Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Frank Hallberg rented an apartment from Steve Schmitz in Helena. Schmitz sent Hallberg a 30-day notice to vacate, and upon inspecting the apartment on July 12, 2021, Schmitz found 20-30 holes in the walls. Schmitz took photos and called the police, who also documented the damage. Hallberg was charged with Criminal Mischief Damage to Rental Property.The Municipal Court scheduled an omnibus hearing, which Hallberg attended without his attorney. The hearing was rescheduled multiple times, and neither Hallberg nor his attorney appeared at the final rescheduled hearing. Consequently, the court set a bench trial for April 15, 2022, which was held on December 14, 2022. The court found Hallberg guilty and ordered him to pay $1,226.45 in restitution. Hallberg appealed to the District Court, arguing he was denied a jury trial, the evidence was insufficient, and the restitution amount was incorrect. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's decision, stating Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by not objecting and that the restitution amount was supported by Schmitz’s testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by failing to object to the bench trial. The court found sufficient evidence to support Hallberg’s conviction based on the testimonies and photographic evidence presented. The court also upheld the restitution amount, finding it was not clearly erroneous as it was supported by Schmitz’s testimony regarding repair costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "City of Helena v. Hallberg" on Justia Law

Bijan Boutiques, LLC (Bijan) appealed a summary judgment in favor of Rosamari Isong. Bijan sought to void the property distribution in the marital dissolution judgment between Isong and her former husband, Richard Milam Akubiro, under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). Bijan argued that the judgment was fraudulent as it awarded Isong the couple’s only U.S. property, making it difficult to enforce a judgment Bijan had against Akubiro without incurring significant expenses to pursue foreign assets.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Bijan’s complaint was barred by Family Code section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which protects property received in a marital dissolution from being liable for a spouse’s debt unless the debt was assigned to the receiving spouse. The court found that the marital dissolution judgment was not a product of a negotiated settlement but was adjudicated by the court, thus not subject to the UVTA.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that Family Code section 916 precludes Bijan from enforcing its judgment against the property awarded to Isong. The court distinguished this case from Mejia v. Reed, which allowed UVTA claims against marital settlement agreements, noting that the dissolution judgment here was court-adjudicated, not a private agreement. The court also rejected Bijan’s arguments that the judgment was obtained by fraud and that the Chino property should not have been subject to division, affirming that the property was presumed to be community property under Family Code section 2581.The appellate court concluded that Bijan could not satisfy its judgment against Akubiro by executing on the property awarded to Isong and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Isong. View "Bijan Boutiques v. Isong" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves the Old Creek Ranch Winery, owned by Holguin Family Ventures, LLC, and leased by OCRW, Inc. The Ventura County Board of Supervisors found that the appellants violated the Ventura County Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance by expanding the winery and wine-tasting area without a conditional use permit (CUP) and changing the principal use of the ranch from crop production to a wine tasting/event venue. The Board also denied their request for zoning clearance for a paved parking lot and electric vehicle charging stations.The trial court upheld the Board's decision, applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The court found that the appellants had converted the property’s principal use from crop and wine production to a commercial wine bar and event space. The court also denied appellants' motion to amend their complaint to add a new cause of action for declaratory relief and dismissed their remaining cause of action for inverse condemnation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint, concluding that the proposed new cause of action was unnecessary and that the delay in filing the motion was unjustified. Additionally, the court ruled that the Outdoor Events Ordinance did not apply to the winery, as it was separately regulated under the Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance.The main holding is that the substantial evidence standard of review was correctly applied, and substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of zoning violations and the denial of the zoning clearance for the parking lot and charging stations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Holguin Family Ventures v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

A land dispute in Ecuador between Jose Vicente Penafiel-Peralta and his sister Sandra led to Penafiel-Peralta, his wife Monica Lourdes Castro-Pineda, and their minor son G.E.P.C. being forced from their home. After being threatened by Sandra and a former military member, Borroso, who claimed ownership of the land, the family fled to the United States. Penafiel-Peralta applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), with Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. listed as derivatives on the asylum application.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all applications, finding that the threats did not amount to persecution, there was no nexus between the threats and a protected ground, and there was insufficient evidence that the Ecuadorian government was unable or unwilling to protect them. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats were due to a personal land dispute and not because of any protected ground, and that the family did not report the threats to the police, undermining their claim of government inaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA and IJ correctly applied the mixed-motive analysis and found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the threats were due to a personal land dispute rather than family membership. The court also noted that the record did not compel a conclusion that family membership was a central reason for the persecution. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review, affirming the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. View "Penafiel-Peralta v. Garland" on Justia Law

B.R.S. Real Estate, Inc. owned a commercial property in West Warwick, Rhode Island, which suffered extensive water damage in 2018 due to frozen and burst pipes. B.R.S. filed an insurance claim under a policy issued by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London. Disagreements arose over the amount of the loss, leading to an appraisal process involving party-appointed appraisers and a neutral umpire. The appraisal panel issued an award, which B.R.S. contested, arguing that the appraiser appointed by the insurers was biased and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on its claim for withheld depreciation.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially denied the defendants' motion to confirm the appraisal award, citing the need for discovery. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find the appraiser biased or the umpire incompetent. The court also found that B.R.S. had not met the policy conditions for receiving the withheld depreciation, as the property had not been repaired or replaced for the same use.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied the summary judgment standard and that B.R.S. could not challenge the appraiser's impartiality post-decision based on information known before the appraisal. The court also found that the umpire was competent and that B.R.S. failed to provide evidence that the property was repaired or replaced for the same use, as required by the policy. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of the withheld depreciation and confirmed the appraisal award. View "B.R.S. Real Estate, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London" on Justia Law

A nonprofit entity, Sports Medicine Research and Testing Laboratory (Sports Medicine), sought a property tax exemption for its South Jordan facility, claiming it was used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine performs testing for both professional sports organizations at market rates and for government agencies and charitable organizations at discounted or no cost. It argued that the revenue from market-rate testing supports its charitable mission and that its vacant property space is intended for future charitable use.The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization denied the exemption, stating the property was not used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission, which affirmed the Board's decision. Sports Medicine then sought judicial review from the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the property did not qualify for a tax exemption. The court reasoned that while Sports Medicine's discounted testing for charitable organizations could be considered a charitable use, its market-rate testing for professional sports organizations was not. The court emphasized that generating profit, even if used to support a charitable mission, does not constitute a charitable use of property. Additionally, the court found that the vacant portion of the property, intended for future charitable use, did not meet the requirement for current exclusive charitable use. Consequently, the court upheld the Tax Commission's denial of the property tax exemption. View "Sports Medicine Research v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law

In September 2020, the CDC issued a nationwide order temporarily halting residential evictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This eviction moratorium remained effective for nearly a year. Owners of residential rental properties sued the government, claiming that the CDC’s order constituted a physical taking of their property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the property owners' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court agreed with the government’s argument that a takings claim cannot be premised on government action that was unauthorized, and it concluded that the CDC’s order was unauthorized because it exceeded the CDC’s statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The Federal Circuit concluded that the CDC’s order was “authorized” for takings-claim purposes because it was issued within the normal scope of the CDC’s duties and pursuant to a good faith implementation of the PHSA. The court also determined that the order did not contravene any explicit prohibition or positively expressed congressional intent. Furthermore, the court held that the property owners’ complaint stated a claim for a physical taking, as the CDC’s order prevented them from evicting non-rent-paying tenants, thus infringing on their fundamental right to exclude others from their property. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DARBY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Anthony Barron, a civilian contractor, drowned while driving through a low water crossing at Camp Bullis, a U.S. military facility near San Antonio, Texas. The crossing was not closed or guarded despite regulations requiring such measures during heavy rain. Barron’s parents sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging general negligence, premises liability, and negligent undertaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the claims, citing sovereign immunity and the discretionary function exception. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation mandating the gate be locked or guarded was non-discretionary. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, ruling that Texas law barred the general negligence and premises liability claims and that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the general negligence and premises liability claims, agreeing that Texas law precludes recovery under these theories. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the elements of negligent undertaking.Given the uncertainty in Texas law regarding whether a negligent undertaking claim can proceed when a premises liability claim is barred by the natural accumulation doctrine, the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The appellate court retained jurisdiction pending the state court’s response. View "Barron v. United States" on Justia Law