Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the trial judge denying Barbara Howard's motion to dismiss a petition seeking to partition two adjacent parcels of land in Foster that Howard Dunn and Howard owned as joint tenants with a right of survivorship, holding that Howard's motion to dismiss should have been granted.During the partition proceedings, Dunn died. Howard subsequently filed her motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Dunn's death vested full title in her as the surviving joint tenant. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the partition proceedings and the acceptance of a buyer's offer to purchase the property did not sever the joint tenancy or terminate Howard's right of survivorship; (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 26 does not confer standing on the heirs of a joint tenant to continue a partition action; and (3) where a party lacks standing under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 1, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 25 does not permit the land court to retain jurisdiction over the defective suit. View "Battle v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of an order affirming the judgment of the district court in the underlying quiet title action, holding that this Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material fact in the record.Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 provides that ten years after a debt secured by a lien on real property has become "wholly due" and has remained unpaid, "it shall be conclusively presumed that the debt has been regularly satisfied and the lien discharged." At issue was what effect a notice of rescission has on the statute's ten-year time frame when it is recorded after a notice of default. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in this case consistent with its unpublished decision in Glass v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 78325, 2020 WL 3604042 at *1 (Nev. July 1, 2020). Appellant sought rehearing. The Supreme Court denied rehearing, holding that the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material facts. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Appellant's claim for declaratory relief and as to Appellant's accompanying violation of property rights claim, holding that public policy favors the adoption of sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.At issue was the scope of a common-interest-community homeowners association's power to adopt rules restricting the design and use of individually-owned properties. In the instant case, Appellant argued that Respondent did not have any express power to adopt the architectural guidelines in question and argued that the district court should interpret an association's implied to adopt rules under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116 as being limited, consistent with sections 6.7 and 6.9. The district court ruled in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this Court expressly adopts sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the subject association possess the authority to adopt design-control restrictions for individually-owned property, but it must exercise that power reasonably. The Court remanded the case for the parties to address this issue. View "Moretto v. Elk Point Country Club Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Debtor executed a security deed for a piece of property. She acknowledged the deed to her closing attorney who certified the acknowledgment on the deed’s final page.Under Georgia law, a deed must be attested by two witnesses, and at least one of them needs to be an official such as a notary or court clerk. Here, the deed was invalid because the attorney was a notary, but he failed to attest to the deed. The error was discovered a few years later when the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Under federal law, a bankruptcy trustee may void a deed if it is voidable by a bona fide purchaser. The managing trustee noticed the problem and sued the loan companies to keep the property in the bankruptcy estate. The loan companies argue that they have produced what the statute requires to save a problematic deed: an affidavit from a “subscribing witness.” Here, the court reasoned that a person becomes a subscribing witness only when she attests a deed, and the closing attorney did not do so. Therefore, the loan companies’ interest in the real property is voidable. View "Pingora Loan Servicing, LLC, et al. v. Cathy L. Scarver" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (“the Act”) requires, among other things, a city to obtain approval from the Coastal Commission for any amendments to its coastal plan. Local coastal programs contain a land use plan and a local implementing program. A local implementing program consists of zoning ordinances, zoning maps, and other possible actions.The City of Manhattan Beach (“the City”) sent the plaintiff a notice of violation for operating a short-term rental. The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate to prevent the City from enforcing its ban on short-term rentals. The trial court determined that the City’s original local implementing plan permitted short-term rentals. Thus, when the City enacted the prohibition on short-term rentals it needed to obtain approval from the Coastal Commission. The City appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed. The City’s residential zoning ordinance prior to the modifications at issue did not distinguish between long-term and short-term rentals. The court held that the use of the term “residence” doesn’t affect the analysis because it does not apply some minimum length of occupancy. View "Keen v. City of Manhattan Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) to the extent it affirmed the circuit court's judgment as to the "Reinstated Hawaiian Nation," vacated the circuit court's final judgment as to the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment as to all other defendants, holding that the circuit court erred in part.In 2011, Nelson Armitage and a group of others (collectively individual defendants), and Frederick Torres-Pestana, entered onto and began occupying land in Maui owned by Alexander & Baldwin, LLC (A&B). The individual defendants claimed they were acting on behalf of the organization called the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation. A&B brought suit seeking a writ of ejectment, damages, and injunctions barring the individual defendants and the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation from entering A&B's property. The circuit court granted summary judgment for A&B and entered an injunction. The ICA dismissed the appeal as to the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation and rejected Armitage's appeal individually. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the judgment against the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation must be voided due to the public policy behind the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law; and (2) the judgment against Armitage or any other defendant still stands. View "Alexander & Baldwin, LLC v. Armitage" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the tax court dismissing Counts I through III of the Attorney General's complaint and granting summary judgment on Count IV, holding that the tax court erred in part.At issue was the scope of three statutes the Attorney General (AG) invoked to challenge an agreement between the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) and a private company for the company to construct and operate a hotel and conference center on property owned by ABOR. The Supreme Court held (1) to initiate an action under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1004(E) there must be an applicable tax law to enforce; (2) the AG may bring a quo warranto action pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2041 to challenge the unlawful usurpation or exercise of a public franchise; and (3) the AG's public-monies claim was subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-212(E). View "State v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board of Environmental Protection's decision to upheld a cleanup order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 1365 against Sultan Corporation for hazardous substances located on its property, holding that the Board improperly declined to address the availability of a third-party defense.In upholding the Commissioner's remediation order the Board expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the third-party defense afforded by Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 1367(3) was available to Sultan in an appeal of a Commissioner's section 1365 order because of the Board's conclusion that even if the defense were available, Sultan failed to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the Board's order in which the Board declined to address the availability of the third-party defense, holding that the question of whether the defense was available was a threshold issue that must be determined before the Board or a court can consider the merits of the defense. View "Sultan Corporation v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court that characterized the court's prior order on Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction as a ruling on the merits and entering a final judgment without holding a hearing, holding that the court's order violated Me. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).Appellants filed this complaint alleging violations of the statutory warranty of habitability and an illegal eviction and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. After a hearing, the court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Appellants' request for a preliminary injunction. Thereafter, Appellants filed a request for default judgment. The court denied the request and then entered the order as a final judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the order, which treated the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction as a consolidated hearing on the motion and on the merits, violated Me. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) and offended due process. View "McKeeman v. Duchaine" on Justia Law

In 2007, Olsen granted Country Visions a 10-year right of first refusal on Wisconsin land. The right was recorded in local property records. Olsen subsequently dissolved and, in 2010, its former partners filed for bankruptcy. Country Visions was not notified and was not listed in the bankruptcy proceedings. Under an agreed plan, ADM became the owner of the Wisconsin land. Country Visions was not given an opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal. In 2015, ADM arranged to resell the property. Country Vision sought compensation in state court.ADM asked the bankruptcy court to enforce the “free and clear” sale and prohibit the state court litigation, citing 11 U.S.C. 363(m). The bankruptcy court and district court denied ADM’s request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Good-faith purchasers are protected by section 363(m) but ADM was not a good-faith purchaser and must defend the state court litigation. ADM had actual notice of the right, in a title report, but did not notify the bankruptcy court; as a non-party, Country Visions could not be expected to appeal the order approving the sale. View "Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Country Visions Cooperative" on Justia Law