Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A farm in Talbot County, Maryland, was the subject of nuisance complaints from neighboring residents due to offensive odors and swarms of insects. The farm, owned by Arthur L. Foster, Sr., and later managed by his son, Arthur L. Foster, Jr., began receiving Class A biosolids and soil conditioners from Denali Water Solutions in January 2021. These materials were stored and applied to the farm, causing strong, foul odors and a midge infestation, which led to numerous complaints from nearby residents.The Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board (the Board) conducted an investigation and held hearings to determine whether the practices at the farm were generally accepted agricultural practices under Talbot County's Right to Farm (RTF) law, Chapter 128 of the Talbot County Code (TCC). The Board found that the application and stockpiling of the materials were generally accepted agricultural practices and issued recommendations to mitigate the odor.The Circuit Court for Talbot County reversed the Board's decision, finding that the agricultural operations on the farm had not been in existence for one year or more when the complaints were filed, as required by Maryland's RTF law, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-403. The court remanded the case to the Board with instructions to find that the operations did not benefit from protection under the RTF laws.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court's decision, holding that the expanded use of soil conditioners and biosolids at the farm was a protected activity under both the state and county RTF laws. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision that the practices were generally accepted agricultural practices and did not violate public health, safety, and welfare.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the Board failed to make necessary findings regarding the public health, safety, and welfare impacts of the practices and did not adequately consider whether the stockpiling of materials for use at other locations was a generally accepted agricultural practice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "In re: Foster Farm" on Justia Law

Cable Matters Inc. sought a use variance from the zoning board of appeals of Northborough to build a 20,000 square foot warehouse in an industrial zoning district. The property is also within the town's groundwater protection overlay district, which does not permit warehouses. The zoning board granted the variance, and the planning board later issued a special permit with conditions, including restrictions on storage, lighting, landscaping, delivery hours, and driveway use.The plaintiffs, who live across the street from the proposed warehouse, appealed the zoning board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing they were aggrieved by the potential noise, light, vibration, odors, and loss of open space. The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for Cable Matters, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they failed to show they were aggrieved by the zoning board's decision. The judge found that the plaintiffs' claims were speculative and not supported by credible evidence.The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court, which vacated the judgment, instructing the judge to consider potential future uses of the warehouse. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court judge correctly assessed the plaintiffs' standing based on Cable Matters's proposed use. The court held that potential future uses unsupported by the record should not be considered in determining standing. The court affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. View "Stone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Northborough" on Justia Law

A plaintiff sought to build a single-family home on his residential parcel in El Dorado County, California. The county required him to pay a $23,420 traffic impact mitigation (TIM) fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. The plaintiff paid the fee under protest and subsequently filed a lawsuit challenging the fee as an unlawful taking of property under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.The Superior Court of El Dorado County dismissed the plaintiff’s federal takings claim without leave to amend and denied his petition for a writ of mandate. The plaintiff appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on established California law that the Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to legislatively imposed impact fees. The California Supreme Court denied review.The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and administrative land-use exactions. The Supreme Court vacated the California Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.On remand, the California Court of Appeal applied the Nollan/Dolan test to the TIM fee. The court concluded that the fee had an essential nexus to the county’s legitimate interest in reducing traffic congestion from new development. Additionally, the court found that the fee was roughly proportional to the traffic impacts attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development. The court held that the TIM fee did not constitute an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment and affirmed the judgment. View "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas Transmission operates a natural gas pipeline that crosses a parcel of land owned by RDFS, LLC. Columbia holds an easement to operate and maintain the pipeline on this parcel. When a coal company planned to mine beneath the parcel, Columbia sought access to mitigate potential harm to its pipeline. RDFS denied access, leading Columbia to file a lawsuit. The district court granted a preliminary injunction allowing Columbia to proceed with its mitigation efforts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia first considered Columbia's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court applied the four factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., concluding that Columbia was likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without access, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored Columbia. The court also granted Columbia's motion for partial summary judgment to condemn a temporary easement under the Natural Gas Act, finding that Columbia met all necessary requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that Columbia's easement provided broad authority to access the entire parcel for maintenance, including mitigation work. The court rejected RDFS's argument that the easement was vague and limited by Columbia's prior use. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that Columbia's right to access the parcel for mitigation was consistent with maintaining the pipeline and did not unreasonably burden RDFS's property. The ruling of the district court was affirmed. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. RDFS, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which added "source of income" to the list of prohibited considerations in housing rental or sale. The appellant, a housing voucher recipient, applied to rent an apartment in the appellee's complex. The appellee applied a minimum-income requirement, combining all sources of income to determine if the total exceeded 2.5 times the full gross rent. The appellant's combined income, including her voucher, did not meet this threshold, leading to the rejection of her application. The appellant sued, claiming the minimum-income requirement constituted source-of-income discrimination under § 20-705.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment to the appellee, finding that the appellee's policy did not discriminate based on the source of income but rather on the amount of income. The court ruled that the appellee neutrally applied its income qualification criteria and rejected the appellant based on the amount of her income, not its source.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the appellee's counting of voucher income in the same manner as other income sources did not entitle it to summary judgment. The court found that this approach did not resolve the appellant's disparate impact claim, which asserts that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing the need to address the disparate impact analysis. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

Charley Johnson, trustee of the Charley E. Johnson Revocable Living Trust, purchased approximately 21 acres of land bordering the Tonto National Forest in Gila County, Arizona. Johnson later discovered that many of the improvements on the land, including a house, barn, well, and corrals, were actually on National Forest Service (NFS) land due to an erroneous survey. To resolve this, Johnson filed an application under the Small Tracts Act (STA) to purchase the encroached land. The U.S. Forest Service eventually sold Johnson a 0.59-acre parcel that included the house, barn, and well but excluded the corrals, claiming they were authorized range improvements owned by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals was not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was committed to agency discretion by law. The court also found that the Forest Service's reliance on an appraisal valuing the 0.59-acre parcel at $27,000 was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the APA's narrow exception for actions committed to agency discretion did not apply to discretionary conveyances under the STA. The court found that the STA and its regulations provide meaningful standards for evaluating the Forest Service's decisions, making them subject to judicial review. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals from the STA sale was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law

John Schutt, as an agent for the J.E. Schutt & M.A. Schutt Family Trust, leased a residential property to Sherri Foster. Foster agreed to pay $1,900 per month in rent, with a late charge of $20 per day for any rent paid after the due date. Foster missed rent payments for July, August, and September 2020. Schutt filed a forcible detainer petition seeking unpaid rent and late fees. Foster countersued for money owed for construction services she performed for Schutt. The district court found Foster owed Schutt $5,700 in unpaid rent and awarded Schutt $21,240 in late fees, calculated at $20 per day for 1,062 days. After offsetting judgments, the court ruled Schutt owed Foster $544.98.Foster appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing for the first time that the late-fee provision was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reached the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim, despite it not being raised in the district court, and concluded that the late fees were unconscionable under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The panel reversed the district court's award of late fees exceeding $2,460, the amount due for the 123 days between Foster's first missed payment and the date she vacated the property.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that appellants must brief exceptions to the preservation rule in their opening brief, as required by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5). Foster failed to comply with this requirement, as she first invoked exceptions to the preservation rule in her reply brief. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on these exceptions to reach the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated its opinion, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Schutt v. Foster " on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint against Astra Genstar Partnership, LLP, seeking a declaratory judgment related to a property purchased at a foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo requested a declaration that all previously held interests in the property, including Astra's interest, were terminated. Astra filed an answer opposing Wells Fargo's request. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that any interest Astra had in the property was terminated by the foreclosure sale and the redemption period's expiration. The court administrator failed to notify the parties of the judgment immediately.The district court entered judgment on December 28, 2023, but the parties did not receive notice until March 15, 2024, after the appeal deadline had passed. Astra appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals on May 13, 2024. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, stating it was late under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104 and that Rule 14.01(c)(2) of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts did not apply to appellate courts.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Rule 14.01(c)(2) does not authorize appellate courts to reinstate a late appeal. However, the court determined that the interests of justice warranted reinstating the appeal because the court administrator failed to transmit notice of the judgment as required by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 77.04. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and reinstated Astra's appeal, emphasizing the need to avoid setting a trap for the unwary and to preserve the right to appeal. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. True Gravity Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

Mary Bennett owns a farm on the U.S.–Mexico border. In 2008, the United States built a segment of the border wall on a portion of her property where it had an easement. In 2020, the government initiated a condemnation action to take that portion of the land and surrounding areas to further build the wall and make related improvements. Bennett argued that the government exceeded the scope of its easement when it built the wall, claiming ownership of the wall and seeking just compensation for its value. She attempted to present expert testimony on the wall's value, which the district court excluded.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas excluded Bennett's expert testimony, concluding that she was not entitled to just compensation for the wall's value. The court interpreted the common-law rule from Searl v. School-Dist. No. 2, which states that fixtures built by a trespasser become part of the estate, to include an exception for trespassers with an objective, good-faith belief in their right to build. The court found that the government had such a belief and thus precluded Bennett from recovering the wall's value. Bennett appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government acted under its power of eminent domain, which cannot be limited by state trespass laws. The court affirmed that Bennett is entitled to compensation for the land taken but not for the value of the wall, as the government built it at its own expense for a public purpose. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Rodney Alexander and Steve Hobart entered into an agreement granting Alexander a right of first refusal to purchase Steve’s cattle and to have Steve’s national forest livestock grazing permit transferred to him. An addendum later clarified that the agreement extended to Steve’s son, Nick. Years later, Nick sold the cattle and transferred the permit to a third party without notifying Alexander, who then sued for breach of contract and fraud. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the contract was void due to impossibility of performance or because it was for an unlawful object, and that the right of first refusal was an unreasonable restraint on property alienation.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted the motion, ruling the contract void for impossibility of performance. Alexander appealed, asserting the court erred in its conclusion. Nick, through notice of review, sought to challenge the court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It found that the contract did not require the Hobarts to transfer the permit directly, but rather that the purchase was contingent on the USFS transferring the permit to Alexander. The court concluded that the contract was not void for impossibility of performance. Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, considering the purpose, price, and duration of the agreement, and the mutual consent of the parties.The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Alexander v. Estate Of Hobart" on Justia Law