Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Costco sought to operate a gas station adjacent to its retail store in Colchester, Vermont, near a busy highway interchange. The company obtained both municipal and Act 250 permits, which included conditions requiring traffic mitigation measures—specifically, improvements at a nearby intersection (the MVD Improvements) or, alternatively, implementation of modified traffic signal timings if a larger state highway project (the DDI Project) was not yet under construction. Two neighboring businesses, who also operated gas stations nearby, actively participated in the permitting process and subsequent litigation, arguing that Costco’s gas station would exacerbate traffic congestion and that Costco should not be allowed to operate the station at full-time hours until the DDI Project was complete.After initial permits were issued, the neighbors appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld the permits with the mitigation conditions. The neighbors then appealed the Act 250 permit to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the sufficiency of the mitigation measures. As the DDI Project faced delays, Costco sought and received permit amendments allowing limited-hours operation of the gas station, subject to the same traffic mitigation conditions. The neighbors continued to challenge these amendments and argued that the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) should have been joined as a co-applicant, and that Costco needed further permit amendments to operate at full-time hours.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to consider whether Costco could operate the gas station at full-time hours. The Court concluded that Costco was not required to seek further amendments to its Act 250 or municipal permits before commencing full-time operation, as the permit conditions were satisfied either by the commencement of the DDI Project or by implementation of the signal timing modifications. The Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision and found the neighbors’ remaining arguments moot. View "In re Costco Wholesale Administrative Decision" on Justia Law

In 2006, Brenda Merle White executed a $250,000 promissory note secured by a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans, which was later assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM). White stopped making payments in 2008, and BNYM initiated, then rescinded, a non-judicial foreclosure. In 2012, the Association of Apartment Owners of Kumelewai Court foreclosed on the property for unpaid fees, and Gabi Collins acquired an interest in the property in 2015 via quitclaim deed. Collins was not a party to the original mortgage. In 2017, BNYM sent White a notice of default and filed a foreclosure action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. White did not respond, but Collins contested the action, arguing, among other things, that the statute of limitations had expired.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment to BNYM, finding the foreclosure action timely. Collins appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action is twenty years under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-31.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed whether the ICA erred in applying a twenty-year statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions. The court held that such actions are more analogous to real property actions than to debt recovery actions, and thus the twenty-year limitations period under HRS § 657-31 applies. The court rejected Collins’ arguments that recent precedent required a different result and found that neither DW Aina Lea Development, LLC v. State Land Use Commission nor Adair v. Kona Corporation conflicted with this approach. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment, holding that the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure actions is twenty years. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. White" on Justia Law

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

Kenneth Minshall sought to quiet title to a two-acre property in Washakie County, Wyoming, which had previously belonged to Gail Lee Quinn. Minshall lived with Quinn for decades and claimed that Quinn had agreed to transfer the property to his business, identified variously as M/G Enterprises, M/Q Enterprises, or M-Q Enterprises, all sharing the same EIN but none of which were ever legally incorporated. In 2018, Quinn executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property to M/G Enterprises. After Quinn’s death in 2019, Minshall executed a quitclaim deed on behalf of M/G Enterprises to himself. Quinn’s daughters, Robin Griffin and Joy Osbon, as her heirs and personal representatives, contested Minshall’s claim to the property.The District Court of Washakie County held a bench trial and found that the deeds purporting to transfer the property to M/G Enterprises (or its variants) were void because the grantee entities had no legal existence and thus could not take title. The court concluded that the last valid deed left the property in Quinn’s name, making it subject to probate by her estate. The court ordered that the void deeds be stricken from the county records. Minshall appealed, arguing that the doctrine of estoppel by deed should prevent Quinn’s heirs and estate from challenging the validity of the deeds.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that estoppel by deed cannot apply where the underlying deed is void, as a deed to a nonexistent entity is a nullity and does not pass title. Because the grantee entities never legally existed, no interest in the property was conveyed, and the property remained with Quinn’s estate. The court affirmed that the doctrine of estoppel by deed had no application in this case. View "Minshall v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Two companies each owned a one-half undivided interest in the subsurface estate (sand, gravel, and clay) of a small parcel of land, while one of them, Toll, also owned the surface estate. Toll developed the parcel as part of a larger project, excavating soil from parts of the parcel and using it as fill on the same parcel to achieve the desired grade and density. The other company, Genesis, alleged that Toll had removed and transferred soil from the parcel to third parties without compensation, and also claimed that Toll’s use of the soil on-site interfered with Genesis’s rights.After discovery, Toll moved for summary judgment in the Fourth District Court, Provo, arguing there was no evidence it had exported soil from the parcel and that Genesis was not entitled to compensation for soil used on-site. Genesis conceded it lacked evidence of off-site removal but argued that a jury could infer such removal due to Toll’s exclusive control of relevant information. Genesis also argued it was entitled to compensation for Toll’s on-site use of the soil, claiming this interfered with its rights or unjustly enriched Toll. The district court granted summary judgment to Toll, finding no evidence of off-site removal and holding that, under Utah law and persuasive Washington precedent, a surface owner may use soil on-site without compensating the subsurface co-owner unless the soil is exported.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that Genesis failed to provide evidence supporting its claim that Toll removed soil from the parcel, and that mere speculation or attacks on Toll’s credibility were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The Court further held that Genesis was not entitled to compensation for Toll’s on-site use of the soil, as such use did not constitute actionable interference with Genesis’s subsurface rights under the deed or common law. The summary judgment in favor of Toll was affirmed. View "Genesis Aggregates B v. Toll Southwest" on Justia Law

A group of residents sought to challenge a Tooele County zoning ordinance that changed the designation of a parcel of land in Erda from agricultural to planned-community zoning, enabling its development. The residents, acting as referendum sponsors, attempted to gather enough signatures to place the ordinance on the ballot for possible repeal, aiming to preserve the land’s agricultural status. Their efforts were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related executive orders, which they argued hindered their ability to collect signatures. Despite requesting permission to use electronic signatures, their request was denied, and they ultimately failed to meet the required signature threshold as determined by the County Clerk.The sponsors then filed suit in the Third District Court, Tooele County, against both the County and the Governor, challenging the signature threshold and the denial of electronic signatures. During the litigation, the area containing the property was incorporated as the City of Erda, transferring land-use authority from the County to the new city. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, finding the Clerk had correctly applied the signature threshold, and granted judgment on the pleadings to the Governor, rejecting the constitutional claims. The sponsors appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and determined that it was moot. The court held that, because the property is now within the City of Erda and subject to its zoning authority, a referendum repealing the Tooele County ordinance would have no legal effect on the property’s current zoning. The court found that it could not provide meaningful relief to the sponsors, as Erda has enacted its own zoning ordinances for the property. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Haney v. Tooele County" on Justia Law

Two companies each owned a one-half undivided interest in the subsurface estate (specifically, sand, gravel, and clay) of a small parcel of land, while one of them also owned the entire surface estate. The surface owner developed the parcel by excavating soil and using it as fill on the same parcel to achieve the desired grade and density for construction. The subsurface co-owner sued, alleging that the surface owner had removed and transferred soil off-site without compensation, and also claimed entitlement to compensation for the on-site use of the soil, arguing that such use interfered with its rights.The Fourth District Court reviewed the case after discovery. The surface owner moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence that no soil was removed from the parcel and that all excavated soil was used on-site. The subsurface co-owner conceded it had no evidence that soil was exported off-site but argued that a jury could infer such removal due to the surface owner’s exclusive control of relevant information. The district court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding off-site removal and held that, under Utah law and persuasive Washington precedent, a surface owner is entitled to use soil for on-site development without compensating the subsurface owner, unless the soil is exported. The court granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that the subsurface co-owner failed to provide evidence supporting its claim of off-site removal, and that the surface owner’s on-site use of soil did not constitute actionable interference with the subsurface rights. The Court clarified that, absent an agreement to the contrary, a surface owner may use subsurface materials for on-site development without owing compensation to a subsurface co-owner, provided there is no interference with the latter’s right to remove those materials. The summary judgment in favor of the surface owner was affirmed. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property, which they had borrowed to develop parcels in Utah. After several loan modifications and assignments, the lenders—Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P.—foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, where they were the only bidders. The sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt, and the lenders continued to pursue the deficiency. Later, Talisker discovered information suggesting that the lenders, in coordination with a court-appointed receiver, may have taken actions to depress the sale price, including deterring potential bidders and bundling properties in a way that made them less attractive.Talisker filed suit in the Third District Court, Summit County, seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, alleging that the lenders’ conduct during the foreclosure process violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and constituted fraud or grossly inequitable conduct. The lenders moved to dismiss, arguing that Talisker had broadly waived any rights or defenses related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but concluded that the waivers were enforceable and covered the rights Talisker sought to assert, including those under Rule 69B(d). The court found no unlawful irregularity in the sales and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s broad and explicit waivers in the loan documents encompassed all rights and defenses related to the foreclosure sales, including the right to challenge the method of sale or seek equitable relief based on alleged unfairness or irregularities. The court concluded that, regardless of the alleged conduct, Talisker had contractually relinquished any basis for relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

A Michigan landlord who owns several rental properties in Oak Park challenged the city’s housing code, specifically its requirement that landlords consent to property inspections as a condition for obtaining a rental license. The city’s code mandates that landlords apply for a license and certificate of compliance, which involves an initial inspection and periodic re-inspections. The landlord refused to sign the consent form for inspections, resulting in the city withholding his license and issuing fines for renting without one. Despite these penalties, he continued to rent out his properties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The district court found that the landlord lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim because there had been no warrantless, nonconsensual inspection. It also ruled that the city’s licensing and inspection regime did not violate the Fourth Amendment or impose unconstitutional conditions, and that the landlord’s Equal Protection claim was without merit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the landlord did have standing to challenge the licensing scheme under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, as the denial of a license for refusing to consent to inspections constituted a cognizable injury. However, the court concluded that the city’s requirement of consent to an initial inspection as a condition of licensing was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, drawing on Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between reasonable conditions for public benefits and coercive mandates. The court also found that the city’s inspection requirements for one- and two-family rentals did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification was rationally related to legitimate public health and safety goals. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Herschfus v. City of Oak Park" on Justia Law

Two companies, HBKY and Elk River, each claimed rights to thousands of acres of timber in Kentucky based on their respective contracts with a third party, Kingdom Energy Resources. Kingdom had entered into a timber sales contract with Elk River, allowing Elk River to cut and remove timber from certain land. Separately, Kingdom obtained a $22 million loan from a group of lenders, with HBKY acting as their agent, and mortgaged several properties—including the timber in question—as collateral for the loan. Kingdom later breached both agreements: it ousted Elk River from the land, violating the timber contract, and defaulted on the loan, leaving both HBKY and Elk River with competing claims to the timber.After HBKY secured a judgment in a New York federal court declaring Kingdom in default, it registered the judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and initiated foreclosure proceedings on the collateral, including the timber. Elk River and its president, Robin Wilson, were joined as defendants due to their claimed interest. The district court granted summary judgment to HBKY, finding that Elk River did not obtain title to the timber under its contracts, did not have a superior interest, and was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business under Kentucky law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the loan documents did not authorize a sale of the timber free of HBKY’s security interest, as the mortgage explicitly stated that the security interest would survive any sale. The court also found that Elk River failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish its status as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of HBKY. View "HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC" on Justia Law