Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Bakewell submitted applications regarding its proposed development of "Campus Town," on approximately 122 acres of the former Fort Ord military base. The City of Seaside certified an environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000, and approved the project. After holding a public hearing, the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) determined that the project was consistent with the Fort Ord Reuse Plan. A nonprofit organization filed a petition for a writ of mandate, alleging that the Campus Town EIR violated CEQA and that FORA’s failure to provide the Committee with notices of the consistency hearing for the project violated the Committee’s right to due process. Bakewell argued that the CEQA causes of action were time-barred and the due process cause of action was moot.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of all claims. Under Emergency rule 9(b) the last day for the Committee to file its petition asserting CEQA causes of action was August 4, 2020; it was not filed until September 1, 2020. there is currently no requirement that development projects proposed for the former Fort Ord military base be consistent with the Fort Ord Reuse Plan, so the due process claim is moot. View "Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting injunctive relief requiring Petitioners to remove a bridge and road that Respondent maintained after Petitioners brought this action for alleged flood damages caused to Respondent's property as a result of the construction of the road and bridge, arguing that they impeded the flow of Little Grave Creek, holding that the circuit court erred.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly found that Respondent had good cause for a delay in service; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that construction of the road and bridge was the proximate cause of Respondent's damages; (3) the circuit court erred in denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the relevant statute of limitations; and (4) the circuit court's order granting injunctive relief failed to contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Reilley v. Board of Education of the County of Marshall" on Justia Law

Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB”) filed suit in 2004, alleging oil and gas operations conducted pursuant to a 1935 mineral lease and a 1994 surface lease damaged Section 16 land. VPSB asserted causes of action for negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract, and violations of Louisiana environmental laws. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted rehearing to reconsider its prior decision in Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 20-00685 (La. 6/30/21), _So.3d_. The case presented two main issues: (1) the proper interpretation of Act 312 relative to the award of damages for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage; and (2) whether the strict liability tort claim prescribed. With the benefit of additional oral argument and briefing, the Court affirmed its original decree. View "Louisiana, et al. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., et al." on Justia Law

An automobile driven by defendant Patrick McLaughlan, struck plaintiff Jerry Harwood while Harwood was leaving his work shift and crossing the street to an employer provided parking lot. After an unsuccessful attempt to recover workers compensation benefits for his injuries, Harwood filed a lawsuit against the driver and his employer. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit against the employer for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Harwood appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because an employer may have assumed the duty to provide a safer crosswalk for access to an employer designated parking lot, the employee pled a claim for relief which is legally possible. The trial court's dismissal was premature. View "Harwood v. Ardagh Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Lewis and Clark County (County) and Bridge Creek Estates Homeowners Association (HOA) on the County's claim for declaratory judgment and on Philip Wirth's counterclaim against the County, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in its interpretation of the covenants by concluding that Wirth was unambiguously prevented from further subdividing the lots retained by him within the subject subdivision, in failing to consider extrinsic evidence, and by resolving the issue at summary judgment; (2) erred by granting summary judgment to the County and dismissing Wirth's counterclaim for statutory damages; (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to the HOA; and (4) prematurely granted attorney fees to the HOA. View "Wirth v. Lewis & Clark County" on Justia Law

Lassen Irrigation Company (Irrigation Company) challenged the superior court’s orders interpreting paragraphs1 17 and 55 of the 1940 Susan River Water Rights Decree (decree). The superior court adopted the trust’s interpretations of those paragraphs, thereby overturning the contrary decisions by Honey Lake Valley Resource Conservation District, serving as the watermaster administering the decree. Although the superior court expressed an unfamiliarity with water law, it viewed the trust’s interpretations of the paragraphs as “not ridiculously inconsistent with the objectives of the overall agreement” and “within the bounds of the agreement and . . . consistent with the language in the agreement.” The Court of Appeal concluded the trust’s interpretations of paragraphs 17 and 55, as adopted by the superior court, were unreasonable considering the language, record, history, and context of the decree. The superior court’s finding the trust’s place of use change request otherwise comported with Water Code section 1706 and California water law also did not save the paragraph 17 order. Accordingly, the superior court’s orders were reversed in their entirety. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment in favor of a pipeline company, holding that remand was required for a new trial to determine the market value of the property taken.A landowner challenged the pipeline company's right to condemn, arguing that the transport of polymer-grade propylene did not the pipeline company common-carrier status. After excluding the landowner's evidence of sales of other pipeline easements the trial court found in favor of the pipeline company. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that whether the pipeline served a public use presented a fact question for a jury to resolve and that the trial court erred in excluding the landowner's testimony about easement sales. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Tex. Bus. Org. Code 2.105 grants common-carrier eminent domain authority for the construction and use of a polymer-grade propylene pipeline; (2) the company demonstrated that its pipeline served a public use, and that determination is a legal one; and (3) a property owner may testify to sales of pipeline easements across the property made to other pipeline carriers. View "Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline Partnership, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting Barbara Humphrey's motion for summary judgment as to partition of certain property and denying both parties' motions for summary judgment as to unjust enrichment, holding that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to Barbara's partition claim.Donald Humphrey and Edward Smith purchased a home together, and Donald paid a portion of the purchase price. The parties agreed this was to be a loan and memorialized their understanding in a loan agreement wherein they agreed that Donald would remove his name from the property's ownership when the loan was repaid. After Donald died, Barbara, his wife, brought a complaint for partition of the property, arguing that she and Smith were tenants in common. Smith counterclaimed for unjust enrichment, asserting that Donald forgave the remainder of the loan before he died, leaving Smith as the property's sole owner. The district court granted summary judgment for Barbara as to partition and denied summary judgment on all other claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara on the issue of partition. View "Humphrey v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this action involving a foreclosed property located in a homeowner's association (HOA) community and sold by the HOA to a subsequent purchaser at a foreclosure sale, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.In the alternative to seeking to quiet title, Plaintiff, the subsequent purchaser of the property at issue, asserting a misrepresentation claim against the HOA and its agent based upon their failure to disclose and publicly record for failing to disclose a superpriority tender. The court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-3" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the conclusion of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Washington County School District claiming that the School District had failed to offer it the right of first refusal to repurchase its former property, holding that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of Utah Code 78-34-20(1)(b), replaced by Utah Code 78B-6-521(1)(a)(ii).Several years after Plaintiff sold a parcel of land to the School District the School District resold the property. Because Utah law requires a government entity to offer property acquired through condemnation or a threat of condemnation to the original owner before disposing of it Plaintiff bought suit, arguing that the School district acquired its property under a threat of condemnation. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a government entity does not specifically authorize the use of eminent domain until it approves an eminent domain lawsuit in an open meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not support the appellate court's interpretation of what it means to be specifically authorized. View "Cardiff Wales, LLC v. Washington County School District" on Justia Law