Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the Moores sued, claiming that Equitrans breached the parties’ right-of-way agreement and trespassed on the Moores’ land by laying two pipeline segments outside of the area specified in their agreement. A jury found that Equitrans either trespassed on the Moores’ West Virginia property or violated the right-of-way agreement but made no findings as to the proper remedy. While the Moores initially sought equitable relief (ejectment), a subsequent condemnation judgment in favor of Equitrans ultimately precluded such relief. Following several appeals, the district court allowed the Moores to pursue damages for breach-of-contract and trespass but denied leave to add a claim for intentional trespass. Later, the district court barred any claim for breach-of-contract damages. After excluding much of the Moores’ evidence of trespass damages, the court sua sponte entered judgment in favor of Equitrans.The Fourth Circuit vacated in part. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, in making its motion in limine rulings, or in entering judgment in favor of Equitrans on contract damages. The court rejected a contention that the proper measure of trespass damages includes a portion of Equitrans’s profits. Because the Moores lacked sufficient notice that they needed to come forward with all evidence of trespass damages, the court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning trespass damages for procedural error and remanded. View "Moore v. Equitrans, L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a decision of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas and holding that amicus curiae Guernsey County Community Development Corporation (CDC) had violated land transfer restrictions that were included in a deed under the CDC's grant agreement with the Ohio Public Works Commission (OPWC), holding that there was no error.OPWC appealed the trial court's judgment that the deed restrictions did not apply to the subsurface of the property and the trial court's earlier holding denying OPWC's motion for an injunction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the transfer restriction in the deed applied to both the surface and subsurface rights of the property and that OPWC had the authority to seek equitable remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the CDC violated enforceable land transfer restrictions included in the deed and thus violated the terms of CDC's grant agreement with the OPWC; and (2) OPWC was entitled to seek remedies at law and in equity to conserve the land for its intended purpose. View "Siltstone Resources, LLC v. Ohio Public Works Commission" on Justia Law

Canyon Mine is located within the Kaibab National Forest, which has been withdrawn from new mining claims; the withdrawal did not extinguish “valid existing rights.” The Trust challenged the Forest Service’s determination that Energy Fuels holds a valid existing right to operate the uranium mine, alleging that in determining that there were “valuable mineral deposits,” 30 U.S.C. 22, the Service ignored sunk costs. The Ninth Circuit previously held that the Trust had Article III standing.The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. It was not arbitrary for the Service to ignore costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Applying Chevron analysis, the court held that the critical term in the Mining Act, “valuable mineral deposits,” was ambiguous. The Department of the Interior’s interpretation of the Act, in which sunk costs are not considered when determining whether a mine is profitable, was permissible and not manifestly contrary to the Act; it was consistent with the prudent person and marketability tests. It is a basic principle of economics that sunk costs should be ignored when making a rational decision about whether to make further expenditures. It was not arbitrary for the Forest Service to rely on the Department's interpretation. View "Grand Canyon Trust v. Provencio" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the valuation for real property tax purposes of the Lodge at Vail (“the Lodge”), a luxury resort property that included a hotel, privately owned condominiums, and amenities. The Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) fees paid by the condominium owners to a third-party company that managed the rental of their condominiums to overnight guests was intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the actual value of the Lodge under the income approach to valuation; and (2) the net income generated from such fees should have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach. The Supreme Court concluded the net income generated from rentals of the individually and separately owned condominium units was not income generated by the Lodge and therefore should not have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the division below, and did not consider whether the contractual right to net rental management income generated from the condominiums constituted intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. View "Lodge Properties v. Eagle County" on Justia Law

The Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, suffered financial losses in 2008 when the housing market collapsed. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency tasked with regulating the Enterprises, including stepping in as conservator, 12 U.S.C. 4511.With the consent of the Enterprises’ boards of directors, FHFA placed the Enterprises into conservatorship, then negotiated preferred stock purchase agreements (PSPAs) with the Treasury Department to allow the Enterprises to draw up to $100 billion in exchange for senior preferred non-voting stock having quarterly fixed-rate dividends. A “net worth sweep” under the PSPAs replaced the fixed-rate dividend formula with a variable one that required the Enterprises to make quarterly payments equal to their entire net worth, minus a small capital reserve amount, causing the Enterprises to transfer most of their equity to Treasury, leaving no residual value for shareholders.Shareholders challenged the net worth sweep. Barrett, an individual shareholder, separately asserted derivative claims on behalf of the Enterprises. The Claims Court dismissed the shareholders’ direct Fifth Amendment takings and illegal exaction claims for lack of standing; dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the shareholders’ direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of implied-in-fact contract; and found that Barrett had standing to bring his derivative claims, notwithstanding HERA. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of shareholders’ direct claims but concluded that the shareholders’ derivatively pled allegations should also be dismissed. View "Fairholme Funds, Inc. v, United States" on Justia Law

The Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, suffered financial losses in 2008 when the housing market collapsed. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), tasked with regulating the Enterprises, including stepping in as conservator, 12 U.S.C. 4511. FHFA placed the Enterprises into conservatorship, then negotiated preferred stock purchase agreements (PSPAs) with the Treasury Department to allow the Enterprises to draw up to $100 billion in exchange for senior preferred non-voting stock having quarterly fixed-rate dividends. A “net worth sweep” under the PSPAs replaced the fixed-rate dividend formula with a variable one that required the Enterprises to make quarterly payments equal to their entire net worth, minus a small capital reserve amount, causing the Enterprises to transfer most of their equity to Treasury, leaving no residual value for shareholders.In a companion case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of shareholders’ direct claims challenging the net worth sweep and concluded that the shareholders’ derivatively pled allegations should also be dismissed.The Washington Federal Plaintiffs alleged direct takings and illegal exaction claims, predicated on the imposition of the conservatorships, rather than on FHFA's subsequent actions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims. Where Congress mandates the review process for an allegedly unlawful agency action, plaintiffs may not assert a takings claim asserting the agency acted in violation of a statute or regulation. These Plaintiffs also lack standing to assert their substantively derivative claims as direct claims. View "Washington Federal v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dividing the marital property of Husband and Wife, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of marital property.After a bench trial, the district court entered a decree of divorce that resolved credibility issues against Husband and awarded an equalization payment to Wife. Husband appealed, arguing that the property division and equalization payment were unfairly punitive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it disposed of the marital property at issue in this case. View "Morrison v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed Merechka's home, Vigilant denied his insurance claim, which sought $634,000 for the dwelling and $475,500 for its contents. During its investigation, Vigilant discovered that Merechka had filed for bankruptcy about four years earlier. According to his bankruptcy petition, he had around $9,000 in personal property, well short of the more than $600,000 (or $325,825, according to a third-party appraiser) that he reported to Vigilant. Without an explanation for the discrepancy, Vigilant suspected insurance fraud. Merechka assured Vigilant that he had acquired nearly all of his personal property after the bankruptcy using several sources of income: $700 per week he received for working for his brother, a $1,300 monthly social-security payment, and periodic payments from an investment account. The numbers did not add up, so Vigilant denied coverage under the policy’s concealment-or-fraud provision.Merechka sued. Vigilant filed a counterclaim, seeking reimbursement for the nearly $400,000 it had paid to Merechka’s mortgage lender. Applying Arkansas law, the district court determined that neither side owed anything. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and remanded Vigilant’s claim. No reasonable juror could believe that Merechka acquired so much property in such a short time on his modest income; the circumstances indicate that the falsehood was intentional. View "Merechka v. Vigilant Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case involving two separate deeds to property in which successive grantors conveyed the surface rights and part of the mineral interest while retaining part of the oil and gas rights the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Both deeds at osier were executed before 1925 and did not contain words of inheritance. The lower courts concluded that the conveyances created reservations of the oil and gas rights that retained life estates in those rights expiring on the respective deaths of the grantors. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgments in favor of Appellees - Peppertree Farms, LLC and Jay and Amy Moore - and quieting title to the oil and gas rights claimed by Appellants - KOAG, Inc., Richard Reinholtz, and Sylvia Ann Miller. The court further concluded that Miller's and Reinholtz's interests - but not KOAG's - would have been extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.47 et seq. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding words of inheritance were not required to retain more than a life estate in excepted interests in the oil and gas; and (2) summary judgment against KOAG was erroneous. View "Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen" on Justia Law