in-lieu monetary contribution to the city to defray the cost” of new, off-site parking spaces for “sites which would otherwise be precluded from development due to parking constraints.” In 1995, the city recognized the need to further mitigate insufficient downtown parking facilities and established an in-lieu parking fee for new, nonresidential development in the “University Avenue parking assessment district.” City staff has periodically submitted “five-year findings” on the parking fund, consistent with the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, 66000).The plaintiffs, developers who paid the fees as a condition of approval of a building project, sued, seeking a refund of their unexpended fees. The city argued that the fee was not subject to the Mitigation Fee Act; that the five-year finding and refund provisions did not apply; that, even if the Act did apply, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and that it complied with the Act’s requirements by belatedly adopting five-year findings.The court of appeal reversed the trial court, ordering a refund of the plaintiffs’ unexpended fees. The fee is subject to the Act, and the action is not time-barred. The failure to timely make five-year findings triggered the refund provision. Section 65010(b), does not require that plaintiffs make an independent showing of prejudice for a violation of section 66001(d) View "Hamilton and High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Wyo-Ben, Inc., (“Wyo-Ben”) appealed a district court’s dismissal of its complaint against the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (the “Secretary”) and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM;” collectively, “Respondents”) asserting a single claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). In 1993, Wyo-Ben filed a mineral patent application with BLM. While that application was pending, in 1994, Congress enacted a moratorium on processing mineral patent applications. In the same legislation, Congress also enacted an exemption to the moratorium: if a patent application was still pending by September 30, 1994, and it otherwise complied with certain conditions, the patent application was not subject to the moratorium and the Secretary was required to process the application. On October 3, 1994, BLM—not the Secretary—determined that Wyo-Ben’s mineral patent application did not qualify for the exemption. Congress thereafter reenacted the 1995 Act (including the moratorium and exemption) annually through 2019. In 2019, Wyo-Ben filed suit alleging that, pursuant to § 706(1) of the APA, the Secretary “unlawfully withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” agency action by failing to review Wyo-Ben’s pending application to determine whether it was exempt from the moratorium. The court found that Wyo-Ben’s claim was statutorily barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), reasoning that Wyo-Ben’s § 706(1) claim first accrued on the date BLM determined that Wyo-Ben’s patent application was not exempt (i.e., October 3, 1994) and that the limitations period expired six years later (i.e., October 3, 2000). On appeal, Wyo-Ben contended the district court misconstrued its § 706(1) claim by characterizing the allegedly unlawful conduct as BLM’s decision that Wyo- Ben’s application falls within the moratorium. Respondents maintained: (1) Wyo-Ben submitted an incomplete application in that BLM rejected its tender of the purchase price before the moratorium took effect; and (2) BLM properly determined in 1994, pursuant to authority the Secretary lawfully delegated to BLM, Wyo-Ben’s application fell within the moratorium. The district court did not resolve either of the foregoing two issues in dismissing Wyo-Ben’s claim. And, specifically as to the second issue, the court did not determine whether the lawful effect of any such delegation from the Secretary was that BLM properly stood in the shoes of the Secretary for purposes of determining that Wyo-Ben’s application was subject to the moratorium. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded the action to the district court for further proceedings. View "Wyo-Ben Inc. v. Haaland, et al." on Justia Law

The property at issue in this case was a small parcel, about 50-feet square, located in the middle of a block in the French Quarter. "Lot AA" was bounded on its north and east sides by an alley that accessed Conti Street to the east. On its west and south sides, the lot was contiguous with three parcels identified as lots 8, A, and B, currently owned by defendant, 1025 Bienville, LLC. Nearby lot 3, bordered on its north and west sides by the alley and fronting on Conti Street, was owned by 1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC, a sister entity of the plaintiff, 1026 Conti Holding, LLC. Bienville and Conti Holding both claimed ownership of lot AA. A dispute arose between the neighbors when Bienville refused to allow the owner of Conti Condominiums, Robert O’Brien, to park on lot AA. In a precursor to the present litigation, Conti Condominiums sued Bienville, alleging a servitude acquired by Conti Condominiums in the purchase of lot 3 granted it the right to park on lot AA. The courts disagreed and found the servitude does not extend to parking. During the course of the proceeding, O’Brien learned the public records did not contain a sell-out of lot AA. O’Brien located two of the lot's previous titleholder's grandchildren and paid them $100 to transfer their interest in the property to Conti Holding, a newly formed entity also owned by O’Brien. The heirs quit-claimed their interest to Conti Holding without warranty in an instrument signed by the parties in 2015. O’Brien also got a judgment of possession in the former titleholder's succession recognizing the grandchildren as the titleholder's only living heirs and reflecting the transfer of their interest in lot AA to Conti Holding. Relying on these documents, Conti Holding filed the underlying proceeding against Bienville seeking a judgment declaring Conti Holding the owner of lot AA. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Bienville acquired ownership of the lot by ten-year acquisitive prescription. View "1026 Conti Holding, LLC VS. 1025 Bienville, LLC" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the Supreme Court vacated the final judgment granting Respondent the right to redeem its real property in a tax-sale action and from an order granting Respondent's motion to adjudge Petitioner in contempt, holding that there was no offer to redeem to satisfy the strict statutory requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws 44-9-29.After the property at issue, which was owned by Respondent, was sold at a tax sale by the City of Providence Petitioner filed a petition to foreclose on Respondent's right of redemption. Respondent answered by contesting the validity of the tax sale. Respondent then filed a motion to set a redemption figure. The hearing justice set the redemption amount at $65,000. Petitioner failed to deliver the redemption deed, after which Respondent moved to adjudge Petitioner in contempt. The superior court adjudged Petitioner in contempt and granted a motion to stay the order setting a redemption figure. The Supreme Court vacated the final judgment granting Respondent's right of redemption and the order of contempt, holding that, having failed to set forth in its answer an offer to redeem before the fixed return date, Respondent's right to redeem was barred. View "Westconnaug Recovery Co. v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

Brothers Newton and Jason Wells (plaintiffs) and their mother Beverly Wells, filed suit in September 2017 seeking to partition real property they held as tenants in common with defendant Pall Spera in Stowe, Vermont. The court granted plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion on the question of whether they were entitled to partition as a matter of law, and issued an order of appointment of commissioners and order of reference by consent of the parties. The order appointed three commissioners and directed them to determine whether the property could be divided, assigned to one of the parties, or sold. They were ordered to determine the fair market value of the property and each person’s equitable share. Neither party reserved the right to object to the commissioners’ report. Ultimately, the commissioners concluded that physical division would cause great inconvenience to the parties. Finding division inequitable, the commissioners awarded defendant first right of assignment due to his ability to buy out plaintiffs’ interest immediately, while plaintiffs required a loan to do so, and because partition would constitute the dissolution of the partnership agreement, which defendant had wished to continue. Plaintiffs filed a motion objecting to the report, citing Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)(2)(iii). Plaintiffs’ main argument was that the commissioners exceeded their mandate as provided by the order of reference in concluding that partition would result in zoning violations, and the commissioners erred on that question as a matter of law. In the alternative, they argued the equities favored assigning the property to them. The court denied the motion, including plaintiffs’ request for a hearing, and adopted the report without qualification. It reasoned that plaintiffs had not reserved their right to object to the report as required by the plain language of Civil Rule 53(e)(2)(iii). Finding no reversible error in this decision, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wells et al. v. Spera" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 61-9-1 to -9 (Rev. 2022) the City of Jackson passed an ordinance on August 6, 2019, to incorporate land in Rankin County that surrounded what was known as the Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport. Rankin County, the City of Pearl and the City of Flowood appealed the ordinance; the trial court declared the ordinance void because Jackson had failed to obtain the consent and approval of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors before passing the ordinance. Jackson appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court claiming that the trial court erred by finding that approval of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors was required. The Supreme Court found the ordinance void and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "City of Jackson v. Cities of Pearl & Flowood, & Rankin County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law