Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the superior court affirming the judgment of the district court entered in the Business and Consumer Docket in favor of Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017 LLC and dismissing the action brought by 20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC (collectively, 20 Thames) for forcible entry and detainer (FED), holding that the district court erred.In granting Ocean State's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that 20 Thames's complaint for FED was barred by the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. The superior court affirmed. On appeal, 20 Thames argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the action on claim preclusion grounds because one claim was not and could not have been litigated in an earlier action. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) claim preclusion did not apply; and (2) where it was impossible to discern definitively what was litigated and decided in the earlier action, issue preclusion should not foreclose an inquiry into the merits. View "20 Thames Street LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017 LLC" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure case, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal failing to follow precedent and concluding that the term "Borrower" means something different than both the mortgage and the note define it to mean, holding that the court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's denial of foreclosure.Petitioner's predecessor sought to foreclose on a mortgage that secured the loan. Respondents, Luisa Palmero and her children, defended against the foreclosure action by arguing that Luisa was not a co-borrower under the mortgage. The trial court ruled that Luisa was not a co-borrower but denied foreclosure based on a federal statute. The Third District held that the trial court erred by relying on the federal statute to deny foreclosure and ruled that, as a matter of law, the mortgage unambiguously defined Luisa as a "Borrower." Thus, the Third District affirmed the denial of foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Third District erred in affirming the trial court's denial of foreclosure on the ground that, as a matter of law, Luisa was a surviving co-borrower. View "WVMF Funding v. Palmero" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the trial court incorrectly determined that Defendant was relieved of its duty to defend in the underlying property dispute.Plaintiff contracted with New Beginnings Residential Renovations, LLC to renovate Plaintiff's house. The house received extensive physical damage during the renovation, and Plaintiff brought an action against New Beginnings for property damage. New Beginnings tendered defense of the case to Defendant pursuant to a commercial general liability insurance policy. Defendant declined to defend under two of the policy's "business risk" exclusions. Plaintiff was awarded a default judgment against New Beginnings. Plaintiff then brought this action against Defendant under the direct action statute seeking recovery for the judgment against New Beginnings. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the policy exclusions precluded coverage. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the exclusions did not relieve Defendant of its duty to defend. View "Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America Assurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court finding in favor of Landlord against all of defendants except two on Landlord's suit against two tenants and seven other parties for fraudulent and voluntary conveyances and against a single defendant for conversion, holding that the trial court misapplied Virginia law and made factually insupportable findings.In its letter opinion, the trial court made each of the defendants which the court had found liable jointly and severally liable with in personam judgments for the unpaid rent, Landlord's attorney fees, and sanctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's in personal, joint and several judgments in this case must be reversed as legally erroneous and factually insupportable; and (2) the trial court erred in finding the single defendant liable for conversion. View "Grayson v. Westwood Buildings L.P." on Justia Law

This appeal relates to TOT Holdings' execution of a deed that donated to Foothills Land Conservancy, a conservation easement encumbering nearly all its property. The IRS disallowed the deduction claimed by the taxpayer, and the Tax Court upheld that decision because the deed conveying the easement contained a formula for the distribution of proceeds that did not comply with the extinguishment proceeds requirement and the deed was not saved by purported interpretive provisions. The taxpayer appealed.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Tax Court correctly determined that the taxpayer did not comply with the extinguishment proceeds requirement and that the deed was not saved by the disputed provisions because they constitute an unenforceable condition-subsequent savings clause. The court also held that the Tax Court did not commit reversible error in approving the penalties assessed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "TOT Property Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A California regulation mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Union organizers sought access to property owned by two California growers, who sought to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking and the growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the government, rather than appropriating private property for itself or a third party, imposes regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property, courts generally determine whether a taking has occurred by applying the “Penn Central” factors. When the government physically appropriates property, the flexible Penn Central analysis has no place. California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is “a fundamental element of the property right.” The duration of a physical appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due. The California regulation is not transformed from a physical taking into a use restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organizers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time.The Court distinguished restrictions on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals on the premises; isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access; and requirements that property owners cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits. Government inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action challenging New York City's Third Party Transfer (TPT) Program, through which the City initiates in rem foreclosure proceedings against tax-delinquent properties and, following a foreclosure judgment, transfers ownership of the properties to third party partners who develop and manage the properties. Plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional and state law claims stemming from the transfer of their properties through the TPT. The district court dismissed the complaint.The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; the TIA is not directly applicable to plaintiffs' claims and the district court exceeded its discretion in concluding that comity bars their claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims, or their second takings claim – that their property was taken for a public purpose without just compensation – to the extent that for each of those claims, they seek only the value of their lost property in excess of the amount owed in taxes. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. View "Dorce v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment order entered by the district court in favor of Old Public National Title Insurance Company and Security Title and Abstract Company (collectively, Defendants) upon the parties' stipulated "threshold legal issue" regarding Defendants' duty to Plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not err.At issue was whether Defendants owed a legal duty arising out of their issuance of a preliminary title commitment. Plaintiffs filed this action alleging negligence, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation on the part of Defendants when conducting a title examination. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were foreclosed because the statutes governing the issuance of a title insurance policy did not impose a duty with respect to an offer of title insurance in a preliminary commitment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims could not be sustained. View "Phipps v. Old Republic National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1994, SGV bought 547 acres in Alabaster for $1.65 million. The master development plan, approved in 1995, zoned the land as R-2 (90-foot wide single-family residences), R-4 (60-foot wide garden homes), and R-7 (townhomes). Most of the development was completed by 2008, except the 142-acre Sector 16, zoned predominantly for R-4 and R-7 with a small part as R-2. In 2011, the city rezoned Sector 16 for R-2 lots only. SGV filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and 1988, alleging that the rezoning “constitute[d] an unlawful taking” without just compensation and denials of procedural and substantive due process. The court rejected the due process claims. The city objected to evidence of the city’s motive and the “lot method” valuation and argued that the case was not ripe for adjudication, since SGV had not sought variances. The court found that a zoning ordinance was a final matter that could be adjudicated. A jury found that there was a regulatory taking without just compensation; that before the taking, the value of the property was $3,532,849.19; and after the taking, the value of the property was $500,000. The court added prejudgment interest and entered a final judgment of $3,505,030.65. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the just compensation claim was not ripe, that the district court improperly allowed evidence regarding the city’s motivation for enacting th ordinance, and concerning the admission and exclusion of certain other evidence. View "South Grand View Development Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the admissibility and evidentiary weight of documents and declarations in a foreclosure proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment and order of the circuit court granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and for interlocutory decree of foreclosure, holding that promissory notes are not hearsay.Plaintiff, U.S. Bank, brought this foreclosure action. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, but the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded the case. At issue on remand was whether U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note when it filed its complaint. The circuit court concluded that U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note at the time it brought suit. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment, concluding that U.S. Bank lacked standing because it had not established it possessed the promissory note at the time it filed the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) promissory notes are not hearsay; (2) copies of promissory notes are not self-authenticating under Haw. R. Evid. 902(9); (3) under the incorporated records doctrine, business records may be admissible even absent testimony concerning the business practices or records of their creator; and (4) U.S. Bank was entitled to summary judgment. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Verhagen" on Justia Law