Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A boiler exploded in a home owned by a nonprofit regional housing authority, severely injuring a man who lived there. He sued the housing authority in both contract and tort, claiming that his lease-purchase contract included a promise that the authority would inspect the boiler, which it failed to do with reasonable care. After the man dismissed his contract claim, the housing authority asked the court to decide as a matter of law that a breach of a contractual promise could not give rise to a tort claim. But the superior court allowed the man to proceed to trial on his tort claim, and the jury awarded over $3 million in damages, including over $1.5 million in noneconomic damages and separate awards to several of his family members for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court reduced the man’s noneconomic damages award to $1 million because of a statutory damages cap, but it excluded the family members’ awards from the amount subject to the cap. The housing authority appealed, maintaining it should have been granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the contract did not create a continuing legal duty to inspect the boiler with reasonable care. It also argued it should have been granted a new trial because it had established that the boiler explosion was caused by a product defect rather than negligent inspection. Finally, the authority argued the family members’ damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been included in the amount subject to the statutory damages cap. The man cross-appealed, arguing that the damages cap violated due process because it failed to account for inflation or the severe nature of his physical injuries. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court's judgment on all issues. View "Association of Village Council Presidents Regional Housing Authority v. Mael, et al." on Justia Law

Counties sued to quiet title to section line rights-of-way within the Little Missouri National Grassland, a section of the Dakota Prairie Grasslands, and six roads located in McKenzie County. The State also sought to quiet title to section line rights-of-way in the Little Missouri grassland and two other parts of the Dakota Prairie Grasslands. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss all of the State’s claims and the Counties’ claim as to the Little Missouri National Grassland, and Plaintiffs appealed.The court found the statute of limitations began to run as to the Counties when they “knew or should have known” of the government’s claim. The statute of limitations would not begin to run as to the State until the government issued “public communications” that were “sufficiently specific as to be reasonably calculated” to give the State notice. Here, the Travel Plans and Public Notices were sufficient notice of the government’s exclusive claim to the 33 feet on either side of the section lines within the Dakota Prairie Grasslands over which Plaintiffs claim a right-of-way.Plaintiffs also argue that if the court finds that the Travel Plans and Public Notices did put Plaintiffs on notice, any such notice was only as to the section lines that fall within the specific areas where motor vehicle access was restricted. The court found that the Travel Plans and Public Notices made an adverse claim as to all the national grasslands within North Dakota, including areas over which USFS chose not to restrict travel. View "North Dakota v. United States" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding a total of $360,000 to Corey Rubin and Don Hauth in the lower court proceedings against Brent and Grace Hughes, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Rubin and Health filed a complaint against the Hugheses seeking a declaratory judgment as to their respective easements, a temporary restraining order, and injunction, and alleging that the Hugheses' behavior constituted a nuisance, interfered with the use of their easements, and caused them mental distress. The district court entered judgment against the Hugheses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly denied the Hugheses' motion for a directed verdict; (2) did not err in determining that the Hugheses did not have an easement that entitled them to specific performance; (3) did not err in waiving the statutory cap on punitive damages; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Rubin's unenforceable agreement to grant the Hugheses an easement. View "Rubin v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review for the City of Kenosha classifying certain property as residential, holding that the Board's determination to sustain the residential classification was supported by sufficient evidence.The City assessor valued the subject property at $89,800 and classified it as residential for property tax purposes. On appeal, Appellant argued that the property should be classified as residential. The Board sustained the assessor's classification. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board acted according to law when it looked for more than minimal agricultural use in evaluating whether the property was devoted primarily to agricultural use; (2) the Board did not err in considering the prospective residential use of the property; and (3) the Board's determination to sustain the residential classification was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Board of Review for the City of Kenosha" on Justia Law

In this action brought for the nonpayment of a promissory note the First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court entering summary judgment against SBK Holdings USA, Inc. and denying SBK's motion to set aside the judgment, holding that there was no error.Unibank for Savings sued Edgar and Elina Sargsyan and 999 Private Jet, LLC based on their nonpayment of a promissory note secured by a Gulfstream aircraft. The district court granted Unibank's unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction authorizing it to repossess the aircraft. SBK subsequently moved to intervene, asserting an alleged superior security interest in the aircraft. The district court allowed the intervention. The district court entered summary judgment against SBK and denied its subsequent motion to set aside the judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Unibank held a perfected security interest in the aircraft, while SKB did not. View "UniBank for Savings v. SBK Holdings USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant, Grant Park Association, and dismissing Plaintiff's action alleging that Defendant violated the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act of 1993, Minn. Stat. 515B.1-101 to .4-118, holding that the district court erred.After Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff's request for the postal and e-mail addresses of all members of the Association Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant violated the Act and the Association's bylaws by not turning over the records. The district court granted Defendant's motion for judgment for the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an association must disclose all records that fall under the categories listed in Minn. Stat. 515B.3-118, including records of membership kept by the association; (2) Defendant's bylaws required the same level of disclosure as the Act; and (3) Plaintiff adequately pleaded his claims to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Harkins v. Grant Park Ass'n" on Justia Law

In dividing the divorcing parties’ assets, a Massachusetts court ordered a special master to sell the Vermont property. After the sale, plaintiff filed an action in a Vermont superior court to rescind the sale and quiet title to the property. Applying the doctrine of comity, the civil division dismissed his action, deferring to the ongoing proceeding in Massachusetts. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Vermont court should not have dismissed his suit on comity grounds because the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order the special master to sell the property. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont court acted within its discretion and affirmed. View "Nijensohn v. Ring" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court, rendered pursuant to a jury verdict, that Stephen Stelly owned real property free of any encumbrance, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim.Stelly brought this action against John DeLoach claiming that DeLoach had breached the parties' contract by not delivering a real property deed after Stelly had paid off the debt on the land's original purchase price.The jury entered a verdict in favor of Stelly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Stelly pleaded only a breach-of-contract claim, not a trespass-to-try-title claim and that the statute of limitations had run on Stelly's breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim. View "Stelly v. DeLoach" on Justia Law