Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the sale of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt. Yvonne Engelhart, the personal representative of the estate, sent a notice letter to interested parties, including the Ebels and Tom Gross, outlining the bidding process for the property. The Ebels submitted bids that complied with the notice letter's requirements, while Gross submitted bids that did not meet the specified conditions. Despite this, the estate's attorney initially declared the Ebels the winning bidders but later accepted Gross's bids after he questioned the process.The District Court of McIntosh County initially dismissed the Ebels' claims, concluding the contracts were invalid due to the statute of frauds. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating the statute of frauds was not properly raised. On remand, the district court declared the contracts between the Ebels and the estate valid and ordered specific performance. The court dismissed the Ebels' tortious interference claims against Gross, finding his actions justified.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that valid contracts were formed between the Ebels and the estate when the estate's attorney declared them the winning bidders. The court found that Gross's bids did not comply with the notice letter's requirements and that he had actual notice of the Ebels' winning bids, disqualifying him as a good-faith purchaser. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Ebels' tortious interference claims, concluding Gross's actions were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law

The case involves the valuation of a bitcoin mining property owned by Michael Oken, who had invested millions in infrastructure upgrades to support bitcoin mining. The property, located in College Park, Georgia, included a Power Sales Agreement with the city for low-cost electricity, which was crucial for the mining operation. After Oken's death in 2019, his businesses filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the property was sold along with an adjacent data center for $4.9 million. The deeds indicated a $2.45 million value for each property based on transfer taxes. Two creditors, Thomas Switch Holding and Bay Point Capital, sought to recover on liens against the property.The bankruptcy court held a bench trial to determine the property's value. Switch's appraiser, Michael Easterwood, valued the property at $830,000 using the cost approach, considering the infrastructure improvements. Bay Point's appraiser, Jeff Miller, valued it at $48,000 using the sales comparison approach, comparing it to other light industrial properties. The bankruptcy court adopted Easterwood's valuation, finding the property to be a special purpose property with bitcoin mining as its highest and best use. The court valued the property at over $700,000, awarding the full escrow amount to Switch.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court upheld the bankruptcy court's findings, agreeing that the property was a special purpose property with bitcoin mining as its highest and best use. The court also affirmed the use of the cost approach for valuation and found no clear error in considering the tax stamp value as supporting evidence. The judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "In re: VIRTUAL CITADEL, INC." on Justia Law

Renee Vasko challenged her property tax assessment on two grounds: the revocation of her homestead classification and the assessed value of her property. In 2018, McLeod County sent a homestead application to Vasko’s property address, which was returned as undeliverable. The County learned from the City of Lester Prairie that there had been no measurable water use at the property since 2016. Consequently, the County revoked the homestead classification effective January 2, 2019, and assessed the property at $110,100.Vasko filed a petition in the Minnesota Tax Court, disputing the revocation of the homestead classification and the property’s assessed value. She presented evidence, including mail addressed to the property, utility records, and testimony, to establish occupancy and use of the property. Vasko also compared her property’s valuation to five other properties in the City to argue that her home was overvalued. The Tax Court found that Vasko did not occupy and use the property as a homestead in 2019 and upheld the County’s valuation, concluding that Vasko did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of the County’s assessment.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The Court held that the Tax Court correctly placed the burden of proof on Vasko to show that the revocation of the homestead classification was unlawful and that the assessed value was incorrect. The Supreme Court found no clear error in the Tax Court’s findings that Vasko did not occupy and use the property as a homestead and that she failed to provide substantial evidence to challenge the County’s valuation. The decision of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Vasko vs. County of McLeod" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law

Rodney and Tonda Ross, along with Laura Field, sued Norman Terry Nelson and his corporate entities for trespass and nuisance. Nelson operated an industrial hog-farming operation and installed pipelines beneath a public road to transport treated pig waste to his farmland, which caused odors and fly infestations affecting the Rosses' property. The plaintiffs claimed Nelson did not have permission to install the pipelines and that the resulting conditions constituted a nuisance.The Phillips District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the trespass claim, ruling that Nelson needed the landowners' permission to install the pipelines, which he did not have. The court also denied Nelson's motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim, concluding that Nelson was not entitled to the statutory presumption of "good agricultural practice" under Kansas' right-to-farm statutes because his actions violated state law by trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs for both trespass and nuisance, including punitive damages.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that Nelson's installation of the pipelines exceeded the scope of the public highway easement because it was for his private and exclusive use, thus constituting a trespass. The court also agreed that Nelson was not entitled to the right-to-farm statutory protections because his agricultural activities were not "undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws," given the trespass.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that Nelson's use of the public highway easement for private pipelines was outside the easement's scope and constituted a trespass. The court also held that Nelson's agricultural activities did not conform to state law, disqualifying him from the statutory presumption of good agricultural practices and the right-to-farm protections. View "Ross v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The case involves the prosecution of Kay E. Anderson for multiple misdemeanor violations of a city property maintenance code at a residential apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska, known as Yale Park. Anderson was responsible for managing and maintaining the complex, which consisted of 13 buildings with approximately 100 residential units. In September 2018, city inspectors, acting on numerous tenant complaints about unsafe living conditions, obtained an inspection warrant and discovered approximately 2,500 code violations. Anderson was subsequently charged with 99 counts of violating the Omaha Municipal Code (OMC).In the county court, Anderson filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the inspection, arguing that the warrant was invalid because inspectors had not complied with the statutory requirement to seek consent before obtaining the warrant. The county court initially granted the motion, but the district court reversed, finding Anderson lacked standing to challenge the warrant for units leased to others. Anderson's renewed motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on four counts after a bench trial.On appeal, Anderson argued that the evidence should have been suppressed due to the invalid warrant and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the failure to seek consent before obtaining the inspection warrant did not render the warrant constitutionally invalid. The court held that the omitted information about not seeking consent was not material to the probable cause finding. Additionally, the court found that the violation of the statutory requirement did not affect Anderson's substantial rights and did not require suppression of the evidence.The court also found sufficient evidence to support Anderson's convictions. The violation notices were properly served, Anderson was responsible for maintenance, and he knowingly failed to comply with the correction orders for at least 90 days. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Anderson's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Sandra K. Nieveen owned property in Lincoln, Nebraska, which was free of encumbrances. After failing to pay property taxes, TAX 106 purchased a tax certificate for the delinquent taxes. TAX 106 later transferred its interest to Vintage Management, LLC, which obtained a tax deed for the property. Nieveen alleged that the property was worth significantly more than the tax debt and claimed that the issuance of the tax deed violated her constitutional rights.The District Court for Lancaster County dismissed Nieveen’s constitutional claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment in favor of the county on her remaining claim. The court found that Nieveen was not entitled to an extended redemption period due to a mental disorder. Nieveen appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a plausible takings claim when a property was sold for more than the tax debt. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that Nieveen had alleged a plausible takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC, as the issuance of the tax deed deprived her of property value exceeding her tax debt. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against other defendants and declined to reconsider the Excessive Fines Clause claim, as just compensation under the Takings Clause would provide complete relief.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC. View "Nieveen v. TAX 106" on Justia Law

Kevin L. Fair and his wife owned property in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, but failed to pay property taxes. The county treasurer sold a tax certificate to Continental Resources for the unpaid taxes. After three years, Continental notified the Fairs that they needed to redeem the property by paying the total amount due, which they did not. Consequently, Continental requested and received a tax deed from the county treasurer, transferring title to the property free of any encumbrances.The District Court for Scotts Bluff County granted summary judgment in favor of Continental Resources, rejecting Fair’s constitutional claims, including those under the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Fair argued that the issuance of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The district court found no merit in Fair’s claims and ruled in favor of Continental. Fair appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Continental on Fair’s takings claim. The court found that Fair had a protected property interest in the value of his property exceeding the tax debt and that Continental’s acquisition of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The court determined that Continental, as a state actor, could be liable for the taking.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects but reversed the summary judgment in favor of Continental on the takings claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Continental Resources v. Fair" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of real property following the death of Billy Skidmore. Billy died intestate in July 2015, leaving behind two sons, John and Billy Jr. The Marshall Probate Court awarded John letters of administration over Billy's estate. Billy Jr. later filed a claim asserting his entitlement to an equal share of the estate. John filed an inventory listing the estate's assets, including a one-third interest in a commercial building. Billy Jr. moved to compel a final settlement, leading to a hearing where John admitted to commingling estate rental proceeds with his personal funds. The probate court subsequently appointed Billy Jr. as the successor administrator and authorized him to list the estate's real property for sale.John discovered a 2004 deed conveying the property to him and Billy as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, which he recorded in July 2023. Despite this, the probate court declared the property to be owned one-third each by John, Jenna (John's ex-wife), and Billy's estate. John removed the administration of the estate to the Marshall Circuit Court and filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the probate court's judgment. The circuit court denied his motion, leading John to appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Marshall Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over the title to the real property. The court emphasized that probate courts do not have the authority to determine equitable issues or administer equitable remedies, such as setting aside a recorded deed. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Skidmore v. Skidmore" on Justia Law