by
The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Matthew Needham on a foreclosure complaint filed by Wilmington Savings Fund Society as Trustee for Hilldale Trust (Wilmington) and remanded the matter for entry of judgment for Wilmington, holding a mortgagee may delegate to an agent its duty to provide a notice of the right to cure pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1). After Needham defaulted on his loan, loan servicer BSI Financial Services sent Needham a notice of the right to cure on behalf of Ventures Trust, the then-holder of the note and mortgage. Thereafter, Ventures Trust filed a foreclosure complaint. Wilmington, which was assigned the mortgage and note, was subsequently substituted as Plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment for Needham, concluding that because the notice was sent by the loan servicer rather than the mortgagee, the notice was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that neither the mortgage contract nor Me. Rev. Stat. 6111(1) prohibited the mortgagee from delegating to an agent loan servicer its duty to give a notice of the right to cure to Needham. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Needham" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the the Board of Review for the Town of Delafield’s reclassification of two lots of land owned by Appellants from “agricultural land” to “residential”, holding that the two lots at issue were entitled to be classified as agricultural land as a matter of law. In reversing the circuit court, the court of appeals determined that a business purpose was not necessary for land to be classified as agricultural land for property tax purposes and that the assessor’s determination of the appropriate classification was driven by his erroneous understand of the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a business purpose is not required for land to be classified as agricultural land for property tax purposes; and (2) the two lots at issue were entitled to be classified as agricultural land. View "Peter Ogden Family Trust of 2008 v. Board of Review for the Town of Delafield" on Justia Law

by
In an action arising from a condemnation proceeding, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to MVP based on its right to condemn certain temporary and permanent easements on the properties of several landowners, including WPPLP. In this case, MVP was authorized by FERC to exercise its rights of eminent domain to construct a natural gas pipeline. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of MVP's motion for a preliminary injunction allowing MVP immediate access to the easements described in MVP's complaint. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding potential damage to WPPLP and WPPLLC's coal as a result of the pipeline; the district court did not err by declining to join WPPLLC as an indispensable party; there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to MVP's claim to invoke eminent domain powers; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Winter factors favored a grant of a preliminary injunction to MVP. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Western Pocahontas Properties" on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of HomeAway.com and Airbnb Inc.'s (the Platforms) lawsuits challenging the City of Santa Monica’s Ordinance 2535, which imposes various obligations on companies that host online platforms for short-term vacation rentals. The panel held that the district court properly dismissed the Platforms' complaints for failure to state a claim and dismissed as moot the appeals from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The panel rejected the Platforms' claim that the ordinance was preempted by the Communications Decency Act (CDA) because it required them to monitor and remove third-party content, and held that neither express preemption nor obstacle preemption applied to the ordinance. The panel also rejected the Platforms' contention that the ordinance impermissibly infringed upon their First Amendment rights, and held that the ordinance regulated nonexpressive conduct, specifically booking transactions, not free speech. The panel held that, even assuming the ordinance would lead the Platforms to voluntarily remove some advertisements for lawful rentals, there would not be a severe limitation on the public's access to lawful advertisements, especially considering the existence of alternative channels like Craigslist. The panel reasoned that such an incidental burden was far from a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech. View "HomeAway.com v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court denied the writs of prohibition and mandamus sought by Relators to order the Warren County Board of Elections to remove from the May 7 ballot a referendum on a 2018 resolution adopted by the Wayne Township Board of Trustees relating to property on which Relators sought to construct a housing development, holding that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law. The resolution adopted by the township trustees amended the zoning district for the subject properties from residence single family zone to village transition PUD. Relators submitted a protest on the referendum. The board rejected the protest. Relators then filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus ordering the board to sustain Relators’ protest of the referendum. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relators were not entitled to either writ. View "State ex rel. Federle v. Warren County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order on summary judgment motions and order after bench trial in this dispute arising from an ill-conceived business conveyance plan during a downturn in the oil market, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in any respect. Three Garland brothers, who had separate entities providing specialized services to the oil industry, formed a company with their companies as members and the Garlands individually as members. Alex Mantle was president of the company. Mantle and the Garlands later entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) providing that Mantle and his wife would buy the company, but Mantle backed out of the deal. The Garlands liquidated the company, and this litigation followed. The district court disposed of some claims on summary judgment and resolved the remainder after a bench trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Garlands and their entities did not abandon their counterclaims; (2) the MOU was an enforceable contract; (3) the district court correctly dismissed the Mantles’ fraud claim; (4) the district court correctly concluded that some conveyances by the Garlands fit the definitions of a fraudulent conveyance; (5) the elements for LLC veil-piercing were absent; and (6) the Garlands did not owe Mantle a duty of good faith. View "Garland v. Mantle" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Darryl Montague sued Hundred Acre Homestead, a therapeutic residential community, after a resident of Hundred Acre shot him at the shooting range he owned. He invoked two theories of liability: (1) that as the resident’s mental-health provider, Hundred Acre breached a duty to take reasonable steps to protect him from the resident by warning him of the danger she posed; and (2) Hundred Acre breached a duty to him by accepting and retaining the resident for care in violation of applicable Vermont regulations. Montague appealed the superior court’s dismissal of both. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review reduced to whether one who provides residential care for an individual had a tort-law duty to warn a potential victim of violence by that individual when that potential victim is neither individually identified or identifiable, nor a member of a discrete identified or identifiable class of potential victims. The Court concluded both theories of negligence failed because neither established that Hundred Acre had a cognizable legal duty to protect Montague enforceable through a private tort action. View "Montague v. Hundred Acre Homestead, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Surviving Mustang fighter planes are collectors’ items. In 1965 Vartanian bought a Mustang, serial number 44-74543 and kept it in a Fulton County New York hangar. In 1985 Vartanian's representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected Martin, who had promised to restore the plane. Vartanian’s lawyer unsuccessfully demanded that Martin return the plane. Vartanian complained to the FAA, the FBI, and local police. Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane. Martin later registered with the FAA a Mustang, serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts that it was cobbled together using parts from a plane that crashed in Nicaragua plus components acquired from several sources. In 1998 Martin sold 44-63655 to Greenhill. Vartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by reading a magazine article that incorrectly identified it as 44-74543. Vartanian hired another lawyer, who died before filing suit. Vartanian did not follow up until after learning in 2013 that there were irregularities in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. Vartanian demanded that Greenhill return the plane. Greenhill sought a declaratory judgment of ownership. Vartanian filed counterclaims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the counterclaims were untimely and that the aircraft is free of Vartanian's claim. Although federal law provides the registration system, state law supplies the rules for determining ownership, 49 U.S.C. 44108(c)(1). For conversion claims, Illinois law establishes a five-year limitations period that starts when the injured party “knows or reasonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Vartanian knew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected Martin immediately and knew long ago what serial number Martin was using. Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. View "Greenhill v. Vartanian" on Justia Law

by
Chris and Jeanne Rosauer owned a home and underlying property in Girdwood across the municipal roadway from a home and underlying property owned by Thomas Manos and Jody Liddicoat (collectively, Manos). The Municipality of Anchorage owned a right-of-way between the Rosauers’ property and the municipal roadway. In August 2015 Manos hired Greatland Tree Service, LLC to remove several cottonwood trees within the municipal right-of-way in front of the Rosauers’ property. The Anchorage Municipal Code required private entities to obtain a permit for the “use” of municipal rights-of-way, including tree removal. Neither Manos nor Greatland obtained a permit before the tree removal, but Greatland later obtained a permit in October. In April 2016 the Rosauers sued Manos and Greatland, seeking damages under Alaska’s timber-trespass statute, AS 09.45.730. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Manos and Greatland, concluding that the municipality’s subsequent permit approving the tree removal negated the neighbors’ claim. The Rosauers appealed. Because the Alaska Supreme Court agreed the municipality’s subsequent permit effectively conferred lawful authority to cut the trees, it affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Rosauer v. Manos" on Justia Law

by
At issue in this appeal were the pleading requirements for a verified claim in a civil forfeiture proceeding. The Eighth Circuit previously held that a claimant who contests a forfeiture must state its interest in the disputed property "with some level of specificity," and that "a general assertion" of an interest in property is insufficient to satisfy the governing rule of procedure. The court held that the "specificity" requirement imposed by the court's prior decision was not supported by Supplemental Rule G(5), and that LNG's claim was sufficient to comply with Rule G(5). In this case, LNG satisfied the Rule G(5) requirement by stating that it was the owner of the currency at issue and it had a claim to, interest in, and right to the property. The court reasoned that, to impose a mandate that the claimant must provide more detail or specificity, such as information about how it obtained the funds at issue, would go beyond the sparse terms of the rule. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order striking LNG's claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. LNG Express, Inc." on Justia Law