Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group of plaintiffs, including abutting property owners and a nonprofit, challenged the sale of a 21-acre cranberry bog in Centerville, Massachusetts, known as the Jenkins Bog. The land had been classified for tax purposes as horticultural use under G. L. c. 61A, which provides municipalities a right of first refusal when such land is sold for non-agricultural purposes. Susan L. Jenkins, as trustee, notified the Barnstable town manager of her intent to sell the bog to a buyer intending residential use, but failed to provide notice to other required municipal bodies and the State forester. The sale proceeded, transferring title to Bog Partners LLC. The plaintiffs learned of the sale after the fact and contended that the statutory notice requirements had not been met, seeking to invalidate the transaction and compel compliance with the statute.The plaintiffs brought their claims in Barnstable Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and mandamus relief. Both the Town of Barnstable and Bog Partners LLC moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing. Two Superior Court judges granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of lack of standing.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The Court held that the plaintiffs, as abutters and concerned citizens, did not have standing to seek declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A because the statutory notice and right of first refusal provisions in G. L. c. 61A are designed to protect municipal—not private—interests. The Court also held that mandamus relief was improper because the Town had fulfilled its statutory obligation by notifying the seller of the deficient notice; any further enforcement steps were discretionary. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court judgments in favor of the Town and Bog Partners LLC. View "Banevicius v. Barnstable" on Justia Law

A woman married a man who was, unbeknownst to her, still legally married to his first wife. After learning of the bigamy, she obtained an annulment of the marriage. Meanwhile, the man's first wife obtained a court judgment against him for unpaid spousal support and an equalization payment, totaling over $1.4 million. To enforce this judgment, the first wife secured a writ of execution and served notices of levy on the man's bank accounts. Relying on a statutory provision allowing a judgment creditor to levy accounts in the name of a judgment debtor’s spouse without a court order if accompanied by an affidavit of spousal status, the first wife provided an affidavit stating that the second woman was the man's spouse. As a result, more than $380,000 was levied from accounts held in the second woman's name, either individually or with her son.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the second woman’s motion to quash the levies, concluding that the annulment of her marriage did not undermine the validity of the levies. The court found the levies valid, except for a small exemption, and awarded nearly all the seized funds to the first wife. The second woman appealed, arguing that her marriage to the judgment debtor was void from the outset and thus could not form the basis for levying her separate accounts without a court order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that, under California law, a void marriage is invalid from its inception and its invalidity can be shown in collateral proceedings. Therefore, the affidavit of spousal status was ineffective, and the levies on the second woman's accounts were invalid. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, directed that the levies be quashed, and ordered the return of the funds improperly seized. View "Greely v. Greely" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Buck, alleged that his attorney’s legal advice led him to sever a joint tenancy and lose his right of survivorship in a property located in Sheridan, Montana. Originally, Buck, James, and Mary held the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Later, Buck and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary, granting her exclusive use and possession of the property during her lifetime. In 2020, Buck, acting on his attorney’s advice, transferred his interest in the property to a living trust. After Mary’s death in 2022, her estate claimed a 50% ownership interest, and Buck sold his remaining share.The Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reviewed Buck’s legal malpractice claim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Buck did not plead a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that the joint tenancy had already been severed in 1987 when Buck and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary, as this act destroyed at least one of the four unities essential to a joint tenancy. Therefore, the attorney’s advice in 2020 did not cause the severance or extinguish Buck’s right of survivorship.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the conveyance of a life estate to Mary in 1987 severed the joint tenancy and extinguished Buck’s right of survivorship. Because the severance occurred decades before the attorney’s involvement, Buck could not plead a viable legal malpractice claim. The Court clarified that the four unities approach governs severance of joint tenancy in Montana and that the intent of the parties was not dispositive in this case. View "MacLaurin v. Fischer Law, PLLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns an apartment complex owner who challenged a school district’s policy for appealing property tax assessments. The district’s policy only targeted properties for appeal if an increase would yield at least $10,000 in additional annual tax revenue. This policy, in place since 2012, did not discriminate by property type and had led to appeals involving various categories, including residential and commercial properties. For the tax year at issue, the district’s consultant identified fifteen properties meeting the threshold, and the district later added the taxpayer’s property, making a total of sixteen appeals. The taxpayer’s property had recently been sold, and its assessed value was significantly below its stipulated fair market value.After the Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals denied the school district’s appeal, the district sought review in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. At a de novo hearing, the parties stipulated to the property’s fair market value. The main issue was whether the district’s policy was constitutional, both on its face and as applied. The county court sided with the district, finding the policy neutral and not discriminatory. The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the district arbitrarily applied its policy by not appealing all properties meeting the threshold, failing to justify certain choices, and by not appealing some properties for reasons unrelated to value.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It held that a taxing district’s use of a monetary threshold for selecting properties to appeal does not violate the state constitutional requirement of tax uniformity, so long as the policy is neutral and not based on impermissible classifications such as property type. The Court further found that the district’s application of its policy in this instance was not arbitrary or discriminatory under the Uniformity Clause or Equal Protection Clause. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court was vacated and the case remanded for consideration of any remaining issues. View "Downingtown Area SD v Chester Cnty Bd of Assmt." on Justia Law

A state agency sought a new headquarters and training facility, issuing detailed specifications for its construction. The agency, as a public body, entered into a long-term “build-to-suit” lease with a private developer, who agreed to construct the facility to the agency’s precise needs. The developer financed the project primarily through a bank loan, with rent payments from the agency structured to cover the developer’s debt service, taxes, and insurance. The lease included provisions requiring the agency to pay unamortized construction costs if it terminated the lease early. The developer sought confirmation that the project was not subject to the state’s prevailing wage law, but the Bureau of Labor Law Compliance determined that the lease payments, as public funds, ultimately financed the construction, making the prevailing wage statute applicable.The developer appealed the Bureau’s decision to the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, which upheld the Bureau’s position, citing the financial structure and risk allocation indicating public financing. The developer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the lease was a bona fide lease rather than a construction contract, finding that the developer bore the financial risk, and that the agency’s payments were for rent and not directly for construction.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the lease constituted "public work" under the state’s Prevailing Wage Act. The Court held that risk allocation is only one of several relevant factors in determining whether public funds paid for construction. Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court found that the structure of the lease, financing terms, and the agency’s obligations demonstrated that public funds did pay for construction. The Court thus concluded the prevailing wage requirements applied to the lease and reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order. View "PSP NE, LLC v. PWAB" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on foreclosure proceedings involving a residential property in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased the property in 2006, executing a mortgage and promissory note with Long Beach Mortgage Company. After defaulting on the mortgage payment due July 1, 2022, Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), the mortgage servicer, sent a notice of default and right to cure by certified mail in August 2022. The mortgage had previously been assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Following further notices, including a notice of acceleration, the property was sold at foreclosure in April 2023. Plaintiffs then filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure based on purported defects in the required notices, specifically arguing that the notices failed to strictly comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage contract, which governs the notice requirements prior to foreclosure.In Kent County Superior Court, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the notices strictly complied with the contractual requirements and properly informed plaintiffs of their rights, including the right to cure and reinstate. Plaintiffs objected, asserting that the notice of default contained inaccuracies regarding the cure date and that the notice of acceleration used language that was insufficiently unequivocal with respect to their right to reinstate. The hearing justice found no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that the notices satisfied the requirements of the mortgage. Judgment was entered in February 2025.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case de novo. It held that the notice of default strictly complied with paragraph 22 of the mortgage, adequately informed plaintiffs of the required cure date, and unequivocally stated the right to reinstate after acceleration. The Court further determined that the notice of acceleration was not required to reiterate the right to reinstate in the same manner. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Diaz v. Select Portfolio Servicing" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned several triplexes in Wichita, Kansas, which included an easement over an alleyway used daily by residents. The defendant acquired the property burdened by the easement in 2009. In 2022, tensions between the parties escalated when the defendant obstructed the easement by dumping asphalt and debris, effectively blocking access. The plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, later adding a claim for slander of title after the defendant denied the existence of the easement and continued interfering with access.The Sedgwick District Court conducted a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiffs, determining they had a valid easement and that the defendant had slandered their title through false and malicious statements and actions. The court awarded declaratory and injunctive relief, and further ordered attorney fees as damages for the slander of title claim, ultimately awarding $33,165 after reviewing evidence of incurred legal expenses. The defendant appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings, including the award of attorney fees as damages, distinguishing between fee-shifting and damages for slander of title.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas considered whether attorney fees incurred in the litigation itself could be awarded as special damages for slander of title in the absence of statutory or contractual authority, or third-party litigation. The court held that, under Kansas's "American Rule," attorney fees and litigation expenses are not recoverable as special damages in a slander of title action unless they arise from litigation with a third party caused by the defendant's tortious conduct. The Supreme Court reversed both the Court of Appeals’ affirmance and the district court’s award of attorney fees as damages. View "Savage v. Timsah " on Justia Law

An Oklahoma company, formed to acquire mineral rights in Appalachia, alleged that two Texas parties failed to convey certain West Virginia mineral interests as contractually agreed. The Oklahoma company, which included non-Texas owners and participants, had funded the purchase of these rights, but a number of mineral deeds were recorded in the name of the Texas seller rather than the buyer. As a result, royalties from those mineral rights were paid to the seller. The Oklahoma plaintiff sought to compel the Texas defendants to reform the deeds, perform their contractual obligations, declare the plaintiff’s entitlement to the royalties, and enjoin the defendants from transferring the disputed interests.The 141st District Court in Tarrant County, Texas, denied the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and ultimately granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, awarding specific performance, deed reformation, declaratory relief, an injunction, and monetary relief. The court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and the contract, even though the mineral rights were located in West Virginia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed, holding that Texas courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit’s gravamen was the adjudication of title to foreign (West Virginia) real property.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the matter and disagreed with the appellate court’s application of the so-called “gist” rule. The Supreme Court held that Texas courts with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue in personam judgments concerning contractual obligations to convey out-of-state real property, as long as the judgment binds only the parties and does not purport to establish or alter title to the property by the court’s own force. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of remaining issues. View "BRAXTON MINERALS III, LLC v. BAUER" on Justia Law

A private trust owning land near a community park at Triboji Beach, adjacent to West Okoboji Lake, sought to quiet title to an unpaved road (Lakeview Drive) bordering its property. The land, including the road, had originally been dedicated to public use in 1929 by the Tribune Company. Despite the public’s longstanding use of the road for access to the beach and park, the trust initiated a quiet-title action against “Unknown Claimants,” providing notice solely by publication in a local newspaper. No parties appeared to contest the petition, resulting in a default judgment for the trust.Following the judgment, a group of neighboring landowners who regularly used the road discovered the action and filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County to vacate the default judgment. They argued that they, as well as the State of Iowa, should have received personal service because they were known or readily ascertainable interested parties. The district court initially agreed, finding that failure to personally serve the landowners and the State constituted fraud. However, after reconsideration, the district court reversed itself, holding that neither the landowners nor the State had a specific property interest requiring personal service and dismissed the petition to vacate, reinstating the default judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trust’s failure to provide personal service to the neighboring landowners, who were known or readily ascertainable and had a potential adverse interest, constituted a procedural irregularity requiring the default judgment to be vacated. The Court also determined the trust was required to personally serve the State due to its potential jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 461A.11(2). The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Streeter v. The Dunn Trust Dated May 20, 2005" on Justia Law

A house in Hoover, Alabama was owned by William and Roberta as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. After William’s death in 2012, Roberta remained at the property, later joined by her son, Parker, who eventually married Hall. Roberta died in 2019, and Parker claimed he became the property owner as her sole heir. The mortgage, originally executed with Countrywide Home Loans and later assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), went into default, leading to foreclosure in 2021. BONY purchased the property at foreclosure, but Parker and Hall did not vacate. BONY filed an ejectment action in 2022, initially naming William and Roberta (both deceased) as defendants, later substituting Parker, Hall, and the estate of Roberta.The Shelby Circuit Court granted summary judgment for BONY and Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), ordering Parker and Hall to make payments into court, granting BONY immediate possession, declaring Parker and Hall forfeited any right of redemption for failing to vacate, and granting judgment against their counterclaims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and first addressed whether the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that, because the original complaint only named deceased persons as defendants, the action was void from its inception and did not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the circuit court had no authority to entertain amendments, substitute the estate, or address any further motions or pleadings. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court’s order and remanded with instructions for the trial court to vacate its order and dismiss the action, without prejudice. This disposition was based solely on the jurisdictional defect, pretermitting other arguments. View "Parker v. The Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law