Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cathy Mixon sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT,” or “the State”), claiming nuisance and inverse condemnation based on alleged flooding on her property following a road-widening project. Mixon claimed GDOT’s failure to maintain its storm water drainage systems resulted in regular flooding, drainage, and erosion problems “within and around” her property. Her complaint sought “just and adequate compensation” for the alleged taking, other money damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction “to prevent future nuisance and continual trespass[.]” GDOT moved to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. In particular, the trial court dismissed any claims arising from professional negligence (due to the lack of an expert affidavit, as required by OCGA 9-11-9.1) and any claims arising more than four years prior to the filing of the complaint (due to the applicable statute of limitations). The trial court otherwise denied GDOT’s motion. Among other things, the trial court rejected GDOT’s argument that sovereign immunity barred Mixon’s claims. The Court of Appeals granted GDOT’s application for interlocutory appeal and then affirmed, holding in relevant part that the trial court did not err in ruling that sovereign immunity is waived for Mixon’s claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed: because Mixon’s claim for injunctive relief ... fell into at least one of the two categories of situations in which the Just Compensation Provision acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief. View "Dept. of Transportation v. Mixon" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of an adversary action filed in a Chapter 11 proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court allowing the debtor to avoid a mortgage, holding that there was no error in the bankruptcy court's judgment.After Debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Debtor commenced an adversary proceeding against U.S. Back seeking to "avoid" the mortgage because her name was missing from the certificate of acknowledgment. The district court granted Debtor's motion. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted for Debtor because the omission of Debtor's name from the certificate of acknowledgment was a material defect under Massachusetts law. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Desmond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writs of prohibition and mandamus sought by Relators to order Respondent, the Union County Board of Elections, to remove a zoning referendum from the November 2, 2021 general-election ballot, holding that Relators' arguments were unavailing.This case concerned the proposed rezoning of approximately 139 acres of property in Plain City, Union County, and Relators in this action owned the property, which was zoned rural residential. When the board of trustees voted to rezone the property to a planned-development district, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition containing a summary of the zoning amendment. The board of elections certified the petition to be placed on the November 2 election ballot. Relators then filed a protest to the referendum petition, contending that it failed to satisfy the "brief summary" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). The board voted to deny the protest and allow the referendum to appear on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied Relators' writs, holding that Relators did not show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in denying their protest. View "State ex rel. T-Bill Development Co. v. Union County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Pemberton Park Community Association (Association) on its complaint against Li for violations of several restrictive covenants found in the "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Pemberton Park" (the Covenants) holding that the court of appeals erred.On appeal, Appellant argued that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant failed to preserve for appeal her argument that the Association's enforcement of the Covenants was "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory," in violation of Tex. Prop. Code 202.004(a). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Appellant preserved her argument for appeal. View "Li v. Pemberton Park Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

Jessica Petersen and Charles Johnson began living together while Petersen was attending college in Georgia. Although Johnson worked as a mechanic, the couple’s lifestyle was funded almost entirely by a trust created for Petersen’s benefit by her grandfather. In 2000 they returned to Louisiana and purchased a house and surrounding acreage in Ouachita Parish. The act of sale expressly conveyed ownership of the property to Johnson and Petersen, both of whom signed the deed before a notary public and two witnesses. The purchase price was paid in full at closing with funds from Petersen’s trust. Shortly thereafter Petersen and Johnson acquired additional acreage adjacent to the original tract. This second act of sale also conveyed ownership of the property to Johnson and Petersen, and both signed the deed before a notary public and two witnesses. The purchase price for this parcel was paid with funds loaned to Petersen by her mother. At the time of the purchases, Petersen and Johnson were not married. They married soon afterward, had the first of three children, and began a life in their new home. Their relationship ended in divorce in 2006. Petersen was granted exclusive use of the home in the divorce proceeding and remained there until moving out of town and eventually out of state. A prospective buyer offered to purchase the property, but Johnson would not agree to the sale. In 2017 Johnson moved back into the house with his current wife and their children. In 2018 Petersen sold an undivided one-half interest in the property to Fairbanks Development, LLC., which then instituted this proceeding to partition the property, naming both Petersen and Johnson as defendants. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was which of the following determines one’s status as a co-owner of immovable property: the authentic act conveying ownership of the property, or the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price. The Court found the authentic act controlled. View "Fairbanks Development, LLC v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law

The City of Gulf Shores ("the City") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss tort claims brought against the City. The City contended the claims were barred by the recreational-use statutes found at 35-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. In June 2018, Sophia Paulinelli (minor) was injured while walking on a wooden boardwalk owned by the City. The boardwalk ran over beach property and allowed pedestrians to access the public beach. In addition to owning the boardwalk, the City owned the beach property on which the boardwalk sat. Sophia was walking on the boardwalk behind a man when the man stepped on a board, causing the board to spring up from the boardwalk. The dislodged board had a screw protruding from it, and the board and screw fell on Sophia's foot, impaling the screw in her big toe. In May 2019, Sophia's father, Ronald Paulinelli, sued the City and fictitiously named defendants claiming negligence and wantonness. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to immunity under the recreational-use statues. Two precedential cases were central to Ronald's argument the City was not entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court found nothing in the record that the City ever presented to the circuit court the arguments that it presented to the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of those decisions. Accordingly, the Court did not consider those arguments, and denied the City's petition. The Court expressed no opinion regarding the merits of Ronald's claims; rather the Court's decision was based on the City's failure to preserve key arguments before the circuit court. View "Ex parte City of Gulf Shores." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Security State Bank (SSB) and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint asserting a first priority equitable lien on certain ranch property, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff loaned his friends, the Waymans, $100,000 to make a down payment on a ranch. After the Waymans defaulted on their mortgage the lender, SSB, sold the property at a foreclosure sale. In an effort to recover the $100,000 down payment, Plaintiff sued SSB, asserting a first priority equitable lien on the ranch property. The district court granted summary judgment for SSB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously convert SSB's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment; and (2) did not err when it determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding SSB's superior priority mortgage on the ranch property. View "Martin v. Security State Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Galvanizers, Inc., and K and K Construction and Repair, Inc., appealed the dismissal of their action against Paul Kautzman seeking to quiet title to real property. Plaintiffs argued the district court erred in dismissing their quiet title action and failed to make sufficient findings to understand the evidentiary and theoretical basis for its decision. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the court’s findings were sufficient to support its decision dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. View "Galvanizers, et al. v. Kautzman, et al." on Justia Law

This action concerned a piece of property in Rancho Mirage. At one time, the owners of record were Val Janelunas and his father, Joseph Janelunas, as joint tenants; however, Joseph died, leaving Val as sole owner. Thereafter, Val died. Plaintiff Douglas Humphrey asserted a claim to the property; he filed this action to quiet title to it, and he filed a lis pendens. He served process by publication. None of the named defendants (including Val Janelunas’s heirs) responded. At Humphrey’s request, the trial court entered their default. Thereafter, Peter Bewley became the administrator of Val Janelunas’s estate. He filed a motion to intervene, so he could move to expunge the lis pendens. In response, Humphrey withdrew the lis pendens; the trial court then denied the motion to intervene as moot. Bewley proceeded to sell the property. Humphrey filed a request for a prove-up hearing and a default judgment, to which Bewley objectied. The trial court, on its own motion, quashed the service by publication and vacated the default. Humphrey appealed, contending: (1) service by publication was proper, therefore the trial court erred in quashing service, vacating the default and failing to hold a prove-up hearing; (2) the trial court should not have quashed service as to Val Janelunas’ heirs because Bewley made a general appearance; and (3) the trial court erred in setting aside the default on its own motion because Bewley’s request to have to set aside was untimely. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held the trial court’s order granting the motion to quash was appealable, and in such an appeal the Court could also review its order vacating the default. The Court also held Humphrey did not properly effect service by publication because the notices that he published specified the property only by assessor’s parcel number (APN) and not by either legal description or street address. However, the Court held Bewley made a general appearance. Accordingly, the trial court erred by quashing service on Bewley, but not by quashing service on other parties who had not appeared nor by vacating the default. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected all other contentions raised. View "Humphrey v. Bewley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Lease Option Solution, LLC's (LOS) motion for summary judgment on lien property and entering judgment in favor of ACI Construction, LLC on its unjust enrichment claim, holding that the district court did not err.ACI filed this action for lien foreclosure, naming as defendants all parties with liens or interest in the property and alleging, as relevant to this appeal, unjust enrichment against LOS. LOS sought summary judgment regarding priority of liens on certain property. The district court granted summary judgment to LOS on the issue of lien priority and entered judgment for ACI on its unjust enrichment claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its determination of lien priority; and (2) did not err by determining that ACI was entitled to recover under the theory that LOS was unjustly enriched. View "A.C.I. Construction, LLC v. Elevated Property Investments, LLC" on Justia Law