Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court and granting Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees on appeal, holding that the ICA should have limited its appellate attorney's fees.Plaintiffs alleged that their neighbor, Defendant, was in breach of a restrictive covenant contained in the parties' subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions stating that trees and shrubs on every lot shall be maintained at a reasonable height. After a trial, the circuit court ordered Defendant not to maintain any plants on her property at a height not to exceed the roofline of her residence. The court awarded Plaintiffs $40,000 in damages plus attorney's fees. The ICA affirmed and granted Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment in part, holding (1) the ICA should have limited its appellate attorney's fees to twenty-five percent of the damages award Plaintiffs received; and (2) the ICA did not otherwise err. View "Gailliard v. Rawsthorne" on Justia Law

The superior court determined that an unmarried couple lived for a time as domestic partners and, in connection with the dissolution of the domestic partnership, that a residential property one party purchased was intended to be domestic partnership property. The court ordered a 50/50 division of the partnership equity by way of an equalization payment. The property owner appealed both determinations and the resulting equalization payment. In this opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed only the superior court’s property ruling, concluding that the court erred by determining the residential property was intended to be domestic partnership property. "Even assuming Kristy and John’s relationship rose to the level of a domestic partnership, the factors used to determine intent for property to be domestic partnership property do not support an intent to share ownership, and based on the evidence in the record finding an intent to share ownership of the Rose Lane property was clearly erroneous." The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the equalization payment judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McConville v. Otness" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary and declaratory judgment order of the circuit court determining that Frank Bonacci and Brian Bonacci (together, the Bonacci brothers) were the owners of an undivided and unsevered oil and gas estate, holding that there was no error.The circuit court's order found that the Bonacci brothers were the owners of the undivided oil and gas estate at issue because the tax deeds through which Petitioners, two Florida limited liability companies, had allegedly obtained title to the same mineral estate were void. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that the underlying tax deeds were void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax deeds were void and conveyed no interest in the oil and gas estate underlying the surface panel now owned by the Bonacci brothers. View "Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Mills was convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and bribery. These charges were related to a years-long scheme to defraud the United States of monies intended to feed low-income children. The jury found that fourteen properties and monies were traceable to the proceeds of Mills's fraud. Rosie and John Farr, Mills's mother and stepfather, filed third party petitions asserting interests in various properties to be forfeited, including monies from a Southern Bancorp account number. The forfeiture order became final as to Mills when she was sentenced, but it remained preliminary as to the Farrs until the ancillary proceeding concluded. In the two years between the Farrs filing their third party petitions and the government moving for summary judgment, the Farrs failed to present evidence supporting their claims of a superior ownership interest in the Southern Bancorp account.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, on this record, the Farrs failed to prove a prior interest in the property under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(A) because the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is committed, and when they come into existence, the government's interest under the relation-back doctrine immediately vests. Furthermore, the Farrs failed to present evidence that they qualify as bona fide purchasers for value under section 853(n)(6)(B). The court also concluded that excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) does not include ignorance or carelessness on the part of an attorney, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying that general rule in this case. Finally, as in United States v. Waits, it is clear that the Farrs as third parties had adequate notice the government intended to seek forfeiture, as their timely third party petitions confirmed. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering three separate judgment opinions and orders against Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) in this action brought by the United States seeking to recover response costs associated with the cleanup of the Maunabo Area Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site, holding that the district court did not err.The United States brought this action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., against PRIDCO, as a potentially responsible party. PRIDCO owned property on the Site that contained elevated levels of hazardous substances in the groundwater that were found downgradient in a public drinking water well. In its orders against PRIDCO, the district court found, inter alia, that the United States had established its prima facie case against PRIDCO for liability under CERCLA and that PRIDCO was liable for $5.5 million in past response costs and would be liable for additional response costs reasonably incurred by the United States. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the entry of summary judgment and award of response costs was not error. View "United States v. Puerto Rico Industrial Development Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of the Bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In this case, the district court concluded that plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue the Bank for violating the timely recordation requirements imposed by New York State's mortgage-satisfaction-recording statutes and certified the question for interlocutory appeal. The court held, however, that plaintiffs' allegations fail to support their Article III standing, and that they may not pursue their claims for the statutory penalties imposed by the New York Legislature in federal court. In this case, plaintiffs have not suffered a concrete harm due to the Bank's violation. View "Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

The People filed suit against Venice Suites for violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) and for public nuisance, among other causes of action, alleging that Venice Suites illegally operates a hotel or transient occupancy residential structure (TORS).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary adjudication in favor of Venice Suites. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the People did not raise the issue of permissive zoning in their briefing but the court exercised its discretion to consider the issue on its merits. On the merits, the court concluded that the LAMC did not prohibit the length of occupancy of an apartment house in an R3 zone. Furthermore, the court concluded that the permissive zoning scheme does not apply to the length of occupancy, and the Rent Stabilization Ordinance and Transient Occupancy Tax Ordinance do not regulate the use of an apartment house. View "People v. Venice Suites, LLC" on Justia Law

The Union Pacific Railroad charged Heber Rentals, LC (“Heber”) and L.K.L. Associates, Inc. (“L.K.L.”) rent under a lease that allowed L.K.L. to continue operating a building materials supply business on land that was owned in fee by Heber—and leased to L.K.L.—but encumbered by Union Pacific’s right of way. After the Supreme Court stated in 2014 that railroad rights of way like Union Pacific’s were “nonpossessory” easements, L.K.L. and Heber stopped paying rent and filed suit against Union Pacific. In addition to requesting declaratory relief, L.K.L. and Heber sought to have their leases rescinded and to receive restitution for rent already paid. Union Pacific brought counterclaims arising out of their nonpayment. On summary judgment, the district court held that Union Pacific’s easement, while nonpossessory, gave it exclusive use and possession rights “insofar as Union Pacific elected to use the land subject to its easement for a railroad purpose.” Although it found that the lease agreements served no railroad purpose, it denied the rescission claim as “untimely and redundant.” In a follow-up order, it ruled that L.K.L. and Heber had abandoned their remaining claims. The district court also rejected all of Union Pacific’s counterclaims. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Union Pacific that its right of way included the unqualified right to exclude L.K.L. and Heber, but the Court agreed with L.K.L. and Heber that their leases were invalid. “Even if the incidental use doctrine applies, neither the leases nor the underlying business conduct furthered a railroad purpose, as the easement requires.” The Court: reversed the district court’s declaratory judgment rulings to the extent they are inconsistent with the Court’s opinion; affirmed the district court’s ruling that the rescission claim was time-barred; affirmed the district court’s rejection of Union Pacific’s counterclaim for breach of contract; reversed its rejection of Union Pacific’s other substantive counterclaims; and reversed the district court’s finding of abandonment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "LKL Associates, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final decree of the superior court foreclosing Respondent's right of reception for property sold at a tax sale, holding that there was no error.Petitioner purchased the property at issue in this case at a tax sale. More than one year after the tax sale and the recording of the deed, Petitioner filed a petition seeking to foreclose Respondent's right of redemption. The superior court held a hearing on the petition and determined that Respondent was in default and that Petitioner was entitled to its requested relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent waived all of the arguments that he raised on appeal. View "E.T. Investments, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court reversed two judgments of the superior court entered in favor of Petitioners, a group of taxpayers who challenged the City of Providence's tax assessments on their properties for tax years 2014 and 2015, holding that the trial justice erred.The trial justice ruled that a revaluation conducted in 2013 of property values was illegal and invalid and that the tax bills for the relevant tax years shall be revised based on the 2012 revaluation. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Petitioners in excess of $1.5 million. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial justice improperly weighed the evidence and erred as a matter of law in finding that the 2013 revaluation was illegal, invalid, selective, arbitrary, and discriminatory. View "Athena Providence Place v. Pare" on Justia Law