Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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In this residential landlord-tenant dispute, the tenants, Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, entered into a lease with landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. The lease included a clause that capped recoverable litigation costs and attorney’s fees at $1,000. After successfully suing the landlords for retaliatory eviction, the tenants were awarded a monetary judgment and attorney’s fees exceeding the $1,000 cap. They then sought to recover additional litigation costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The landlords argued that the lease’s $1,000 cap barred any further cost recovery.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially ruled in favor of the landlords, enforcing the $1,000 cap. However, after further arguments from the tenants, the court reversed its decision, allowing the tenants to recover nearly $14,000 in costs. The court reasoned that enforcing the cap would contravene the public policy intent of California Civil Code section 1942.5, which aims to protect tenants from abusive landlord conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The main issue was whether parties to a contract could waive their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b) through a pre-dispute agreement. The appellate court concluded that section 1032(b) establishes a default rule allowing prevailing parties to recover costs but does not prohibit parties from waiving this right by agreement. The court found that such waivers are consistent with Civil Code section 3513, which allows the waiver of rights intended for private benefit. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order, directing it to strike the tenants’ memorandum of costs, thereby enforcing the $1,000 cap stipulated in the lease. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

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Jonathan and Angela McOmber purchased a home from Shane and Keri Thompson. After the purchase, the McOmbers discovered significant issues with the property, including dry rot, mold, and water damage, which were not anticipated. They also found that the roof leaked and was not professionally installed, and that the previous owner had rewired parts of the kitchen improperly. The McOmbers relied on the sellers’ disclosures, which indicated that a drainage problem had been fixed and that there were no current mold issues or roof leaks. The McOmbers did not conduct an independent property inspection.The McOmbers filed a lawsuit against the Thompsons for breach of duty to disclose/fraud, common law fraud, and breach of contract, among other claims. The district court dismissed Angela McOmber from two of the claims and denied the McOmbers’ motion to add a claim for constructive trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thompsons, finding that they had complied with the Property Condition Disclosure Act by disclosing known defects. The court also awarded attorney fees to the Thompsons based on a provision in the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (REPSA). The McOmbers’ motion for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the Thompsons complied with the disclosure requirements and that the McOmbers failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the falsity of the Thompsons’ statements. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying the motion to amend the complaint or the motion for reconsideration. However, the court reversed the award of attorney fees against Angela McOmber, as she was not a party to the REPSA, and remanded for the district court to issue an amended judgment. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "McOmber v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

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Christopher Fucci and over 50 other individuals and family entities (Plaintiffs) purchased interests in real estate development projects in Florida and Ohio. Each sale was documented in a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) containing an arbitration clause. However, none of the projects were completed, and Plaintiffs sued First American Title Insurance Company (First American) and its employee Kirsten Parkin (FA Defendants), who acted as the escrow agent in the closing of each sale. Although the FA Defendants were not signatories to the PSAs, they moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clauses in the agreements.The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied the motion to compel arbitration. The FA Defendants argued on appeal that they could enforce the arbitration clauses because they were parties to the PSAs, third-party beneficiaries, agents of a party to the PSAs, and that Plaintiffs were equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. The district court had previously denied the motion without prejudice, waiting for a related case ruling. After the related case was decided, the FA Defendants filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration, which was denied by a magistrate judge. The district court overruled the FA Defendants' objections and adopted the magistrate judge's order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FA Defendants were not parties to the PSAs, were not third-party beneficiaries, and could not compel arbitration as agents because Rockwell, the principal, had waived the arbitration provision. Additionally, the court ruled that equitable estoppel could not be invoked to expand the scope of the arbitration clause to include disputes between Plaintiffs and the FA Defendants. View "Fucci v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Capital Video Corporation (CVC) obtained a judgment against Joseph A. Bevilacqua in 2002 for $178,000 plus interest. CVC requested and received an original execution in December 2002, which lapsed. In 2004, CVC obtained an alias execution, recorded it against property jointly owned by Bevilacqua and his wife, Donna Bevilacqua. In 2005, CVC obtained another alias execution, recorded it against another jointly owned property, and later partially discharged it. In 2020, CVC requested a replacement execution, which was issued and recorded against a property in North Providence. This property was later transferred to Donna Bevilacqua and then to her trust. In 2022, CVC obtained another pluries execution and scheduled a constable’s sale of the property. Donna Bevilacqua intervened, seeking to prevent the sale.The Superior Court invalidated the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions, finding that they were not issued within the six-year limitation period set by § 9-25-3. The court determined that the 2020 execution was not issued within six years of the 2005 alias execution and that the 2022 execution was invalid because it assumed the validity of the 2020 execution.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The Court held that the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions were invalid because they were not issued within the six-year period required by § 9-25-3. Additionally, CVC failed to properly apply for a replacement execution and did not provide proof that the 2005 alias execution was lost or destroyed. The Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in ordering the release and discharge of the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions. View "Capital Video Corp. v. Bevilacqua" on Justia Law

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Zoey Watch Hill, LLC applied for a dimensional variance to expand a nonconforming structure on its property in Westerly, Rhode Island. The property, a small, irregularly shaped lot with a house built in 1938, did not meet current zoning requirements. Zoey proposed lifting the house to create additional living space and sought variances for all setbacks. The Westerly Zoning Board of Review approved the application, finding that the unique characteristics of the lot and the inadequacy of the existing house created a hardship justifying the variance.The Watch Hill Fire District (WHFD) appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing that Zoey failed to demonstrate that there was no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial use of the property. The Superior Court affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct standard of "more than a mere inconvenience" and that substantial evidence supported the board's findings. The court also found that the proposed project was the least relief necessary and that Zoey's hardship was not self-created or primarily for financial gain.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case on a writ of certiorari. The Court held that the Superior Court and the zoning board applied the correct standard for granting a dimensional variance. The Court clarified that the "more than a mere inconvenience" standard was appropriate and that the "no other reasonable alternative" language from a definitional statute did not alter this standard. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the zoning board's decision to grant the dimensional variance to Zoey. View "Watch Hill Fire District v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

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The Nordstroms applied for a dimensional variance to the Westerly Zoning Board of Review to demolish their existing house and build a new three-story house on their property, which is a preexisting nonconforming lot. The property did not meet the minimum lot size and frontage requirements of the Medium-Density Residential 30 (MDR-30) district. The board approved the application, granting variances for side yard setbacks, despite objections from neighboring landowners.The Superior Court consolidated appeals from RH McLeod Family LLC and 4 Spray Rock, LLC, who argued that the board did not follow the correct legal standard and violated the zoning ordinance. The trial justice affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct legal standard and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The trial justice also determined that the zoning ordinance allowed the Nordstroms to obtain a dimensional variance to build a new nonconforming structure after demolishing the existing one.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the trial justice's interpretation of the zoning ordinance. The Court held that the plain language of § 260-32(C)(2) of the Westerly Zoning Ordinance prohibits the rebuilding or replacement of a demolished nonconforming structure unless it conforms to the dimensional requirements of the ordinance. The Court concluded that the ordinance does not allow for the possibility of obtaining a dimensional variance in such cases. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "RH McLeod Family LLC v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose between a surety bond company, Granite Re, Inc. (Granite), and a creditor bank, United Prairie Bank (UPB), over entitlement to funds held by a receiver in a receivership action. Granite issued payment bonds to Molnau Trucking LLC (Molnau) for public works projects, but Molnau defaulted on both the projects and loans from UPB. The issue was whether Granite or UPB had priority to the bonded contract funds held by the receiver. Granite argued for priority under equitable subrogation, having paid laborers and suppliers, while UPB claimed priority under the UCC, having perfected its security interests in Molnau’s accounts receivable before Granite issued the bonds.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPB, recognizing Granite’s equitable subrogation rights but ruling that UPB’s perfected security interest had priority. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a “mistake of fact” standard from mortgage context case law, which Granite did not meet.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the “mistake of fact” standard does not apply to performing construction sureties. The court concluded that Granite, as a surety, has the right to equitable subrogation without needing to show a mistake of fact. The court further held that a surety’s right to equitable subrogation is not a security interest subject to the UCC’s first-in-time priority rule. Instead, a performing surety has priority over a secured creditor regarding bonded contract funds.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Granite, allowing Granite to request redistribution of the bonded contract funds. View "In re Receivership of United Prairie Bank v. Molnau Trucking LLC" on Justia Law

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Jamie Wallace was biking home from work through the promenade part of the Inner Harbor Park in Baltimore when her bike’s front tire became wedged in a gap between the bricks and granite bulkhead, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. She sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for negligence, alleging the City failed to warn of the gap. The City sought judgment under the Maryland Recreational Use Statute, arguing it owed no duty of care as the promenade was designated for recreational purposes and biking is a recreational activity.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the statute did not apply because Wallace was commuting, not engaging in recreational activity. The court also denied the City’s motions for judgment during the trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury awarded Wallace $100,000 in compensatory damages. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, concluding the promenade functioned primarily as a public pedestrian walkway and shared bicycle path, not a recreational facility, and the statute did not abrogate the City’s common law duty.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Maryland Recreational Use Statute did not shield Baltimore City from liability. The court determined that by incorporating the promenade into its transportation infrastructure, the City established an independent right of access separate from any recreational invitation and assumed the corresponding common law duties. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the City was not protected by the Recreational Use Statute in this instance. View "Mayor of Baltimore v. Wallace" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law