Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's judgment granting specific performance to the Estate of Gordon Campbell in this property dispute, holding that the circuit court erred by determining that there were not material facts in dispute regarding one claim.After Campbell died, his Estate sought to withdraw property contributed by him from Redwater Grazing Association, of which Campbell and John Nelson were founding members. Before the Estate attempted withdraw the property it tried sell it by soliciting bids from Nelson and Jared Capp. The Estate accepted Capp's offer and sought the deed for the property from Redwater so it could convey the property to Capp. Redwater refused to provide the deed. Nelson and Redwater then filed various claims against the Estate and Capp. The circuit court granted specific performance to the Estate and dismissed the remaining claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err when it granted specific performance directing Redwater to deliver the deed for the property to the Estate; (2) did not err in failing to find a valid contract for the sale of the property between Nelson and the Estate; and (3) erred by granting summary judgment to Capp on Nelson's action for claim and delivery of personal property. View "Nelson v. Estate of Campbell" on Justia Law

In this dispute between the residents of a senior-living facility in a receivership over the proceeds generated by the sale of the facility the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the circuit court that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' entrance fee claims, holding that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' contract claims.After Atrium, the subject senior-living facility, defaulted on debt service payments to Bondholders, it filed a petition for receivership. The receiver sold the assets for more than $4 million in proceeds. Atrium owed Bondholders more than $6 million secured by a valid mortgage lien on the facility's estate, but many of the facility's Residents claimed they were owed reimbursement of the entrance fees they paid to Atrium. The circuit court entered judgment for Bondholders, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bondholders were entitled to first payment from the proceeds of the sale of Atrium's assets. View "Casanova v. Polsky" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) holding that a plaintiff may not recover attorneys' fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine from a private defendant even where the State voluntarily participated as a co-litigant in the case, holding that the ICA erred.Petitioners prevailed against Defendant Haleakala Ranch Company (HRC) in procuring the circuit court's judgment that the State of Hawai'i and not HRC owned a portion of the Haleakala Trail that ran over HRC's property. At issue before the Supreme Court was Petitioners' attempt to recover attorneys' fees from HRC under the PAG doctrine. The Supreme Court held (1) plaintiffs who recover attorneys' fees and costs under the PAG doctrine may also recover fees and costs reasonably incurred in litigating their initial claim for fees; and (2) a plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees under the PAG doctrine from a private defendant where the State voluntarily participated as a co-litigant in the case. View "Public Access Trails Haw. v. Haleakala Ranch Co." on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Land Use Commission (LUC) denying Petitioners' petition for a declaratory order challenging the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), holding that Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-2(e) does not authorize the Commission to exclude or enforce certain land uses within conservation districts.Petitioners in this case sought to use the LUC's districting authority in a manner that would compel the removal of all astronomy facilities located within the Astronomy Precinct. The LUC denied the petition, and Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to directly review Petitioners' appeal; (2) the LUC correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested declaratory orders; and (3) Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their remaining claims of error. View "In re Petition of Ku'ulei Higashi Kanahele" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure dispute, the Supreme Court held that Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-146(n) provides a scheme for distributing rents following a lender's foreclosure against an association and that the Association of Apartment Owners of Elima Lani Condominiums (AOAO) may be entitled to all or some of the rent collected for Nationstar Mortgage, LLC in this case.AOAO foreclosed an a unit owned by Thomas and Sarah David for failure to pay common assessments. Thereafter, Nationstar filed a complaint for foreclosure of the Davids' unit, alleging that the Davids had defaulted on their mortgage. The circuit court entered summary judgment and a decree of foreclosure in favor of Nationstar after AOAO came into possession of the unit. Nearly eleven months later after the foreclosure sale of the unit, the circuit court confirmed the foreclosure sale. Before the Supreme Court was whether AOAO was entitled to rents that accrued from the unit during the period between summary judgment and the confirmation of sale. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment to the extent it awarded post-foreclosure rents to Nationstar and remanded for a calculation of the amount AOAO was owed from post-foreclosure units, holding that AOAO may be entitled to all or some of the rent collected for Nationstar after summary judgment. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Elima Lani Condominiums" on Justia Law

Stephanie Owens appealed a district court’s order affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”) in which it determined that Owens was an “applicant” under the Medical Indigency Act (the “Act”) and, therefore, required to pay reimbursement for the medical expenses incurred by her two children at public expense. In 2017, Owens’s children were involved in a serious car accident and suffered substantial injuries, which later resulted in the death of one of the children. Because the children’s father, Corey Jacobs, was unable to pay for the children’s medical bills, he filed two applications for medical indigency with the Board. Owens and Jacobs were never married and did not have a formal custody agreement for their children. At the time of the accident, the children resided with their father. The Board determined that Owens and her children met the statutory requirements for medical indigency. Although Jacobs filed the applications for medical indigency, the Board concluded that Owens was also an “applicant” under the Act and liable to repay the Board. As a result, the Board “recorded notices of statutory liens” against Owens’s real and personal property and ordered Owens to sign a promissory note with Ada County to repay the medical bills. Owens refused to sign the note and instead challenged the sufficiency of her involvement with the applications via a petition for reconsideration with the Board and a subsequent petition for judicial review. Both the Board and the district court ultimately concluded that Owens was an “applicant” and liable for repayment of a portion of the children’s medical bills. Owens timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed: because she never signed the medical indigency applications for her children and she did not affirmatively participate in the application process, Owens was not an "applicant" as defined by the Act. As a result, the Board acted outside its authority when it ordered Owens to reimburse Ada County for its expenses and when it placed automatic liens on her property. View "Owens v. Ada County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of rights conveyed by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its parishioners, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the burial certificates' unambiguous language permitted the court to disinter and relocate the cremated remains buried on the church's former property despite objections of the decedents' families.After the church in this case was compelled and close and sell its property, it contacted the families of the at least forty-nine deceased individuals interred in the churchyard and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of the cremains. Family members representing the cremains of twelve individuals did not consent, and the church brought this complaint seeking a declaration that newly-amended church regulations authorized it to relocate the remains. The family court entered judgment in favor of the church. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this is the type of situation where relocation of the remains is proper. View "Church of Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary injunction preventing Robert Oberlander from accessing his leased State school trust land via private roadways in a subdivision, holding that Oberlander had standing to bring a prescriptive easement claim.In 2001, Oberlander acquired his leases and accessed the leased land by traveling over portions of two private roads maintained by the homeowners association (HOA) in this case. In 2021, the HOA applied for a preliminary injunction, claiming that Oberlander's use constituted a trespass, violation of applicable covenants, and unjust enrichment. Oberlander filed a third-party complaint against individual property owners within the HOA, claiming a prescriptive easement. The district court dismissed Oberlander's prescriptive easement claim on the grounds that he lacked standing and then granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the preliminary was grounded in the improper conclusion that Oberlander lacked standing because, as an occupant of the dominant tenement, Oberlander had standing to bring a prescriptive easement claim pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 70-17-109. View "Oberlander v. Hennequin" on Justia Law

Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law