Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A county in Georgia revised a zoning ordinance to increase the maximum allowable dwelling size in a historic district on Sapelo Island. Some residents opposed this change and, relying on the Georgia Constitution’s Home Rule Provision, petitioned for a referendum to repeal the ordinance. The county probate court found the petition valid and scheduled a special election. Before the order was entered, the county filed suit in superior court to stop the referendum, arguing that zoning ordinances are not subject to the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process.The Superior Court of McIntosh County agreed with the county, holding that the ordinance was adopted under the Constitution’s Zoning Provision, not the Home Rule Provision, and thus was not subject to repeal by referendum. The court issued a writ of prohibition against the probate judge to halt the referendum. However, the superior court also granted an injunction, at the request of the residents, preventing enforcement of the revised ordinance while the appeal was pending.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process applies to county zoning ordinances. The court held that, under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, the legislative power to enact zoning ordinances derives from the Home Rule Provision, and nothing in the Constitution excludes zoning ordinances from the referendum process. Therefore, the superior court erred in stopping the referendum and issuing a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed those portions of the superior court’s order. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, finding the county failed to show error in the record regarding the injunction. View "Bailey v. McIntosh County" on Justia Law

Doug Ridley and Sherry Shen owned a condominium unit in a Santa Clara complex managed by a homeowners’ association (HOA). In April 2018, flooding occurred in the crawlspace beneath their unit, which was a common area under the HOA’s control. Initial investigations suggested the water originated from an undestroyed well, but the HOA delayed meaningful repairs for over 19 months, during which the unit suffered extensive damage, including mold and termite infestation. The HOA repeatedly ignored expert recommendations and shifted its position, ultimately failing to properly investigate or remediate the source of the water and related damage.The homeowners filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court against the HOA and its president, Steve Moritz, alleging breach of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs), negligence, nuisance, and other claims. After a lengthy bench trial, the court found in favor of the homeowners on all claims, awarded damages for restoration, lost rent, and emotional distress, and issued an injunction requiring the HOA to complete specified repairs and compensate the homeowners until the work was finished. The court also found the HOA’s conduct grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s finding that the HOA breached its duties under the CCRs by failing to reasonably investigate and timely repair the common area damage. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, rejected the HOA’s defenses under the business judgment rule, rule of judicial deference, and the CCRs’ exculpatory clause, and concluded the HOA’s conduct constituted gross negligence. The injunction order was affirmed, and the homeowners were awarded costs on appeal. View "Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for an apartment in Minneapolis that was subsidized under the Section 8 project-based voucher program, with the local public housing authority paying most or all of the rent directly to the landlord. After the tenant fell behind on utility payments, her electricity was disconnected, and she and her boyfriend broke into the building’s utility closet to restore power, inadvertently affecting other units. The landlord learned of this breach but continued to accept three months of rental payments from the public housing authority on the tenant’s behalf. Later, the landlord filed an eviction action based on the tenant’s breach of the lease.The Hennepin County District Court dismissed the tenant’s counterclaim regarding the utility shutoff and, following the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Westminster Corp. v. Anderson, held that the common law doctrine of waiver by acceptance of rent did not apply to rental payments made by a public housing agency. The district court found the tenant had materially breached the lease and did not address her retaliation defense. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings on the waiver and breach issues but remanded for consideration of the retaliation defense.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed only the waiver issue. It overruled Westminster, holding that the common law rule—whereby a landlord who accepts rent with knowledge of a tenant’s breach waives the right to evict for that breach—applies equally to private and publicly subsidized tenancies. The court clarified that whether a landlord has accepted rent for purposes of this doctrine is a factual question, to be determined by the totality of the circumstances, including the landlord’s conduct after payment. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hook & Ladder Apartments, L.P. v. Nalewaja" on Justia Law

Several utility companies operating in California, including in Ventura County, challenged the property tax rates applied to their state-assessed utility property. They argued that the method used to calculate the debt service component of their property tax rate resulted in a higher rate than that applied to locally assessed, nonutility property (referred to as “common property”). The utilities claimed this disparity violated section 19 of article XIII of the California Constitution, which states that utility property “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”The utilities filed suit in the Ventura County Superior Court against the County of Ventura and the California State Board of Equalization, seeking partial refunds for property taxes paid between 2018 and 2023. The County demurred, relying on recent appellate decisions that had rejected similar claims. The parties stipulated that the decision in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court was binding for purposes of this case, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, entering judgment in favor of the County and the Board.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that article XIII, section 19 does not require that utility property be taxed at the same or a comparable rate as nonutility property. Instead, the provision is an enabling clause that allows utility property to be subject to property taxation, but does not mandate rate equivalence. The court also found that the general uniformity requirement in article XIII, section 1 does not override the Legislature’s authority to implement reasonable distinctions in tax treatment for utility property. The judgment in favor of the County and the Board was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

Dakota Bay, LLC owns property adjacent to McCook Lake in Union County, South Dakota, and planned to construct a canal connecting its land to the lake. To facilitate this, Dakota Bay’s owner, Michael Chicoine, applied for a shoreline alteration permit and a water permit to use an existing irrigation well to fill and maintain the canal. The McCook Lake Recreation Area Association, which holds a permit to pump water from the Missouri River into McCook Lake, opposed the project. The Association argued that constructing the canal would require a permit to appropriate water from McCook Lake and that the canal would increase water loss from the lake, potentially impairing the Association’s ability to maintain lake levels.The South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Water Management Board held hearings and ultimately denied the Association’s petition for a declaratory ruling, finding that the canal’s construction would not constitute an appropriation of water from McCook Lake. The Board also granted Dakota Bay’s application to use well water for the canal, finding that unappropriated water was available, the use was beneficial and in the public interest, and that it would not unlawfully impair existing water rights. The Association appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the Board’s rulings and also upheld the Board’s decision to quash subpoenas issued by the Association.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Court held that constructing the canal would not result in an appropriation of water from McCook Lake and thus did not require a water appropriation permit. The Court also held that Dakota Bay’s proposed use of well water for the canal was a beneficial use in the public interest and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas, clarifying that administrative proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, not the rules of civil procedure. View "Mccook Lake Recreation Area V. Dakota Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh leased a unit in the Northview Heights Complex to Darlene Nash. On January 9, 2021, Nash hosted a birthday party at her unit, which was attended by numerous people, including a juvenile known as “Shooter.” During the party, after Nash asked another guest, Blake Green, to leave, Green was shot and killed inside Nash’s unit. Shooter was identified as the main suspect, though no charges or arrests were made. The Housing Authority served Nash with a notice to terminate her lease, citing the shooting as a violation of lease provisions prohibiting criminal activity and the discharge of deadly weapons by any “Covered Person,” which includes guests and other persons under the tenant’s control.The Magisterial District Court granted the Housing Authority possession of the unit, permitting eviction. Nash appealed to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, where a non-jury trial was held. The trial court found that Shooter was not an unauthorized occupant or a guest, but was an “Other Person Under the Tenant’s Control” (OPTC) due to Nash’s “open house” invitation. The court concluded Nash violated the lease and awarded possession to the Housing Authority. Nash’s post-trial motion was denied, and she appealed to the Commonwealth Court.The Commonwealth Court reversed, reasoning that an invitation to the unit was not the same as an invitation to the premises, and the Housing Authority had not established that Shooter was on the premises due to Nash’s invitation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the lease and relevant law de novo, holding that an invitation to a unit is an invitation to the premises, and Shooter was an OPTC at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, holding that the Housing Authority may evict Nash for the criminal act committed by Shooter in her unit. View "Housing Authority v. Nash" on Justia Law

Lano/Armada Harbourside, LLC sold five condominium units in Washington, D.C. to Allegiance 2900 K Street LLC in 2013 for $39 million. The sale was documented by a deed that purported to reserve to Lano/Armada a leasehold interest in the property, referencing a separate ground lease agreement between Allegiance (as landlord) and Lano/Armada (as tenant). The ground lease had a term exceeding thirty years, with options to extend up to 117 years, and specified substantial annual rent payments. The ground lease itself was not recorded at the time of the sale, and no taxes were paid on it. Only the deed was recorded, and taxes were paid based on the transfer of the fee simple interest.After a series of assignments and a foreclosure, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, as subrogee of COMM 2013-CCRE12 K STREET NW, LLC, sought to record a deed of foreclosure in 2019. The Recorder of Deeds refused, noting that the ground lease had never been recorded or taxed. Commonwealth then recorded a memorandum of lease and paid the required taxes under protest. Commonwealth sought a refund from the Office of Tax Revenue, which was denied, and then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for relief. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the ground lease was a separate taxable transfer and that the statute of limitations had not run because no return for the ground lease had been filed until 2019.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the ground lease was a separate transfer of a leasehold interest, not a mere retention, and was subject to recordation and taxation. The court further held that the statute of limitations for tax collection was not triggered by the earlier deed and tax return, as they did not provide sufficient information about the ground lease. Thus, the District’s collection of taxes on the ground lease was timely. View "Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law