Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Depiero v. Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' petition for review of a decision of the Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County under Wyo. R. App. P. 12 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-3-114, holding that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Appellants with dismissal of their petition for review.The district court dismissed Appellants' petition, determining that Wyo. R. App. P. 2.06 required a transcript to be filed within sixty days of the filing of the petition for review of agency action and that no transcript was filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court misstated and misapplied Rule 2.06; (2) the Board failed to transmit the record as required by Rule 12.07; and (3) because the Board, not Appellants, had the responsibility to transmit the entire record to the district court, the court abused its discretion by dismissing the action. View "Depiero v. Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County" on Justia Law
Ehlebracht v. Deuel County Planning Commission
The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Deuel County Board of Adjustment (Board) unanimously approving the application filed by Crowned Ridge Wind II, LLC for a special exception permit (SEP) to construct and operate a wind energy system (WES) in Deuel County, holding that there was no error.In 2004, the Deuel County Board of County Commissioners adopted the Deuel County Zoning Ordinance, which created the Board and authorized it to decide requests for "special exceptions" from zoning standards. In 2018, Crowned Ridge sought an SEP from the Board for the construction and operation of a WES with up to sixty-eight wind turbines to be build on property zoned for agricultural use. The Board granted the SEP, and the circuit court upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance complied with the statuary requirements of S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-17.3, and therefore, the Board acted within its jurisdiction by considering crowned Ridge's application for an SEP; (2) the Board acted within the requirements of the ordinance and S.D. Codified Laws chapter 11-2; and (3) as to Appellants, landowners in Deuel County, the Board did not illegally grant an easement over Appellants' property, nor did the ordinance violate due process. View "Ehlebracht v. Deuel County Planning Commission" on Justia Law
Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown Capital Corp.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of homeowners in this complaint brought against them and their attorneys for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process, holding that the case must be remanded for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.At issue was the proposed development by Bardstown Capital Corporation of Jefferson County residential property into a commercial center. The proposed development was ultimately approved, despite opposition by neighboring homeowners. The homeowners appealed, arguing that the rezoning ordinance was invalid due to, among other things, inadequacy of notice of the various zoning hearings. After the appeal was denied, Bardstown Capital brought this action against the homeowners. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the homeowners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Noerr-Pennington doctrine afforded the homeowners immunity from claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings; and (2) the trial court properly applied the Doerr-Pennington doctrine and, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown Capital Corp." on Justia Law
Cook v. Van Orden
The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review concerned whether a prescriptive easement existed on a road accessing property owned by Shelley and Roger Cook near the Bingham and Bonneville County line. The Cooks’ property was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker, and stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Harker family (including the Cooks) claimed to have used what the parties called “Tower Road” to access their property for as long as the family can remember. Tower Road connected the Cook Property to a county road and ran through property owned by Jay and Shelli Van Orden. The Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens claiming a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ property via Tower Road. The district court ruled in the Van Ordens’ favor, holding that because the Cooks’ longstanding use of the land was not adverse, it did not have to address the remaining elements of a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in finding their family’s use of Tower Road was with implied permission and in not addressing the remaining elements. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting judgment to the Van Ordens without determining the relevant statutory period for determining adverse use. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a determination of the relevant statutory period for the claimed prescriptive easement and whether the evidence established adverse use during that time. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law
Fonzi v. Brown
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's decisions in these two cases consolidated for appeal, holding that owners of the surface rights to land did not comply with the requirements of the Dormant Mineral Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56, in seeking to have mineral interests in that land deemed abandoned.Plaintiffs filed complaints for declaratory judgment and seeking to quiet title, alleging that the surface owners had failed to exercise reasonable due diligence in attempting to locate holders of the mineral interests before commencing the abandonment process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants in both cases. The court of appeals reversed in both cases, ruling that Defendants' searches were unreasonable and that they had failed to comply with the relevant notice requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable diligence in these cases. View "Fonzi v. Brown" on Justia Law
Flores v. Department of Transportation
Appellants sought a petition for writ of mandate and/or injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell them the homes they are renting at the original price paid by Caltrans when it purchased the properties to make way for the 710 Freeway. Under the version of Government Code section 54237.9 effective at the time of the decision in the trial court, the trial court held that Caltrans was permitted to sell the homes at the original price paid by Caltrans adjusted for inflation. In July 2021, while this appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended section 54237.9 by adding a sentence precluding adjustment for inflation.Because this suit seeks a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell the homes at a certain price, and thus prospective relief, the Court of Appeal concluded that California Supreme Court precedent establishes that it must apply the law current at the time of the decision in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court to apply the current version of section 54237.9. Finally, appellants' challenge to the trial court's evidentiary challenge as to Exhibit 7 is moot. View "Flores v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law
Egan Slough Community, Yes! v. Flathead County Board of County Commissioners
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this litigation related to the expansion of an agricultural zoning district through citizen initiative to include the area where Montana Artesian Water Company had been developing a large-scale water bottling plant, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.At issue on appeal was whether Montana Artesian's water bottling facility was a valid nonconforming use under the Egan Slough Zoning District Regulations. Montana Artesian raised numerous issues on cross appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Montana Artesian's motion for summary judgment on the validity of the ballot initiative process; (2) did not err in affirming the conclusion that Montana Artesian's facility was a legal nonconforming use; and (3) did not err in concluding that the initiative was not unconstitutional or illegal reverse spot zoning. View "Egan Slough Community, Yes! v. Flathead County Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law
Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County
Five adjacent Burtonsville, Maryland parcels are restricted from receiving sewer service. Several previous attempts to obtain approval of water and sewer category change requests were unsuccessful. The owners' alternative plan was to sell to a religious organization. They believed that land-use regulations must submit to “[c]hurch use [which] cannot be denied.” They entered into a contract with Canaan, contingent on the approval of the extension of a public sewer line for a new church. Such an extension required amendment of the Comprehensive Ten-Year Water Supply and Sewerage Systems Plan, which involves the Montgomery County Planning Board, the County Executive, the County Council, public hearings, and the Maryland Department of the Environment.Following denial of their requests, the owners sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. The land has been bound by decades of regulations restricting development for both religious and non-religious purposes. The parties were aware of the difficulties in developing the property when they entered into the contract; they could not have a reasonable expectation of religious land use. The restrictions are rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting the region’s watershed. View "Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law
Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC
The Supreme Court held that a homeowners' association (HOA) may not rely on a general amendment power provision in its covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) to place restrictions on landowners' use of their land only as to those restrictions for which the HOA's original declaration has provided sufficient notice.Plaintiff brought this action against Calabria Ranch Estates, a residential subdivision, and other property owners seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate recently amended CC&RS that were voted upon without Plaintiff's consent or knowledge. The superior court invalidated portions of the amended CC&RS. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that all of the amendments were invalid without unanimous consent. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that an HOA cannot create new affirmative obligations where the original declaration did not provide notice to the homeowners that they might be subject to such regulations. View "Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC" on Justia Law
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Arizona Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas
New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law