Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, former tenants of apartments owned and managed by the defendants, filed a putative class action alleging that the defendants violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (4) (iii) by deducting charges for "reasonable wear and tear" from tenants' security deposits. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants included lease provisions requiring tenants to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, which they argued was a violation of the same statute.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court and later removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Federal judge denied these motions without prejudice and certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding the interpretation of the statute.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a tenant's reasonable use of a property as a residence is expected to result in gradual deterioration, such as the need for painting, carpet repair, or similar refurbishment at the end of a lease. Deductions from a security deposit for such reasonable wear and tear violate the statute. Whether damage constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" is a fact-specific question depending on various circumstances, including the nature and cause of the damage, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy.The court also held that a lease provision requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, on penalty of bearing the costs of repairs regardless of whether the damage is reasonable wear and tear, conflicts with the statute. Such a provision is void and unenforceable under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (8). View "Peebles v. JRK Property Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A couple divorced, and the superior court awarded them joint legal custody of their minor child, with primary physical custody to the mother. The court also divided the couple’s marital estate. The father, representing himself, appealed, arguing that the division of the marital estate was inequitable. He claimed errors in the court’s determinations, including not crediting him for post-separation payments, not allowing him to apply for the child’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), not allowing him to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, and its custody decision.The superior court held a one-day trial by videoconference, where both parties testified. The court issued a decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical custody to the mother. The court divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, taking into account the father’s child support arrearage and an escrow shortage. The court also divided the couple’s vehicles and assigned debts based on testimony and the mother’s spreadsheet. The court ordered that the mother would be responsible for the child’s PFD and could claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The court ordered that the father’s 401(k) be divided equitably according to the mother’s spreadsheet.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It vacated the superior court’s division of the marital estate, finding that the court’s treatment of the father’s 401(k) was unclear and lacked clarifying findings. It also found legal error in the court’s failure to address post-separation payments when dividing the marital estate. The court remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s decisions, including the custody award and the decisions regarding the child’s PFD and tax dependency. View "Wolffe v. Wolffe" on Justia Law

Fletcher Properties, Inc. and other appellants own multi-tenant residential properties in Minneapolis. The City of Minneapolis enacted an ordinance prohibiting property owners from refusing to rent to individuals based on requirements of public assistance programs, including Section 8 housing vouchers. Fletcher challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the Minnesota Constitution’s Takings Clause and was preempted by the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).The district court initially ruled in favor of Fletcher, finding the ordinance violated due process and equal protection clauses. The court of appeals reversed this decision, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, remanding the case to address the remaining claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the City, rejecting Fletcher’s takings and preemption claims. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, leading to the current appeal.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the ordinance does not constitute a physical or regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitution. The court applied the Penn Central factors, concluding that the economic impact of the ordinance, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action did not support a finding of a regulatory taking. The court also determined that the ordinance does not effect a physical taking as landlords voluntarily rent their properties and are not compelled to continue doing so.Additionally, the court held that the ordinance is not preempted by the MHRA. The court found no conflict between the ordinance and the MHRA, as the MHRA does not grant landlords an affirmative right to reject voucher holders. The court also concluded that the MHRA does not occupy the field of housing discrimination based on public assistance, allowing for local regulation.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the ordinance. View "Fletcher Properties, Inc. vs. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

Jeannette F. Tasey failed to pay property taxes starting in 2017. In 2018, she applied for an elderly/disabled tax credit program, believing she did not need to pay taxes until her application was decided. On August 1, 2018, the Yellowstone County Treasurer issued a tax lien on her property, which was later assigned to Guardian Tax MT, LLC. Tasey mailed a check for the full amount on July 30, 2021, with an expected delivery date of July 31. However, the Treasurer received and processed the check on August 3, one day after the redemption period expired. The Treasurer rejected the payment and issued a tax deed to Guardian Tax, which then sued to quiet title and declare Tasey a trespasser.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of Guardian Tax, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court found Tasey's assertion that the check was received on July 31 to be speculative and unsupported by evidence. Tasey appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Tasey substantially complied with the redemption statute by mailing the payment in good faith, believing it would arrive before the deadline. The court emphasized that redemption statutes should be liberally construed to allow property owners to pay their debts and save their property. The court found that Tasey's actions met the substantial compliance standard and that there was no prejudice to Guardian Tax or the Treasurer’s Office. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guardian Tax v. Tasey" on Justia Law

David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law

Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Kevin and Jeannine Extreme appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County's order enjoining them from violating restrictive covenants applicable to their property in the Sloway Flats Minor Subdivision. The District Court also ordered them to remedy their violations and awarded attorney fees to Sloway Cabin, LLC (Sloway).The District Court found that the covenants were enforceable and that the Extremes had violated them by operating a commercial towing company, diesel repair shop, and impound lot on their property, among other activities. The court enjoined the Extremes from further violations and ordered them to remedy their current violations. The court also awarded attorney fees to Sloway.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Subdivision’s covenants were clear and unambiguous, and therefore enforceable. The court rejected the Extremes' arguments that the covenants were never meant to be enforced and that their enforcement was barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches. The court found that the Extremes had been repeatedly informed about the covenants and that Sloway had promptly acted to enforce them upon noticing violations. The court also found that the Extremes' arguments regarding the use of surrounding properties were irrelevant as those properties were not subject to the Subdivision’s covenants.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by enjoining the Extremes from violating the covenants and that the award of attorney fees to Sloway was proper under the circumstances. The court found that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the tangible parameters test was met. View "Sloway Cabin v. Extreme" on Justia Law

A group of residents and business owners in Salt Lake City filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city's failure to eliminate encampments of unsheltered people on public land interfered with their use and enjoyment of their properties. The residents claimed that the city, as a landowner, had a duty to maintain its properties free of nuisance. The city argued that the residents were attempting to use the court to force the city to exercise its enforcement powers in a specific way, and that under the public duty doctrine, the city had no duty to the residents regarding its failure to use those powers.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County dismissed the residents' complaint with prejudice, ruling that the public duty doctrine precluded their claims. The court found that the residents failed to allege that the city breached a duty owed specifically to them, rather than a duty owed to the public at large. The court concluded that the city owed no duty to the residents individually apart from its general duty to enforce laws and protect the public.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the public duty doctrine, which protects government actors from civil liability for failing to perform duties owed to the public, precluded the residents' claims of public and private nuisance. The court found that no special relationship existed between the residents and the city that would exempt the residents' claims from the public duty doctrine's preclusion. The court emphasized that the public duty doctrine applies to omissions by government actors performing public duties and that the residents did not demonstrate any unique duty owed to them by the city. View "Barrani v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Rudra Tamm, Trustee of the Rudra Tamm Revocable Trust, owns Tract 2-B, which is situated between Tract 1-B owned by Diane Gatzke and Tract 3-B owned by Herman Eggers. Tamm sought a declaratory judgment to confirm his right to use vehicular driveways on access easements over the defendants' properties. He claimed that these easements were created when the original owner, Fred Roberts, subdivided the land and recorded a plat in 1993. Tamm also presented a 2010 warranty deed from Scott Johnson, which included the easements.The District Court of Burleigh County denied Tamm's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that no easements existed on the defendants' properties for the benefit of Tract 2-B. The court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's denial of summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved, particularly regarding the creation and necessity of the easements. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings, determining that the district court erred in concluding that Tamm could not prove any claim that an easement existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address these factual issues, including whether Roberts intended to create easements and whether alternative access routes to Tract 2-B exist. View "Tamm v. Gatzke" on Justia Law