Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
CBS Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc.
Hexagon US Federal, Inc. ("HexFed") leased a portion of a building from Intergraph Unimproved Properties, LLC in 2015. The lease included two bays with different terms and renewal options. In 2016, the lease was amended to provide a five-year term for both bays. CBS Holdings, LLC later acquired the building and the lease. A dispute arose over whether HexFed had validly renewed the lease, leading HexFed to file a lawsuit against CBS Holdings for breach of the lease agreement.The Madison Circuit Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of HexFed, finding that CBS Holdings had waived its right to argue that the lease for one of the bays had expired after 12 months. The court also reformed the lease to correct a mutual mistake, establishing that the maximum monthly rent for the bay did not expire after one year. The court declared that HexFed had properly exercised its renewal option and awarded HexFed costs and attorneys' fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that CBS Holdings had waived its argument about the lease term by accepting rent without objection and by executing a lease amendment without changing the lease term. The court also upheld the reformation of the lease, finding clear evidence of a mutual mistake. Additionally, the court agreed that HexFed had validly renewed the lease by providing timely written notice, despite an error in the rent calculation. Finally, the court affirmed the award of costs and attorneys' fees to HexFed, as it was forced to file the action to enforce the lease. View "CBS Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc." on Justia Law
Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C.
A property developer settled claims with the U.S. Department of Justice for alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sought to assert a state-law claim for contribution against other companies involved in developing the properties. The developer, Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C., alleged that the franchisees, including Wilcox Development Group, L.L.C., failed to comply with the FHA in their construction and design of certain properties.The trial court dismissed the case, not on the grounds argued by Wilcox, but on the theory that if a state-law cause of action for contribution existed, it was preempted by federal law. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and Epcon appealed the preemption issue to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in deciding the case on the basis of federal preemption. The court emphasized principles of judicial restraint, noting that no party had argued for federal preemption and that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions unless necessary. The court also highlighted that the preemption issue was hypothetical and should not have been addressed without first determining whether a state-law contribution claim was available.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the facts alleged present a claim for relief under Ohio law. The court did not address the preemption issue, as it was not properly presented by the parties and was unnecessary to resolve at this stage. View "Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law
MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT
A Nevada limited liability company, Mass Land Acquisition, LLC, challenged the use of eminent domain by Sierra Pacific Power Company, d/b/a NV Energy, to take an easement across its property for a natural gas pipeline. NV Energy sought immediate occupancy of the property, while Mass Land argued that such a taking by a private entity violated the Nevada Constitution and requested a jury determination on whether the taking was for a public use.The First Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Mass Land's motion to dismiss and granted NV Energy's motion for immediate occupancy. The court concluded that NV Energy, as a regulated public utility, was exercising delegated eminent domain powers and acting as the government, not as a private party. The court also found that the taking was for a natural gas pipeline, a statutorily recognized public use, and thus did not require a jury determination on public use before granting occupancy.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied Mass Land's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The court held that the Nevada Constitution's prohibition on transferring property taken by eminent domain to another private party did not apply to NV Energy's taking for a natural gas pipeline, as it was a public use. The court also determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury determination on whether the taking was actually for a public use. The court concluded that NV Energy's actions were lawful and consistent with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing eminent domain in Nevada. View "MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law
ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.
Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law
Plus Properties Trust v. Molinuevo Then
In 2021, the appellee purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure auction and later filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to quiet title against Jose Strickland. The complaint was amended to include Plus Properties, LLC, and later Plus Properties Trust as defendants. The docket indicated service was directed to Plus Properties Trust, but no affidavit of service was filed. Plus Properties Trust, represented by Kellee Baker, moved to dismiss some claims but did not allege insufficient service of process. The trial court granted partial dismissal, requiring a responsive pleading by October 4, 2022, which Plus Properties Trust failed to file.The trial court entered default against Plus Properties Trust and scheduled an ex parte proof hearing. Despite being served with notice of the hearing and subsequent motions, Plus Properties Trust did not respond. The court granted default judgment, quieting title in the appellee's name and issuing a preliminary injunction against Plus Properties Trust. Plus Properties Trust, with new counsel, filed two Rule 60(b) motions to vacate the default judgment, arguing lack of notice and ineffective service of process. Both motions were denied by the trial court.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Plus Properties Trust failed to preserve its claim of ineffective service of process by not raising it in the trial court. The court also found that Plus Properties Trust had sufficient notice of the default proceedings and the ex parte proof hearing, as evidenced by the certificates of service. The court concluded that the default judgment did not violate due process and affirmed the trial court's orders denying the Rule 60(b) motions. View "Plus Properties Trust v. Molinuevo Then" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections
The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law
Daoang v. Perry
Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law
Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals
The plaintiff, a property owner, was ordered by the Pine Orchard Association's zoning enforcement officer to cease and desist from renting his property on a short-term basis. The plaintiff appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Pine Orchard Association, which upheld the cease and desist order. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the board's decision, concluding that the plaintiff's use of the property for short-term rentals was permitted under the 1994 zoning regulations.The defendants, including the zoning board and intervening neighbors, appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the 1994 regulations permitted short-term rentals but remanding the case for a factual determination on whether the plaintiff had established a lawful, nonconforming use of the property.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that the language of the 1994 zoning regulations, which permitted the use of a property as a single-family dwelling, was ambiguous. The court concluded that the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling constituted a permissible use under those regulations. The court reasoned that the terms "home" and "residence" could reasonably be interpreted to mean a structure used as a house or dwelling, without any temporal occupation requirement. The court also noted that the regulations did not differentiate between long-term and short-term rentals, and thus, short-term rentals were permitted. View "Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law
Sikes v. Kirkland
Dwight D. Sikes appealed a judgment from the Choctaw Circuit Court, where Michelle M. Kirkland, representing Kenneth McIlwain's estate, had obtained a judgment against him. The case involved land originally owned by Dwight's father, James Sikes, which was deeded to Dwight's brother, Archie, and subsequently to Kenneth and Patricia McIlwain. The McIlwains sued Dwight, alleging his livestock trespassed and caused damage. Dwight counterclaimed, alleging the McIlwains improperly removed James's personal property, and cross-claimed, arguing James was not competent when deeding the land to Archie.The Choctaw Circuit Court ordered Dwight to remove his livestock but did not rule on his counterclaim. After the McIlwains passed away, Kirkland was substituted as the plaintiff. The court later ruled against Dwight on his cross-claim, finding James competent when deeding the land, but did not address the counterclaim. Dwight appealed this judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and noted that the lower court had not disposed of all claims, specifically Dwight's counterclaim regarding the removal of personal property. The court emphasized that a final judgment must conclusively determine all issues and rights of the parties. Since the trial court's judgment did not address the counterclaim or fully resolve the initial trespass and nuisance claims, it was not a final judgment.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Dwight's appeal due to the lack of a final judgment, as the unresolved claims deprived the court of jurisdiction. View "Sikes v. Kirkland" on Justia Law