Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Treasure Valley Home Solutions, LLC, (“TVHS”) filed a complaint against Richard Chason alleging breach of contract and requesting specific performance of a real estate purchase contract after Chason refused to move forward with the transaction. Chason moved for summary judgment, arguing the Agreement lacked definite terms and was therefore unenforceable. The district court granted Chason’s motion for summary judgment after concluding the Agreement was a mere “agreement to agree.” The district court also awarded Chason attorney fees. TVHS appealed both orders. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court did not err when it granted Chason’s motion for summary judgment because a valid contract was never formed between the parties. However, the district court erred when it awarded Chason attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because the evidence did not establish that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of the claim between TVHS and Chason. Neither party was awarded attorney fees or costs on appeal. View "Treasure Valley Home Solutions, LLC v. Chason" on Justia Law

Field Asset Services, Inc. (“FAS”) is in the business of pre-foreclosure property preservation for the residential mortgage industry. Plaintiff was the sole proprietor of BB Home Services, which contracted with FAS as a vendor. Plaintiff alleged that FAS willfully misclassified him and members of the putative class as independent contractors rather than employees, resulting in FAS’s failure to pay overtime compensation and to indemnify them for their business expenses. FAS first argued that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class, despite the predominance of individualized questions over common ones.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on July 5, 2022; and (2) an amended opinion reversing the district court’s order certifying a class of 156 individuals who personally performed work for FAS, reversing the partial summary judgment in favor of the class, vacating the interim award of more than five million dollars in attorneys’ fees, and remanding for further proceedings.   The panel held that here, the class failed the requirement because complex, individualized inquiries would be needed to establish that class members worked overtime or that claimed expenses were reimbursable. The panel concluded that class certification was improper. The panel noted that FAS’s joint employment argument would likely succeed was an actual employee of a vendor suing FAS, claiming that FAS was an employer. The panel further held that the interim award of attorneys' fees must be vacated because the class certification and summary judgment orders were issued in error. View "FRED BOWERMAN, ET AL V. FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Plaintiffs did not adversely possess their northern neighbors deeded property in the Bighorn Mountains because their use was presumptively permissive, holding that the district court did not clearly err.Plaintiffs' fancy had enclosed portions of Defendant's deeded property within Plaintiffs' property since the 1950s. Plaintiffs brought this suit requesting that the district court quiet title in the disputed lands. The district court concluded that the fence was built for convenience, and therefore, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of actual notice to Defendant of their hostile use of the land. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision quieting title in Defendant and ejecting Plaintiffs from the property, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Lyman v. Childs" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the inclusion of concise and relevant additional information does not void an otherwise proper notice to borrowers sent pursuant to N.Y. Real. Prop. Acts. Law (RPAPL) 1304 and thus does not bar a subsequently filed foreclosure action.Borrower obtained a loan secured by a mortgage on his home and later defaulted on the loan. Bank sent Borrower notice of default pursuant to RPAPL 1304 and then brought this foreclosure action. Borrower filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the inclusion of two paragraphs in his notice not found in RPAPL 1304 violated the statute. Supreme Court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. The appellate division affirmed, determining that including in the envelop sent to the borrower any language not required by the statute violates the statute's separate envelope provision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 1304 does not prohibit the inclusion of additional information that may help borrowers avoid foreclosure and is not false or misleading; and (2) the additional information in this case was not false or misleading and should not render the notice void. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Kessler" on Justia Law

In the late 1930s, Milwaukee County built a dam on the Milwaukee River in Estabrook Park, an urban green space that runs along the east bank of the river where the City of Milwaukee borders suburban Shorewood and Whitefish Bay. In 2017 the County transferred the dam to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District for the purpose of removing it. Demolition was completed the following year. With the dam removed, the water level immediately upstream fell by about four feet from its previous high-water mark. Kreuziger owns a home along this stretch of the river, and the drop in the water level exposed a ten-foot swath of swampy land on his waterfront that used to be submerged.Kreuziger sued the District and Milwaukee County, alleging that their removal of the dam amounted to a taking of his riparian right to the prior surface water level without just compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. the riparian rights of waterfront property owners are subordinate to the government’s authority to regulate navigable waterways under the public-trust doctrine. Kreuziger had no property right to have the river remain at the previous level. View "Kreuziger v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this foreclosure action, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Plaintiff executed a promissory note and mortgage secured by certain Pawtucket property. After Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, Defendants initiated the foreclosure process and sent Plaintiff the notice of sale. Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking to enjoin Defendants from proceeding with the foreclosure sale. The superior court denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and held a foreclosure sale. Thereafter, the trial judge granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) were was no genuine issue of material precluding summary judgment; (2) the hearing justice did not err in finding that neither the default notice nor the amount of listed arrearage violated the mortgage or prejudiced Plaintiff; (3) the hearing justice properly disposed of Plaintiff's motions to strike; and (4) the hearing justice did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend his original complaint. View "Degasparre v. Fay Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The case presents an apparently unresolved question in the Second Circuit: whether a district court’s order granting a purportedly final judgment on a noteholder’s claims seeking (1) foreclosure on a mortgage, (2) foreclosure on a security interest in real property and (3) possession of said real property is an appealable final judgment – even though the order also refers the case to a magistrate judge to calculate the amount of the judgment of foreclosure and sale. The district court struck the Borrower’s and Guarantors’ affirmative defenses, granted the motion for summary judgment on the Foreclosure Claims, and granted the motion to sever the Guaranty Claim in an opinion and order dated December 2, 2021. On appeal, the Borrower contends that the district court improperly struck certain affirmative defenses prior to entering summary judgment for the Noteholder on the Foreclosure Claims.   The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court concluded that such a judgment is not, in fact “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and that no other basis for appellate jurisdiction exist. The court explained that the district court did not certify its judgment as final and appealable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in its December 2, 2021, Order and Judgment. And even if it did, the Court would have to “consider for itself whether the judgment satisfies the requirements of that rule.” View "RSS WFCM2018-C44 - NY LOD, LLC v. 1442 Lexington Operating DE LLC" on Justia Law

Property owners sought compensation for an alleged taking pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241–51. When a railroad wishes to relinquish responsibility over a railroad corridor, it must seek permission to abandon the corridor. Under the Trails Act, before abandonment is consummated, other entities can intervene to railbank the corridor and preserve it for future railroad use. The railbanking intervention process allows a railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. The issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking if the railroad was granted an easement, interim trail use and railbanking were beyond the scope of that easement, and the NITU caused a delay in termination of the easement.The Claims Court found that the property interests at issue were easements, but that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court erred in interpreting Missouri law and in concluding that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements; railbanking is not within the scope of the easements. With no causation dispute, the NITU issuance constituted a taking. View "Behrens v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendants Churchwell White LLP, a law firm, and two of its attorneys, Barbara Brenner and Robin Baral (collectively Churchwell) represented a corporation in an action to quiet title to water rights. In the quiet title action, Churchwell sued the City of Weed (City) and the plaintiffs here, Water for Citizens of Weed California, its members, and other citizens of the City (collectively Citizens). The trial court in that action granted Citizens’s special motion to strike the complaint (an anti-SLAPP motion). Citizens then filed this action against Churchwell, alleging malicious prosecution for naming them in the quiet title action. Churchwell, in turn, filed its own anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted, concluding Citizens did not establish a probability of prevailing on their claim. The court determined Citizens did not show that Churchwell lacked probable cause or acted out of malice in naming them in the quiet title action. Citizens appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of Churchwell’s motion. View "Water for Citizens of Weed Cal. v. Churchwell White LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in the proceedings below, holding that an appraiser cannot be "disinterested" if he or she, or a firm in which he or she has an interest, is to be compensated for services as a public adjuster with a contingency fee.At issue was whether George Keys, the president of Keys Claims Consultants, Inc. (KCC), a homeowner's public adjusting firm, which was to be compensated on a contingency basis for its adjusting services, could subsequently serve as a "disinterested" appraiser for Jon Parrish under the language of the relevant insurance policy with State Farm. The trial court concluded that Keys could serve as Parrish's disinterested appraiser because the two had disclosed their arrangement to State Farm. The Second District reversed, concluding that Keys could not serve as Parrish's disinterested appraiser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Keys’s company, KCC, was to be compensated via contingency fee, Keys had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the claim and could not qualify as a “disinterested” appraiser. View "Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Insurance Co." on Justia Law