Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Caruso Builder Belle Oak, LLC entered into a contract with Ronalda Sullivan on July 17, 2015, for the sale of a property in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The property was subject to deferred private water and sewer assessments, and Caruso provided a disclosure that was allegedly noncompliant with Maryland’s Real Property Article § 14-117(a)(3)(i). The parties settled on the contract on February 24, 2016. On February 22, 2019, Sullivan filed a complaint against Caruso seeking monetary penalties under § 14-117(b)(2)(i) for the noncompliant disclosure.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County dismissed Sullivan’s complaint, ruling that her claim was barred by Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations, which began to run on the date of the contract, July 17, 2015. Sullivan appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of settlement, February 24, 2016, making Sullivan’s claim timely.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that a seller’s violation of § 14-117(a)(3)(i) gives rise to a cause of action because the purchaser suffers an informational harm. The court determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the contract, July 17, 2015, because Sullivan knew or should have known of the noncompliant disclosure at that time. Therefore, her claim filed on February 22, 2019, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to affirm the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Sullivan’s complaint. View "Caruso Builder Belle Oak v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Arizona and the Foothills Reserve Master Owners Association (HOA) regarding the condemnation of easements in a master-planned community. The community, consisting of 590 homes, had easements in common areas owned by the HOA. These easements allowed homeowners to use the common areas and restricted their development. The State condemned these easements to construct the Loop 202 South Mountain Freeway, compensating the HOA $6.5 million for the common areas. The HOA, representing the homeowners, sought additional compensation for the reduction in home values due to the freeway's proximity.The Superior Court in Maricopa County ruled in favor of the HOA, allowing them to pursue proximity damages. The court awarded the HOA $18 million, including $6 million for the easements' value and $12 million for proximity damages, pending the State's appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, stating that proximity damages under A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2) are only available when the condemned property is a physical parcel of land, not easements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2) allows for proximity damages when appurtenant easements are condemned. The court concluded that the statute does authorize such damages. The court reasoned that appurtenant easements are part of the dominant estate and that the homeowners' properties, including the easements, constitute a "larger parcel." Therefore, the homeowners are entitled to severance damages for the reduction in property values due to the freeway's proximity. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, allowing the HOA to receive the $12 million in proximity damages. View "STATE v FOOTHILLS RESERVE MASTERS ASSOCIATION, INC." on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC sought to condemn a 9.89-acre easement on Elizabeth Reynolds' 109-acre farmland in Roanoke County, Virginia, under the Natural Gas Act. The district court granted partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession to Mountain Valley Pipeline, leaving the issue of just compensation unresolved. Reynolds submitted two expert reports to determine compensation, which the district court excluded, leading to a summary judgment in favor of Mountain Valley Pipeline.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia excluded Reynolds' expert reports, citing Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The court found the first report speculative and the second unreliable due to insufficient data. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to Mountain Valley Pipeline, awarding just compensation based on the higher estimate of the pipeline company's experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The appellate court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply identically in eminent domain cases as in other cases, and the district court should not have conflated Rule 71.1(h) with Rule 702. The appellate court also determined that the district court should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when resolving contested factual issues under Rule 71.1(h). The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 9.89 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) condemned a 0.32-acre access easement on Grace Terry's land in southwestern Virginia to deliver heavy equipment to a section of its pipeline. The key issue in this case is the amount of just compensation MVP must pay Terry for the easement. Terry argued that the easement significantly devalued her land, blocking the best hiking trail and citing recent below-market sales of neighboring properties affected by MVP's actions. The district court excluded Terry's testimony on damages and an expert report she submitted, leading to her appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted MVP partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the easement. The court excluded Terry's testimony on damages, finding it speculative and without a rational basis. It also excluded the expert report by Dennis Gruelle, applying a heightened admissibility standard and determining contested facts at the evidentiary stage. The court then granted MVP summary judgment, awarding Terry $10,409 in just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding most of Terry's testimony and the Gruelle Report. The Fourth Circuit found that Terry's personal knowledge of her land and comparable sales were valid bases for her testimony. It also determined that the district court applied erroneous legal principles by using a heightened evidentiary standard for the expert report. The Fourth Circuit vacated the exclusion of the Gruelle Report and reversed the exclusion of most of Terry's testimony, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

Northstar Center, LLC entered into a real estate contract with Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP to purchase a 120-acre parcel of land. The contract was later assigned to Northstar by Templeton Enterprises, LLC. The agreement included an option to purchase an additional 105-acre parcel, which was amended to a commitment to purchase. Northstar provided a promissory note for a tax increase payment due by January 1, 2014, but paid it late. Lukenbill sold the disputed property to Tundra Properties, LLC, leading Northstar to sue for breach of contract and intentional interference with contract.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract claim against Lukenbill and its intentional interference with contract claim against Tundra. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra and dismissed Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill. The court held a bench trial on Northstar’s damages due to Lukenbill’s breach.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims. The Supreme Court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Northstar breached the contract by failing to make the tax increase payment on time and whether Tundra had knowledge of the contract amendments. The court also found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes regarding Tundra’s knowledge and intent, and whether Tundra acted without justification.The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim but reversed the summary judgments on Northstar’s breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as well as Lukenbill’s indemnification claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

CEZ Prior, LLC ("CEZ") entered into a purchase agreement with 755 N Prior Ave., LLC ("Prior") to buy a property for $26 million. The agreement required Prior to cooperate in obtaining tenant estoppel certificates. Errors in square footage measurements led to rent discrepancies, prompting an amendment to reduce the purchase price to $15.1 million and the cash required at closing to $3.8 million. CEZ later requested to delay closing due to financial issues, but Prior did not agree. Prior sent estoppel certificates that did not address rate increases, and CEZ proposed edits that Prior rejected. CEZ demanded satisfactory certificates on the closing date, but Prior terminated the agreement, alleging CEZ failed to tender cash.CEZ sued Prior for breach of contract in Minnesota state court and sought to enjoin the termination. Prior removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court stayed the matter and later denied CEZ's motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court found that CEZ was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim, as Prior had reasonably cooperated in obtaining the estoppel certificates. The balance of harms favored Prior, given CEZ's insufficient evidence of its ability to pay. The public interest did not favor CEZ due to its low probability of success on the merits.The court also addressed CEZ's argument under Minnesota law, finding that the district court's stay order was not an injunction and did not extend statutory deadlines. Consequently, CEZ was not entitled to additional time to close under Minnesota statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "CEZ Prior, LLC v. 755 N Prior Ave. LLC" on Justia Law

A landlord, MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC, owns an apartment building in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Mackenzie Miller, a tenant, entered a one-year lease in June 2022. The lease required rent to be paid by the first of each month, with a three-day notice period for nonpayment before the landlord could terminate the tenancy and pursue eviction. In December 2022, Miller failed to pay rent, and the landlord served a three-day notice. When the rent remained unpaid, the landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action in the small claims division of the Linn County District Court.The small claims court dismissed the FED action, ruling that the Federal CARES Act required a thirty-day notice before eviction, which preempted Iowa's three-day notice law. The landlord appealed to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, arguing that the thirty-day notice requirement was time-limited to the 120-day moratorium period specified in the CARES Act. The district court upheld the small claims court's decision, stating that the plain language of the CARES Act did not include an expiration date for the thirty-day notice requirement.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the thirty-day notice requirement in the CARES Act applies only to rent defaults that occurred during the 120-day moratorium period. The court reasoned that the statute must be read in context with the surrounding provisions, which were temporary measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also noted the presumption against preemption of state law, particularly in areas traditionally governed by state law, such as landlord-tenant relationships. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law