Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following question: Under Nevada law, must a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 be sued in its own name for a court to obtain jurisdiction over it, or may the master LLC under which the series is created be sued instead? View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Saticoy Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction in an action challenging the Minneapolis City Council's enactment of Ordinance No. 244.2030 under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (and similar provisions of the Minnesota Constitution). The Ordinance requires landlords to evaluate applicants for rental housing by either (1) "inclusive screening criteria" or (2) "individualized assessment."The court concluded that the landlords have neither demonstrated a physical-invasion taking nor a Penn Central taking. The court stated that, due to the individualized assessment option, the Ordinance is a restriction on the landlords' ability to use their property, not a physical-invasion taking. Furthermore, the district court properly ruled that the landlords offered nothing but conclusory assertions of economic impact and interference with investment-backed expectations. Finally, the Ordinance withstands rational basis review where it does not infringe a fundamental right and where the government had a legitimate purpose in ameliorating problems that often prevent people from finding housing. View "301, 712, 2103 and 3151 LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford rejecting a zoning amendment approved by the Zoning Board of the City of Stamford, holding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the petition.Local property owners filed a protest petition opposing the amendment. After determining that the protest petition was valid, the board of representatives considered and rejected the amendment. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to consider whether the petition was valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the protest petition; but (2) the petition was valid because it contained the requisite number of signatures. View "High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court sustaining Plaintiffs' appeal from a determination of the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford approving a protest petition that objected to master plan amendments approved by the Planning Board of the City of Stamford, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs filed an application with the planning board to amend the City of Stamford's master plan. The planning board subsequently filed its own application to amend the city's master plan. The planning board approved both applications with some modifications. After local property owners filed a protest petition the board of representatives determined that the petition was valid and rejected the planning board's approval of the amendments. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs' appeal, holding that even if the board of representatives had the authority to vote on the validity of the protest petition, the vote was not sufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the protest petition was invalid as to Plaintiffs' proposed amendment. View "Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers designed a stormwater diversion system for Pond Creek, which drains into a large watershed in the Louisville area. It included Pond Creek’s tributary, Fishpool Creek, and a nearby basin, Vulcan Quarry. The Corps suggested connecting the two through a spillway. The Corps partnered with Metro Sewer District (MSD). MSD filed an eminent domain action. The court awarded MSD only an easement over the quarry and refused to impose water treatment obligations on the easement. MSD’s stream construction permit from the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet did not require treatment of the water or cleaning up any pollutants.In 2000, the project was completed. South Side bought Vulcan Quarry in 2012 and claimed that MSD had exceeded its easement by diverting all of Fishpool Creek. In 2018, South Side sent MSD notice of its intent to sue for violations of the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) “prohibition on the dumping of pollutants into U.S. waters,” the easement, and Kentucky-issued permits. The district court dismissed certain claims as time-barred and others because the notice failed to identify sewage as a pollutant, provide dates the pollution took place, and describe the source of the pollution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MSD did not need a CWA discharge permit when it built the spillway and does not need one now. The waters of Fishpool Creek and Vulcan Quarry are not meaningfully distinct; the spillway is the kind of water transfer that is exempt from the permitting process. View "South Side Quarry, LLC v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District" on Justia Law

This appeal presented a question of first impression in Mississippi as to whether short-term rentals of private homes through online services such as Airbnb, VRBO, and HomeAway were residential uses of property for the purposes of a restrictive covenant. The trial court’s finding that Clyde Esplin’s use of his property was residential and that short-term rentals were allowed under the covenants was affirmed as was the trial court's finding that the amended bylaws restricting property rentals were invalid. View "Lake Serene Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Esplin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the tax court ruling on certain motions filed by Taxpayer and rejecting Taxpayer's statutory claim that its property was unequally assessed, holding that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motions, and Taxpayer failed to present evidence to support the unequal assessment claim.On appeal, Taxpayer challenged the tax court's denial of its motion to compel Washington County to produce information about other similar properties, its motion to amend the pleadings to add unequal assessment and disparate treatment claims, and its motion to compel the county assessor to testify. Taxpayer further appealed the tax court's rejection of Taxpayer's unequal assessment claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's denial of Taxpayer's motions was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the tax court did not err in rejecting the unequal assessment claim. View "Chambers Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC v. County of Washington" on Justia Law

In this premises-defect case, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus brought by Eagleridge Operating, LLC seeking relief from a trial court order striking its responsible-third-party designation under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that Eagleridge failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.In this action, Eagleridge argued that a former well site owner-operator bore continuing responsibility for injuries caused by a burst gas pipeline because the former owner acted as an independent contractor in constructing, installing, and maintaining the pipeline. The lower courts concluded that Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016), was controlling and that the former owners' responsibility for premises defects did not survive the conveyance of its ownership interest. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that an agreement between tenants in common to allocate expenses, assign responsibilities, and compensate for disparate efforts in a joint endeavor does not create an exception to Occidental as to improvements each party would otherwise have been free to construct without the consent of the other. View "In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligence claim can arise from the condition or use of an improvement even when negligence elsewhere is alleged to have contributed to a plaintiffs' injuries so long as the other statutory requirements are satisfied.Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattels against Defendant, the owner of property upon which Plaintiffs were working to drill a water well. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that there was negligence regarding a condition of the water well Plaintiffs were drilling, and this negligence caused damages. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 95 applied; and (2) the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Defendant proved conclusively that it could not be held liable under Chapter 95 given its lack of control over the work. View "Energen Resources Corp. v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed in part and affirmed in part the interlocutory appeal brought in this negligence action, holding that the district court did not err in denying summary judgment based on the discretionary function exemption and that this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the remainder of this appeal.Plaintiff landowners alleged that an employee of the Sargent Irrigation District (SID), a political subdivision in Custer County, negligently mixed and over applied an herbicide mixture, causing damage to Plaintiffs' corn crop. SID moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims fell within the discretionary function or duty exception to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-901 et seq. The court denied the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying summary judgment based on the discretionary function exemption; and (2) the remainder of SID's assigned errors were not reviewable under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902(1)(d). View "Clark v. Sargent Irrigation District" on Justia Law