Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Leonard Schleder and declaring him the owner of the mineral rights at issue in this case, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) correctly interpreted the warranty deed language to reserve to Schleder all his mineral interests in the property; (2) properly considered the chain of title in interpreting the language of the unambiguous warranty deed; and (3) did not err in determining that estoppel by deed did not apply to prevent Schleder from asserting title to the mineral interests. View "Dellit v. Schleder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals in this appeal involving a dispute between a homeowner and an insurance company over prejudgment interest, holding that Minnesota standard fire insurance policy, Minn. Stat. 65A/01, entitled Homeowner to prejudgment interest in an amount that may result in a total recovery that exceeded the policy limit.Homeowner sought coverage from Insurer after fires damaged his home. Insurer denied coverage, leading Homeowner to bring this lawsuit. A jury found for Homeowner. The district court award awarded Homeowner prejudgment interest in a limited amount, finding that Homeowner's total recovery for his personal property loss could not permissibly exceed the policy coverage limit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court to recalculate prejudgment interest, holding that, consistent with past precedent interpreting the standard fire policy, prejudgment interest can lawfully begin accruing before ascertainment of the loss when the insurer denies all liability. View "Else v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal and cross-appeal involved a residential lease agreement with an option to purchase executed by Tony Hiett, Sr., and his wife Kelly Hiett ("the tenants") and Beverlye Brady ("the landlord"). According to the tenants, they accepted the first option to purchase the property presented in the landlord's email and began making monthly holdover rental payments of $2,500. And, in April 2017, they informed the landlord that they had obtained financing and were ready to close on the property by April 30, 2017. The landlord, however, refused to convey title to the property because, she claimed, the tenants had never responded to her email; thus, according to the landlord, the option to purchase had expired. The tenants thereafter stopped paying rent under the lease agreement, but continued to occupy the property, and sued the landlord, seeking specific performance of the option to purchase. The landlord counterclaimed, asserting a claim for ejectment and a claim of breach of contract, based on unpaid rent and late fees owed under the lease agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of the tenants on their specific-performance claim and against the landlord on her ejectment claim. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of the landlord on her breach-of-contract claim based on the inadequacy of damages awarded, and the Court remanded the case with directions to the trial court to grant a new trial as to only that claim, unless the tenants consented to an additur. View "Hiett v. Brady" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order entered by the district court denying Skyline Consulting Group's motion to vacate and set aside bond substitution and reinstate construction lien, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Skyline had waived its right to challenge the substitute bond.In this dispute between two subcontractors, Mortensen Woodwork petitioned the district court to substitute Skyline's construction lien against certain property with the intent to pursue foreclosure. Skyline named SP Hotel Owner in the lien. Mortensen then secured a bond from a surety company for 150 percent of the amount Skyline claimed and filed a petition to substitute the bond for the lien. The district court did so. Skyline requested that the district court reinstate its lien because Mortensen was not authorized to substitute a bond. The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Skyline did not waive its right to challenge the substitute bond in a separate arbitration proceeding; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that Montana law authorized Mortensen, a subcontractor, to substitute a bond for Skyline's construction lien. View "Skyline Consulting Group v. Mortensen Woodwork, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, decree of foreclosure, and order of sale by the district court, and the orders and actions contained within these documents, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Thermal Design, Inc. filed a complaint to foreclose its construction lien against Mark and Pam Duffy and Central Copters, Inc. The complaint also asserted claims against TNT Building Systems. A jury found that TNT, acting as an agent of Central Copters, entered into a contract with Thermal Design for the insulation system, and both TNT and Central Copters were jointly and severally liable for breaching the contract with Thermal Design. As to a crossclaim between TNT and Central Copters, the jury found that both parties breached their agreement but that only TNT incurred damages. The district court entered a final order restating that, as a matter of law, Thermal Design had a valid construction lien attaching to both the Duffys’ real property and Central Copters’ building that should be foreclosed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in the proceedings below. View "Thermal Design, Inc. v. Thorson" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae purchases mortgage loans from commercial banks, which enables the lenders to make additional loans, finances those purchases by packaging the mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities, then sells those securities to investors. In 1968, Fannie Mae became a publicly-traded, stockholder-owned corporation. Freddie Mac also buys mortgage loans and securities and sells those mortgage-backed securities to investors. In 1989, Freddie Mac became a publicly traded, stockholder-owned corporation. In the 2008 recession, both entities suffered precipitous drops in the value of their mortgage portfolios. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) was established and authorized to undertake extraordinary measures to resuscitate the companies, 12 U.S.C. 4511(b)(1).Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders sought to nullify an agreement (the “third amendment”) between FHFA and the Treasury Department that “secured unlimited funding" from Treasury in exchange for "almost all of Fannie’s and Freddie’s future profits.” The third amendment was authorized by FHFA’s Acting Director, who was serving in violation of the Appointments Clause. Shareholders also claimed that they are entitled to retrospective relief because the Supreme Court held in 2021 that FHFA’s enabling statute contained an unconstitutional removal restriction. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Acting Director was not serving in violation of the Constitution when he signed the third amendment. The court remanded for determination of whether the unconstitutional removal restriction inflicted harm on shareholders. View "Rop v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals applying the statutory definition of "public waters" in Minn. Stat. 103G.005, subd. 15, to determine whether the upper reach of Limbo Creek was a public water, holding that the court of appeals did not err.At issue was the upper reach of Limbo Creek in Renville County and whether it was a public water for purposes of environmental review under Minn. Stat. 116D.01-.11. Specifically in question was whether the classification of waters as "public water" was based on the statutory definition of "public waters" in Minn. Stat. 103G.005, subd. 15, or the "public waters inventory" maintained by the Department of Natural Resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reliance on the statutory definition of "public waters" to determine in this case whether the upper reach of Limbo Creek was a public water, holding that court of appeals did not err. View "In re Petition of MCEA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Ocean Bay Mart, Inc. (“Ocean Bay”), owned a 7.71- acre parcel of real property in the City of Rehoboth Beach (“the City”). In June 2015, Ocean Bay submitted a Site Plan to the City proposing to develop the property into 63 residential condominium units. Under the plan, the 7.71 acres would remain a single, undivided parcel. The development would be known as “Beach Walk.” The submission of the Site Plan set into motion a chain of events over whether Beach Walk could be approved as a single, undivided parcel or whether the project had to be subdivided into individual lots corresponding to the residential units. The events included a decision by the City’s Building Inspector that the project could not be approved as a single, undivided parcel; a decision by the City’s Board of Adjustment overruling the Building Inspector’s decision; a decision by the City’s Planning Commission, rendered after the Board of Adjustment’s decision, that the Site Plan could not be considered unless it was resubmitted as a major subdivision application; a decision by the City Commissioners upholding the Planning Commission; an appeal of the Commissioners’ decision to the Superior Court, which reversed the Commissioners; and the City’s adoption of three amendments to its zoning code. Ocean Bay filed this action with the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging that it had a vested right to have its Site Plan approved substantially in the form submitted without going through major subdivision approval, and that the City was equitably estopped from enforcing the zoning code amendments against Beach Walk. After a trial, the Court of Chancery ruled that Ocean Bay did not have a vested right to develop Beach Walk as laid out on the Site Plan and the City was not equitably estopped from enforcing its new zoning amendments. Ocean Bay appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ocean Bay Mart, Inc. v. The City of Rehoboth Beach Delaware" on Justia Law

Borrower took out a $5.6 million dollar bridge loan, with 8.5% interest per annum, secured by a deed of trust on real property. They defaulted on a monthly payment of $39,667, triggering late fee provisions: a one-time 10% fee assessed against the overdue payment ($3,967) and a default interest charge of 9.99% per annum assessed against the total unpaid principal balance. Borrower filed a demand for arbitration, alleging the loan was in violation of Business & Professions Code 10240 and the late fee was an unlawful penalty in violation of section 1671. The arbitrator rejected both claims and denied the demand for arbitration. Borrower petitioned to vacate the decision, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded their authority by denying claims in violation of “nonwaivable statutory rights and/or contravention of explicit legislative expressions of public policy.”The court of appeal reversed the denial of that petition. The trial court erroneously failed to vacate an award that constitutes an unlawful penalty in contravention of public policy set forth in section 1671. Liquidated damages in the form of a penalty assessed during the lifetime of a partially matured note against the entire outstanding loan amount are unlawful penalties. There is no precedent upholding a liquidated damages provision where a borrower missed a single installment and then was penalized pursuant to such a provision. View "Honchariw v. FJM Private Mortgage Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC (“Whitetail”) appealed two district court judgments granting summary judgment and dismissing claims asserted by Whitetail against XTO Energy, Inc. (“XTO”) and the Board of University of School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and Director (collectively “State”). Whitetail argued the court erred by: (1) dismissing its claim asserting the State had committed an unconstitutional taking of its property interest; (2) by dismissing Whitetail’s trespass, slander of title, unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims asserted against the State; (3) by determining XTO had not breached its lease agreement by failing to pay royalties owed to Whitetail; (4) by determining XTO did not violate N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1; and (5) by dismissing Whitetail’s constructive fraud claim asserted against XTO. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there were quiet title claims asserted by Whitetail remaining unresolved, it dismissed the appeal. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy, et al." on Justia Law