Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A resort community in North Georgia included a golf course next to a subdivision. The current owner of the resort wanted to redevelop the golf course into a residential property, and several homeowners in the subdivision sued to stop it. The trial court concluded that the homeowners had an easement in the golf course and granted a permanent injunction preventing the course from being put to any other use, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. Both courts below concluded that the homeowners acquired an easement in the golf course because their lots were bought with reference to a subdivision plat that designated a “golf course” next to the subdivision. The Supreme Court found that conclusion relied on a long line of decisions recognizing that easements in features like streets, parks, and lakes could be acquired on this basis, which amounted to an easement by express grant. But golf courses are different. Given the wide range of interests that an easement in a golf course could possibly include— interests in a view, access, use, or enjoyment, to name a few—merely designating a “golf course” on a subdivision plat and selling lots with reference to the plat "cannot give reasonable certainty as to the scope of a claimed easement." So, although subdivision owners might be able to acquire an easement in a given adjacent golf course, the intent to convey such an interest must be shown through evidence based in the relevant documents taken as a whole, rather than presumed based on the golf course’s mere designation on a plat. View "WS CE Resort Owner, LLC v. Holland, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court denying a property owner's motion for summary judgment in the underlying dispute with a contractor arising from a construction project, holding that the trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment.Defendants hired Plaintiff to serve as a general contractor to renovate a home located on Greenwich property. Defendants later terminated their contractual relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff served mechanics' liens on Defendants and brought this action to foreclose its lien. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court was required to give res judicata effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between Plaintiff and one of Defendants' subcontractors. The trial court denied Defendants' summary judgment motion, determine that all four required elements of res judicata were not met. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in holding that the presumption of privity that the Supreme Court held to apply in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 208 A.3d 1223 (Conn. 2019), did not apply to the instant case. View "Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Philip and Jennie Bowling purchased their house via a promissory note in 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage, which was eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"). A little over a decade later, the Bowlings began missing loan payments. Litton Loan Servicing, LP ("Litton"), the original servicer for the loan, sent the Bowlings several notices of default between July 1999 and June 2011, before eventually transferring service of the loan to another entity, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen"). In September 2011, Ocwen allegedly notified the Bowlings that they were in default. Ocwen then scheduled a foreclosure sale, which took place in October 2012. A company called WGB, LLC ("WGB"), purchased the Bowlings' house at the foreclosure sale, but the Bowlings refused to vacate the property. A few weeks later, WGB filed an ejectment action against them. The Bowlings answered by asserting that they had not defaulted on the loan and that the foreclosure sale was invalid. The Bowlings also named as third-party defendants U.S. Bank, Ocwen, and Litton (collectively, "the banks"), alleging that the banks had mishandled the loan, the foreclosure sale, and related matters. In total, the Bowlings asserted 15 third-party claims against the banks. Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure gives a trial court discretion to certify a partial judgment as final, and thus immediately appealable, even though some piece of the case remains pending in the trial court. This appeal stemmed from a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in certifying its partial judgment as immediately appealable. Because an improper Rule 54(b) certification cannot support an appeal on the merits of the underlying judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bowling v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al." on Justia Law

In this "double-fraction" dilemma arising from antique mineral conveyances in which the parties used two fractions, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of a 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth" equalled one-half of the mineral estate.The parties in this case were the parties who derived from the grantees (White parties) and the parties whose interests derived from the grantors (Mulkey parties). The ownership of certain royalties turned on which side correctly interpreted the 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth." The trial court entered an order granting the White parties' motion for partial summary judgment on the construction of the deed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in holding that the Mulkey parties did not have a one-half interest in the minerals because (1) the presumption that "1/8" was used as a term of art to refer to the "mineral estate" was not rebutted in this case; and (2) alternatively, the presumed-grant doctrine would confirm that the Mulkey parties had title to one-half of the mineral estate. View "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court following the grant of Flagstar Bank, FSB's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing this action filed by Plaintiffs for wrongful acceleration, foreclosure, and sale of certain property, holding that the trial justice erred in part.In deciding Flagstar's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court was required to resolve any doubts in favor of the complaining party. However, a disputed issue of material fact existed. The Supreme Court remanded the case in part, holding (1) the trial justice's failure to to resolve the disputed issue of material fact in favor of Plaintiffs, as the complaining party, was erroneous; and (2) the trial justice did not err in concluding that Flagstar complied with 24 C.F.R. 203.604. View "Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

After the Arcadia City Council approved J.W.’s application to expand the first story of her single-family home and add a second story (“the project”), Arcadians for Environmental Preservation (AEP), a grassroots organization led by J.W.’s next-door neighbor, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City’s decision. AEP’s petition primarily alleged the city council had erred in finding the project categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and CEQA’s implementing guidelines. The superior court denied the petition, ruling as a threshold matter that AEP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that AEP failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the question of whether the project fell within the scope of the class 1 exemption. Further, the court found that AEP’s general objections to project approval did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, the court wrote that AEP has not demonstrated the City failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it impliedly found no exception to the exemption applied. Finally, the court held that AEP has not demonstrated the City erred in concluding the cumulative effects exception did not apply. View "Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment concluding that Plains Commerce Bank could not foreclose on certain trust real estate, that the trustee's mortgage on trust real estate was void and unenforceable, and that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, holding that the attorney fee award was an abuse of discretion.Garry and Betty Beck treated an irrevocable spendthrift trust naming their three children as secondary beneficiaries. Their child Matthew Beck took out a substantial personal loan with Plains Commerce and granted a mortgage to the bank on trust real estate as partial collateral. When Matthew defaulted on the loan, Plains Commerce brought a foreclosure action against Matthew in his capacity as trustee. Jamie Moeckly intervened on behalf of the trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Jamie and further granted her motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in awarding attorney fees to Jamie as intervenor for the trust; and (2) because there was no mortgage foreclosure the statutory provision in S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38 authorizing attorney fees "on foreclosure" did not apply. View "Plains Commerce Bank, Inc. v. Beck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered by the superior court determining ownership and land use rights in intertidal land bordering Penobscot Bay, holding that the disputed land belonged to Jeffrey Mabee and Judith Grace under the plain language of the relevant deeds.Nordic Aquafarms Inc. negotiated an agreement with Richard and Janet Eckrote to bury industrial pipes in the intertidal land located between the Eckrotes' upland property and Penobscot Bay. During the ensuing trial, the City bought the Eckrotes' property and was granted intervenor status. Mabee and Grace jointly owned property near the Eckrotes' property and claimed that they owned not only the intertidal land abutting their own upland property but also the intertidal land abutting the upland properties of the Eckrotes. The superior court concluded that Mabee and Grace failed to establish title to the intertidal land abutting the Eckrotes' upland properties. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the governing deed conveying land did not include the intertidal land that was eventually conveyed to Mabee and Grace; and (2) Mabee and Grace held an enforceable servitude over the Eckrotes' upland. View "Mabee v. Nordic Aquafarms, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that the assessments of Lowe's Home Centers, LLC's property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years by the City of Delvan were not excessive, holding that the assessments were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.On appeal, Lowe's argued, among other things, that the City's assessments should not have received a presumption of correctness because they were conducted in violation of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of correctness attached to the City's assessments; and (2) Lowe's failed to demonstrate that the assessments were excessive. View "Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Tres C, LLC was an Oklahoma limited liability company whose members were Viola "Tincy" Cowan, her son David Cowan, her daughter Karlea Cowan Ewald, her grandson Scot Meier, and her granddaughter Marsha Bukowski. Tres C was a successor-in-interest to certain mineral interests a the 320-acre lot in Blaine County, Oklahoma, that were formerly owned by the parents of Tincy's late husband, George and Coral Cowan. In February 1955, George and Carol Cowan executed an oil and gas lease in favor of J.J. Wright (hereinafter "the Lessee") concerning those mineral interests. Under its habendum clause, the Cowan Lease would remain valid for a primary term lasting 10 years and then--so long as a producing well was drilled--for a secondary term lasting "as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, or any of the products covered by this lease is or can be produced." Defendants-petitioners were the Lessee's current successors-in-interest under the Cowan Lease. This appeal concerned the trial court's judgment that granted Plaintiff's petition to cancel defendant's oil and gas lease and to quiet title in its favor so that a third party could exercise the option of executing a new lease. The Court of Civil Appeals conditionally affirmed the trial court's judgment, but remanded the matter with instructions to address the noncontractual defense of obstructions, set forth in Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d 872. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the trial court erred in applying a rule of law that analyzed only a 3-month window of time for assessing whether a dip in the existing well's production was a cessation of production in paying quantities such that defendants' lease expired by its own terms. On de novo review, the Court found the trial court did err insofar as it relied upon the lease's cessation-of-production clause to define the time period for assessing profitability. The Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court's judgment, quieted title in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tres C, LLC v. Raker Resources" on Justia Law