Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish ownership of a disputed parcel of property by adverse possession but reversed the trial court's determination that Defendant had established its counterclaim for slander of title, holding that the trial court erred in part.Defendant held record title to the disputed parcel at issue, which abutted Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought this quiet title action alleging that her predecessors in title had acquired fee ownership of the parcel by adverse possession. Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging slander of title. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant as to all claims and counterclaims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to establish adverse possession of the parcel; but (2) erred in determining that Defendant established its counterclaim for slander of title. View "Dowling v. Heirs of Bond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the town of Hamden in this tax dispute, holding that the appellate court correctly determined that the word "submit" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) unambiguously requires that an assessor receive income and expense forms by June 1.Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) requires the owners of certain rental property to "submit" income and expense information to their municipal tax assessor "not later than the first day of June." Plaintiff in this case mailed the relevant information on May 31, 2016, but the assessor did not receive the forms until June 2, 2016. The assessor imposed a ten percent penalty on Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the penalty was improper because its timely mailing was sufficient under the statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word "submit" requires receipt of the income and expense forms no later than June 1; and (2) the ten percent penalty imposed on Plaintiff pursuant to section 12-63(d) was valid. View "Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the summary judgment ruling of the district court and resulting final judgment granting Plaintiff judgment that Plaintiff was the sole owner of a formerly co-owned family cabin property and denying Defendant's constructive fraud counterclaim, holding that that the district court erred in part.At issue was cabin property located on land owned by the United States Forest Service in Granite County, Montana. Plaintiff brought this action seeking declaratory judgment that he was the sole owner of the property and asserting a claim for quiet title. Defendant asserted a counterclaim alleging constructive fraud. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on his asserted declaratory judgment and quiet title claims; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on Defendant's constructive fraud counterclaim. View "Drescher v. Malee" on Justia Law

In 2004, Foster, a real estate investor, purchased Florida property, with a $1.1 million loan secured by a PNC mortgage. Foster and PNC had multiple disputes. PNC acquired force‐placed insurance. While the parties disputed that issue, Foster only made payments in the amount originally specified in a 2010 modification although the payments had increased as a result of the force‐placed insurance policies. In 2012, PNC began returning Foster’s payments as incomplete payments. As of May 2019, PNC claimed Foster owed more than $1.75 million. PNC reported delinquent payments to credit agencies; Foster’s credit score dropped.Foster’s lawsuit included a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for PNC’s failure to investigate the two credit reporting disputes; a breach of contract claim regarding the force‐placed insurance policies; a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim for the insurance; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim for the alleged mishandling of the escrow account. PNC counterclaimed to seek judgment on the loan. After determining that Foster’s affidavit was conclusory and speculative as to proof of insurance and his loan payments and that his evidence of damages was too general and conclusory, the district court granted PNC judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but found that the FCRA claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. Foster did not establish an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to PNC’s conduct. View "Foster v. PNC Bank, National Association" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Wyoming State Board of Equalization (Board) affirming the tax assessment set forth by the Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) imposing severance and ad valorem property taxes on the waste mine gas (WMG) captured and used by Solvay Chemicals, Inc., holding that there was no error.Solvay used the WMG released from its trona mining operations to help fuel its soda ash processing plant during the years 2012 through 2015. The DOR imposed severance and ad valorem taxes on the WMG during those years. Solvay objected, arguing that the WMG was not taxable under the severance or ad valorem tax statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Solvay failed to show the DOA and DOR improperly valued the WMG for production years 2012-2015. View "Solvay Chemicals, Inc. v. Wyoming Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained this case to resolve a question of first impression on whether Production Tax Credits (PTCs) used to finance the building of a wind farm were "property" which could be used to determine the fair cash value of the wind farm for ad valorem taxation purposes. To this, the Court held PTCs were intangible personal property, and were not subject to ad valorem taxation pursuant to the Okla. Const. art. 10, §6 A. Because the trial court's findings regarding valuation were not otherwise against the weight of the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Kingfisher Wind, LLC v. Wehmuller" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the Town of Bartlett’s 2018 tax assessment of a single-family home located on 0.88 acres of land owned by petitioner Eleonora Porobic. In 2017, the property was assessed at $206,000. In 2018, following the construction of an addition to the house and the clearing of trees, which expanded a view of the mountains, as well as a “full update” of property values in the Town by its new assessing contractor, Avitar Associates of New England, Inc., the property was assessed at $408,400. After the Town denied Porobic’s abatement request, she appealed to the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA), objecting to the Town’s position that the value of the land had increased by $153,000 as a result of the expanded view of the mountains. Porobic submitted an appraisal of the property prepared by Nanci Stone-Hayes, a certified general appraiser, valuing the property at a fair market value of $270,000 (Hayes Appraisal), and argued that she was entitled to an abatement based on that valuation. The Town, however, defended its assessment, arguing that the Hayes Appraisal understated the value of the expanded view. The BTLA found neither party’s valuation entirely persuasive, determining the Hayes Appraisal understated the property’s market value, and the Town’s assessment overstated it. Consequently, the BTLA concluded that Porobic had carried her burden to demonstrate that the property was assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value than the general level of assessment in the Town, and that, as such, she was paying more than her proportional share of taxes. The BTLA granted Porobic’s request for an abatement, and reduced the property’s 2018 assessed value to $345,400. Porobic appealed the new valuation, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the BTLA's decision and affirmed it. View "Appeal of Eleonora Porobic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ operated a mobilehome park owned by one of Plaintiff’s clients. The Department of Real Estate filed an accusation alleging Plaintiff violated various provisions of the Real Estate Law. The administrative law judge issued a proposed order revoking Plaintiffs’ licenses which the Department adopted. Plaintiffs’ filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate, contending they did not receive a fair hearing because the administrative law judge considered improper evidence, including expert testimony from several witnesses the Department did not designate as experts. Plaintiffs also contended the administrative law judge erred in ruling they violated statutes in the Business and Professions Code.   The trial court denied the petition and Plaintiffs’ appealed. The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiffs’ contend they did not receive a fair hearing because, while the Department “did not properly identify any expert witnesses” prior to the hearing and represented at the hearing that “no expert opinion testimony would be offered,” the testimony of all three witnesses went far beyond permissible lay witness opinion.” The court explained that Plaintiffs’ cite the wrong legal standard governing their contentions. As the trial court correctly observed, a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act “need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses,” unless expressly required by the Act. Further, the court held that even if the Department’s decision to revoke Nijjar’s and Miller’s licenses was partially motivated by its belief Plaintiffs had some responsibility for the fire, Plaintiffs would still not be entitled to reversal of the judgment. View "Miller v. Dept. of Real Estate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and judgment of the superior court affirming the decisions of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) denying the application of Champlin's Realty Associates to expand its marina on the Great Salt Pond in the Town of New Shoreham, holding that there was no error.The trial justice found there was sufficient evidence to support the CRMC's denial of Champlin's application to expand its marina and held that the CRMC had acted within its authority in denying the application. Champlin's and the CRMC later filed a motion seeking to incorporate and merge a joint memorandum of understanding (the MOU) purporting to serve as the CRMC's decision relative to this matter into a consent order of the Court. Certain entities (intervenors) and the attorney general contested the propriety of the purported settlement and the validity of the MOU. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied the request by Champlin's and the CRMC to incorporate and merge the MOU into a consent order of the Supreme Court, holding that the remand justice erred in determining that the CRMC and Champlin's had authority to meditate. View "Champlin's Realty Associates v. Coastal Resources Management Council" on Justia Law

Oakland County took title to the plaintiffs’ homes under the Michigan General Property Tax Act, which (after a redemption period) required the state court to enter a foreclosure judgment that vested “absolute title” to the property in the governmental entity upon payment of the amount of the tax delinquency or “its fair market value.” The entity could then sell it at a public auction. No matter what the sale price, the property’s former owner had no right to any of the proceeds.In February 2018, under the Act, Oakland County foreclosed on Hall’s home to collect a tax delinquency of $22,642; the County then conveyed the property to the City of Southfield for that price. Southfield conveyed the property for $1 to a for-profit entity, the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, which later sold it for $308,000. Other plaintiffs had similar experiences.The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The “Michigan statute is not only self-dealing: it is also an aberration from some 300 years of decisions.” The government may not decline to recognize long-established interests in property as a device to take them. The County took the property without just compensation. View "Hall v. Meisner" on Justia Law