Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that declaratory relief actions are not categorically exempt from statutes of limitations, that the four-year statute of limitations applies to an action like this one to determine the validity of a lien under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010, and that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the titleholder affirmatively repudiates the lien.In this declaratory relief and quiet title matter arising out of a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as the questions leading to this opinion. The Supreme Court held (1) City of Fernley does not hold that declaratory relief actions are categorically exempt from statutes of limitations; (2) this is a quiet title action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010; (3) the four-year catch-all statute of limitations applies; and (4) the four-year limitations period is not triggered until the titleholder repudiates the lien. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Daniel Rothstein's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Robert Godlove and Theresa Wolfe (together, Appellants) and vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of Rothstein, holding that this case was moot.The trial court interpreted a deed of dedication as permitting Rothstein to extend a paved driveway within an easement running across Appellants' property to Rothstein's property. After Appellants filed a notice of appeal, Rothstein filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court granted the motion and vacated the judgment, holding that there was no longer any live controversy. View "Godlove v. Rothstein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County and Laramie County Assessor Kenneth Guille (collectively, the County) and concluding that the durational residency requirement in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-13-105(a)(vi) is constitutional, holding that there was no error.Section 39-13-105(a)(vi) grants qualified veterans an annual property tax exemption if they have been Wyoming residents for at least three years. Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that the durational residency requirement for the veteran tax exemption is unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 39-13-105(a)(vi) does not infringe on Plaintiff's fundamental right to travel, and therefore, the rational basis test applies; and (2) the statute does not violate either the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or the constitutional right to interstate travel. View "Martin v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Oakland’s Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance, which requires landlords re-taking occupancy of their homes upon the expiration of a lease to pay tenants a relocation payment. Plaintiffs alleged that the relocation fee is an unconstitutional physical taking of their money for a private rather than public purpose, without just compensation. Alternatively, they claimed that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional exaction of their Oakland home and an unconstitutional seizure of their money under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Although in certain circumstances money can be the subject of a physical (per se) taking, the relocation fee required by the Ordinance was a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, not an unconstitutional taking of a specific and identifiable property interest. Because there was no taking, the court did not address whether the relocation fee was required for a public purpose or what just compensation would be. The court rejected an assertion that Oakland placed an unconstitutional condition (an exaction), on their preferred use of their Oakland home. The plaintiffs did not establish a cognizable theory of state action; Oakland did not participate in the monetary exchange between plaintiffs and their tenants. View "Ballinger v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure, holding that the appellate court erred in holding that noncompliance with federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations is a special defense that Defendant must plead and prove and that the case must be remanded for a trial.Defendant executed a mortgage in a mortgage deed that were guaranteed and/or insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and ultimately assigned to Plaintiff. Under the terms of the mortgage deed and note, Plaintiff was not authorized to accelerate payment of the debt or to initiate foreclosure proceedings unless permitted by HUD regulations. After Defendants defaulted on the note and mortgage the trial court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) compliance with applicable HUD regulations is a condition precedent to enforcement of the note and foreclosure of the mortgage and must be pleaded and ultimately proved by the mortgagee; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to require Plaintiff to establish compliance with HUD regulations at trial. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lorson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court ordering a foreclosure by sale as to two parcels of land owned by Defendants and secured by a blanket mortgage given to Plaintiff, holding that there was no error in the trial court's order of foreclosure by sale.The mortgage agreement between the parties contained a remedies provision providing that Plaintiff could seek a foreclosure by sale as to two parcels of land in the events Defendants defaulted on the mortgage. The trial court determined that the remedies provision was not binding on the court but, in its balancing of equities, considered the remedies provision as one factor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a foreclosure by sale. View "Toro Credit Co. v. Zeytoonjian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court remanding this case to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's negligence claim that had previously been the subject of mandatory arbitration in a prior civil action, holding that the appellate court's decision was not in error.Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against Defendant in 2015. Before trial, the parties attended arbitration, and the arbitration found in favor of Defendant. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. Plaintiff then brought the instant action repeating the allegations of negligence in the first action. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata. The appellate court affirmed on different grounds, concluding that action was not viable because the action had been tried on its merits by the arbitrator and had resulted in a judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellate court did not err. View "Larmel v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants' appeal from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton approving an application for a planned development district submitted by Shelter Ridge Associates, LLC, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Appellants' argument on appeal, the zoning authority conferred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-2 supports the creation of planned development districts; (2) the planned development district proposed by Shelter Ridge did not violate the uniformity requirement contained in section 8-2; and (3) the Commission’s decision did not result in an unlawful subdivision. View "Tillman v. Planning & Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the State's complaint seeking the forfeiture of currency the State seized from him, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the State's forfeiture complaint.In his motion to dismiss, Appellant asserted that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the action because the amount of currency seized was less than $50,000. The district court denied the motion, finding that Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1049, the forfeiture statute, vested exclusive jurisdiction in district courts. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) the forfeiture statute does not grant exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture actions to district courts; and (2) district courts have general jurisdiction over civil forfeiture proceedings. View "Orosco v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court concluding that three clinics - Perham Clinic, Ottertail Clinic, and New York Mills Clinic - were not subject to property tax because they clinics were exempt under Minn. Stat. 447.31, subd. 6, holding that there was no error.The exemption at issue is provided for hospital districts. At issue on appeal was whether to classify the three medical clinics that were owned and operated by Perham Hospital District as taxable or exempt. Otter Tail County classified the clinics as commercial and thus subject to property tax, concluding that the tax exemption at issue was available to hospitals and not to clinics. After a trial, the tax court concluded that the clinics were exempt from tax under Minn. Stat. 447.31, subd. 6. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court did not clearly err in finding that the District used the clinics to improve and run Perham Hospital during the tax years at issue. View "Perham Hospital District v. County of Otter Tail" on Justia Law