Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, owner of an apartment building in Manhattan, filed an application with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) in 2019 to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements. The petitioner claimed that the registrations erroneously stated that unit 1B was temporarily exempt from rent stabilization due to owner/employee occupancy, while it should have been permanently exempt due to a high rent vacancy in 2002. The petitioner sought to withdraw the erroneous registrations and submit new ones removing unit 1B from the total of rent-stabilized units.The Rent Administrator denied the application, stating that registration amendments could only correct ministerial issues, not substantive changes like recalculating rental history or removing an apartment from rent-stabilized status. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR upheld this decision, agreeing that the requested amendments went beyond the scope of an amendment application proceeding. The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul DHCR's determination.The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, reasoning that DHCR rationally determined the requested correction was substantive rather than ministerial. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, noting that DHCR's interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) as precluding the requested amendments was rational and reasonable.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and held that DHCR's interpretation of the RSC, which limits amendments to ministerial issues, was entitled to substantial deference. The court found that DHCR's decision to deny the petitioner's application was rational, as it aimed to protect tenants from fraud, preserve agency resources, and ensure rent stabilization disputes were litigated in the proper forum. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

Dorothy Golobe died in 1992, leaving behind a three-story building in New York. Her nephew, John Golobe, became the estate's administrator, believing his father, Zangwill Golobe, was Dorothy's only surviving heir. An attorney testified that Dorothy's other brother, Yale Golobe, had predeceased her. Surrogate's Court found Zangwill to be the sole distributee, and he renounced his interest in favor of John, who maintained the property. However, Yale was actually alive at Dorothy's death and should have inherited half of the estate. John discovered this error in 2018 and claimed sole ownership through adverse possession. Yale's successor, the Emil Kraus Revocable Trust, counterclaimed for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.Supreme Court granted summary judgment to John, declaring him the sole owner and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that John had established adverse possession and dismissing the fraud and fiduciary duty claims due to lack of evidence of scienter or reliance and no extraordinary duty to confirm a distributee's death.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that John had acquired sole ownership through adverse possession, as his possession was hostile, under a claim of right, and open and notorious. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Trust's counterclaims, finding no triable issue of fact regarding fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. The court emphasized that a cotenant may obtain full ownership even when neither party is aware of the co-tenancy, provided the statutory period and other adverse possession requirements are met. View "Golobe v Mielnicki" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants of a building in Queens, alleged that the defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate rents unlawfully. The building participated in the Real Property Tax Law § 421-a program, which required compliance with rent stabilization laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the previous owner registered both a preferential rent and a higher legal regulated rent, allowing for illegal rent increases. This scheme allegedly continued for years, affecting many tenants. Plaintiffs also accused the defendant of concealing this conduct by registering a legal regulated rent that matched the preferential rent.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient indicia of fraud to invoke the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because they could not have reasonably relied on the inflated rent figures, which were disclosed in the registration statements and leases.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and clarified that to invoke the fraud exception, a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate each element of common-law fraud, including reliance. Instead, the complaint must allege sufficient indicia of fraud. The Court modified the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case for further proceedings to determine if the plaintiffs' complaint met the established standard for alleging a fraudulent scheme. The Court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff's overcharge claim based on a rent concession, as the defendant's evidence refuted the allegations. View "Burrows v. 75-25 153rd St., LLC" on Justia Law

Nicole Simone, a resident in a multi-tenant building, fell and was injured on January 16, 2018, after slipping on ice on a walkway in a common area. She filed a premises liability action against Mohammed Zakiul Alam on December 2, 2019, alleging that he owned, possessed, maintained, and controlled the premises, and was responsible for the common areas. Simone claimed that the ice accumulation was due to damaged or misrouted rain gutters and spouts, and sought damages exceeding $50,000.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas dismissed Simone’s complaint on October 7, 2022, for failure to join an indispensable party, specifically Alam’s brother, Mohammed Zafiul Alam, who was a co-owner of the property. The trial court held that all co-owners must be joined in a premises liability action. Simone’s motion to vacate and reconsider was denied, and she appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on precedent that all tenants in common must be joined in such actions.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that a tenant in common who did not exercise possession or control over the property is not an indispensable party in a premises liability action. The court found that liability in such cases is based on possession and control, not mere ownership. Since Alam alone managed and controlled the property, his brother was not an indispensable party. The court reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simone v. Zakiul Alam" on Justia Law

In 2021, Contango Resources, LLC purchased oil and gas production and processing facilities in Fremont and Sweetwater Counties, Wyoming. In 2022, the Fremont County Assessor assessed the taxable value of the property located in Fremont County. Contango appealed the assessment to the Fremont County Board of Equalization, arguing that the County Assessor and her expert consultant failed to properly use the purchase price of the property in their valuations and used improper trending and depreciation factors. The County Board upheld the valuation.The State Board of Equalization and the district court both affirmed the County Board's decision. Contango then appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The main issues on appeal were whether the County Board’s decision to uphold the County Assessor’s rejection of the property’s purchase price as a starting point for valuation was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law, and whether the County Board’s decision to uphold the County Assessor’s application of trending and depreciation factors in the valuation was in accordance with law.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the County Assessor was justified in rejecting the purchase price as a starting point for valuation due to the lack of detailed information and the complexity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA). The Court also found that the Assessor’s use of trending and depreciation factors outside those recommended by the Department of Revenue was permissible under the Department’s rules, as long as the sources were credible. The Court concluded that the County Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. View "Contango Resources, LLC v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

Chris Shamro sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Delaware County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the May 6, 2025 primary-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment for a property in Brown Township owned by Henmick Brewery, L.L.C. The board of elections decertified the referendum from the ballot, finding that the petition did not contain the correct name of the zoning amendment, had a misleading summary, and was accompanied by a misleading map.The board of elections held a protest hearing and voted to sustain the protest and decertify the referendum. Shamro filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the board of elections abused its discretion. The board of elections and Henmick argued that the petition failed to comply with statutory requirements, including providing an accurate summary of the zoning amendment and modifications approved by the board of trustees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions. The court concluded that the referendum petition’s summary was misleading because it did not include approved modifications to the zoning amendment. Therefore, the court denied the writ and Shamro’s request for attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Shamro v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Iron Bar Holdings, LLC, a private landowner in Wyoming, owns a checkerboarded ranch interspersed with federal and state public lands. The only way to access these public lands, other than by aircraft, is by corner-crossing, which involves stepping from one public parcel to another at their adjoining corners without touching the private land in between. In 2020 and 2021, a group of hunters from Missouri corner-crossed to hunt elk on the public lands within Iron Bar's ranch. Iron Bar's property manager confronted the hunters, and law enforcement was contacted, but no citations were issued. In 2021, the hunters were prosecuted for criminal trespass but were acquitted. Iron Bar then filed a civil lawsuit for trespassing, seeking $9 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment in favor of the hunters, holding that corner-crossing without physically contacting private land and without causing damage does not constitute unlawful trespass. Iron Bar Holdings appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while Wyoming law recognizes a property owner's right to exclude others from their airspace, federal law, specifically the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) of 1885, overrides state law in this context. The UIA prohibits any inclosure of public lands that obstructs free passage or transit over them. The court found that Iron Bar's actions effectively enclosed public lands and prevented lawful access, which is prohibited by the UIA. The court affirmed the district court's decision, allowing the hunters to corner-cross as long as they did not physically touch Iron Bar's land. View "Iron Bar Holdings v. Cape" on Justia Law

Shelby Roberts rented an apartment from Ansley at Roberts Lake Apartments. After a dispute over the lease termination, Ansley retained her $500 security deposit and sent her an invoice for $791.14 for additional damages. Roberts believed these charges were fabricated and refused to pay. Ansley referred the debt to Carter-Young, a collection agency, which reported the debt to credit reporting agencies. Roberts disputed the debt, but Carter-Young only confirmed the debt with Ansley without further investigation. Roberts sued Carter-Young for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed Roberts' claim, stating that her dispute involved legal, not factual, matters, and thus did not require Carter-Young to investigate under the FCRA. The court held that the FCRA did not mandate investigations into legal disputes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to state a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the information in their credit report is inaccurate or incomplete and that this inaccuracy is objectively and readily verifiable by the furnisher. The court found that both legal and factual disputes could form the basis of a claim if they meet this standard. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Roberts' allegations met the new standard of being objectively and readily verifiable. View "Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc." on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law