Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

Jeannette F. Tasey failed to pay property taxes starting in 2017. In 2018, she applied for an elderly/disabled tax credit program, believing she did not need to pay taxes until her application was decided. On August 1, 2018, the Yellowstone County Treasurer issued a tax lien on her property, which was later assigned to Guardian Tax MT, LLC. Tasey mailed a check for the full amount on July 30, 2021, with an expected delivery date of July 31. However, the Treasurer received and processed the check on August 3, one day after the redemption period expired. The Treasurer rejected the payment and issued a tax deed to Guardian Tax, which then sued to quiet title and declare Tasey a trespasser.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of Guardian Tax, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court found Tasey's assertion that the check was received on July 31 to be speculative and unsupported by evidence. Tasey appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Tasey substantially complied with the redemption statute by mailing the payment in good faith, believing it would arrive before the deadline. The court emphasized that redemption statutes should be liberally construed to allow property owners to pay their debts and save their property. The court found that Tasey's actions met the substantial compliance standard and that there was no prejudice to Guardian Tax or the Treasurer’s Office. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guardian Tax v. Tasey" on Justia Law

David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law

Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Kevin and Jeannine Extreme appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County's order enjoining them from violating restrictive covenants applicable to their property in the Sloway Flats Minor Subdivision. The District Court also ordered them to remedy their violations and awarded attorney fees to Sloway Cabin, LLC (Sloway).The District Court found that the covenants were enforceable and that the Extremes had violated them by operating a commercial towing company, diesel repair shop, and impound lot on their property, among other activities. The court enjoined the Extremes from further violations and ordered them to remedy their current violations. The court also awarded attorney fees to Sloway.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Subdivision’s covenants were clear and unambiguous, and therefore enforceable. The court rejected the Extremes' arguments that the covenants were never meant to be enforced and that their enforcement was barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches. The court found that the Extremes had been repeatedly informed about the covenants and that Sloway had promptly acted to enforce them upon noticing violations. The court also found that the Extremes' arguments regarding the use of surrounding properties were irrelevant as those properties were not subject to the Subdivision’s covenants.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by enjoining the Extremes from violating the covenants and that the award of attorney fees to Sloway was proper under the circumstances. The court found that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the tangible parameters test was met. View "Sloway Cabin v. Extreme" on Justia Law

A group of residents and business owners in Salt Lake City filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city's failure to eliminate encampments of unsheltered people on public land interfered with their use and enjoyment of their properties. The residents claimed that the city, as a landowner, had a duty to maintain its properties free of nuisance. The city argued that the residents were attempting to use the court to force the city to exercise its enforcement powers in a specific way, and that under the public duty doctrine, the city had no duty to the residents regarding its failure to use those powers.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County dismissed the residents' complaint with prejudice, ruling that the public duty doctrine precluded their claims. The court found that the residents failed to allege that the city breached a duty owed specifically to them, rather than a duty owed to the public at large. The court concluded that the city owed no duty to the residents individually apart from its general duty to enforce laws and protect the public.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the public duty doctrine, which protects government actors from civil liability for failing to perform duties owed to the public, precluded the residents' claims of public and private nuisance. The court found that no special relationship existed between the residents and the city that would exempt the residents' claims from the public duty doctrine's preclusion. The court emphasized that the public duty doctrine applies to omissions by government actors performing public duties and that the residents did not demonstrate any unique duty owed to them by the city. View "Barrani v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Rudra Tamm, Trustee of the Rudra Tamm Revocable Trust, owns Tract 2-B, which is situated between Tract 1-B owned by Diane Gatzke and Tract 3-B owned by Herman Eggers. Tamm sought a declaratory judgment to confirm his right to use vehicular driveways on access easements over the defendants' properties. He claimed that these easements were created when the original owner, Fred Roberts, subdivided the land and recorded a plat in 1993. Tamm also presented a 2010 warranty deed from Scott Johnson, which included the easements.The District Court of Burleigh County denied Tamm's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that no easements existed on the defendants' properties for the benefit of Tract 2-B. The court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's denial of summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved, particularly regarding the creation and necessity of the easements. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings, determining that the district court erred in concluding that Tamm could not prove any claim that an easement existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address these factual issues, including whether Roberts intended to create easements and whether alternative access routes to Tract 2-B exist. View "Tamm v. Gatzke" on Justia Law

A farm in Talbot County, Maryland, was the subject of nuisance complaints from neighboring residents due to offensive odors and swarms of insects. The farm, owned by Arthur L. Foster, Sr., and later managed by his son, Arthur L. Foster, Jr., began receiving Class A biosolids and soil conditioners from Denali Water Solutions in January 2021. These materials were stored and applied to the farm, causing strong, foul odors and a midge infestation, which led to numerous complaints from nearby residents.The Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board (the Board) conducted an investigation and held hearings to determine whether the practices at the farm were generally accepted agricultural practices under Talbot County's Right to Farm (RTF) law, Chapter 128 of the Talbot County Code (TCC). The Board found that the application and stockpiling of the materials were generally accepted agricultural practices and issued recommendations to mitigate the odor.The Circuit Court for Talbot County reversed the Board's decision, finding that the agricultural operations on the farm had not been in existence for one year or more when the complaints were filed, as required by Maryland's RTF law, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-403. The court remanded the case to the Board with instructions to find that the operations did not benefit from protection under the RTF laws.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court's decision, holding that the expanded use of soil conditioners and biosolids at the farm was a protected activity under both the state and county RTF laws. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision that the practices were generally accepted agricultural practices and did not violate public health, safety, and welfare.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the Board failed to make necessary findings regarding the public health, safety, and welfare impacts of the practices and did not adequately consider whether the stockpiling of materials for use at other locations was a generally accepted agricultural practice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "In re: Foster Farm" on Justia Law

Cable Matters Inc. sought a use variance from the zoning board of appeals of Northborough to build a 20,000 square foot warehouse in an industrial zoning district. The property is also within the town's groundwater protection overlay district, which does not permit warehouses. The zoning board granted the variance, and the planning board later issued a special permit with conditions, including restrictions on storage, lighting, landscaping, delivery hours, and driveway use.The plaintiffs, who live across the street from the proposed warehouse, appealed the zoning board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing they were aggrieved by the potential noise, light, vibration, odors, and loss of open space. The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for Cable Matters, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they failed to show they were aggrieved by the zoning board's decision. The judge found that the plaintiffs' claims were speculative and not supported by credible evidence.The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court, which vacated the judgment, instructing the judge to consider potential future uses of the warehouse. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court judge correctly assessed the plaintiffs' standing based on Cable Matters's proposed use. The court held that potential future uses unsupported by the record should not be considered in determining standing. The court affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. View "Stone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Northborough" on Justia Law

A plaintiff sought to build a single-family home on his residential parcel in El Dorado County, California. The county required him to pay a $23,420 traffic impact mitigation (TIM) fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. The plaintiff paid the fee under protest and subsequently filed a lawsuit challenging the fee as an unlawful taking of property under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.The Superior Court of El Dorado County dismissed the plaintiff’s federal takings claim without leave to amend and denied his petition for a writ of mandate. The plaintiff appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on established California law that the Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to legislatively imposed impact fees. The California Supreme Court denied review.The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and administrative land-use exactions. The Supreme Court vacated the California Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.On remand, the California Court of Appeal applied the Nollan/Dolan test to the TIM fee. The court concluded that the fee had an essential nexus to the county’s legitimate interest in reducing traffic congestion from new development. Additionally, the court found that the fee was roughly proportional to the traffic impacts attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development. The court held that the TIM fee did not constitute an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment and affirmed the judgment. View "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado" on Justia Law