Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A vineyard in Riley County sought to expand its operations through an amendment to its planned unit development. Some neighboring property owners filed a protest petition, as permitted by Kansas law if at least 20% of the affected landowners sign. One property bordering the vineyard was owned by two parties as tenants in common, but only one signed the petition. The Board of Riley County Commissioners counted only half the acreage of that property toward the 20% threshold, reasoning that only half the owners had signed. This calculation meant the protest petition narrowly failed to reach the required threshold, but it would have succeeded if the entire property had been counted.The Riley District Court reviewed the Board’s calculation and the applicability of the protest petition process. The Kansas Court of Appeals later affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with the Board’s approach of counting only the proportional share represented by the signing tenant in common. The Court of Appeals also held that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process from state law. Both Prairiewood Holdings, LLC (one of the protest petitioners) and the Board sought further review.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment but clarified the rule. It held that for acreage owned by tenants in common to count toward a protest petition under K.S.A. 12-757(f)(1), all tenants in common of a property must sign the petition. If only one tenant in common signs, none of the acreage for that property should be counted. The Supreme Court also affirmed that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Prairiewood Holdings v. Board of Riley County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Growmark, Inc., an agricultural cooperative, owns eleven large propane storage tanks at its New Hampton fuel terminal in Iowa. The tanks, each holding 90,000 gallons, rest unattached on concrete saddles and have been at the site since 1977. The Chickasaw County assessor included the tanks’ value—nearly $2 million—in Growmark’s property tax assessment, classifying them as taxable “improvements” to real property. Growmark argued that the tanks are equipment, not improvements, and should be nontaxable personal property under Iowa law.The Chickasaw County Board of Review affirmed the assessor’s classification and assessment, finding the tanks to be taxable improvements under Iowa Code section 427A.1(1)(c). Growmark appealed to the Iowa Property Assessment Appeal Board (PAAB), which reversed the Board of Review’s decision, concluding that the tanks were unattached equipment under section 427A.1(1)(d) and not taxable. The Board of Review then sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, which affirmed the PAAB’s ruling, agreeing that the tanks were equipment rather than improvements.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case to determine whether the tanks should be classified as taxable improvements or nontaxable equipment under Iowa Code section 427A.1. The court held that the tanks are equipment, not improvements, because they are implements used for a specific business purpose, are not permanently affixed to the land or a structure, can be moved without damage, and their utility lies in Growmark’s operations rather than the land itself. The court declined to defer to non-rule administrative guidance and overruled prior precedent requiring tax statutes to be construed in favor of taxpayers. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the tanks are not assessable as real property. View "Chickasaw County Board of Review v. Property Assessment Appeal Board" on Justia Law

A landlord served a residential tenant with an eviction notice for nonpayment of rent during a period when the governor had ordered a temporary ban on such notices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenant responded by counterclaiming that the landlord violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), specifically Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j), which bars attempts to collect a debt under an “agreement to defer payment” when the right to collect does not exist. The tenant also alleged the lease was void under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it permitted eviction for a crime committed in relation to the property but lacked the required notice of domestic abuse protections.The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed the landlord’s eviction claim since the notice was issued during the moratorium. The court also held that the WCA did not apply to the lease and found the lease was not void under the cited statutes and regulations, concluding that the tenant was not entitled to damages or attorney fees. The tenant’s attorney was denied intervention for attorney fees but was later allowed to intervene to appeal that issue.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for the first time that a residential lease with monthly rent payments is a “consumer transaction” and an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, and that serving the eviction notice violated the Act. The appellate court also found the lease void for omitting the required domestic abuse notice and allowed recovery of double damages and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court. It held that a typical residential lease with monthly rent payments is not an “agreement to defer payment” under Wis. Stat. § 427.104, so the WCA does not apply. Even if the lease were void, the tenant showed no pecuniary loss, precluding recovery of damages, costs, or attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) or § 425.308(1). View "Koble Investments v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between neighboring property owners in Johnston, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased their property in 1985 and, over the years, cleared and improved a strip of land beside their home, installing features such as a playset, landscaping, and a staging area. The disputed strip lay between their property and the defendant’s property. The defendant bought his property in 2011. In 2013, a survey commissioned by the defendant revealed that some of the plaintiffs’ improvements encroached on the defendant’s land. Tensions escalated, leading to the defendant installing a fence and the plaintiffs filing an action to quiet title based on adverse possession, claiming they had possessed the disputed area for the required statutory period.Proceedings in the Providence County Superior Court included a bench trial, where the main factual dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed land was “hostile”—that is, without the permission of the record owner. The trial justice found that the plaintiffs had proved adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence as to a portion of the disputed area beyond an old line of hemlock trees, but not as to the area along the tree line itself. The court found the plaintiffs’ claim to hostility was undermined by evidence that a prior owner may have given them permission to use that area. Final judgment was entered, granting partial relief to each party. Both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment below. The Court held that, contrary to the trial justice’s view, the sale of the servient parcel (i.e., the land that was allegedly permissively used) can terminate prior permission and may render subsequent use hostile for adverse possession purposes. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings on hostility under the correct legal standard and for clarification on the precise location of the disputed area beyond the hemlock tree line. View "Desrochers v. Micheli" on Justia Law

The case centers on a foreclosure action brought by a bank that sought to enforce a mortgage on property owned by the defendant. The defendant had executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage with a predecessor lender. After the defendant defaulted, Bank of America became the holder of the note and owner of the debt, and the mortgage was later assigned to the plaintiff bank. However, during the period Bank of America held the note, the original note was lost while in the custody of its loan servicer. The plaintiff bank, as the assignee, initiated foreclosure proceedings and moved for summary judgment, presenting affidavits from employees of the loan servicer as secondary evidence of its ownership of the debt.The Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiff and subsequently rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant appealed, arguing that the affidavits submitted were insufficient to prove the plaintiff’s ownership of the debt. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, prompting a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that the plaintiff failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding its ownership of the debt, as required for summary judgment. The court found the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff were either inadmissible due to lack of personal knowledge or were conclusory and lacked a sufficient factual foundation. The court explained that, when a note is lost, secondary evidence must clearly and competently establish ownership of the debt, which was not done in this instance. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Schulz" on Justia Law

A church founded in 1982 primarily serving Korean-speaking congregants operated independently for many years, later joining a regional Korean-American presbytery affiliated with a national Presbyterian denomination. Over two decades, the church participated in various activities with the presbytery, including meetings, reports, dues, and ordinations, while maintaining autonomy in its financial and property matters. Disagreements arose when the presbytery asserted a trust interest in the church’s property after the church refinanced a loan without presbytery approval, referencing denominational rules requiring property to be held in trust for the national denomination. The church disputed its membership status and the applicability of those rules, asserting independence.After a failed ecclesiastical complaint with the synod overseeing the presbytery, the church filed suit in the Fairfax County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding its independence and property rights. The presbytery counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of membership and property trust obligations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the church, finding it was not a member of the national denomination due to the absence of a covenant required by denominational rules, and thus, no trust obligation existed. The presbytery appealed.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because the dispute involved church membership—a matter the parties had initially submitted to the synod.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine dispute of material fact existed about the church’s membership status. The Court further held that neither court could resolve the ecclesiastical abstention issue or the membership question on the summary judgment record. It reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Shalom Presbyterian Church of Washington v. Atlantic Korean American Presbytery" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on an owner of a waterfront condominium in Newport, Rhode Island, who hired a real estate agency and its agent to find a suitable tenant for his property. The agency presented a candidate, Cynthia Dziurgot, who passed credit and criminal background checks, and the owner entered into a lease with her. After several months, Dziurgot stopped paying rent and refused to vacate the property at the end of the lease, leading to an extended eviction process during the COVID-19 eviction moratorium. The owner later discovered that an internet search would have revealed a history of misconduct and legal issues involving the tenant.The plaintiff filed suit in Newport County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract and negligence by the agency and its agent for allegedly failing to adequately vet the tenant. The plaintiff intended to call a real estate expert to testify that a reasonable real estate professional would have conducted an internet search of the prospective tenant. However, after failing to produce the expert for deposition as agreed in a consent order, the court precluded the plaintiff from offering any expert testimony. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not establish the applicable standard of care for real estate professionals. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the standard of care was not within common knowledge and required expert testimony.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that establishing the standard of care for real estate professionals regarding background searches is not within the common knowledge of laypersons and requires expert testimony. Because the plaintiff was precluded from offering such testimony, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Hurd v. H & H Real Estate, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization applied for a special use permit to operate a residential addiction-recovery facility on a 27-acre parcel in a rural residential zoning district. The facility would house ten to sixteen residents in a converted single-family home. Local property owners adjacent to the site expressed concerns about increased traffic, potential for trespass, noise, privacy, and other impacts. The organization classified its application as an “Assisted Living Residence” (ALR) after consulting with the county zoning administrator, who advised that this was the appropriate category under the local land use code. During hearings before the county Board of Adjustment, both sides presented expert testimony on property values and traffic, though some opinions were excluded by the Board.After the Board granted the permit with certain conditions, the neighbors filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Henderson County Superior Court. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, ruling that: (1) the facility should have been classified as a “Mental Health Facility” rather than an ALR; (2) the Board erred by excluding the petitioners’ expert testimony; and (3) the Board erred by admitting the respondent’s expert testimony. The trial court ordered the Board to revoke the permit and require any future application to be categorized as a Mental Health Facility.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the neighbors had standing due to special damages. The court determined the Board acted reasonably in categorizing the facility as an ALR, as this was consistent with the text of the county code and the code did not enumerate “Mental Health Facility” as a permitted use. The appellate court also found the Board did not err in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s order and reinstated the Board’s grant of the special use permit. View "Hall v. Henderson Cnty" on Justia Law

A tenant leased a commercial space from a landlord beginning in December 2020. The landlord alleged that the tenant failed to pay rent during 2022 and 2023, leading to an ejectment action in early 2024 seeking both possession of the premises and damages for unpaid rent. After the court ordered rent escrow and the tenant failed to comply, the landlord obtained a writ of possession, and the tenant vacated the property. The remaining dispute centered on alleged rent arrearages. The tenant requested a jury trial and was allowed limited discovery. Prior to trial, the tenant sought continuances based on alleged inadequate discovery responses and personal health concerns, which were denied. The tenant failed to appear for jury draw, and the landlord moved for default judgment.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted default judgment to the landlord on the same day as the missed jury draw, without holding a separate hearing or providing the tenant with seven days’ notice. The court later entered judgment awarding the landlord damages and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of continuances, discovery rulings, and the procedure used to enter default judgment.The Vermont Supreme Court held that, under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)(4), when a party has appeared in a case, the court must provide at least seven days’ written notice and hold a hearing before entering default judgment. The Court found that these requirements were not met because the hearing on default judgment occurred without notice and immediately after the tenant’s nonappearance. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded for the trial court to provide the required notice and hearing before considering default judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s discovery rulings and declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. View "Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC" on Justia Law