Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a judgment debtor may claim the so-called "wildcard exemption" from execution under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(z) to protect up to $10,000 of the debtor's disposable earnings not already excepted by the earnings exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(g), holding that the district court did not err.The district court permitted Appellant to execute on the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings to the extent that those earnings exceeded $10,000 during the 180-day garnishment period. Appellant appealed, challenging Respondent's use of the wildcard exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because earnings qualify as personal property, the plain language of the wildcard exemption permits a debtor to shield from execution up to $10,000 of earnings not otherwise exempted; and (2) the use of the wildcard exemption on nonexempt earnings does not produce absurd results. View "Platte River Insurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Eugene Taszarek, Marlys Taszarek, Trina Schilling, Steven Taszarek, and Michael Taszarek (“Taszareks”) appealed a judgment finding Lakeview Excavating, Inc., was not the alter ego of Brian Welken. Welken was Lakeview Excavating’s president and sole shareholder. While working on certain county projects, Lakeview Excavating’s employees took fieldstones from a nearby property owned by the Taszareks to use for the roads. The Taszareks sued Lakeview Excavating and Welken for intentional trespass, conversion of property, and unjust enrichment. The claims of trespass and conversion were tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in the Taszareks’ favor, finding Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and holding both parties liable for damages. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the district court inadequately instructed the jury on the alter ego doctrine. After a bench trial, the district court found Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and ordered the Taszareks could recover damages from either Welken or Lakeview Excavating. The Supreme Court reversed again, concluding the court’s findings relating to piercing Lakeview Excavating’s corporate veil were inadequate to permit appellate review. On remand, the court held an evidentiary hearing and found Lakeview Excavating was not the alter ego of Welken. The Taszareks argue the district court exceeded the scope of remand by holding an evidentiary hearing instead of specifying findings of fact based on evidence already in the record. Finding no reversible error in last of the district court's alter ego findings, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taszarek, et al. v. Lakeview Excavating, et al." on Justia Law

Jared and Katherine Sommer brought a declaratory judgment claim against Misty Valley, LLC, after receiving written notice that the real estate developer planned to use an express easement across the Sommers’ land for access to a recently platted residential subdivision. The Sommers contended the planned use constituted an impermissible expansion of the scope of the easement, and brought a claim to terminate the easement. After a bench trial, the district court limited the use of the easement to the dominant parcel, which only included part of Misty Valley’s planned subdivision, and declined to terminate it. Misty Valley appealed the district court’s judgment, and the Sommers cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

Edward and Janice Easterling owned three contiguous parcels of real property in Ammon, Idaho. The Easterlings brought suit against Hal Pacific Properties, L.P. (“HAL”), claiming an easement by necessity over and upon HAL’s property in order to access their three merged parcels. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, a motion for reconsideration, and a short bench trial, the district court largely ruled in the Easterlings’ favor. The district court denied HAL’s affirmative defense that the Easterlings’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court further held that the Easterlings were entitled to an easement by necessity over and upon the HAL Parcel to allow access to all three of the Easterlings’ merged parcels. The district court placed the easement at the western border of the HAL Parcel and set its width at twenty-six feet. HAL appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, contending the district court erred by denying its statute of limitations affirmative defense, granting the Easterlings’ claim for an easement by necessity for all three of their parcels, and improperly determining the location and width of the easement. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision at summary judgment rejecting HAL’s statute of limitations defense under Idaho Code section 5-224. Because of this, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed its decisions that the Northern Parcel was entitled to an easement by necessity over the HAL Parcel; and that the width of the easement was set at twenty-six feet. The Supreme Court further reversed the district court’s decisions setting the location of the easement and granting an easement by necessity as to the Southern and Eastern Parcels over the HAL Parcel. The matte was remanded for further proceedings. View "Easterling v. Hal Pacific Properties, L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) and the prosecutor in this case to comply with the twenty-day and forty-five-day statutory deadlines contained in Haw. Rev. Stat. 712A-7 and 712A-9 applicable to the seizure of Petitioner's property required its return to Petitioner.In 2012, HPD seized twenty-seven Product Direct Sweepstakes (PDS) machines from six Winner'z Zone locations for violating Hawaii's gambling statutes. For two years, while the machines remained in police custody, HPD did not initiate foreclosure proceedings, give notice of the seizure of forfeiture to all parties, or provide the prosecutors a written request for forfeiture. In 2014, HPD "re-seized" the PDS machines, and the prosecutor initiated forfeiture proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the agency was required to return the seized property because the agency failed to commence forfeiture proceedings according to the specific timing requirements set forth in sections 712A-7 and 712A-9. View "Kaneshiro v. Eleven Products Direct Sweepstakes Machines" on Justia Law

A congregation of the hierarchical Church of God purchased an insurance policy from GuideOne Specialty Mutual Insurance Company (GuideOne) covering the risk of fire damage to a church building that was held by the congregation, as agent of the greater church, in trust for the benefit of the larger church body. After the local congregation voted to sever its relationship with the Church of God, a regional oversight authority took over as the agent/trustee holding the property on behalf of the greater church, after which the previously affiliated local congregation moved out, and the new agent added the property to its own insurance policy, with Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), covering the same risk. Fire destroyed the building while both policies were in effect. Church Mutual paid the claim. GuideOne denied coverage on the ground that the former local congregation no longer had an insurable interest in the property. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether Church Mutual was entitled to contribution from GuideOne. The trial court concluded the answer was no. While the appellate court disagreed with certain aspects of the trial court’s statement of decision, it concluded the trial court reached the correct result. The Court of Appeal also concluded the trial court correctly determined Church Mutual was not entitled to prevail against GuideOne on a separate subrogation cause of action. View "Church Mutual Ins. Co. v. GuideOne Specialty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that a trial was required as to certain claims.This case arose from a dispute surrounding the purchase of an oceanfront beach house by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs later discovered significant structural damages to the house arising from past water intrusion Plaintiffs brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The trial court reversed in part and remanded the case for a trial on the merits on certain claims, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of negligence and fraud against Re/Max Community Brokers and Robert Carroll; and (2) erred by reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rudd & Associates, Inc., Brooke Rudd-Gaglie, and James Goodman as to Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary claim. View "Cummings v. Carroll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that instructed a receiver to continue its management of agricultural land, in which Appellants, the testator's children, each held fractional life estates along with the testator's surviving spouse, holding that it was too late to attack the receiver's appointment.In 2019, the court appointed a receiver. In 2021, the court provided further instructions to the receiver. Appellants appealed, arguing that the district court appointed a receiver for 2021 without either party requesting the appointment and without deciding that a receiver was needed or necessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the receiver was appointed in 2019, not 2021, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its instructions to the receiver. View "Seid v. Seid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the district court affirming the decision of the Public Information Board that the Polk County Assessor violated the Open Records Act by refusing to disclose a list of property owners who asked that their names be removed from the public name search function on the Assessor's website, holding that a statutory exemption applied.A reporter sought the list at issue, and the Assessor withheld it as exempt from disclosure under Iowa Code 22.7(18). Thereafter, the reporter filed a complaint with the Board, which ordered the Assessor to disclose the list. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the Assessor had the burden to establish that the list was exempt under section 22.7(18); and (2) the Assessor met that burden, showing that the list is confidential, subject to resolution of an open issue. View "Ripperger v. Iowa Public Information Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Public Resources Code section 30610.8 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for each coastal development permit (CDP) applicable to Hollister Ranch. In this case, after the California Coastal Commission denied a CDP request from Jack Wall and the Wall Family Trust to build a pool and spa on their Hollister Ranch property, plaintiffs challenged the Commission's denial in a petition for writ of administrative mandate.The court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the Commission required public access to their property; the trial court correctly concluded that the California Coastal Act of 1976 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for approval of plaintiffs' CDP; and plaintiffs' alternative contention -- that even if the Coastal Act requires them to pay a $5,000 in-lieu public access fee for their CDP, imposing that requirement would be unconstitutional -- is waived. View "Wall v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law