Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Spencer sued Sheriff Benison under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Benison violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by ordering him to remove cones and vehicles that were preventing Spencer’s neighbor from completing construction that Spencer claimed encroached on his property. The district court found that Benison acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority and was not entitled to qualified immunity on Spencer’s individual capacity claims and that Spencer had presented adequate evidence of a constitutional violation to sustain his section 1983 claims against Benison in both his individual and official capacities.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Benison was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles. It was a legitimate job-related function for Benison, an Alabama sheriff, to seek the removal of cones and vehicles for the purposes of achieving public safety, given that traffic was backing up and customers were unable to access a business. Benison properly carried out his duties by verbally commanding Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles and by threatening arrest should he fail to comply. Spencer failed to present adequate evidence of a constitutional violation; he did not demonstrate that Benison’s actions caused him to be deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest. View "Spencer v. Benison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Main St Properties LLC's (MSP) "Petition to Appeal Assessment of Bellevue Board of Equalization" for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 19-2422 authorized MSP's appeal of the resolution that levied a special assessment and placed a lien on MSP's property.MSP sought to appeal a City of Bellevue resolution that placed liens on property owned by MSP so as to collect costs that had been assessed for the demolition and removal of a structure on the property. In its petition, MSP argued that the resolution levied a "special assessment" pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-1722 and attempted its appeal under section 19-2422. The district court dismissed the appeal, determining that no special assessment was imposed and, therefore, section 19-2422 did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the City's resolution levied a special assessment against MSP under the authority of section 18-1722; and (2) therefore, section 19-2422 authorized MSP's appeal of the resolution. View "Main St Properties LLC v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Champir, LLC (Champir), Daniel Javaheri, and Shiva Dehghani sued the Fairbanks Ranch Association (the Association) to enforce the recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of their planned development community. Upon resolution of the litigation, both parties sought an award of attorney fees and costs as the “prevailing party” under Civil Code section 5975(c). The trial court determined Plaintiffs were the prevailing party and entered judgment for Plaintiffs with an award of $112,340 in attorney fees, plus costs of suit. The Association appealed, asserting the court should have determined that it was the prevailing party in the litigation. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of possession rendered in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the trial court properly rejected Defendants' claim that the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture should have operated to prevent their eviction in a summary process action for nonpayment of rent under the terms of a commercial lease.After Defendants failed to pay rent, Plaintiffs served a notice to quit on Defendants, thereby terminating the parties' lease. Because Defendants did not subsequently vacate the premises Plaintiffs initiated this summary process action. In response, Defendants raised special defenses, including the special defense of equitable nonforfeiture. The trial court rendered judgment of possession for Plaintiffs. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Defendants equitable relief from forfeiture and granting possession of the premises to Plaintiffs. View "Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's declaratory judgment concluding that Homeowners' amended restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a commercial driving range on a lot within a residential subdivision and that a restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner applied for zoning variances and exceptions from the Talbot County Board of Appeals to modify the boundaries of the sixth of five lots in the Swan Point Subdivision and to construct a driving range. Respondents, property owners in Swan Point, opposed the variance and amended the restrictive covenant specifically to prohibit a driving range on any lot within Swan Point. The Board granted the zoning variance for Petitioner. After the circuit court affirmed, Respondents brought this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court declared that Respondents' restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a driving range on the lot at issue and that the original Swan Point restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court reached the correct result. View "RDC Melanie Drive v. Eppard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda and Dwayne Struiksma lost title to their home in a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at the sale then brought an unlawful detainer action against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a(b)(3). A default judgment was issued, and plaintiffs were evicted from their property. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendants HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (collectively, defendants), their lender and loan servicer, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer action. Generally, they alleged defendants carelessly failed to credit several payments to their loan balance. Thus, plaintiffs contended they were never in default and defendants wrongfully foreclosed on the property. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the complaint, finding all of plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by the unlawful detainer judgment except for a claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which was defective for other reasons. Plaintiffs were denied leave to amend on all claims and appealed the resulting judgment. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in ruling plaintiffs’ claims were precluded, and published this case to clarify the preclusive effect of an unlawful detainer action under section 1161a. Defendants also argued certain claims the trial court found precluded failed for reasons other than preclusion. Given its ruling, the court had no opportunity to consider these arguments. So, this case was remanded for the trial court to consider them in the first instance. As to the TILA claim, the Court held it suffered from several defects, and the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to this claim without leave to amend. View "Struiksma v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (CARES Act), among other things, imposed a 120-day moratorium on evictions for rental properties receiving federal assistance. The CDC then issued a temporary eviction moratorium on September 4, 2020, that suspended the execution of eviction orders for nonpayment of rent. Before the CDC's order was originally set to expire on December 31, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which extended the CDC's order through January 31, 2021. The CDC's order was then extended again through March 31, 2021, and again through June 30, 2021, and again through July 31, 2021.Plaintiffs, several landlords seeking to evict their tenants for nonpayment of rent and a trade association for owners and managers of rental housing, filed suit alleging that the CDC's orders exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their constitutional right to access the courts.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to show an irreparable injury. The court declined to find that the CDC's order is unconstitutional, and failed to see how the temporary inability to reclaim rental properties constitutes an irreparable harm. Furthermore, the court explained that, without any information about a tenant’s financial or employment picture, the court has no way to evaluate whether she will ever be able to repay her landlord; to decide otherwise based solely on the CDC declaration would be to conclude that no one who signed the declaration is likely to repay their debts after the moratorium expires. Given the lack of evidence and the availability of substantial collection tools, the court could not conclude that the landlords have met their burden of showing that an irreparable injury is likely. View "Brown v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court holding that the Secret Gulch Road Easement was an easement in gross, vacating Plaintiffs' temporary restraining order, denying Plaintiffs injunctive relief, and awarding Defendants costs and attorney's fees, holding that the Secret Gulch Road Easement was appurtenant.Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a preliminary injunction order against Defendant. The district court denied the request, holding that the Secret Gulch Road Easement was in gross rather than appurtenant. The order awarded costs, damages and attorney's fees to Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its determination that the Secret Gulch Road Easement was in gross because the easement was appurtenant; and (2) as such, Plaintiffs had the right to utilize the Secret Gulch Road Easement. View "Wilkinson, LLC v. Erler" on Justia Law

In this road dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Seiben Ranch Company, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Lyons Creek Road, traversing northwesterly beyond the gate installed by Sieben Ranch, was private.Sieben Ranch filed for declaratory and injunctive relief asserting that Defendants had no legal access over Sieben Ranch property via Lyons Creek Road. The district court granted summary judgment for Sieben Ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Lyons Creek Road was a public highway up until Sieben Ranch's gate and properly granted summary judgment to Sieben Ranch; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that Defendants did not have an express easement to access Sieben Ranch's property. View "Sieben Ranch Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

RLR owns land on the Little Pigeon River. Tract 1 had a private resort and parking spaces. Tract 2 had a duplex building. The city decided to build a pedestrian walkway along the River, going through both tracts, and filed a petition for condemnation of a permanent easement. The easement would make some of the parking spaces on Tract 1 unusable. The petition also sought temporary construction easements, including one on which the city would construct Tract 2 parking spaces to replace those lost on Tract 1. RLR argued that the compensation for the loss of the spaces was too low and that the plan of building parking spaces on Tract 2 was a private, rather than public, purpose. The court ruled in favor of the city, which took possession of the land and built the walkway, but never built the parking spots. Before valuation proceedings, RLR filed suit in federal court, alleging an unlawful taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the source of RLR’s injury was the state court’s order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court’s 2005 Exxon decision abrogated Sixth Circuit precedent applying Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders. The state-court order of possession counts as a judgment under Rooker-Feldman. View "RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge" on Justia Law