Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Northwest Landowners Association filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of North Dakota Senate Bill 2344, which related to subsurface pore space. The district court granted the Association’s cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding S.B. 2344 was unconstitutional under the state and federal takings clauses. The State and Continental Resources appealed the district court’s summary judgment order and amended judgment. On appeal, the State argued S.B. 2344 did not violate the takings clauses and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift, and that the district court misapplied N.D.R. Civ.P. 56 by failing to consider evidence submitted by the State. Continental Resources argued the court erred in analyzing the Association’s facial challenge, in determining pore space had value as a matter of law, and in denying Rule 56(f) discovery. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in invalidating the entirety of S.B. 2344. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed to the extent that it declared certain portions unconstitutional, but reversed to the extent it declared the remainder of the bill inseparable and invalid. View "Northwest Landowners Association v. State, et al." on Justia Law

In this quiet title action, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Wrongful Lien Act, the statute of frauds, and caselaw have not declared that restrictive covenants recorded without the signature of the affected landowner are absolutely void. In 1973, Charles Lewton signed and recorded documents purporting to create a homeowners association (HOA) covering 2,000 acres of land. Landowners purchased properties within the HOA's boundaries. In 2015, Landowners discovered that Lewton had owned just eight acres of the 2,000 acres purported to be included in the HOA, and no other landowners signed the recorded documents. Landowners subsequently brought this action to quiet title to their property, arguing that the HOA and its restrictive covenants were void ab initio based on public policy. The district court denied Landowners' motion for summary judgment, applying the two-factor test set forth in Ockey v. Lehmer, 189 P.3d 51 (Utah 2008). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that restrictive covenants that are recorded without the signature of the affected landowner are voidable and therefore ratifiable. View "WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court rendered primarily in favor of the Town of Colebrook in this municipal property tax appeal, holding that equipment associated with wind turbines should have been classified as personal, rather than real, property.In its appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly upheld the Town's classification of its two wind turbines and their associated equipment as real property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-64(a). The Supreme Court agreed in part, holding (1) the wind turbines were properly classified as real property; but (2) the associated equipment must be treated as personal property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-41(c). View "Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Colebrook" on Justia Law

In this action challenging a proposed amendment that would remove two schoolhouses from a county list of historically protected sites the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding that the adoption of CR-72-2019 was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial evidence, holding that Prince George's County Council acted within its legal boundaries when it adopted the minor amendment CR-72-2019.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the arguments raised by the Town of Upper Marlboro had not been waived because CR 72-2019 was not a final appealable decision; (2) CR 98-2019 was a final agency action subject to judicial review, and the Town was permitted to challenge CR 98-2019 by alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019; and (3) CR-72-2019 was not procedurally deficient because the resolution adequately provided the purpose and scope of the minor amendment pursuant to Prince George's County Code 2727-642. View "Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a landlord attempts to collect unpaid rent from a tenant during a period when the landlord was unlicensed a tenant may have a claim under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA) and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) to the extent that the landlord's unlawful collection activity caused the tenant to suffer damages, including any rent payments made responding to the landlord's attempts to collect unpaid rent.Specifically, the the Court of Appeals held (1) a tenant who voluntarily paid rent to a landlord who lacked a rental license may not bring a private action under the MCPA or MCDCA to recover restitution of rent based upon the landlord's lack of licensure pursuant to the Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, 5-4; and (2) when a municipality or county enacts a rental license law conditioning the performance of a residential lease upon the issuance of a rental license a landlord may not file an action against a tenant to recover unpaid rent attributable to the period when the property was not licensed. View "Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Maher" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that Baltimore City Council's enactment of a local law did not create a private right of action for Baltimore City tenants to recoup rent payments and related fees they paid in connection with their use and occupancy of rental dwellings during a period when the landlord did not have a valid rental license.Petitioners, tenants in a multi-unit apartment building, filed a putative class action alleging that Respondent did not hold an active rental license for the property, as required by the Baltimore City Code, and seeking to recoup paid rent and other fees paid to Respondent. The circuit court dismissed the case prior to a determination of issues relating to class certification. The court of special appeals largely agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-4(a)(2) of Article 13 of the Baltimore City Code does not provide a private right of action to recover rent and related payments that a tenant made during a period in which the landlord was unlicensed. View "Aleti v. Metropolitan Baltimore, LLC" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by Protect the Peninsula, Inc. to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by a group of wineries and an association representing their interests (collectively, the Wineries) against a Michigan municipality over several zoning ordinances that regulate vineyards, holding that the district court erred.Protect the Peninsula, Inc., a local advocacy group, moved to intervene in this action brought against Peninsula Township challenging the zoning ordinances regulating the vineyards' activities as unconstitutional and in violation of state laws. Protect the Peninsula moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), but the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Protect the Peninsula satisfied each of Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements. View "Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass'n v. Township of Peninsula, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that delivery of a pre-litigation notice to each of the three addresses referred to in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-18202(A)(1)(a)-(c) is sufficient to satisfy the statute's pre-litigation-notice requirement, even if the lienholder has reason to believe that the property owner never received the notice.HNT Holdings, LLC owned three continuous parcels of real property on which property tax payments became became delinquent. Lienholders each purchased a tax lien on one of the parcels and later sought to foreclose on the respective properties. After the statutorily-mandated time, Lienholders filed complaints to foreclose on their tax liens and attempted to serve the complaints on the HNT statutory agent. Three separate trial proceedings resulted in default judgments against HNT. HNT then successfully moved to set the judgments aside. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) Lienholders' efforts to provide notice to HNT complied with the second method of notice under section 42-18202; and (2) Lienholders were not required to take any other action to provide notice of their intent to foreclose. View "4QTKids, LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power Board of Commissioners (collectively, Los Angeles) appealed a trial court judgment granting the petition of Mono County and the Sierra Club (collectively, Mono County) for a writ of mandate directing Los Angeles to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before curtailing or reducing deliveries of irrigation water to certain lands Los Angeles leased to agricultural operators in Mono County. The trial court ruled that Los Angeles implemented a project in 2018 without complying with CEQA when: (1) it proposed new leases to the lessees that would not provide or allow water to be used for irrigation; and (2) while claiming it would study the environmental effects of the new leases, it nonetheless implemented that policy of reducing water for irrigation by allocating less water than usual under the prior leases that were still in effect. Los Angeles did not dispute that it was required to engage in CEQA analysis before implementing the new proposed leases, and it noted it issued a notice that it was undertaking environmental review of those new leases. But it argued that its 2018 water allocation was not part of that project and instead part of an earlier project, and the limitations period for challenging the earlier project has run. The Court of Appeal agreed with Los Angeles, the trial court's judgment was reversed. View "County of Mono v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Thomas Mann Post No. 81 of the American Legion, department of Montana (Legion) and denying Knudsen Family Limited Partnership's (KFLP) motion for summary judgment against the Town of Culbertson, holding that to the extent the court ostensibly expanded the scope of an easement the ruling was reversed.This action stemmed from a property dispute as to whether Legion had an easement across KFLP's ranch property to access Legion Park in Culbertson. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment in part, holding (1) to the extent the district court ostensibly expanded a 1913 written easement by granting summary judgment against KFLP on the Town's complaint, this was in error; (2) the district court did not err in ruling that Legion had an implied easement by preexisting use; and (3) the district court erred in awarding attorney fees without holding an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the award. View "Thomas Mann Post v. Knudsen Family Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law