Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
McGill Restoration, Inc. v. Lion Place Condominium Ass’n
The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part the judgments of the district court in this action brought to levy execution against a condominium unit, holding that the district court erred by failing to sustain a motion to quash.McGill Restoration, Inc. obtained a breach of contract judgment against Lion Place Condominium Association and, together with its successor-in-interest, sought and obtained two writs of execution. Both of the writs directed the county sheriff to levy execution against a condominium unit owned by Michael Henery, one of the Association's members. Henery filed motions to quash those writs, but the district court overruled the motions. The Supreme Court vacated the second writ of execution and dismissed Henery's second appeal, holding (1) the district court erred by failing to sustain Henery's motion to quash; and (2) Henery's first appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction over subsequent proceedings. View "McGill Restoration, Inc. v. Lion Place Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law
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Nebraska Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
Muller v. Weeder
The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a second opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court affirming the county court's monetary judgment in favor of Richard Muller in this fence dispute action between Muller and John Weeder, holding that, as a result of Weeder's death, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue its opinion and mandate in the first appeal.After the district court affirmed, as modified, the judgment in favor of Muller, Weeder appealed. Weeder died while the case was pending in the court of appeals. Unaware of Weeder's death, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the county court again entered a monetary judgment in favor of Muller. The district court dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on Weeder's death. The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the court in which it was pending at the time of Weeder's death, holding that the court of appeals' opinion and mandate in the first appeal must be vacated as null and void and that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the second appeal. View "Muller v. Weeder" on Justia Law
Boutrous, et al. v. Transform Operating Stores, et al.
Transform Operating Stores, LLC d/b/a Transformco Operating Stores LLC; Transform SR Brands LLC d/b/a Transformco d/b/a Kmart; and Transform KM LLC (collectively, “Transform”) appealed after a North Dakota district court entered an order awarding damages to Ted J. Boutrous, L.L.C. and The Boutrous Group, LLP and entered a [second] amended judgment of eviction. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err finding a material breach of the lease and in exercising jurisdiction as a summary eviction. "While the court abused its discretion in bifurcating the eviction action, that error was harmless." The Court further concluded Transform failed to timely appeal the court’s contempt order for the untimely turnover of the property. View "Boutrous, et al. v. Transform Operating Stores, et al." on Justia Law
Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al.
Angus Kennedy owned real property and mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1960, Angus and his wife, Lois, executed two deeds conveying the surface and “excepting and reserving unto the parties of the first part, their heirs, successors or assigns, all right, title and interest in and to any and all . . . minerals in or under the foregoing described lands.” Lois did not own an interest in the property when Angus and Lois Kennedy executed the deeds. Angus died in 1965, and Lois died in 1980. Angus and Lois did not have children together. Angus had six children from a previous marriage. Angus' heirs executed numerous mineral leases for the property. Lois had one child, Julia Nevin, who died in 1989. In 2016 and 2017, Julia Nevin’s surviving husband, Stanley Nevin, executed mineral leases with Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2018, Stanley sued the successors in interest to Angus, alleging Lois owned half of the minerals reserved in the 1960 deeds. In response, the Angus heirs claimed Angus did not intend to reserve any minerals to Lois because she did not own an interest in the property conveyed in the 1960 deeds. The district court granted Northern Oil’s motion to intervene. Northern Oil appeals the quiet title judgment deciding Northern Oil did not own mineral interests in the McKenzie County property, arguing the district court erred in concluding the deeds at issue were ambiguous as to whether Angus intended to reserve minerals to his wife, Lois. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al." on Justia Law
Bass v. Esslinger
This appeal involved a dispute over ownership of one-third of an acre of land between two parcels near Slate Creek, Idaho. The disputed one-third acre was located south of a fence erected in the 1970s by the family of the current owners of the southern parcel, the Basses, and the predecessors-in-interest to the northern parcel’s current owners, the Esslingers. The district court granted summary judgment for the Basses, declined to take judicial notice of a case file from a 2006 quiet title action concerning the northern parcel, found that a boundary by agreement existed at the historic fence line, denied a motion to continue the summary judgment hearing pending criminal trespass charges against the Esslingers, and granted the Basses $107,134.32 in treble damages. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "Bass v. Esslinger" on Justia Law
Whitham v. Creamer
Kent and Linda Whitham, trustees of the Kent G. Whitham and Linda M. Whitham Revocable Trust, owned a property that benefitted from the use of a forty-foot private road easement that they and several neighbors used to access their homes in rural Bonner County, Idaho. Jeff Creamer owned a portion of the land that was encumbered by the easement. The easement consisted of a dirt road that was prone to erosion in the spring following snow melt and heavy rainfall. Because their property benefits from the easement, the Whithams took much of the responsibility for the maintenance of the road. In an effort to combat erosion, Creamer installed a French drain across a portion of the roadway that ran on his property. Kent Whitham then filled in the drain with dirt, rendering it inoperable. Creamer then re-installed the French drain. This back-and-forth conduct repeated itself several times and ultimately led the parties to district court in Bonner County when the Whithams sued Creamer. After a bench trial, the district court permitted Creamer to install a French drain on a portion of the roadway easement that encumbered his property and prohibited the Whithams from interfering with the drain. Both parties appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s findings that the Whithams created an additional burden on the Creamer property and acted negligently when Kent filled in the French drain. However, the Court vacated the district court’s failure to award damages to Creamer to repair the French drain. The district court’s declaration allowing Creamer to install French drains across the portions of the Private Road Easement that ran through his property and prohibiting the Whithams from interfering with those installations, was affirmed. The Court also affirmed the district court’s failure to address Creamer’s common law trespass claim because the claim was subsumed by the negligence claim, and the trial court properly dismissed Creamer’s statutory trespass claim because Kent was within the easement when he filled in the French drain. View "Whitham v. Creamer" on Justia Law
Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC
In this case concerning the meaning and application of a standard title insurance policy exclusion (Exclusion 3(a)) designed to cover any defects, encumbrances, or adverse claims created or suffered by the insured in the context of construction lending, holding that this Court's opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394 (2008), sets forth the proper interpretation and application Exclusion 3(a).In its underlying rulings, the trial court invoked Action Acquisitions to interpret Exclusion 3(a) in the construction lending context. The court of appeals reversed, instead applying the bright-line rule articulated in BB Syndication Services, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Co., 780 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) this Court adopts Action Acquisitions' causation test for Exclusion 3(a)'s applicability; and (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the BB Syndication approach. View "Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC" on Justia Law
Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law
Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates
The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law