Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A property owner purchased a lot in a Wyoming subdivision governed by two homeowners’ associations, each enforcing its own set of covenants. The owner sought to demolish an existing structure and build a new residence with an attached hangar, submitting construction plans for approval as required. Disputes arose over whether his application was complete and whether the associations unreasonably delayed or withheld approval, resulting in increased construction costs due to inflation. Complicating matters, one association (AVR I) had been dissolved years earlier, but its board continued to act as if it existed, later forming a new entity (AVR II) that purported to enforce covenants recorded after AVR I’s dissolution but before AVR II’s formal creation.The property owner initially sued AVR I, believing it to be the proper party, and later sued the other association, AAA. During discovery, he learned that AVR I had been defunct and that AVR II was the actual entity acting as the homeowners’ association. He moved to amend his complaint to add AVR II and assert new claims, including that the covenants were invalid. The District Court of Lincoln County denied the motion to amend, finding the amendments would be futile, and granted summary judgment to AVR I, reasoning that the covenants automatically approved the owner’s plans by default and any delay was self-imposed.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and held that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. The Supreme Court found that the proposed claims against AVR II were not futile, as there were unresolved factual and legal questions regarding the validity and enforceability of the covenants and AVR II’s authority. The court also held that summary judgment for AVR I was premature. The orders denying amendment and granting summary judgment were reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Conger v. AVR Homeowner's Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether the trustees of a family trust, who inherited land south of a subdivision, have an easement—either express or implied—across Lot 4 of the subdivision, now owned by the Fullers. The subdivision, created by the Clarks’ predecessor, included a private road (Buttercup Lane) running north-south through all four lots, ending at a temporary cul-de-sac at the southern edge of Lot 4. The original owner reserved the right to extend the road to the southern boundary for access to adjoining lands, contingent on providing notice to Lot 4’s owners. After the Fullers purchased Lot 4 and denied access, the trustees sued, claiming an easement for access to their southern property.The District Court of Lincoln County held a bench trial and found that no express easement existed because the original owner had not exercised her reserved right by providing the required notice to Lot 4’s owners. The court also found no implied easement, concluding that the trustees failed to show that access through Lot 4 was necessary and beneficial, as alternative access routes to the southern property existed. The trustees appealed these findings.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the evidence did not show the required notice was given to create an express easement, and that the existence of alternative access routes meant the necessity element for an implied easement was not met. The Supreme Court of Wyoming thus affirmed the judgment, finding no express or implied easement across Lot 4 in favor of the trustees. View "Clark v. Fuller" on Justia Law

A construction worker employed by a subcontractor was injured when a scaffold collapsed at a Manhattan worksite. The worker sued the property owner and general contractor in New York Supreme Court, alleging negligence and violations of state labor laws. The owner’s insurer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, sought a declaration in federal court that the subcontractor’s insurer, Hudson Excess Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify the owner as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy. The subcontract between the general contractor and the subcontractor required the latter to provide insurance coverage for the owner and general contractor.In the New York Supreme Court, summary judgment was granted to the injured worker on some claims, while other claims remained pending. The court denied summary judgment to the owner on its contractual indemnification claim against the subcontractor, finding factual questions about the scope of the subcontractor’s work. Later, after the federal district court’s decision, the state court dismissed all third-party claims against the subcontractor, finding the indemnity provision in the subcontract invalid due to lack of a meeting of the minds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding, after a bench trial on stipulated facts, that the subcontractor’s actions proximately caused the worker’s injuries and that Hudson owed a duty to indemnify the owner under the policy. The Second Circuit held that the later state court decision did not alter this result. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Liberty, holding that Hudson was entitled to a statutory safe harbor under New York Insurance Law, and thus was not required to pay Liberty’s attorney’s fees for the federal action. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Hudson Excess Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A company constructed and operated a large interstate natural gas pipeline running through Ohio, which was completed in late 2018. The project’s actual construction costs significantly exceeded initial estimates due to unusually heavy rainfall causing delays and an environmental incident that led to regulatory actions and further delays. During construction, an investment firm acquired a substantial indirect ownership interest in the pipeline’s parent company, paying a price that implied a high valuation for the pipeline.For the 2019 tax year, the Ohio Tax Commissioner assessed the taxable value of the Ohio portion of the pipeline using a statutory cost-based method, resulting in a valuation that the company believed was excessive. The company challenged the assessment, arguing that the pipeline’s true value was much lower, citing alternative appraisal methods and the impact of construction delays and overruns. The Tax Commissioner rejected these arguments, maintaining that the statutory method produced the correct value.The company appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, where both parties presented expert appraisals. The company’s appraiser used a unit appraisal approach and arrived at a lower value, while the Tax Commissioner’s appraiser, using both cost and income approaches, opined a higher value. The Board found the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal more credible, especially in light of the investment firm’s transaction and the actual construction costs, and ordered the pipeline to be valued according to that appraisal.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the Board’s decision was reasonable and lawful. The court held that the Board has broad discretion in weighing competing appraisals and evidence, and that its adoption of the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal was supported by the record. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, upholding the higher valuation for tax purposes. View "Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Twelve days before filing for bankruptcy, the debtors purchased a new property in New Hampton, Iowa, but did not list this property in their bankruptcy schedules. Instead, they listed their Waucoma property, consisting of three contiguous parcels totaling just under 30 acres, as their residence and claimed it as fully exempt under Iowa’s homestead laws. No objections were filed to this exemption. The debtors later sold two of the three Waucoma parcels, retaining only a vacant lot (Parcel A). After their bankruptcy discharge, a creditor, AgVantage, sought to execute a pre-petition judgment lien against Parcel A, ultimately acquiring it at a sheriff’s sale.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the debtors’ motion to avoid AgVantage’s judicial lien, finding that the debtors had abandoned the Waucoma property as their homestead by purchasing and using the New Hampton property. The court also dismissed the debtors’ adversary complaint seeking contempt sanctions against AgVantage for violating the discharge injunction, concluding that AgVantage held a valid lien and was enforcing in rem rights, not collecting a discharged debt. The bankruptcy court further denied the debtors’ motion to amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings regarding the debtors’ homestead status on the petition date were not supported by the record. The panel held that the debtors’ exemption claim was presumptively valid and that AgVantage had not met its burden to rebut this presumption. The panel also determined that the bankruptcy court erred in granting a motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding without affording the debtors the procedural presumptions required at that stage. The panel reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing. View "Jencks v. AgVantage FS" on Justia Law

A dispute arose after a rare vehicle, originally owned by a Wisconsin man, was stolen and shipped to Europe. Richard Mueller inherited the vehicle and sold part of his interest to Joseph Ford. Years later, TL90108 LLC (“TL”) purchased the vehicle overseas and, upon attempting to register it in the United States, was notified that Ford and Mueller were the owners of record. Ford and Mueller sued TL in Wisconsin state court for a declaratory judgment and replevin. The trial court dismissed the case on statute-of-repose grounds, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review. While the appeal was pending, Ford filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy but did not list TL as a creditor or provide it with formal notice of the bankruptcy proceedings or relevant deadlines.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida set a deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) for creditors to file complaints objecting to the discharge of debts. TL did not file a complaint before this deadline, as it was unaware of the relevant facts supporting a fraud claim until later discovery in the Wisconsin litigation. After learning of Ford’s alleged fraud, TL moved to extend the deadline and file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), arguing for equitable tolling and asserting a due process violation due to inadequate notice. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in In re Alton, which held that equitable tolling does not apply to Rule 4007(c) deadlines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in In re Alton remains binding and precludes equitable tolling of Rule 4007(c)’s deadline, even in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The court also held that TL’s actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding satisfied due process, and thus, the deadline could not be extended on that basis. View "TL90108 LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner, after selling his San Diego County home and purchasing property in Trinity County, sought to transfer the base year value of his former property to his new one. In 2009, he sued the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to compel such a transfer under California law. The parties settled in 2012, agreeing that if the County later adopted an ordinance or if a change in law required it, the owner would be entitled to retroactively transfer the base year value. In 2020, after the passage of Proposition 19, which expanded the ability to transfer base year values between counties, the owner requested the transfer from the county assessor, who denied the request.The Superior Court of Trinity County held a bench trial and found in favor of the property owner on his breach of contract claims, ordering the County to specifically perform the settlement agreement and awarding damages. The court rejected the County’s arguments that the agreement was limited to intra-county transfers and that the Board lacked authority to bind the assessor. The court also found that the new law triggered the County’s obligations under the agreement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, concluded that the Board of Supervisors did not have the authority to direct the county assessor in setting or transferring base year values, as this is a duty assigned by law to the assessor, an elected official independent of the Board’s control. The court held that the 2012 settlement agreement was void and unenforceable because it exceeded the Board’s legal authority. As a result, the judgment on the breach of contract claims was reversed, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The County was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Sceper v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over mining rights to a parcel of land near Nome, Alaska. After the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) deemed certain mining claims abandoned, two individuals, Foster and Baker, relocated and recorded new claims in 2017. However, another miner, Klutchnikov, also recorded claims on the same land, asserting an earlier staking date, which would give his claims priority. DNR notified the parties of the overlap and advised them to resolve the conflict through legal means. Klutchnikov later transferred his claims to Amerigold Holdings, LLC, which invested in developing the site. Baker and Silverbow Mining, LLC, whose claims were closed by DNR due to the unresolved conflict, filed suit seeking a declaration that Klutchnikov’s claims were invalid because he had not physically staked the land, but had instead “paper staked” the claims.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, held a bench trial. The court admitted testimony from other miners about Klutchnikov’s alleged pattern of paper staking, over Amerigold’s objection. The court found that Klutchnikov had not physically staked the disputed claims and that Baker and Silverbow’s claims were valid. The court rejected Amerigold’s laches defense, concluding that Amerigold had not shown it was prejudiced by the delay in filing suit, and that any harm suffered by Amerigold’s manager, Hice, was not relevant because he was not a party.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that laches can apply to both quiet title and declaratory judgment actions when they are equitable in nature. The court further held that prejudice to a nonparty closely connected to the defendant, such as an investor with a contractual relationship, may be considered in the laches analysis. The court vacated the Superior Court’s rejection of the laches defense and remanded for further proceedings on that issue, but affirmed the admission of testimony regarding Klutchnikov’s prior acts as relevant to the absence of accident. View "Amerigold Holdings LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged the tax assessment of its facility in Salisbury, Vermont, for the 2023-2024 tax year. After a grievance hearing attended by both the property owner and its attorney, the town listers denied the grievance and mailed the decision by certified mail to the property owner’s address of record. The property owner received the notice twelve days before the deadline to appeal but did not forward it to its attorney until after the appeal period had expired. The attorney then filed an appeal to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA), which was rejected as untimely.The property owner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, arguing that the town violated its procedural due process rights by failing to send notice of the listers’ decision to both the property owner and its attorney. The Superior Court allowed the property owner to amend its complaint and ultimately granted summary judgment in its favor, relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, which required notice to both a claimant and their attorney in the context of unemployment benefits. The court ordered the BCA to hear the untimely appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, in the context of property tax grievances, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s counsel. The Court distinguished Perry as limited to unemployment-benefit proceedings and found that the statutory scheme for property tax appeals only requires notice to the taxpayer. Because the property owner received actual notice and had sufficient time to appeal, the Court concluded that due process was satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and instructed that summary judgment be entered for the Town of Salisbury. View "Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law