Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Division purchased two office buildings from the city that included a short-term leaseback at below-market rent. Division alleged that the assessor failed to take the leaseback into account when valuing the buildings for property tax purposes and claims this violated Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.1. After failing to persuade the City’s Assessment Appeals Board, Division filed suit. The trial court dismissed, holding that the lease did not constitute an “enforceable restriction” under section 402.1.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Division paid $53 million, a price discounted to reflect the leaseback. While a purchase price may play a significant role in the reassessment of property upon its sale, that price is only the beginning of the inquiry; one factor that may skew the purchase price and make it an unreliable indicator of fair market value is an agreement containing restrictions on the buyer’s use of the property. Such restrictions do not bind the assessor. Government-imposed land use restrictions must be taken into account when a property is valued for assessment purposes but under section 402.1 “enforceable restrictions” are land use restrictions imposed by the government under its police power, not restrictions agreed to by a public entity selling property to a private buyer in an ordinary arm’s-length transaction. View "290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and holding that eight of nine restrictive covenants governing Plaintiffs' lots within the parties' residential subdivision were extinguished by operation of North Carolina's Real Property Marketable Title Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 47B-1 to 47B-9, holding that the eight covenants were extinguished by operation of law.At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the Act's thirteenth enumerated exception did not apply to save all of the nine restrictive covenants in question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that all but one of the restrictive covenants, as applied to Plaintiffs' property, were to be extinguished under the Act; and (2) a plain reading of section 47B-3(13) exempts from extinguishment only those covenants that actually require that a property be used residentially within the confines of a general or uniform scheme of development. View "C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from third-party claims in a legal-malpractice action. Plaintiffs Gail Haupt and Thomas Raftery filed suit against defendant, attorney Daniel Triggs, who represented plaintiffs in a property dispute. Triggs filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification against third-party defendants, Liam Murphy, Elizabeth Filosa, and MSK Attorneys, who succeeded Triggs as counsel to plaintiffs in the property matter. Plaintiffs hired Triggs to represent them in a land-ownership dispute with their neighbors. Triggs took certain actions on behalf of plaintiffs, including sending a letter in 2016 to neighbors asserting that neighbors were encroaching on plaintiffs’ land and threatening litigation against neighbors, but never filed a lawsuit on plaintiffs’ behalf. In 2018, neighbors filed a lawsuit against plaintiffs asserting ownership over the disputed land by adverse possession, and plaintiffs hired third-party defendants to represent them. The adverse-possession lawsuit eventually settled. Plaintiffs then filed this malpractice action against Triggs, alleging that he was liable for legal malpractice by allowing 12 V.S.A. § 501’s statute of limitations for recovery of lands to run without filing an ejectment suit against neighbors, thereby enabling neighbors to bring an adverse-possession claim. Third-party defendants moved to dismiss Triggs’s complaint, and the civil division granted their motion. Triggs appealed this dismissal. The Vermont Supreme Court determined Triggs did not allege that any legal relationship—contractual or otherwise— existed between him and third-party defendants, and the civil division found that no legal relationship existed between the two parties. Instead, Triggs alleged that third-party defendants’ independent actions caused plaintiffs’ injury. The Court determined this is not a basis for implied indemnity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Haupt, et al. v. Triggs, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court affirming the Polk County assessor's original tax valuation of two large corporate office buildings in downtown Des Moines at $87,050,000 and $44,910,000, holding that the district court did not err by relying on the Board's expert appraisers when it affirmed the assessor's valuation.Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the owner of the buildings at issue, protested the valuation, and the Polk County Board of Review upheld the valuation. The district court affirmed the assessment after hearing appraisers appointed by both the Board and Nationwide as expert witnesses and finding the Board's experts more reliable. The court of appeals reversed and reduced the assessments. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the district court holding (1) there was no basis to reject the district court's determination about the relative reliability of the expert witness testimony; and (2) the Board met its burden to prove that the valuation was not excessive. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Polk County Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded this matter for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in proceeding to a trial without a jury on Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment.Plaintiff's brought this complaint against Defendants for, among other causes of action, forcible entry and detainer. The district court granted relief on the forcible entry and detainer claim, ordering restitution. After a bench trial, the district court heard the remaining causes of action and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's remaining causes of action were legal in nature, and the issues of fact that arose thereunder entitled Defendants to a jury trial unless waived; and (2) there was no waiver of Defendants' right to a jury trial. View "132 Ventures, LLC v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a first-party, all-risk property insurance policy covers "all risks of physical loss or damage" to insured property from any cause unless excluded, coverage is not triggered when a toxic, noxious, or hazardous substance is physically present in the indoor air of that property, adheres to and can later be dislodged from physical items on the property, and causes a loss of the functional use of the property provided that the substance causes neither tangible, concrete, and material harm to the property nor deprivation of possession of the property.Insurer issued insurance policies to Insured covering policy periods in which Insured's stores were closed in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. Insured submitted claims to Insurer under the policies for "physical loss or damage" to its covered property exceeding $700 million. Insurer denied the bulk of the claim, leading to this lawsuit. The Court of Appeals held the presence of Coronavirus in the air and on surfaces at Insured's properties did not cause "physical loss or damage" as that phrase is used in the policies. View "Tapestry, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the superior court ordering Plaintiffs to post a $35,000 bond, holding that the bond provision set out in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, 14 applies to comprehensive permits issued under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, 21 to promote low- and moderate-income housing and that the costs recoverable under the bond provision do not include attorney's fees or delay damages.Plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the decision of the zoning board of appeals of Salisbury issuing a comprehensive permit to build seventy-six condominium units at 6 Forest Road in Salisbury. Defendant filed a motion for Plaintiffs to post a $50,000 surety or cash bond pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, 17. The superior court judge granted the motion in part, reducing the bond to $35,000. Plaintiffs appealed the bond order. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order, holding (1) the bond provision applies to appeals of comprehensive permits; (2) the court should only order a bond if the judge find that a plaintiff's appeal seems so devoid of merit that it may reasonably be inferred to have been brought in bad faith; and (3) remand was required in this case. View "Marengi v. 6 Forest Road LLC" on Justia Law

In 2003, JCJIC proposed a 312-unit apartment complex on 15.45 acres of vacant land along the Petaluma River. In 2008, after starting a draft environmental impact report (DEIR), for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), Petaluma adopted General Plan 2025. In response, JCJIC submitted an application for a 278-unit complex. After conducting site visits, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service identified the issues the EIR should address. A “Habitat Mitigation Monitoring Plan” was incorporated. In 2018, the DEIR was published. JCJIC provided consultant studies regarding environmental impacts, including on “Special Status Species.” The Planning Commission considered traffic impacts, floodplain impacts, and decreased quality of neighborhood life. City Council members requested supplemental documentation and authorized the preparation of a final EIR. JCJIC further reduced the proposal to 205 units; reduced the height of buildings; increased setbacks from the River; and implement a “Traffic Calming Plan.” The Final EIR concluded the revisions eliminated or reduced several potential significant impacts. In 2020, JCJIC submitted another plan with 180 units.Objectors disputed the adequacy of the EIR’s special status species analysis and failure to analyze emergency evacuations. The City Council certified the EIR and approved zoning amendments. The trial court and court of appeal upheld the approvals. View "Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court in favor of Plaintiff on its action for declaratory judgment and quiet title, concluding that a right-of-way and access easement over a twenty-foot-wide strip of property connecting a public road to land now owned by Plaintiff was appurtenant and continued to benefit Plaintiff, holding that there was no error.Defendant's predecessor granted a right-of-way and access easement over the property at issue, but Defendant denied Plaintiff access across the easement, claiming that the easement was in gross and provided access only to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of appurtenance. View "Upper Wagon Box, LLC v. Box Hanging Three Ranch Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law