Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this dispute about who owned an undeveloped .53-acre parcel in Teton Village and whether it should be sold or conserved, holding that there was no reversible error.Many different parties in this case asserted different ownership theories as to the parcel at issue, depending on which entity they claimed to derive their interest from. The district court had issued several summary judgment orders and related rulings, which the Supreme Court affirmed. At issue in these cross-appeals was whether the receivership order pertaining to a 2006 LLC was an appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) laches barred Tram Tower Townhouse Association's claim that a 1998 conveyance was unlawful, and therefore, the Association could not challenge the later-issued receivership order; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order the receiver to maintain the 2006 LLC as a going concern. View "Dvorson v. Weiner" on Justia Law

In this oil and gas case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment, holding that a fact issue remained on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease and that Plaintiffs' argument was not barred by res judicata but that the court of appeals erred by reversing a take-nothing summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims.At issue was the meaning and application of an express covenant to protect against drainage that appeared in a lease addendum that expressly limited the location of wells that may trigger Defendant-Lessee's obligation to protect against drainage but did not directly address the location of wells that may cause drainage. Plaintiffs-Lessors argued that the covenant allowed for separate triggering and draining wells and that Defendant breached the covenant by failing to protect against drainage from a non-triggering well. In response, Defendant argued that it had a duty to protect only against drainage from the limited class of triggering wells. The Supreme Court held (1) the addendum was ambiguous because both interpretations of the covenant were reasonable; (2) the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims; and (3) remand was required for further proceedings on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease. View "Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin" on Justia Law

In this case disputing whether a drainage district properly reclassified benefits in connection with a drainage repair project the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower courts did not err.The drainage district at issue was formed more than a century ago, and a railroad that traversed the land within the district court was assessed 4.81 percent of the benefit of installation of tiling. In 2018, the drainage district determined that repairs were needed to the tiling and sought to reclassify the land in the district to equitably apportion the cost of the new repairs. The reclassification commission recommended that one-half of the repair cost be assessed to the railroad through the reclassification process. The drainage district approved the reclassification. The railroad brought this action challenging the reclassification. The district court granted summary judgment for the railroad, concluding that the reclassification commission acted inequitably, and declared the reclassification of benefits null and void. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the railroad met its burden of showing that the assessment was inequitable and improper as a matter of law. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Drainage District 67 Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the just compensation award for commercial property the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of the property owner regarding his opinion testimony that sales of other commercial property were comparable where that opinion required technical or specialized knowledge.An Iowa municipality condemned part of the owner's undeveloped land for a road. The district court allowed the owner to opine as to the site's reduction in value resulting from the taking but barred the owner's evidence of comparable sales on the grounds that the owner relied on hearsay and was unqualified as an expert. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the owner, a former restaurant manager, was not qualified as an expert under Iowa R. Evid. 5.702 to offer the opinion testimony given his lack of expertise and the complexity of these commercial real estate valuations. View "Rausch v. City of Marion" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the trial court resolved a property line dispute between two neighbors by creating an easement in favor of Respondents, the encroaching property owners. It granted Respondents an exclusive implied easement and, alternatively, an equitable easement over the entire encroachment. Appellants appealed the judgment.   Appellants made three primary arguments on appeal. First, the trial court’s judgment “should be reversed because, as a matter of law, the court cannot create an exclusive implied easement.” Second, that the court erred in creating an implied easement.” Third, that the court abused its discretion and “erred in creating an equitable easement” which “is not narrowly tailored to promote justice and is significantly greater in scope and duration than what is necessary to protect [respondents’] needs.”   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment on the cause of action for implied easement and affirmed the judgment on the cause of action for equitable easement. The court held that the trial court erred in granting an exclusive implied easement that amount to fee title. The court reasoned that in this case there was no express grant of an exclusive easement. And the encroachment, totaling 1,296 square feet of appellants’ 9,815-square-foot property, cannot reasonably be qualified as de minimis as it amounts to approximately 13.2 percent of Appellants’ property.  The court affirmed the trial court’s creation of an equitable easement reasoning that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that respondents were innocent and did not have knowledge of their encroachment on Appellants’ property. View "Romero v. Shih" on Justia Law

In 2008, Morris defaulted on her home mortgage. After negotiating a loan modification, she again defaulted in 2009. Morris and her husband, Mazhari, then filed two bankruptcy proceedings. Mazhari died while the second bankruptcy was pending. Morris unsuccessfully tried to obtain another loan modification. Following the 2016 lifting of the automatic stay in her third bankruptcy, Morris’s home was sold at public auction to Chase, the deed of trust beneficiary and successor to the original lender. Morris claims that the trustee’s sale occurred without notice to her because Chase and then Rushmore, the loan servicer, pursued foreclosure secretly while giving her false assurances that loan modification terms were forthcoming and shuttling her between uninformed representatives who gave her inconsistent information about her modification request.Morris sought post-foreclosure relief, including damages, an order setting aside the trustee’s sale, and a declaration quieting title under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR) (Civ. Code 2923.6, 2923.7) and other theories. In 2018, the trial court dismissed all claims. After another delay occasioned by another bankruptcy, Morris appealed. The court of appeal reversed in part, with respect to claims alleging failure to appoint a single point of contact (HBOR 2923.7), dual tracking (2923.6), and failure to mail upon request a notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale 2924b). The court otherwise affirmed. View "Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of forfeiture entered by the district court after determining that Nevada's homestead exemption may, as a general matter, protect against civil forfeiture, holding (1) there is no forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption, and (2) incarcerated individuals may still be deemed residents for purposes of the homestead exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020.After Appellant had been arrested Elko County Sheriff's Office filed a complaint for forfeiture of the property. While in jail, Appellant recorded his initiated declaration of homestead. Appellant was subsequently convicted of a drug-related crime. While incarcerated, Appellant leased the property to a third party. After a trial, the district court awarded the sheriff a judgment of forfeiture. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a valid homestead is exempt from civil forfeiture; and (2) the property was a constitutionally-protected homestead because Appellant satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020. View "Aguirre v. Elko County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Davison County Drainage Commission approving permits to install drain tile on Appellant's farmland, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear Kenneth Hostler's challenge to the commission's permitting decision.Hostler, Appellant's downstream neighbor, appeared on the commission's public hearing on Appellant's applications and objected to the permits. After the commission approved the permits Hostler appealed. The circuit court reversed, ruling that the commission abused its discretion in granting the permits. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding that the circuit court did not have authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act to consider Hostler's complaint challenging the commission's decision to grant Appellant's permitting request. View "Hostler v. Davison County Drainage Commission" on Justia Law

Miguel and Janice Aizpitarte sued their neighbors Michael and Laura Minear to quiet title to what they contended was an established easement for an access driveway, and sought a declaratory judgment to recognize their right to an implied easement by prior use. The Aizpitartes also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Minears from blocking access to the drive(10) Wilkins (way. The Aizpitartes moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded the Aizpitartes had an implied easement by prior use of the driveway crossing the Minear property to the Aizpitarte property. The Minears appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them because there were genuine issues of material fact in the record. They also argue the scope of the easement recognized by the district court was too broad. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Aizpitarte v. Minear" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether E. Howard Carson acquired a vested right to develop property in a particular manner based upon alleged assurances made to him by Tom Brown, the Forsyth County Planning Director. Carson was the principal for Red Bull Holdings II, LLC, the property owner in this case. In 2016, Carson met with Brown and discussed Carson’s plans to purchase approximately 17 acres of land and develop that property into 42 separate 9,000- square-foot residential lots. In his role as Planning Director, Brown was allowed to interpret the zoning code; however, he could not unilaterally promise or authorize the issuance of a building permit. The record further showed that Carson knew prior to that meeting that the zoning code allowed for 9,000-square-foot lots. During the meeting, Carson showed Brown a hand-drawn document depicting Carson’s proposed subdivision layout, and asked Brown to confirm whether the current zoning code allowed for his proposed development. Brown made no representations as to future zoning code changes that might impact the property, nor did he guarantee that Carson would be able to build as he proposed. Carson purchased the property and spent money obtaining the various plans and appraisals necessary to begin development. Then, in August 2016, the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners “imposed a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for land disturbance permits” for 9,000 -square-foot residential lots. Based on the record before the Supreme Court, it concluded Carson did not acquire a vested right; therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary was reversed. The case was remanded with direction. View "Brown, et al. v. Carson, et al." on Justia Law