Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Geoffrey S. Stiff and Carolyn B. Stiff own a lot on Long Pond in Belgrade, Maine. Their neighbors, Stephen C. Jones and Jody C. Jones, own an adjacent 1.23-acre lot within the limited residential district of the Belgrade shoreland zone. The Joneses' lot is legally non-conforming and already contains a non-conforming house and a shed. In 2017, the Joneses sought a permit to build a garage with a laundry room and playroom. However, they constructed a two-story structure with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, a laundry room, and a playroom with kitchen appliances, which was not in accordance with the permit.The Stiffs objected to the new structure, leading the Joneses to apply for an after-the-fact permit from the Town of Belgrade Planning Board. The Planning Board approved the permit with the condition that kitchen appliances be removed. The Stiffs appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which remanded the matter due to a lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the permit, finding the new structure to be an accessory structure. The Stiffs appealed to the BOA again, and after the BOA denied their appeal, they filed a complaint in the Superior Court, which also denied their appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the Planning Board had misconstrued the Belgrade Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO). The court held that the new structure was not an accessory structure as defined by the SZO because it was not incidental and subordinate to the existing house. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOA, which would then remand to the Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Stiff v. Town of Belgrade" on Justia Law

The case involves a property dispute in the Holiday Beach neighborhood of Owls Head, Maine, between John M. Carter and Christine C. Carter (the Carters) and their neighbors, Michael A. Voncannon and N. Kermit Voncannon (the Voncannons), and Zachary Rogers and Kathryn Rogers as Trustees of the Nancy C. Rogers Irrevocable Trust (the Rogerses). The dispute centers on the ownership and use of two "paper streets"—Austin Avenue and the Reserved Way—that transect their properties.The Business and Consumer Docket (Murphy, J.) held a bench trial and found that the Carters had superior title to Austin Avenue, while the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to the Reserved Way through adverse possession. The court determined that the Carters' deed conveyed the Reserved Way to them, but the Voncannons and Rogerses had used the Reserved Way openly, notoriously, and exclusively for over twenty years, thus meeting the requirements for adverse possession. The court also found that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road and does not extend to the high-water mark of Owls Head Harbor.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The Court held that the Carters had full record title to Austin Avenue and that the Voncannons and Rogerses' activities on Austin Avenue constituted trespass. The Court also upheld the finding that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road, not the high-water mark. Additionally, the Court agreed that the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to their respective halves of the Reserved Way through adverse possession, as their use of the land was actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period. The Court found no clear error in the trial court's factual determinations and legal conclusions. View "Carter v. Voncannon" on Justia Law

In 2017, Riverside Mining Limited (Riverside Mining) leased 73 acres of its property to Quality Aggregates (Quality) for mining. By 2020, disputes arose, leading Quality to sue Riverside Mining in 2021 for breach of contract, trespass, and quiet title. In 2022, Riverside Mining filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Quality for alleged lease breaches. The parties agreed that Quality would deposit monthly rent payments with the court during the litigation. Quality later made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Riverside Mining did not accept. Riverside Mining then dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice.The Superior Court of Riverside County dismissed the unlawful detainer action and later addressed two motions: Quality's motion for attorney fees under section 998 and Riverside Mining's motion to disburse the deposited rent payments. The court denied Quality's motion for attorney fees and granted Riverside Mining's motion for disbursement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that Quality was not entitled to attorney fees under section 998 because Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), precludes awarding attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed. The court also affirmed the disbursement of the deposited funds to Riverside Mining, as Quality had no right to a setoff for attorney fees. The court's main holding was that section 998 does not independently authorize attorney fees without an underlying statutory or contractual right, and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), prevents such an award in cases of voluntary dismissal. View "Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Syre appealed an order denying her motion to disqualify California Indian Legal Services (CILS) from representing defendant Mark Douglas. Syre had initially contacted CILS seeking representation for a quiet title lawsuit against Douglas but was declined due to her non-residency in Inyo County. She later filed the lawsuit with other counsel. Douglas, who is homeless and the son of the late property owner Charlotte Willett, successfully obtained representation from CILS. Syre argued that CILS had a conflict of interest due to her prior contact with them.The Superior Court of Inyo County denied Syre's motion to disqualify CILS, finding no conflict of interest. The court noted that Syre had only spoken to a non-attorney intake advocate at CILS and that no confidential information was shared with any attorney at CILS. The intake advocate had merely gathered preliminary information to determine Syre's eligibility for CILS's services, which she did not meet. The court also found that CILS had adequate screening measures in place to protect any confidential information.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Syre was a prospective client but did not communicate any confidential information to an attorney at CILS. The court emphasized that the information shared was preliminary and necessary to determine eligibility for CILS's services. Additionally, the court noted that public interest law offices like CILS are treated differently from private law firms regarding disqualification rules. The court concluded that there was no substantial relationship between Syre and any attorney at CILS and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. View "Syre v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The case involves the Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network (appellant) challenging actions taken by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission (CPC) in March 2018 to implement parts of the Westside Mobility Plan. This plan aims to address congestion and mobility issues in the western part of Los Angeles. The appellant argued that the CPC’s actions did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and sought to invalidate them.The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the case and rejected most of the appellant’s contentions, denying the petition. The court found that the CPC was a decision-making body authorized to certify the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA. The court also found that the EIR was legally adequate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the CPC was authorized to certify the EIR as it was a decision-making body for the project. The court also found that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA under Guidelines section 15301, which covers minor alterations to existing public structures. The court concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate that the Streetscape Plan fell within any exceptions to the categorical exemptions. Additionally, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts was adequate and that the City had ensured that mitigation measures would be implemented.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, and the City of Los Angeles was awarded costs on appeal. View "Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A sub-subcontractor, Diamond Services Corporation, entered into a contract with Harbor Dredging, a subcontractor, to perform dredging work in the Houston Ship Channel. The prime contract for the project was awarded to RLB Contracting by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and RLB obtained a surety bond from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America. During the project, unexpected site conditions, including the presence of tires, caused delays and increased costs. Diamond continued working based on an alleged agreement that it would be compensated through a measured-mile calculation in a request for equitable adjustment (REA) submitted by RLB to the Corps. However, RLB later settled the REA for $6,000,000 without directly involving Diamond in the negotiations and issued a joint check to Harbor and Diamond for $950,000.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed some of Diamond's claims, including those for unjust enrichment and express contractual claims against RLB, but allowed Diamond's quantum meruit claim to proceed. The court also denied Travelers' motion to dismiss Diamond's Miller Act claims but required Diamond to amend its complaint to include proper Miller Act notice, which Diamond failed to do timely. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of RLB and Harbor, dismissing Diamond's remaining claims and striking Diamond's untimely second amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment against Diamond's quantum meruit claims, holding that the express sub-subcontract covered the damages Diamond sought and that Diamond failed to provide evidence of the reasonable value of the work performed. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Diamond's Miller Act claim, as the damages sought were not recoverable under the Act. The court dismissed Diamond's appeal regarding the tug-expenses claim due to untimeliness. View "Diamond Services v. RLB Contracting" on Justia Law

Kerry Angelos filed a defamation lawsuit against Greg and Susan Schatzel, alleging they created a website that published defamatory comments about him. During the lawsuit, Angelos faced financial difficulties, leading to his interests in the lawsuit being auctioned at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a preexisting judgment. Greg Schatzel purchased Angelos’s interests and substituted himself as the plaintiff, subsequently dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Angelos appealed, arguing that his defamation claims were personal and could not be deemed “property” subject to execution under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted Schatzel’s motion to substitute as the plaintiff and denied a motion by another creditor, Pacific Global Investment, Inc. (PGI), to intervene. The court found no legal basis to support Angelos’s contention that the sheriff’s sale was invalid or that substituting Schatzel violated public policy. Consequently, the court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that defamation claims are personal and not assignable under Idaho law, referencing the precedent set in MacLeod v. Stelle. The court concluded that Angelos’s defamation claims could not be subject to execution as “other property” under Idaho Code section 11-201. The court vacated the district court’s order granting Schatzel’s motion to substitute and the judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. The case was remanded to determine which of Angelos’s remaining claims, if any, were properly transferred to Schatzel through the sheriff’s sale. The court also denied Schatzel’s request for attorney fees, awarding costs to Angelos as the prevailing party. View "Angelos v. Schatzel" on Justia Law

The case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a settlement agreement among the trustee of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, and other parties. The settlement released claims that appellants Richard and Marisa Stadtmauer had originally asserted in a New York state court action. The Stadtmauers alleged that the debtor, Mark Nordlicht, and others engaged in a scheme to conceal Nordlicht’s assets to avoid paying his debts. When Nordlicht filed for bankruptcy, the state court proceedings were stayed, and the trustee took possession of the Stadtmauers’ claims. The settlement included a $2.5 million payment to the estate by Nordlicht’s mother, Barbara Nordlicht, and provisions for indemnification and reimbursement of legal fees.The Stadtmauers objected to the settlement and appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They argued that the state court had granted them valid liens on two of Nordlicht’s properties, giving them secured property rights. They contended that the trustee lacked the authority to settle their claims, that the settlement violated due process and bankruptcy principles, and that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in approving the settlement. The district court rejected these arguments and affirmed the approval of the settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court. The court held that the trustee had the authority to settle the Stadtmauers’ claims because they were general claims that were property of the bankruptcy estate. The court also found that the settlement did not violate the principles of creditor priority as articulated in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. because the validity of the Stadtmauers’ liens was in bona fide dispute. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In re Nordlicht" on Justia Law

Jason Ziemann, the plaintiff, became involved in the operation of Grosz Wrecking, a business owned by his grandmother, Juanita Grosz, after her husband passed away. Ziemann moved into a home on the business property in 2014. In 2022, Grosz sought to evict Ziemann after he refused to purchase the home. Ziemann then sued Grosz, alleging they had an oral partnership agreement and sought a declaration of partnership, accounting, and dissolution, along with claims for breach of fiduciary duties and tortious interference with a business relationship. Grosz denied the partnership and counterclaimed for trespass.The District Court of McLean County denied Ziemann’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling factual issues existed regarding the partnership. The court granted Grosz’s motion, dismissing Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, citing inadmissible hearsay and lack of evidence for damages. After a bench trial, the court found the parties had formed a partnership with specific profit-sharing terms and dismissed Grosz’s trespass claim, allowing Ziemann to remain on the property until the business was dissolved. The court ordered the liquidation of partnership assets and awarded Ziemann costs.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s findings that a partnership existed and that Grosz contributed property to it. The court also upheld the dismissal of Grosz’s trespass claim and Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty. However, it reversed the lower court’s decision not to apply the default partnership winding up provisions under N.D.C.C. § 45-20-07. The case was remanded for the district court to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of costs and disbursements to Ziemann as the prevailing party. View "Ziemann v. Grosz" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a bridge constructed by John Dimar over the Clearwater River to provide better access to a subdivision where all parties reside. Dimar built the bridge at his own expense and later sought to restrict access to it, prompting neighboring lot owners to file a lawsuit for declaratory relief to access the bridge and to avoid sharing in the construction costs. The plaintiffs argued that the 1994 Easement Agreement granted them access rights without the obligation to share in the construction costs.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Missoula County granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the 1994 Easement Agreement allowed them access to the bridge and that they were not responsible for the construction costs. The court also issued a preliminary injunction requiring Dimar to provide keys to the bridge to the plaintiffs and emergency responders. Dimar appealed, arguing that the easement did not cover the bridge and that the plaintiffs should share in the construction costs.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the 1994 Easement Agreement was clear and unambiguous in granting the plaintiffs access to the bridge. The court also found that Dimar was estopped from contesting the validity of the easement due to his previous litigation in the River Watch case, where he had argued for the easement's validity. Additionally, the court ruled that the plaintiffs were not unjustly enriched by using the bridge without sharing in the construction costs, as the 1994 Easement Agreement explicitly stated that any improvements made without a prior written agreement would be at the expense of the improver. View "Beck v. Dimar" on Justia Law