Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit in 2014, alleging that Little Rock Ranch, which had proceeded to develop and plant an irrigated walnut orchard, was trespassing on 3.44 acres of plaintiffs' property. Although the trial court found that Little Rock Ranch was trespassing by encroachment on plaintiffs' property, the trial court applied the defense of laches and the "relative hardship" doctrine, denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs. The trial court fashioned an alternative equitable remedy: Little Rock Ranch was required to pay damages to plaintiffs and undertake corrective action to limit erosion of the now-excavated hillside, while plaintiffs were required to deed the strip of land at issue to Little Rock Ranch. The trial court also found the trespass by Little Rock Ranch was permanent such that the appropriate measure of damages was "diminution in value" damages, rather than other alternative measures.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that case law supports the trial court's conclusion that Little Rock Ranch's excavation of plaintiffs' hillside and encroachment amounted to a permanent trespass. Furthermore, the court found no error in the trial court's determination that the trespass was permanent and, in turn, to award damages based on the diminution in value of plaintiffs' property absent the 3.44 acres. Finally, there is no merit in plaintiffs' claim that the trial court erred in not awarding additional damages for conversion of dirt excavated from their property. View "Johnson v. Little Rock Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting title in favor of Respondent, the first deed-of-trust beneficiary in this case, holding that the district court properly quieted title in Respondent's favor.A homeowners' association foreclosed its lien on the subject property. The property was eventually transferred to Appellant by deed expressly providing that Appellant's interest was subject to any claims, encumbrances, or liens. U.S. Bank Trust, the assignee of the first deed of trust, sought to quiet title. The district court concluded that Appellant took title to the property subject to U.S. Bank Trust's first deed of trust and that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that U.S. Bank Trust may enforce its deed-of-trust lien in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.210. View "Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust" on Justia Law

Gavora, Inc., a real estate company, acquired an existing long-term lease with a purchase option for a municipality-owned property. Dry-cleaning businesses operating on the property contaminated the groundwater both prior to and during the real estate company’s involvement. The municipality knew about, but did not disclose, groundwater contamination at nearby sites when the real estate company ultimately purchased the property. A state agency later notified Gavora and the municipality of their potential responsibility for environmental remediation. Gavora sued the municipality in federal district court; the federal court determined that the parties were jointly and severally liable for the contamination, and apportioned remediation costs. Gavora also sued the municipality in state court for indemnity and further monetary damages, alleging that the municipality had misrepresented the property’s environmental status during purchase negotiations. The superior court ruled in the municipality’s favor, finding the municipality did not actively deceive Gavora; Gavora had reason to know of the contamination; and all physical harm occurred before the sale. Gavora challenged all three findings. Finding no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Gavora, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks" on Justia Law

In this longstanding property dispute between neighbors, the Court of Chancery held that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prescriptive easement of land owned by Defendant, and entered judgment in favor of Defendant on all counts.This dispute stemmed from the neighbors' shared drainage system and the actions of Defendants that caused drainage problems and flooding on both lots. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant that included four counts all based on Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement theory. After a trial, the Court of Chancery denied relief, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish the necessary elements of a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. View "Jones v. Collison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's entry of summary judgment for First Security Bank (FSB) in its foreclosure action against David and Linsay Buehne, holding that that the Buehnes's challenges on appeal were unavailing.FSB brought this foreclosure action after the Buehnes failed to make payments on the commercial promissory note they executed with FSB. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FSB. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that a specific contractual clause in the note waiving the defense of the statute of limitations in advance was not void as against public policy. View "First Security Bank v. Buehne" on Justia Law

In 2010, Leszanczuk executed a mortgage contract, securing a loan on her Illinois residence. The mortgage was insured by the FHA. After Carrington acquired the mortgage, Leszanczuk contacted Carrington by phone in December 2016 to make her December payment. Leszanczuk asserts that Carrington told her that her account was not yet set up in their system and that her account was in a “grace period.” In early 2017 Carrington found Leszanczuk to be in default and conducted a visual drive-by inspection of Leszanczuk’s property. Carrington charged Leszanczuk $20.00 for the inspection and disclosed the fee in her March 2017 statement. Leszanczuk claims Carrington knew or should have known that she occupied her property because of the phone conversation and Carrington mailed monthly mortgage statements to the property’s address.Leszanczuk sued Carrington for breach of the mortgage contract and for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, on behalf of putative nationwide and Illinois classes. She alleged that a HUD regulation limits the fees Carrington may charge under the contract and that the inspection fee was an unfair practice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The mortgage contract expressly permits the disputed fee. Leszanczuk has failed to adequately allege that the inspection fee offended public policy, was oppressive, or caused substantial injury. View "Leszanczuk v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Carter Community Building Association appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff Carter Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), on CCCI's petition to quiet title to a parcel of property in Lebanon, New Hampshire. Defendant also appealed the denial of its motion to amend its counterclaim to add a claim for declaratory relief. In 1986, CCCI conveyed the property at issue to the Trustee of the Farnum Hill Trust by deed. In December 1986, CCCI conveyed by deed the rights it reserved in the Farnum Hill deed to defendant. In November 1989, the property was conveyed to a private corporation. In September 1990, the corporation brought an action to quiet title, naming as defendants CCCI’s shareholders; defendant moved to intervene. In September 1991, a superior court issued an order declaring that the corporation’s title was “free and clear of all rights or interests” of CCCI’s shareholders, and ordering that any issues pertaining to the defendant’s motion to intervene would be addressed in further proceedings. The litigation settled without resolving the issue before the New Hampshire Supreme Court here, whether defendant had an interest in the property. At some point thereafter, the plaintiff took title to the property. In August 2018, the plaintiff brought an action to quiet title, naming the defendant as a party and claiming that the conveyance of CCCI’s future interest in the property to the defendant was void. The plaintiff’s theory was that the Farnum Hill deed created a right of reentry retained by CCCI, which, the plaintiff contended, was not freely transferable. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s interest in the property, if any, violated the rule against perpetuities and was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that it had an enforceable future interest in the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding that CCCI had an inalienable right of reentry, defendant may have the right to enforce a golf-course restriction as a restrictive covenant. Judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter Country Club, Inc. v. Carter Community Building Association" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Cal. Health & Safety Code 13009 and 13009.1 incorporate the common law theory of respondent superior, and therefore, a corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the cost of suppressing fires that its agents or employees negligently or unlawfully set or allowed to escape.After a 2016 wildfire burned nearly 7,500 acres of land in California, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) determined that the fire had started on the property of Defendant, Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers, Inc., when an employee of Defendant removed a smoldering log from a fireplace in one of Defendant's cabins. CalFire brought suit, seeking recovery of its expenses from Defendant. Defendant demurred, contending that sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not contemplate vicarious liability. The trial court overruled the demurrer. Thereafter, Defendant brought a writ petition challenging the trial court's order. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 13009 and 13009.1 incorporate the common law theory of respondent superior. View "Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court determining that property used for a residential mental health treatment program was tax exempt under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-81(7), holding that the court did not err.The trial court granted the exemption on the residential mental health treatment program on the grounds that it did not provide housing subsidized by the government and that any housing provided was temporary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the trial court properly found that the program's housing was temporary and therefore qualified for the exemption on that basis; and (3) therefore, the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Rainbow Housing Corp. v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory relief challenging attorney fees imposed under a deed of trust, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant purchased certain real property at a homeowners association foreclosure sale, taking the property subject to Respondent's deed of trust, which allowed Respondent to add any reasonable expenses incurred protecting its interest in the property, including attorney fees, to the secured debt. The deed of trust entitled Respondent to add the attorney fees accrued in protecting its interest in the property to the secured debt without filing a motion seeking those fees in court. The district court concluded that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note secured by the deed of trust because Appellant's property was subject to the deed of trust and because Appellant sought to pay off the note secured by the deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and its timing requirements were inapplicable in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note. View "Oella Ridge Trust v. Silver State Schools Credit Union" on Justia Law